CASSANDRA IN OZ

Counterinsurgency and Future War

CONRAD C. CRANE

CASSANDRA IN OZ

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The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the positions of the U.S. Army War College, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

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To 1st Lt. David Bernstein and
the thousands of other Americans who
gave their last full measure of devotion
in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I hope we do better next time.

And there will be a next time.

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NATO Partnership for Peace Consortium COIN Curriculum Working Group

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Hanoi museum billboard from 2002 proclaiming victory in “Dien Bien Phu of the air” against American B-52s

ABBREVIATIONS

AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
BCT	brigade combat team
BCTC	Battle Command Training Center
BPC	Baghdad Police College
CAC	Combined Arms Center
CCO	Consortium for Complex Operations
CADD	Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate
CDC	Combat Development Command
CENTOM	U.S. Central Command
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Component Commander
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CJTF-7	Combined Joint Task Force 7
CLC	Concerned Local Citizens
COIN	counterinsurgency

CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CS	combat support
CSL	Center for Strategic Leadership
CSS	combat service support
DART	detention, assessment, rehabilitation, and transition
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID	foreign internal defense
FM	field manual
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
GOI	government of Iraq
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HTT	human terrain team
IED	improvised explosive device
INP	Iraqi National Police
INSS	Institute of National Security Studies
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISF	Iraqi security forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JAM	Jaysh al-Mahdi [Sadr Shi‘a Militia]
JP	joint publication
LAOTF	Law and Order Task Force
LLO	logical lines of operations
LOE	lines of effort

MEF	Marine expeditionary force
MCO	major combat operation
MNC-I	Multinational Corps–Iraq
MND	multinational division
MND-B	Multinational Division–Baghdad
MND-C	Multinational Division–Center
MND-N	Multinational Division–North
MND-SE	Multinational Division–Southeast
MNF-I	Multinational Force–Iraq
MNF-W	Multinational Force–West
MNSTC-I	Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq
MPRI	Military Professional Resources Incorporated
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defense University
NESA	Near East South Asia (Center for Strategic Studies)
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
ORA	Operational Readiness Assessment
ORHA	Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
PST	provincial support team
RC	Reserve Component
S/CRS	State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SNA	social network analysis
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	special operations forces

SSC	smaller-scale contingency
SSI	Strategic Studies Institute
SSR	security sector reform
TF	task force
USA	U.S. Army
USAF	U.S. Air Force
USAIC	U.S. Army Intelligence Center
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USN	U.S. Navy
UW	unconventional warfare

INTRODUCTION

It was a glorious spring day in the Hudson Valley in 2000. I was approaching the end of my twenty-six-year military career, the last nine as professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. Teaching military history to the finest young men and women the nation has to offer had been my ideal job; I felt I was making a difference every day. But life is rarely ideal for that long, and I was approaching mandatory retirement as a lieutenant colonel. When I had signed up to be an Academy professor a decade earlier, promotion to colonel had been guaranteed. While the Army never lies to you, its truth does sometimes change, and now, under different rules, I had to compete with peers who had commanded battalions in the Balkans and held key staff positions in Washington. Former holders of those arduous positions were rightly seen as more deserving of promotion than I was, so I was reconciled to a new career as a civilian research professor at the Army War College.

But before I moved on, I was determined to take advantage one last time of one of the special privileges available to soldiers stationed at West Point: the renting of one of the superintendent's small excursion boats for a few hours' cruise up and down the Hudson. I invited some of my family to accompany me, and my niece Sarah asked me to contact the valedictorian from her 1997 high school class in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, David Bernstein. David, almost ready to enter his senior, or "Firstie," year as a member of the West Point class of 2001, graciously consented to join us.

I had seen Cadet Bernstein around the USMA campus but had never before dealt with him directly. He was everything the nation expects of

West Pointers. A swimmer apparently constructed of the same granite as the hills surrounding the military reservation, he exuded charisma, confidence, and competence. Not only was he an accomplished athlete, but he was also excelling academically. He joked that it appeared he was destined to rank fifth in his class but that only the top four received special awards. He fit very smoothly into our family gathering, catching up on old times with Sarah, but he was obviously ready for the challenges the future held for him. When he left us, I was sure he was destined for great accomplishments, and I must admit I felt a bit of pride to be part of an institution that produced such men.

2003

It was 18 October 2003, near Taza, Iraq. The 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), had parachuted into northern Iraq from Italy back in March as part of an assault force from the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Its objectives had been to secure an air base and oil facilities around Kirkuk and to create a northern flank for operations to bring down Saddam Hussein. Those missions had been accomplished, but now the soldiers faced a different threat, as a growing insurgency threatened stability throughout Iraq. David Bernstein had completed tough Airborne and Ranger schools, commanded a platoon, been promoted to first lieutenant, and been named executive officer of Company C. He was always so physically fit and well prepared that his soldiers and superior officers nicknamed him “Super Dave,” though he possessed all of the skills and attributes that television character lacked.

Today his company’s position was receiving rocket fire from a town south of Kirkuk. First Lieutenant Bernstein accompanied a patrol that was assigned to deal with the threat. It was ambushed by rocket-propelled grenades and smallarms fire. The gunner of First Lieutenant Bernstein’s unarmored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or “Humvee,” was killed immediately, and his assistant was wounded. The driver crashed the Humvee off the road, where he was thrown out of the vehicle and trapped underneath it. First Lieutenant Bernstein jumped out firing and was shot through the leg. The bullet severed his femoral artery. Four times he tried unsuccessfully to haul himself under fire into the driver’s seat. The

fifth time he made it, moving the vehicle and then limping out to drag the driver to safety. The young officer would earn the Silver Star for his bravery that day. But the same soldier's, and swimmer's, heart that gave him heroic strength was also pumping out his lifeblood. The driver survived. David Bernstein did not.[1]

2004

It was 28 May 2004, back at West Point. At the annual awards ceremony preceding graduation for the USMA class of 2004, Cadet (soon to be 2nd Lt.) Joe Wells received the first annual 1st Lt. David R. Bernstein Memorial Prize, a pewter tray given to the fifth-highest-ranking graduate. Parents Rich and Gail Bernstein were there, culminating a whirlwind week in which they had presented the first annual David R. Bernstein Memorial Scholarship to Crista McDonald, valedictorian at Phoenixville High School, and had also bestowed a new award established by the USMA Department of Civil Engineering in David's name. After the awards ceremony the West Point swimming coach showed them a photo of their son that had been added to an array in the gym devoted to team members killed in action over the years. He told them that four graduating members of the swimming team who had been plebes in their son's last year at the Academy planned to have their bar-pinning ceremony the next day at David's gravesite in the West Point cemetery. One of them, Dennis Zilinski, would himself soon die in Iraq, killed by a roadside bomb in 2005. On Graduation Day 2006, a new group of graduating swimmers would have their bars pinned on at his grave.[2]

2006

It was 23 February 2006, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I stood in front of 150 of the world's most knowledgeable experts concerning counterinsurgency and its nuances. It was the opening session of a two-day conference set up by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus to critique and perfect new American doctrine for that complex kind of war. After opening talks by Lieutenant General Petraeus, Col. Douglas King of the Marine Corps, Dr. Barbara Stephenson from the State Department, and Dr. Sarah Sewall,

director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard and a cosponsor of the present unique symposium, I approached the podium to manage the flow of the rest of the gathering. I opened my own talk with David Bernstein's graduation picture, a caption reading "Why Are We Here?" I then showed the next slide, a photo of his gravestone, and declared, "To Minimize This."[3]



The much-decorated headstone of David Bernstein in the West Point cemetery AUTHOR

2014

It is 23 June 2014, at West Point again. I have returned to give a presentation at the annual Summer Seminar in Military History conducted by the History Department, and I have the morning free to visit my favorite place at USMA, the cemetery. Cemeteries are great venues for storytellers, and there are many volumes' worth of inspiring tales to weave in this particular glade overlooking the Hudson. Amidst the historical giants like Winfield Scott and Sylvanus Thayer are many of my friends, classmates, and even former students. No teacher should survive his or her students, but West Point's graduates have paid a high price in Iraq and Afghanistan for their education. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has been the deadliest for USMA since the war with Mexico in terms of percentage of Americans

killed in action. More than a hundred of the Long Gray Line have fallen since 9/11.

Over recent years, the tradition of placing stones and mementos on headstones in this cemetery has grown. The top of the large headstone of Mickey Marcus, founder of the Israeli Defense Forces and subject of the movie *Cast a Giant Shadow*, a stone carved from marble taken from cliffs overlooking Jerusalem, is always covered in pebbles and rocks. Today the marker with the most stones is that of Maggie Dixon, the young basketball coach who took the Army women's team to its first National Collegiate Athletic Association tournament and then died suddenly and tragically of a heart ailment.

But the most heavily and uniquely decorated group of headstones are those of the dead of Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps because their losses are the freshest wounds, or perhaps because their sacrifice is currently the most questioned. The markers are covered with pebbles, quarters, military commemorative coins, and family mementos. There used to be a small section in the back of the cemetery for such graves, but they quickly overwhelmed that plot and spread throughout the grounds. A recent addition is that of Maj. Paul Voelke, killed in Afghanistan in 2012 on his fourth GWOT deployment. My former students Stephen Frank and Andrew Houghton are here. For those who still doubt whether women belong at West Point, women too have earned their place in the Long Gray Line with blood. Three are interned with their GWOT comrades in the cemetery. Laura Walker, the daughter of an Army general, died in Afghanistan in 2005; some veteran has left a set of his "dog tags" on her headstone. The effervescent Emily Perez made the ultimate sacrifice in 2006. The mementos left behind for her reflect her vibrant personality: rocks inscribed with "Believe" and "Smile," others that say "Happy Birthday" and "Boston Rocks." The latest woman to join their ranks is the posthumously promoted Lt. Col. Jaimie Elizabeth Leonard, class of 1997, killed in Afghanistan in a "green on blue" insider attack (that is, by a "friendly" Afghan soldier) in 2013.

David Bernstein's headstone stands in the last row of the cemetery in Section XXXVI, with a hedge to the rear. There are no other GWOT markers nearby, but he is not far from their densest section. Dennis Zilinski's headstone has a pair of swimming goggles on it; his teammate

David would have appreciated that. I wonder as I look at David's grave whether I could have done more to prevent his death or those of his many comrades who fell later. I wonder whether what I did do, along with many other dedicated people, might have saved some lives instead of costing them. This book is a story about trying to influence large institutions to change, ideally in the right direction for the right reasons, and an attempt to draw insights from that experience about future conflict. As Cassandra in Greek mythology learned, it is not enough just to tell truth to power; somehow one must also get heard. Perhaps more ears will be ready to listen now.

CHAPTER ONE

New Beginnings

Engaging the Puzzle Palace

I began working as a research professor at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in September 2000. SSI is the Army's think tank, and when I reported in, it had quite a stable of distinguished analysts. The director was Col. Doug Lovelace, USA (Ret.), an aviator and lawyer. The division dealing with regional analysis was headed by Dr. Steve Metz, an Africa expert who today continues to serve, as one of the Army's most perceptive prognosticators of future war. Under him were a number of well-known regional commentators: Dr. Andrew Scobell for China, Dr. Max Manwaring for Latin America, and Dr. Steve Blank for Russia and Eastern Europe. Dr. Sami Hajar provided Middle East expertise; he would soon be replaced by Dr. Andy Terrill. I was assigned to the division dealing with contemporary American military affairs. Its head was Col. John Martin, a West Point classmate of mine who was SSI's "Mr. Inside" for the Pentagon, knowing which doors to open and where to find them. His other analysts included Col. Dallas Owens, who focused primarily on Reserve Component issues, and Dr. Steve Biddle, the smartest person I have ever met. Dr. Lenny Wong was just beginning to publish his important human and organizational studies of generational differences within the Army's officer corps. Outstanding active-component officers who served with us on rotating tours

included Lt. Col. Tony Echevarria and Lt. Col. Nate Freier. As had been true during my time in the History Department at West Point, water-cooler discussions among this remarkable group were amazingly informative and educational. To participate, people needed to bring their intellectual "A games" every day.

I was assigned an office with Steve Blank. I often talked with him but rarely saw him. Steve believed in printing a copy of every article of note he found on the Internet, and he was interested in a lot of things. Consequently, his side of our space was overwhelmed with piles of documents. I knew Steve was there, because I could hear his printer whirring, but sightings were rare. About twice a year Steve Metz would park a dumpster outside our door so the other Steve could get rid of less relevant documents and clear up space for more skyscrapers of information. Amazingly, though, he remembered what he had printed; I have never met anyone else who knew as much about his or her region.[1]

When I joined SSI, the Army was gearing up for that interservice squabble that occurs every four years called the "Quadrennial Defense Review," or QDR. Mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the QDR is supposed to drive reformulations of military strategy and policy. My first analytical task would be a study for the Army about the role of landpower in contemporary crises. As is often the case during times of peace, the service was in search of a mission to justify its force structure. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) was aggressively pushing its "halt phase strategy," arguing on the basis of its interpretation of events in the Balkans and Desert Storm, particularly the battle of Khafji, that airpower alone could halt an aggressor long enough to allow ground forces time to build up —a concept with implications for both force levels and stationing.[2] I attended a number of such presentations, which usually started with a reference to some strawman soldier who denigrated the role of airpower in recent conflicts. We other soldiers in the audience were always looking for that idiot; the issue as we saw it was one of realistic expectations as to what airpower could really accomplish by itself. Whether in connection with precision bombing doctrine in World War II, the interdiction and Air Pressure campaigns in Korea, "Rolling Blunder" in Vietnam, or even the initial Instant Thunder plan for Desert Storm or the bombing operations to

free Kosovo, the United States has tended to enter wars expecting too much from its air arm.[3] That theme will reoccur in the pages that follow.

My study was supposed to give the Army appropriate intellectual ammunition to make mission and force-structure arguments in the coming QDR debates in light of the USAF campaign. I visited the Pentagon in September 2000 to get guidance from the staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). I had managed to avoid the infamous “puzzle palace” for my whole active-duty career, but now as a civilian I would become a regular visitor. I quickly found out that one reason for its nickname was simply the difficulty of figuring out the floor, ring, and corridor designations that made up room numbers, but I eventually located the cubicle in DAMO-SSP, the office symbol for the section within the DCSOPS complex where the staff’s action officer and my point of contact on the project, a colonel, resided. He ushered me in, and we talked briefly about my role. Basically, his guidance to me was “Don’t cost us any tanks,” implying that I needed to support the Army’s continuing emphasis on its key role in major conventional operations. I headed back to Carlisle and launched into research.



This chart from the Center for Army Analysis shows that the number of American military deployments for smaller-scale contingencies increased significantly during the 1990s after the end of the Cold War.

Crises were simpler in 2000. Today the Department of Defense (DoD) model of the crisis-planning operational life cycle contains six phases, designated 0 to V. Back in those days, there were only four: an "Engagement and Shaping" phase as the crisis began, an "Enhanced Deterrence" phase as we built up forces, a "Hostilities" phase in which major combat operations (MCOs) occurred, and a "Stabilization" phase after they concluded, the notorious Phase IV. Further, there had been an explosion of smaller-scale contingency (SSC) missions for U.S. forces since the end of the Cold War, about 170 by my count, providing plenty of data for analysis. Military missions had also become more complex with the end of the Cold War, and the rate of American SSC deployments had skyrocketed 500 percent during the 1990s.[4] One day during my tenure at West Point I had come into work to find that some of my subordinate

officers had put out a collection box for donations to rebuild the Soviet Union, as if that would restore balance and predictability to their world.

My findings now convinced me that this return to “predictability” would not be happening very soon. It became very clear to me that the unique contributions of landpower were not as evident in Phase III, where cruise missiles and aerial bombing tended to dominate contemporary MCOs, as they were in the other phases, especially IV, where significant long-term Army involvement was required after crisis resolution to ensure the accomplishment of major foreign-policy objectives. Yet the Army continued to encounter problems in the planning, execution, and force structure for stabilization missions. The DoD *Dictionary of Military Terms* did not even have a definition for “nation building,” and incoming president George W. Bush had promised to reduce such involvement. Nevertheless, the capability mismatch between military and civilian agencies, combined with the requirements of peace operations of all kinds, made Army involvement in such missions inevitable. So I argued that the Army needed to acknowledge that “mission creep” was a self-inflicted wound, embrace some degree of nation building, and better structure itself and train for Phase IV requirements.[5]

I never did get any feedback from the Pentagon on my study after it was published in January 2001, but I did find that some geographic combatant commanders were beginning to take great interest in the stabilization tasks of Phase IV. Central Command and its Army service component seemed most advanced in such thinking—ironically, in hindsight, since they were about to be most severely tested by the messy aftermath of major combat operations.

I also found that there was a small but active community of interest in stability operations within DoD and the rest of the government. I met many of its members at a conference at the Army War College in November 2000 and continued in contact with others at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) in Carlisle, founded by Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan in 1993. Col. Bill Flavin, USA (Ret.), who has filled many positions there, including that of deputy director, had already established a reputation as one of the nation’s premier experts in the field. In one of my research sessions with Bill at PKI I met a British lieutenant colonel named Alex Alderson,

who was pursuing similar efforts for his own army; Alex and I would cross paths many times in the future as we moved on to the intellectual challenges of counterinsurgency. During 2000 I first met Dr. Janine Davidson, who would rise to be a key proponent of stability operations within DoD. I met people in the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development who were quietly trying to shape those organizations to deal better with stability and reconstruction. One of the most remarkable personalities was Lorelei Kelly, on the staff of Representative Nancy Pelosi. Lorelei always seemed to be at conferences dealing with stability operations, asking astute and probing questions. When the Army decided to close PKI in 2003 and transfer its functions to Fort Leavenworth, it was Lorelei, I am convinced, who generated congressional opposition to that action. In the end the Army did close PKI but immediately replaced it with an expanded Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), with the same personnel and facilities. Still, that initiative to close PKI reflected the disdain for and ignorance about its mission that existed within DoD.

One of my next assignments for SSI was to manage the annual War College Strategy Conference in April 2001. Our theme was “Transforming Defense in an Era of Peace and Prosperity” (quite an ironic title in hindsight). Stability operations were discussed, as were the various approaches reflected in the so-called Powell Doctrine, which set strict conditions for the use of military force, and the so-called Clinton Doctrine, which allowed much more discretion to use force to spread and support American values. One participant brought up an Eliot Cohen quote:

> International police work is the wayward child that the Pentagon cannot decide whether to embrace (because it is the only job immediately available and because it justifies the current force structure) or reject (because it conflicts with Cold War concepts of what the military exists to do). Posturing by both parties has made the problem worse, as Republicans insist that they would walk away from all peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions, whereas Democrats are too eager to accept such involvements without conceding the long-term problems they pose for the defense establishment.[6]

I engaged in a discussion with one audience member, arguing on my part that we had had problems in the past achieving the objectives of such missions; he proclaimed that a fallacious argument, since we had carried out "four successful reconstructions of Haiti alone in the twentieth century." That impression of success in Haiti, as silly as it was, reflected not only the difficulties of developing useful metrics for stability operations but also the shallowness of the common understanding of such missions, one that was often impervious to more critical viewpoints. Both of those problems would resurface in Iraq and Afghanistan.

9/11 Changes the World

I spent most of 2001 collecting and editing the presentations from that conference, but by the time I had finished the era of "peace and prosperity" was over.[7] I was sitting in my office on the morning of 11 September when I got a call from my wife that a plane had hit the World Trade Center. I told her it was probably some small aircraft accident, but soon after I turned on the television in our office the second plane hit the towers and dispelled any such illusions. Shortly thereafter I got a call from John Martin, who was away on leave, and while we were talking the first tower collapsed. That was too much for John, who had to hang up. Other members of SSI were heading down to the Pentagon that morning, but by the time they arrived that target had also been struck, and they were obliged to turn around by the resulting massive traffic jam. My son was a student at Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, and everyone there left class to sit on the bluffs overlooking the Hudson to watch the carnage and catastrophe develop on the other side of the river. It had been the most cost-effective terrorist attack in history, replacing peace and prosperity with war, chaos, and debt. Air travel has never been the same. Neither has Afghanistan or Iraq, or the United States for that matter. For the cost of nineteen terrorist lives and four airliners, the world was changed irretrievably.

SSI immediately mobilized to help with what became known as the "Global War on Terror," or GWOT. When John Martin returned from leave, he launched two initiatives. The first was to gather a group to assist the Pentagon in planning for the coming conflict. In early October, John, Steve Biddle, and I met in Washington with members from various sections of the

Joint Staff to settle on what assistance we could provide. What we found was appalling. The Joint Staff had received no direct guidance about how to plan for the GWOT; staff members were dissecting the speeches of President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in an attempt to infer intent and direction. Staff planning cells had color-coded terrorist organizations around the world as red, amber, or green, depending on how easily we could attack them; the Joint Staff was waiting for feedback from the geographic combatant commanders as to which should be targeted. We did not have a fruitful meeting, and I doubt anyone there was aware that combat operations were about to begin in Afghanistan.

The frustrations of that meeting stimulated John's second initiative to shape GWOT, a collection of short essays, entitled *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses*, from experts throughout SSI and the Army War College His intent was to keep the entries short, but packed with policy recommendations. The 108-page document contains 21 entries on topics ranging from the history of terrorism, to maintaining public support, to the reactions of allies and adversaries around the world. It was completed by the end of the year. Steve Biddle's discussion of war aims was typically concise and insightful, and worth highlighting today. His conclusions were:

- This war can be won, not merely contained, but only if we choose our aims and strategies correctly.
- Our enemy is not terrorism, it is Al Qaeda's radical ideology.
- Our war aim must be the defeat of this ideology. If we achieve this, mass casualty terrorism against Americans will subside; if we do not, counterterrorist efforts will inevitably fail.
- To defeat this ideology requires both a war of military violence to destroy Al Qaeda's current operatives and a war of ideas to prevent their replacement from among the millions of politically uncommitted Muslims.
- We cannot allow our military means to undermine our ideological ends: the hearts and minds of politically uncommitted Muslims are the center of gravity; military exigencies, while important, take second place.

- This war of ideas must focus on a “third way”; neither Al Qaeda’s radical separatism nor an imposed Westernism, but an indigenous alternative that allows the legitimate religious yearnings of everyday Muslims to see political expression.[8]

I authored or coauthored three entries in the collection, respectively on avoiding unintended consequences, maintaining strategic balance, and foreseeing potential changes in civil-military relations. The first had the most notable conclusions:

- Prolonged destructive military action, especially with airpower, strains coalitions and fosters resentment. The best approach is to apply overwhelming force in short decisive campaigns, even if that requires time to build up resources in theater.
- Relying on local ground forces for combat reduces American leverage to shape the postwar environment, encouraging conditions that undermine political stability and increasing requirements for military peace operations.
- No matter how widespread American operations against terrorism are, attacks on numerous targets in Muslim countries will foster the perspective that the United States is engaged in a war against Islam.
- The United States must avoid appearing to be engaged solely in an attempt to maintain its hegemony or the status quo. Accordingly it should be wary of becoming tied too closely to repressive regimes, and should encourage reform in so-called moderate Arab governments.[9]

The collection was widely distributed, but its impact, if any, was hard to assess. By the time it was published the Taliban had already collapsed in Afghanistan, and American military power, especially airpower, appeared to be invincible. The claims of those who believed new technology would revolutionize warfare seemed vindicated. Al Qaeda was on the run, having reaped the whirlwind, and rumors were already widespread about where our next target would be. Perhaps frustrated by the failure of his attempts to

influence policy from a distance, John volunteered for Afghanistan and was soon on his way there. He is one of those “Iron Colonels” who usually get left out of the history books but have been essential to maintain the security of this nation since its inception. I have never met anyone with a sense of service stronger than his. This would not be his last GWOT deployment.

He was not the only member of SSI motivated to do more about coming operations. Steve Biddle, disturbed by what he considered to be overly hasty judgments about the effectiveness of a new model of warfare whereby a few American special operators calling in precision airstrikes for ragtag indigenous allies could bring down regimes and also by the planning and policy implications of such assessments, proposed to go to Afghanistan and do a detailed analysis of what really happened. He eventually conducted forty-six interviews with personnel ranging from special operations forces (SOF) sergeants to major generals commanding task forces to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives. He assembled many documents and innumerable commentaries and visited the key battlefields in Afghanistan to make personal observations.

The result of his work was a study entitled *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*.[10] It remains the best analysis of the early battles and campaign that brought down the Taliban. Examining all of the alternative explanations for their collapse, Steve concluded that the combination of American airpower with SOF spotters on the ground had indeed been decisive but did not portend any revolution in military affairs. Instead, the campaign was “a surprisingly orthodox example of modern joint theater warfare,” one in which heavy precision firepower tipped the balance between two sizeable armies. He cautioned that despite the great advances in long-range standoff strike capabilities, close combat and maneuver was still necessary as an adjunct to them. He expressed special concern that some advocates of future operations against Iraq were espousing the opinion that Saddam could be removed the same way, by American airpower assisting indigenous resistance elements, despite the latter’s considerable weakness compared to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. In fact, by then Secretary Rumsfeld had already sent Douglas Macgregor, a retired Army colonel and well-known advocate of streamlined force structures, to Central Command (CENTCOM) to try to

persuade its planners that 15,000 troops would be enough to conquer the country, with Air Force support. His trip was part of the secretary's ongoing efforts to reduce the size of the force that would invade Iraq.[11]

Even before *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare* was published, SSI leadership and Steve decided that he needed to try to get his findings to the secretary of defense, in hope of influencing future defense transformation, as well as potential operations against Iraq, the planners of which appeared to be downplaying the role of ground forces and exaggerating the potential of long-range strike. I had the privilege of being his "horse holder," assisting him in a series of briefings to various audiences, including the Army Staff. I managed his PowerPoint slide shows and offered a comment or two when appropriate.[12]

We were told we needed to pass four "gatekeepers" before we could get to the secretary of defense. The first hurdle to be cleared was Dr. Christopher Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans. Steve and I had a very engaging discussion with him, and he passed us on to the next station, Dr. Stephen Cambone, then Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Steve did his usual thorough preparation and discovered that Cambone had civilian analytical experience similar to his own and was most comfortable in that environment. When we arrived at the offices of the Army G-3 (i.e., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations or DCSOPS) in the Pentagon to check in, Steve suggested that we be allowed to brief by ourselves, with no uniformed escorts, thereby keeping the discussion between civilian academics. Instead, the DCSOPS himself insisted on accompanying us, along with some of his key subordinate generals. Dr. Cambone saw all the uniforms and gathered some generals of his own. As a result, there was no room in the meeting room for me. Afterward I got a disappointed report from Steve that Dr. Cambone had remarked there was nothing really new in the analysis. We never got to brief the remaining gatekeepers, Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowitz, or Secretary Rumsfeld. That was definitely not a system designed to encourage innovative thought within the Department of Defense.

While reading Steve's drafts and providing what useful comments I could, I was pursuing a couple of my own writing projects, trying like Steve

to influence contemporary military policies. The QDR report had been published three weeks after 9/11, so I expanded my shorter essay on strategic balance to encompass the QDR's findings and the expanding missions in Afghanistan. The QDR put new emphasis on homeland security, but it downplayed the engagement activities so essential to shaping regional conditions and did not even mention peace or stability operations. Critical operational goals focused on technological transformation and "high volume precision strike," even as Secretary Rumsfeld was trumpeting his willingness to deploy forces to fifteen more countries to combat terrorism. Meanwhile, the Army was getting stretched ever more tightly. On 9/11 the 10th Mountain Division had been planning for deployments to Kosovo and Egypt. Soon it had elements in five additional nations as well, including Afghanistan, while the few troops remaining at Fort Drum, its home in upstate New York, scrambled to meet new base security requirements. By January 2002 more than 80,000 Reserve Component (RC) troops had been called to active duty. I predicted in my paper that the coming demands of GWOT would require increased active ground forces and extensive use of the RC and that accordingly the Army needed to start expansion and restructuring immediately. I also believed that current operations had the potential to overwhelm the momentum and direction of the force transformation that Secretary Rumsfeld was trying to oversee.[13]

At the same time—I had been both intrigued and disturbed by Steve Metz's recounting that both the Command and General Staff College and Special Warfare School had purged their counterinsurgency files in the 1970s—I continued to be frustrated by institutional resistance to irregular missions. I was driven to look at the legacy of the war in Vietnam, in a monograph entitled *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia*. What I determined was that the service had decided to prevent further such failures not by figuring out how to fight counterinsurgency (COIN) better but by just not engaging in such conflicts. Its focus had returned quickly to the conventional European battlefield. The Army's involvement in COIN was seen first as an aberration and then as a mistake. While some interest in COIN had returned during the Ronald Reagan era, that model downplayed military intervention except by small SOF elements. With the creation of a separate Special Operations

Command in 1987 the conventional force had no incentive to reduce its focus on mid-to-high-intensity operations. The result was a force perfectly suited to the high-tech, fast-paced operations of Desert Storm but with structure, doctrine, and attitudes not conducive to the (mislabeled) missions of "low-intensity conflict" or "Operations Other than War."[14] Little did I know at the time that I would someday get the chance to help fill those gaps.

I find that of all the writings I have done on my own, *Avoiding Vietnam* is the most often cited. For me, it highlighted how woefully unprepared the American military was for any sort of sustained irregular conflict against guerrillas and terrorists. It closed, "The American Army can no longer run away from Vietnam. For it has found us in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Philippines" (and eventually it would in Iraq too). We might not want to fight such conflicts, but that does not mean enemies would not choose them.

Playing the Super Bowl with a Pickup Team

Up to that point, none of my writings appeared to have had any effect, as if I was just shooting ideas out into the ether. I had received some attention around the Army War College but little outside of Carlisle. However, in the latter half of 2002 I got involved with a project that promised to have more widespread impact: I was selected to be the recorder for a special conference to be conducted in August at Collins Hall of the War College's Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL). Fifty-one representatives from throughout the Army gathered to examine initial impressions from Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, which had been mounted to, respectively, clear Afghanistan and secure the homeland in the aftermath of 9/11. Representatives attended from U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Central, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Army Center of Military History, West Point, and the War College, as well as from RAND, the interagency community, and the Army Staff. Led by the Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy from the Army G-3 office, participants examined the course of GWOT at home and abroad, seeking ways to improve as well as to capture and exploit best practices.

Discussion was frank and far ranging. In my opinion, the most memorable presentation was given by Brig. Gen. John Brown, the Chief of Military History, who described President Franklin Roosevelt's many programs to involve the American public in World War II. The United States, he argued, had not really needed drives to collect tin and rubber, but those campaigns involved citizens in wartime work and sacrifice. Conference attendees feared that President Bush's stated desire for the American people just to go back to "shopping at malls and flying on airplanes" would detach them from campaigns in the field, leading to what would indeed eventually come to be described as "an Army at War for a Nation at Peace." In other briefings every major Army command described its actions since 9/11, revealing many flaws in Cold War–era force structures and procedures and growing strains within the service.

I completed my report the next month, and it was forwarded to the Army Staff. My covering letter shows what I thought was most important at the time:

> SUBJECT: Army Operation Enduring Freedom/Noble Eagle Initial Impressions Conference Report
>
> 1. Attached is the report from the Army Operation Enduring Freedom/Noble Eagle Initial Impressions Conference, which was conducted at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania from 26 to 29 August 2002. The purpose of this document is to provide initial impressions and insights from the Army's performance in the Global War on Terrorism. It also allows the service to tell its story to outside audiences and hopefully inform future DoD resourcing decisions.
>
> 2. Because this report is designed for external distribution, critical analysis tends to focus on widely recognized joint systemic problems and some service shortcomings. It does not aim to criticize specific organizations or personnel, or get the Army embroiled in interservice disputes. However, there are a number of controversial issues that were discussed at the conference that deserve further review and analysis:
>
> A. The lack of a war plan or theater campaign plan has hindered operations and led to a tactical focus that ignores long term objectives. These problems have been magnified in CENTCOM

because during the last few years that headquarters has become accustomed to a battle rhythm revolving around the air operations of the Northern and Southern no-fly zones, featuring 72 hour planning cycles, centralized operations, and individual taskings. These characteristics have influenced their conduct of the war on terrorism, reinforcing many disturbing trends including a short term focus. However, all participants at the conference from all commands complained about the problems caused by a lack of clear higher direction.

B. Force caps have had a significant negative impact on operations, forcing commanders to make hard decisions about personnel and resources, such as whether to bring artillery, and limiting mission effectiveness. However, it is unclear who was responsible for establishing the limits, how definitive they were, and whether they resulted from political calculations, misperceptions, misunderstandings, or sloppy staff work. A study should be conducted quickly to determine these facts to insure future operations do not run into similar difficulties.

C. The first two items have contributed to and been affected by the ad hoc and nondoctrinal command and control relationships used so far, especially in CENTCOM. This situation has been further exacerbated by the headquarters personnel shortages mentioned in the report. The late establishment of the CFLCC and lack of a JTF in Afghanistan contributed to the initial command and control turmoil there.

D. The short term focus and lack of long term plans evident in the war have contributed to the increased use of RFFs (Request for Forces). While there are aspects of JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution System) that are too unwieldy for the pace and nature of this war, further analysis is necessary about the best use of the RFF process.

E. There was widespread dissatisfaction at the conference with fire support in Afghanistan. Many emphasized the need for artillery, and both conventional and special operations forces complained about the effectiveness and responsiveness of JCAS (Joint Close Air Support). This is a joint problem that needs to be fixed.

F. Force protection priorities are wrong and need to be relooked. It appears that we have spent too many resources defending Army posts and not enough on vulnerable civilian infrastructure. This can not only be a misapplication of resources, it also can further the separation between military bases and surrounding communities.

G. The Army Lessons Learned process needs some reform. It does not communicate externally and has no enforcement mechanism internally.

H. Many at the conference expressed concern about the CENTCOM commander's use of Marines instead of more capable Army forces to set up Forward Operating Post Rhino. An examination of the decision is warranted to see if it resulted because of CENTCOM ownership of the assets, lift constraints, or service responsiveness to the possibility of the mission. Each potential scenario has different implications for the Army.

I. This war of multiple simultaneous operations in widespread locations presents a very different challenge for leaders than the sequential linear scenarios presented at training centers. Possible revisions to training programs should be considered.

J. When the Marines went into FOB Rhino they bypassed CENTCOM restrictions on the press by taking in reporters directly from their ships. Consequently they dominated reports about early operations in Afghanistan and gave the impression they were behind the establishment and construction of most bases there. They have also been very successful publicizing their Anti-Terrorism Brigade. A common theme of the conference was that Army strategic communication has been very poor about its extensive role in widespread activities of the war on terrorism at home and abroad. There has been no coherent Army message, and many of our activities have gone unnoticed or underreported.

Problems with close air support would be fixed by later meetings between the services, but most of the other issues would appear again in Iraq. Complaints about the Army's continuing lack of strategic-communication skills seem never ending. The full report expanded on some

of these ideas and added more areas of concern. The most important critique dealt with planning processes.

> The experience with the war so far has reinforced the importance of campaign planning for major operations, but has also shown that current American systems to develop and execute such plans are too unwieldy for the pace and nature of war in the information age, requiring quick reactions in a global arena. The Joint Operation Planning System; Time-Phased Force and Deployment Lists; and Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System were all products of a Cold War mindset expecting more sequential operations with build-up and lead times. Instead the global war against terrorism has featured simultaneous complex missions with relatively short windows for planning and execution.[15]

This remains a flaw in our command and control systems. The full report also highlighted two sorts of strains to the force. The first was technological. Bandwidth and communications deficiencies had been widespread in Afghanistan. Resources had been inadequate for the vast amount of necessary information sharing, and there were many joint and combined conflicts, especially with SOF but affecting all allies. Inadequacies with airlift, due to shortages of C-17s and the limitations of Blackhawk helicopters at high altitudes, also had big impacts on ground operations.

The most serious strains, however, involved personnel. Two-thirds of Army SOF were deployed, an unsustainable rate. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) was very concerned about excessive call-ups of reserve forces for service at home and abroad and about shortages of key enablers—such as logistics units, engineers, and military police—for operations in constrained environments involving many stabilization tasks.

Another force-structure issue involved major-headquarters staffing. Cost-cutting efforts had tended to be particularly hard on such elements, producing manning levels inadequate for continuous wartime operations. In peacetime, major headquarters were not filled even to those minimal allocations. For instance, Third Army headquarters, serving as the Joint

Force Land Component Commander for CENTCOM, was at the lowest possible authorized level of organization and as of the time of the conference had not yet been manned to meet its needs. Its problems had been worsened when Central Command headquarters, which also needed augmentation to meet wartime demands, had drawn resources from strapped Third Army. That headquarters had in turn reached into FORSCOM to get people from the very tactical units that would soon be fighting in Afghanistan. The pernicious ripple effect of those grab-bag augmentations was to create headquarters staffs with little experience or cohesion. One conference participant described the situation as "playing the Super Bowl with a pick-up team." Many reservists had been called up to fill vacancies, but the talent pool, especially for operational or strategic planning, was thin. One reservist major I know who worked as a librarian in a military archive was called up to serve in a planning position normally filled by a colonel in a tactical operations center in Afghanistan.

There were, however, many successes to highlight as well. Operations in Afghanistan had demonstrated the synergy that can be achieved by modern fires and skillful maneuver. National Guard deployments now protected key homeland assets and reinforced Europe. Stealthy raids in the Balkans had seized terrorist suspects in Bosnia and sensitive materials from Belgrade. U.S. Army Pacific was dealing with delicate diplomatic issues and unique logistical requirements to support deployments to the Philippines designed to train and assist local forces dealing with terrorists—a noteworthy success of a small-footprint approach that remains underreported and underappreciated.

CSL distributed a short summary of the report in October, but the full version was not released to the public until September 2003.[16] By then events in Iraq had overwhelmed any impact an after-action review on Enduring Freedom or Noble Eagle could have had. The nation was now embroiled in a second, even more complex conflict, one that would reveal a whole new set of difficulties, and one in which I would experience an even more frustrating opportunity to influence policy and events.

CHAPTER TWO

Off to See the Wizard

Planning for Iraq

By the fall of 2002, it was clear to everyone at the Army War College that it was only a matter of time before the United States expanded its major combat theaters of GWOT beyond Afghanistan. The Bush administration viewed Saddam Hussein as a supporter of terrorists and a potential source of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for them. The Iraqi leader was playing a dangerous game, trying to appease United Nations weapons inspectors charged to verify the destruction of his WMD while maintaining enough ambiguity to achieve "deterrence by doubt" so as to keep enemies in Iran and opponents in Iraq in check. He believed that revealing the total absence of WMD would be riskier than alarming the United States.[1] He was wrong.

In early October, the commandant of the Army War College, Maj. Gen. Robert Ivany, and the new Army G-3, Lt. Gen. Richard Cody, met at an event in Washington, and the subject of future operations against Iraq surfaced. Both realized that in the event of regime change some Army general was probably going to become "the mayor of Baghdad" and had better have some coherent plan to rebuild the country. Major General Ivany returned to Carlisle with the mission of developing such guidance, and he immediately assigned it to Doug Lovelace and SSI. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces

in a post-Saddam Iraq, examine associated challenges, and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations in ways that mitigated local animosity and facilitated overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism.

Doug in turn assigned the mission to me, because of my previous work on stabilization and Phase IV tasks, and provided the able assistance of Dr. Andy Terrill, SSI's new Middle East expert. Andy is a retired reserve intelligence officer with impressive academic credentials. He is also one of the world's great pessimists (I once told him that he reminded me of Eeyore in *Winnie the Pooh*, but bachelor Andy had no idea who Eeyore was). I suppose that working as long on the Middle East as he has would turn anyone into a pessimist. But his gloomy instincts about the future adventure in Iraq would prove almost totally correct. We had the freedom to invite anyone we wanted to help, but we also knew the fuse was already burning, that we did not have much time to finish before combat operations began. We set a goal of January 2003, giving ourselves about ninety days to get a final product to the Army staff and CENTCOM. My point of contact at the Army G-3 was Col. Bob McClure.

Many others connected to the stabilization operations community were also anticipating coming action in Iraq, and I took advantage of every opportunity to acquire information from them. I had been associated for a number of years with the Harvard Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the Means of Intervention. Its director, Sarah Sewall, held in mid-October a very useful Ground Operations Workshop at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, D.C., bringing together representatives from academia, nongovernmental organizations, the military, and "the interagency" (that is, the broad array of federal agencies) to examine practical, legal, and ethical problems that might arise from a land campaign. Indeed, SSI was not the only government element (aside from planners at Central Command) looking at such issues. Much has been written about the State Department's "Future of Iraq" project, run by Tom Warrick, which produced over 1,200 pages of disparate, if disorganized, reports (unfortunately no one from our team was involved in that effort). Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs Joe Collins asked the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) at National Defense University (NDU) to conduct a workshop to analyze the requirements for regime change in Iraq.

Col. Paul Hughes, the Army senior fellow at INSS, received the assignment and conducted a two-day conference entitled “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule” in mid-November.[2] When I heard about it I wrangled an invitation. Impressed with many of the presentations, I enlisted some of the participants to work on our War College project, most notably Colonel Hughes and Rear Adm. John Siglar, U.S. Navy (USN) (Ret.), Distinguished Professor at the Near East-South Asia Strategic Studies Center at NDU.

Andy and I also accumulated members from the Army and Joint Staffs, the Department of Defense, Joint Forces Command, and Science Applications International Corporation. Bill Kiehl and John Finney added a State Department perspective. Col. Scott Feil, USA (Ret.), had written extensively on stability issues and was serving as executive director of the Program on the Role of American Military Power for the Association of the U.S. Army. Andy brought in Barry Hughes and Sarah Peter for help with his intelligence on Iraq. I was serving as a seminar historian on a War College teaching team and grabbed Lt. Col. Guy Sands-Pingot, an experienced and enthusiastic civil affairs officer, from among my students. We also took great advantage of the uniformed resources of the War College faculty, including Col. Tom McShane for his expertise in international law, Col. Steve Kidder for his planning skills and connections to CENTCOM, and Col. George Oliver and Lt. Col. Mike Esper for their peacekeeping experience.

I scheduled a workshop on 10 and 11 December at Collins Hall, the War College’s war-gaming and conference facility, run by the Center for Strategic Leadership. Andy and I spent the month before the workshop preparing interim reports for examination and dissection by the team. We decided to split the study into three sections. I would open with a historical analysis of case studies relevant to the Army’s possible role in postconflict Iraq. Andy would follow with a detailed look at Iraq, focusing on its history and current environment that would set the conditions for the Army’s effort to reconstruct the state. I would then close with detailed guidance on the tasks required to accomplish that end and a plan ultimately to transfer each task to civilian authorities.

For the latter section I was lucky already to have a good outline of the myriad requirements of rebuilding a functioning state. During my travels to

prepare my *Landpower and Crises* study I had visited CENTCOM headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, which, as I noted earlier, was already analyzing the Phase IV requirements the command might face. Col. Mike Fitzgerald from J-5 gave me a list of missions that had been prepared by the planning group trying to reconstruct Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy. This "Draft Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services" would become the basis for my own matrix. It reflected current civil affairs doctrine as well as interagency inputs. In addition, Steve Kidder produced from his CENTCOM experience a useful chart that divided Phase IV into four phases: "Security," "Stabilize," "Build Institutions," "Handover/Redeploy." Here was the framework I needed to structure the actual process of transition to civilian agencies.

By December I had produced a draft historical analysis and transition matrix, while Andy had some initial observations on the challenges of occupying Iraq. We convened the team members at Carlisle on 10 December to get their opinions. As planned, I began by leading a discussion on the historical case studies. Then Andy and I briefly covered the other two sections of the study before dividing the team roughly in half for the afternoon. I took one group to do a detailed refinement of the task list, while Andy with the other further developed his sociopolitical-historical analysis of Iraq. We had a great first day and expected to finish up by about noon on the next.

Since that was a slow time of year for the Army War College, we were able to quarter our traveling members "on post" in guest housing, a factor that proved very important when a massive ice storm that night completely shut down Carlisle Barracks. Everything was closed on the 11th, except Collins Hall, which was opened by our team members from CSL just for us. Major roads were shut down, though all the local participants managed somehow to show up on time for deliberations that morning. Our visitors had nowhere else to go: we had the whole post to ourselves, there were absolutely no distractions, and nobody traveling back to Washington was going there or anywhere soon. While many of the participants in the study eventually served in Iraq or Afghanistan, I doubt they faced many situations more harrowing there than skating across the parking lot of Collins Hall that morning. I almost flipped twice. Perhaps because of a certain sense of indestructibility developed after surviving the skating rink the parking lot

had become, or the realization that we really were all by ourselves, the first thing I did was find a coffee machine, get a cup of coffee, and wander up to our seminar rooms. One of the restrictions in Collins Hall, because of the intricate electronics and wiring in the building, was that no food or drink was allowed in its meeting rooms. I am not a coffee drinker, but I could not pass up the opportunity to flaunt that regulation. Maybe this was just a case of juvenile behavior by someone who should have known better, but I did feel that we had all earned the privilege, and would work better, by waiving that particular rule. In the end we did not short out the building or damage any sensitive equipment, and we had extremely fruitful discussions. I found out years later from Doug Campbell, who ran CSL, that the whole escapade had been recorded on his security cameras. Thankfully he did not hold that against us.

Because of road closures we actually kept going well into the afternoon past our scheduled ending before everyone felt safe enough to leave. Bill Kiehl, the State Department representative at the Peacekeeping Institute, was particularly insightful in my group on the mission matrix, while Andy got terrific feedback from his intelligence specialists. As the overall list of potential difficulties we discussed continued to mount, however, a general consensus of our team became apparent that this was an operation that should be avoided if possible. But whether or not to invade Iraq was not in our purview; how to do it best was. Andy and I believed that the most valuable service we could provide for decision makers within the parameters of our assignment would be to present a clear description of just how hard and complex occupying Iraq was going to be.



Though the study's cover was very plain, its content was not. When first distributed in February 2003 the publication did not attract widespread attention. Later, however, writers like James Fallows and Tom Ricks began to cite it as a lost opportunity that had been ignored.

That should have been apparent from the oft-quoted six conclusions on page 1 of the final report:[3]

- To be successful, an occupation such as that contemplated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailed interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military commitment, and a national commitment to nation building.
- Recent American experiences with post-conflict operations have generally featured poor planning, problems with relevant military

force structure, and difficulties with a handover from military to civilian responsibility.

- To conduct their share of the essential tasks that must be accomplished to reconstruct an Iraqi state, military forces will be severely taxed in military police, civil affairs, engineer, and transportation units, in addition to possible severe security difficulties.
- The administration of an Iraqi occupation will be complicated by deep religious, ethnic, and tribal differences which dominate Iraqi society.
- U.S. forces may have to manage and adjudicate conflicts among Iraqis that they can barely comprehend.
- An exit strategy will require the establishment of political stability, which will be difficult to achieve given Iraq's fragmented population, weak political institutions, and propensity for rule by violence.

The study opened with a "Historical Overview of American Occupations," which began by contrasting the extensive resources devoted to the planning and execution of the occupation of Germany after World War II with the shortcomings displayed after Operation Desert Storm in 1991. We cautioned right up front that "a war tactically and operationally 'won' can still lead to strategic 'loss' if post-conflict operations are poorly planned or executed." Discussions of recent experiences in Panama, Haiti, and the Balkans (drawing on work I had done for *Landpower and Crises*) followed, emphasizing insights from recent stability operations.

The case-study analysis then moved on to major wars. The American involvement in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War was used to illustrate how inappropriate is the term "postconflict" and to make the point that planning and execution for what is better termed "transition" must begin well before the bullets stop flying. Next topic was the occupation of Germany, both the disappointing efforts after World War I and the brilliant success of Operation Eclipse in 1945; these cases offered many insights about possible mechanisms to demobilize and reintegrate members of the Baath Party and security forces in Iraq. The section finished by looking at

post–World War II Japan, which was rumored to be currently a subject of great interest to the Bush administration. Our study emphasized many differences between Japan and Iraq, a view reinforced by the opinions of John Dower, the leading expert on the occupation of Japan. His only concession about the utility of that example for Iraq was an ominous one—it provided a clear warning to current policy makers that "even under circumstances that turned out to be favorable, demilitarization and democratization were awesome challenges."[4]

A couple of years after the study was published I would realize that I had neglected one of the most important and relevant historical examples, that of South Korea from 1945 to 1949 and then from 1953 onward. Years of training and preparation went into the post–World War II occupations of Germany and Japan, but Korea was an afterthought. The hastily gathered U.S. XXIV Corps, under the command of Gen. John Hodge, was assigned in 1945 as an occupation force; though technically the peninsula was the responsibility of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, he had his hands full with Japan. Hodge did the best he could with a bad situation; his goal was primarily to fabricate some sort of indigenous political structure so the Americans could leave. When the last U.S. combat forces pulled out in 1949, they left behind a fractious government, a struggling economy, a weak military fighting a resilient insurgency, and a well-armed and covetous neighbor waiting to take advantage of South Korea's weakness.[5] As a result of its poorly executed reconstruction and stabilization mission, the United States soon found itself back in Korea with a much bigger problem, fighting another major war. As our occupation of Iraq continued, I used this particular case study increasingly as the best cautionary tale about leaving too soon.

Andy Terrill had primary responsibility for Part II of the monograph, "Military Challenges of the Occupation of Iraq." His work was prescient and brilliant. He began by describing the attitudes of Iraqis toward the United States and their suspicions about our motives, following with a historical summary explaining that Saddam was "a product of Iraqi politics and not an aberration." Half of the section covered potential sources of Iraqi fragmentation: issues of pluralism and territorial integrity, Sunni/Shi'a divides, Kurdish and Turkomen factors, Saddam's "retribalization" of Iraq, and the unpopularity of expatriates like Ahmad Chalabi. One of Andy's

most important points was the importance of maintaining and utilizing the Iraqi army, one of the few "forces for unity within the society." Demobilized soldiers could also end up joining more disruptive organizations. Even if the army was preserved, the American occupation force would still have to be robust enough to maintain law and order in a heavily armed society, deal with inevitable terrorist attacks (including suicide bombers), and manage diverse sources of discontent that could spark mass uprisings and even a civil war—all against the backdrop of considerable domestic pressure to keep the American "footprint" small and its presence brief.

We wanted the last subsection of Part II, headed "Winning the Peace in Iraq," to emphasize firmly the seriousness and precariousness of the mission the U.S. Army was about to acquire. That section included what was to be probably the study's most quoted sentence: "The possibility of winning the war and losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious." Warning that a long occupation could do more to disrupt society than rehabilitate it, we cautioned nevertheless that an early withdrawal under the wrong circumstances could leave a failed state that was a haven for terrorists and a threat to its neighbors or even spawn a civil war. The closing paragraph, our plea to avoid potential disaster, was perhaps more predictive than we realized:

> Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is consequently every bit as important as winning the war. Preparing for the postwar rehabilitation of the Iraqi political system will probably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat. Massive resources need to be focused on this effort well before the first shot is fired. Thinking about the war now and the occupation later is not an acceptable solution. Without an overwhelming effort to prepare for occupation, the United States may find itself in a radically different world over the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow of new problems of America's own making.

The last section, “A Mission Matrix for Iraq,” laid out our detailed plan to reconstruct the state after removing Saddam’s regime. It began with an explanation of Steve Kidder’s chart that divided Phase IV, which we renamed “Transition,” into four subphases. The chart’s estimated time line has often been misinterpreted. Those time periods are sequential, not cumulative; the process of Phase IV we envisioned would take at least five years before handover would be completed. We admitted that even that estimate was probably optimistic; the most problematic part of Phase IV has usually been handover to civilian agencies. We reproduced a graph developed by Steve Metz, the “Ideal Vision of Transition,” with one axis representing the amount of effort required and the other, time. In this model there would be two handover points: at one the civilian interagency and international organizations take over the main effort from the U.S. military and its allies; at the second indigenous organizations and authorities are ready to take control of their own destiny. I supplemented Steve’s image with my own, based on my historical perspective, calling it a “Realistic Vision of Transition.” In my view, the first handover point rarely occurs; the military has to be prepared to carry the main burdens of the transition process until the host nation is prepared to assume them, which always takes a long time.

The mission matrix itself, in appendix A of the report (and reproduced in the appendix of this book), included 135 essential tasks, grouped into 21 mission categories and arrayed across the 4 subphases of Transition. Those columns listed mainly U.S. agencies that should have prime responsibility for each task during each subphase, with some additional reference to coalition partners and international organizations. Iraqi partnership was assumed throughout the process, as was the fact that each task would proceed along a different time line, one that would also vary by region of the country, creating an amazingly complex management and assessment problem.

The mission categories, based on the Haiti model (though much adjusted for Iraq), were comprehensive: “Major Security Activities”; “Public Administration”; “Legal”; “Public Finance”; “Civil Information”; “Historical, Cultural, and Recreational Services”; “Public Safety”; “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration”; “Electoral Processes for More Participatory Government”; “Disaster Preparedness and

Response”; “Public Works”; “Public Utilities”; Telecommunications and Public Communications”; “Education”; “Public Health”; “Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief”; “Economics and Commerce”; “Labor”; “Property Control”; “Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries”; and “Transportation.” Thirty-five tasks were considered “critical” for the military (lack of immediate response risked mission failure), thirty-two were “essential” (important but not as time sensitive), and sixty-eight were classified as “important” (still required for a viable state but tasks that could be done later or by civilian agencies). In hindsight I think we provided a very thorough and complete outline, one that even mentioned tasks like protecting historical artifacts. We closed the report with another plea to our main target audience: “The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation’s major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace as well.”

2-42. The preferred division of labor in the pursuit of counterinsurgency objectives (an ultimate transition to local control) is shown in Figure 2-3.



Figure 2-3. Ideal vision of transition

2-43. As shown in Figure 2-4, a more realistic description of transition has usually required greater effort and perseverance from the armed forces in supporting transition to local control.



Figure 2-4. Realistic vision of transition

These graphs from an early draft of FM 3-24 reveal the difference between the ideal and actual execution of American military interventions. Because of relative deficiencies in the capacity, culture, and capabilities of civilian agencies, military forces always pick up more and longer responsibilities than anyone desires or expects.

We finished our work in January as we had intended. Doug Lovelace decided to publish two versions, one a locally produced condensed version, primarily the mission matrix and some explanatory material, to get something quickly to the field. The full report went to the printer and would be ready for widespread distribution in late February. Hearing that Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, the Third Army commander and CENTCOM's

Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), was in the Pentagon, I dashed to Washington with copies of the short matrix version for the Army Staff to pass on to him. There Colonel McClure expressed gratitude for our work and said he would get our product to Lieutenant General McKiernan. However, I did not sense much real enthusiasm about what we had done. At the time, I did not realize President Bush had just signed National Security Presidential Directive 24, which designated DoD to set up a Post-War Planning Office for Iraq. Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, USA (Ret.), whom I had served under at the U.S. Army Air Defense School in the 1980s, was already gathering his staff for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). The Army no longer had to worry about being the "mayor of Baghdad." That was now Jay Garner's problem.

I soon found out about the changed responsibilities, because John Martin, back from Afghanistan, had signed on with ORHA. He had had a long relationship with Lt. Gen. Ronald Adams, Garner's deputy, and asked Andy and me to brief our findings to them. We met with Martin and Adams on 28 January. Our presentation was short, only twelve slides, but it was packed with bad news. I told them that the insights afforded by major wars of the past reveal that American occupations require much planning, resources, and time, plus a national commitment to nation building. Recent experiences in contingency operations were even more relevant, showing that we characteristically planned poorly for postconflict missions, and had serious deficiencies in the force structure to accomplish them, and also that handovers to civilian responsibility were problematic at best. Andy followed with his powerfully gloomy assessment of Iraq, explaining how Saddam was the culmination of the Iraqi system of a fragmented population, weak political institutions, and a propensity to rule by violence. He described the problems to be faced from long-standing conflicts and divisions, terrorism, widespread weaponry, and meddlesome neighbors. We provided copies of our mission matrix and closed with three major observations: (1) interagency and coalition planning needed to be going on now for a long commitment of manpower and money in Iraq; (2) owing to sanctions, restrictive neighbors, bad experiences in Afghanistan, and possible WMD, few civilian agencies would be willing or able to assist in the earliest stages of occupation; and (3) military forces would be extremely taxed in requirements for military police, civil affairs, engineer, and

transportation units, in addition to facing possible severe security difficulties. There followed a very good discussion with Lieutenant General Adams. He was particularly taken aback when I mentioned that the United States had committed 4 percent of its gross national product to the Marshall Plan; ORHA would have nothing near that level of support.

That was not my only preinvasion experience with ORHA. The Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., asked me for a presentation about our project in mid-February, at a lunchtime session examining the future of Iraq after forced regime change. The other person on the panel with me was Ambassador George Ward, in charge of humanitarian assistance for ORHA. I handed out copies of our mission matrix, which generated a lively discussion from attendees, many of them from international and nongovernmental organizations. There were a number of questions concerning tasks assigned to these agencies in various subphases of Transition; eventually a member of Ward's staff felt driven to stand at his table, hold up our matrix, and announce loudly, "This is not the plan!" Ward too downplayed our efforts, but he provided no real specifics on the intent of his organization. I will always regret that I did not take advantage of that outburst to push harder to learn exactly what ORHA intended to do in Iraq. I should have immediately responded, "Then what *is* the plan?" But I let the opportunity slip away.

In the end our work did not influence ORHA at all. We had better luck with CENTCOM. Steve Kidder had maintained his contacts with planners there and was sending them all our findings and materials. We were later told that the matrix had been useful in the work Col. Kevin Benson and his team were conducting on postconflict aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the C-5 (Plans) section of CFLCC. That operations plan was called Eclipse II, reflecting the hope that it would replicate the success of its namesake; however, its preparation was not officially directed until the very day coalition forces invaded Iraq, and it would not be finished until a week after the fall of Baghdad. It always surprises me that so much condemnation has been directed at CENTCOM for the deficiencies in its Phase IV planning for Iraq, when the fact that there was absolutely no such preparation for postconflict operations in Afghanistan in 2001 is completely ignored. Looking back, besides an overall lack of emphasis from CENTCOM and

CFLCC, there were really two critical shortcomings in the work that Colonel Benson and his team did—one their fault, one not.

The first was that the planning was incomplete. It covered the initial requirements for stability but was based on an assumption that Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) would be designated later to plan and execute the more difficult reconstruction missions. ORHA could fit neatly into that model, though it had none of the assets necessary for such complex operations. The plan recommended that CJTF-7 be composed of important elements of CENTCOM and CFLCC headquarters and be headed by an experienced commander like Lieutenant General McKiernan or Lt. Gen. William Wallace, who led V Corps during the invasion. Instead, CJTF-7 was created from the undermanned V Corps headquarters and assigned to the newest three-star general in the Army, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez. The experienced intelligence and planning assets from CENTCOM and CFLCC went home, and CJTF-7 was left scrambling to deal with a burgeoning insurgency.[6]

The second and more critical error was not the fault of Benson's planners. They had postulated a thorough troop-to-task ratio for postconflict requirements and projected a minimum requirement of twenty brigades to secure Iraq after the fall of Saddam. Contrary to the expressed amazement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz that it might take more troops to secure the peace than win the war, that is exactly what CFLCC expected, and that meant follow-on forces from the 1st Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld continually battered Gen. Tommy Franks and his CENTCOM headquarters about cutting those forces, and the staff continually fought back to keep them. But eventually the "SecDef" had his way, canceling the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division and pulling out the 3rd Infantry Division as the 1st Armored Division arrived. The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment was added as a sop, but then the 173rd Airborne Brigade was withdrawn from the north. So basically the same number of troops was available for Phase IV as for III, about six brigades short of CFLCC projections. The situation would become worse as the British quickly reduced their own strength. Subsequently much of Iraq remained sparsely occupied; these were mostly Sunni areas that had not really felt much impact from the war but whose

inhabitants harbored many resentments and fears after the fall of Saddam, which threatened to end their dominance and unleash the majority Shi‘a against them. There were also far too few troops even to begin to secure Baghdad adequately.[7]

Though Secretary Rumsfeld was partly motivated to keep troop levels down to support his transformation agenda, there were also concerns within the administration and CENTCOM that a larger footprint would be more likely to spark resistance. That was a strong belief of Gen. John Abizaid, who replaced General Franks when he retired. I think the insight from both Iraq and Afghanistan is that such operations should be launched with overwhelming force, in order to make their impact felt everywhere and snuff out any resistance at the outset. After a few months a swift drawdown can follow, leaving behind a small footprint. One reason the occupations of Germany and Japan were so successful was that it was very clear to those populations who had won and who was in charge. That is an essential element in the initial stages of reestablishing stability after removing a regime.

When John Martin headed into the storm in Iraq with ORHA, his old section of SSI disbanded as well. I left to become the director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, the premier archive and library dealing with that service, and deputy director of its parent organization, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center. Steve Biddle has never forgiven me for making the move, but he also would soon leave. Disturbed by exorbitant claims that the success of the invasion of Iraq was another demonstration of the revolution in military affairs achieved by American technology, Steve gathered another team to analyze military operations on the ground. Its members visited Iraq and interviewed both coalition and Iraqi commanders. They found that the key determinant in American success had been Iraqi ineptitude. The Iraqi force, degraded by ten years of sanctions and Saddam’s divisive policies, had been unable to take advantage of their many opportunities to make the invasion much more costly, especially in urban areas. The result of Steve’s extensive research was an article in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* in 2007 entitled “Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam.” It highlighted two serious dangers of using Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

as a model for future warfare. First, drawing the wrong lessons could lead to “a mistaken assumption that precision and situation awareness can produce OIF-like results against other opponents with better skills than the Iraqis’,” whom he characterized as having been “remarkably maladroit.” Second, “to overstate the role of speed, precision and situation awareness in OIF is to risk serious error in restructuring, or ‘transforming,’ the US military.” This is because “speed and standoff precision are highly imperfect substitutes for mass and traditional close combat capability.” To sum up his argument, “A transformation agenda built on trading speed for mass and substituting precision for close combat capability could thus be a dangerous prescription,” especially “if one cannot guarantee inept enemies in the future.”[8]

Many of those working on the Reconstructing Iraq project had concerns about the dangers of opening a new theater before operations in Afghanistan were finished. This prescient February 2003 cartoon from the Washington Post *reflects them—the unfinished barn would indeed fall apart later*.

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As always, Steve's logic was unassailable. But in 2003 his initial findings flew directly in the face of the triumphal claims emanating from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His study came out as the Army War College was being placed under the authority of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, severing its direct connections to the Army Staff and creating above it an extra level of bureaucracy (a decision only reversed in 2014). SSI and Steve struggled to get clearance to publish the study. Finally he thought he had gotten approval, after working his way up to the Army G-3, but then the word came down that only a few copies could be reproduced for local use and that there would be no outside distribution. We will probably never know exactly who ordered that, though. I remember that instructions came to the War College after I left SSI that it was not to use the term "insurgency" in connection with Iraq. While blame has often been assigned to the SecDef, the directive could very well have come from some midlevel Army bureaucrat trying to avoid controversy; I never saw a written directive, and the policy might have been a local interpretation of higher intent. Whoever was responsible for suppressing Steve's study, that soured him on working for the government, and he was soon doing analysis for the Council on Foreign Relations. I doubt SSI will ever see his like again.

Though I had moved to a new position, I was not done with Iraq or SSI. In 2005 Andy Terrill approached me for a follow-up to our *Reconstructing Iraq* monograph. By then public discontent had grown over the U.S. involvement in Iraq and its growing insurgency, and there was much talk of developing a timetable for withdrawal. Andy wanted us to develop guidance as to exactly how that withdrawal should be conducted and when. I readily agreed, and we set to work—just the two of us this time, without a big support team.

The final product was called *Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq*.[9] I came up with what I considered a witty and succinct summary of the U.S. dilemma: "We can't stay, we can't leave, and we can't fail." Any liberator can turn into an occupier over time, and nationalist resentment was increasingly likely to rise the longer significant American presence remained. At the same time, the strain on the Army and waning public enthusiasm threatened commitment at home. Yet premature withdrawal in such a precarious

environment risked civil war or unrestrained repression. The impact of such an obvious failure in Iraq on perceptions of American competence and of the nation's ability to wield international influence would be very serious.

I provided another historical overview, this time focused on the generally disappointing American experience with postwar stabilization and political rehabilitation. The State Department had just created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, with a stated mission to reconstruct societies to reach "a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy." I cautioned that past experiences suggested that proclaimed goals for end states needed to be kept "vague or modest," because "rarely can the course of reconstruction be predicted, and the ultimate success or failure of such efforts is often predicated on the management of public expectations for their result."

Our own Civil War provides a great illustration of the difficulty of expanding civil and political rights against entrenched postwar local resistance: the lofty objectives of Reconstruction were not realized until a century after the conflict ended. After the Spanish-American War, it took about eighty years to achieve real democracy in the Philippines. Because of modestness of goals and adeptness in management of public expectations, the occupation of Cuba was touted a great success when it ended in 1902, and no one seemed to take much notice when all the reforms unraveled and U.S. forces had to return to quell insurrections in 1906, 1912, and 1917.

Even World War II reinforces the importance of flexible end states. Though the United States and its allies stuck to their avowed goal of unconditional surrender, that vision allowed much postwar leeway about its political ramifications. No clear policy direction for German occupation was determined until 1947, and the course of the early Cold War adjusted it even more. The decision to retain the emperor of Japan was made only in August 1945, as the surrender was being finalized. The next month, General MacArthur received an ambitious directive for an accelerated program of demilitarization and democratization. While what John Dower has called "a remarkable display of arrogant idealism" did establish the ideals of peace and democracy in Japan, occupation efforts in the rest of the conquered empire were less successful.[10] I was able finally to incorporate my Korea case study, emphasizing the errors that contributed to war in 1950 and the

fact that democracy really only began to appear in South Korea in the 1980s. I then pointed out many differences between Iraq and Vietnam, noting that American goals for democracy in Iraq were more ambitious than they had been in Southeast Asia. I closed the section with a sobering account of the results of interventions in the 1990s, quoting Kimberly Zisk Marten: "Nowhere have the liberal democratic military peacekeeping operations of the 1990s created liberal democratic societies. They did not even create much forward momentum in that direction, in any of the countries where they were deployed." Her studies demonstrate that just as in the imperial era, disciplined soldiers from liberal democratic states can establish order, but they cannot transplant their values.[11]

My final recommendation was to "keep the bar low":

> This dismal historical record suggests some guidelines for policymakers: avoid setting the bar too high, or being too specific, when proclaiming visions for postwar endstates. It is relatively easy to remove threats or restore order, but changing values and cultures takes much longer. The same liberal democratic system that seems so worth transplanting also hinders such states from conducting the long-term occupations necessary to make it stick. And even after extended reconstructions, the endstate will still most likely be more a result of local realities than imposed structures. The best course of action appears to be to recognize these trends, and aim for generic peace and stability with unique regional characteristics rather than more specific reforms. This leads to quicker withdrawals and fewer heartaches, even if the result will not be as ideologically tidy as exporting U.S. types of democratic institutions.

The rest of the monograph was Andy's work. It was both prescient and foundational, offering grim warnings about potential difficulties withdrawing from Iraq but also providing guidance for any such complex operation, guidance that civilian politicians and military planners ignore at their peril (but unfortunately all too often do anyway). He covered problems of trying to establish new political authorities within Iraq and in sustaining U.S. presence there. He warned particularly about "unrealistic optimism"

concerning the capabilities of Iraqi security forces absent at least some coalition troop presence in support. His discussion of the need for domestic legitimacy for the nascent Iraqi government would resonate for me later when I became engaged in counterinsurgency doctrine. His analysis of the wisdom of a timetable for withdrawal should be required reading for any politician contemplating such a course of action: after looking thoroughly at the pros and cons, he clearly shows the “catastrophic dangers” that “seriously outweigh any advantages that will accrue from such a policy.” If the situation is judged irredeemable, a timetable might allow the United States to save a little face, but even in that case leaving immediately is probably still a better choice. His closing recommendations echoed the themes of lowering expectations while maintaining commitment. When our study was published in October 2005, we did not know that commitment was about to be sorely tested, as Iraq exploded and I became engaged in a last-ditch effort to douse the flames.

CHAPTER THREE

Rearranging the Bible

Eggheads and Jarheads

We used to brag in the History Department at West Point that we always graduated two classes every year: the cadets who became second lieutenants and outgoing faculty members who completed their three-year teaching tours and returned to the field. One of the second group we were most proud of was H. R. McMaster, who taught military history for me for two years before we had to let him head off to Fort Leavenworth for Command and General Staff College. “H.R.” was “on the rocket,” with accelerated promotions because of his exemplary record in Desert Storm and other assignments, and we could not keep him for the regular three years. He was part of a special group set up by Col. Robert Doughty, our department head, and that I helped run, to think about future war. While there are few true “lessons” from history, there are many insights to be gleaned, and our group tried to reconcile these with new concepts and technology. In February 2005 H.R. took his 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment into an Iraqi town called Tal Afar, where he would conduct a model counterinsurgency campaign combining old and new ideas in a way that would be an important model for developing doctrine. Before that combat assignment he had served as director of the Commander’s Advisory Group for CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid. He had talked with Andy Terrill and me before heading to that position, and after he arrived he sent

us an e-mail bragging that he was handing out our *Reconstructing Iraq* study as if it were "Hare Krishna literature." He complimented Andy and me for predicting so much that had transpired. I replied with some frustration that our intent had been to be prescriptive, not predictive; we wanted decision makers to take action, not just to be able to tell them "I told you so" later.

By the time H. R. McMaster was demonstrating how to do COIN in Tal Afar, our work had indeed achieved some notoriety, as many authors, from James Fallows to Tom Ricks, used it to lambast the Bush administration and CENTCOM generals for wishful thinking and for bad assumptions that ignored contrary evidence.[1] In reality, however, most even of the intelligence community disagreed with our arguments at the time. Still, I have talked with many soldiers who had already become uneasy about the unreadiness for Phase IV before invading Iraq in 2003, though they did not voice those concerns and instead followed their orders. Even Gen. Eric Shinseki, who had been assailed by Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz when he told Congress he thought that stabilizing Iraq would require "hundreds of thousands" of troops, stayed silent when he had a chance to express his dissent personally to President Bush.[2] Some commentators, like Michael O'Hanlon, had taken the generals to task for executing a plan that they knew to be flawed, accusations akin to those expressed in H.R.'s best-selling book on the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Vietnam, *Dereliction of Duty* (which he actually finished up while working for me at West Point).[3]

I had written an article for *Military Review*, the Army's operational-level journal, titled "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Won"; eventually there had even been a *This American Life* segment done about me on National Public Radio, calling me a "Cassandra" who should not have been ignored about the aftermath in Iraq.[4] I was being invited to speak in many forums about our study and Iraq. On 2 November 2005 I traveled to Washington, D.C., to talk at a conference organized by Eliot Cohen at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, focusing on "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation." As I was wont to do, I tried to put a contrarian spin on my presentation, calling it "Too Much Phase IV Planning: Coordinating Theater Plans for Iraq." I

discussed the key decision points that, I said, had contributed to insurgency there. The lack of Phase IV planning for Operation Enduring Freedom, I declared, had set bad precedents for Iraq. CENTCOM planning had been too heavily focused on Phase III. Our War College study had been a lost opportunity, eclipsed by the creation of ORHA, which had also derailed a number of other planning initiatives. Secretary Rumsfeld's cancelation of follow-on forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority's disbanding of the Iraqi army, compounded by the designation of V Corps as CJTF-7, had created the unsecure environment that had led to the bombings of August 2003, which loudly announced that an insurgency had developed, and also led to an exodus of international organizations and support. I must have been in rare form that day, as the impression that I made on Dr. Cohen would soon have significant personal repercussions.

Less than a week later I was back in Washington, this time for a two-day conference organized by Sarah Sewall at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on "Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Implications of Irregular Warfare for the United States Government." Sarah, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, now led the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard. As mentioned in chapter 2, I had become connected with her at West Point as a member of her ambitious "Project on the Means of Intervention," an effort to gather military officers, government officials, and representatives from nongovernmental and international organizations to wrestle with practical and ethical problems of the use of military force in conflict resolution. Discussions were always frank and often revealing; I particularly remember one session where panelists from nongovernmental organizations explained the donor agendas that prevented them from being truly neutral. I gave a number of presentations for her on ethical dilemmas involving the application of military tools.

Attendees at her conference in Washington included all the "usual suspects" on COIN, such as Cohen, Kalev "Gunner" Sepp (another former USMA History Department colleague, who would later become Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict), Frank Hoffman from the Marines, and Michèle Flournoy from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (she too would eventually rise high in DoD). Lt. Col. John Nagl was another notable attendee, then serving as the junior military aide for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

I knew John well from teaching together at West Point in the 1990s; though he was in the Social Sciences Department, we had done some work together prepping potential Rhodes scholars. I helped Sarah get Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, recently returned from Iraq, as a lunchtime speaker. He and I were West Point classmates (I sat next to him in advanced military history class), and we had taught at USMA at the same time in the 1980s, though he was also a member of the "Sosh Mafia," as members of the very active and well-connected Social Sciences Department are sometimes characterized. Our two departments have had a lively rivalry ever since History became a separate organization in the 1960s. They were our most intense competitors on the intramural softball field, and always seemed to get the most publicity. That has continued with counterinsurgency coverage, as Social Sciences has gotten accolades for the contributions of the likes of Petraeus, Nagl, and Peter Chiarelli, while the many historians involved have tended to fly under the radar.

The general had just completed a tour in charge of the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), training Iraqi security forces, and he now commanded the Army's Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, the educational nexus for the Army Training and Doctrine Command. At lunch, he presented his ideas about the proper conduct of counterinsurgency, based on his experience commanding the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003, his recent time with MNSTC-I, and his own long study of the topic. Afterward he approached me and asked if I would be willing to review a draft of a revised COIN doctrine that he was developing. Besides hosting the Command and General Staff College and supervising training programs throughout the Army, CAC also has the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate [CADD] in charge of all such publications for the service. I told him that I would be glad to help in any way possible.

A USMA class of 1974 reunion in Baghdad in November 2007; shown are Gen. David Petraeus, the author, and Col. John Martin. FM 3-24 would not have been created without General Petraeus' personal involvement. Colonel Martin too was eventually drawn into the writing effort. AUTHOR

He had also approached John Nagl about writing that doctrinal revision, inspiring that energetic advocate of COIN to convene an ad hoc group that afternoon to develop a structure for it. His small group included Maj. Kyle Teamey, who had been Nagl's intelligence officer in Iraq and was now working for the Defense Intelligence Agency in the Pentagon. An additional key player was Richard Lacquement, another one of those "iron colonels" so essential to the Army. Richard would be one of the key implementers of DoD Directive 3000.05, to be signed later that month, which declared stability operations to constitute a core U.S. military mission, to be given priority equal to that of combat operations.[5] (That was a declaration I had been hoping for since my first work with SSI.) Janine Davidson, then at Science Applications International Corporation, was also dragged along. She, Teamey, Laquement, Nagl, and the rest of John's recruits gathered at the Front Page, a small restaurant nearby, where John claims to have constructed an outline for the future COIN manual on a napkin. Others who were there remember a notebook, but whatever the medium, the result would indeed help shape the new doctrine to come.

It is incorrect to state that the American army that rolled into Iraq in 2003 had no counterinsurgency doctrine. Certainly, in the middle 1970s there had been such a negative reaction to the defeat in Southeast Asia that Army schools were directed to throw away their counterinsurgency files. By the 1980s interest returned, because of conflicts in Nicaragua and El Salvador. But doctrinal guidance was now based upon a model emphasizing only a small advisory footprint, heavily dependent on special forces and avoidance of active or large-scale military intervention. The creation of a separate Special Operations Command in 1987 reinforced the indifference of American conventional forces to counterinsurgency. At the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 the capstone U.S. Army doctrinal manual, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, devoted only one page to counterinsurgency, and the primary emphasis of that brief reference was on providing the minimal support necessary to allow hosts to solve their own problems. Vietnam was highlighted as an example to avoid: there the high level of American support had "undermined Vietnamese government authority and ARVN [Army of Vietnam] credibility."[6] Hasty interim COIN guidance was distributed in 2004, but Petraeus knew it was much in need of revision.[7]

Lieutenant General Petraeus had also asked Eliot Cohen to review the draft doctrine, and after the lunchtime discussion at Sewall's conference Cohen told the general that he needed to scrap that effort and start over. Impressed by my talk a week earlier, Cohen suggested me as the one to lead the makeover. Lieutenant Colonel Nagl soon found out that his duties in the Office of the Secretary of Defense would in any case preclude a major role writing a field manual for the Army, forcing a reconsideration of who could be in charge of the project.[8] Accordingly, on the afternoon of 16 November I received a call at my office in Ridgway Hall at the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks. Maj. Everett Spain, Petraeus' aide de camp at Fort Leavenworth, was on the line and asked if I would have time to talk with the general later that day. We set up a connection late in the afternoon. There the general asked me if I would be willing to write the new manual. That was a bolt out of the blue that I had not expected. He apologized for "adding a huge rock to my rucksack" but emphasized the

opportunity to make an important contribution.[9] I told him I would have to discuss the effort with my superiors at the War College but would get back to him quickly.

Initial Guidance

Looking back at my string of e-mails, I see clearly that I had no idea what I was getting into. I quickly got approval from everyone in Carlisle, including my boss at USAHEC, Col. Robert Dalessandro, who was always to remain supportive of my efforts, even as the time they required ballooned. For his part, the commandant of the War College, Lt. Gen. David Huntoon, was glad I was getting involved. I called Fort Leavenworth that next afternoon with my acceptance but found the general was out. Early in the evening I sent him an e-mail to confirm that I would do as he asked. I informed him that I had just received some questionable medical test results that would require some follow-up and therefore needed a strong coauthor in case some distraction came up; I asked for John Nagl. (My health turned out to be fine.) I envisioned devoting sixty days to the manual, and then backing off for a while to handle my regular duties as director of the Military History Institute. I also projected putting a “small team” together to do the actual writing. I said I would be coming out to Leavenworth as quickly as possible to get the general’s guidance and intent at first hand.[10]



The invaluable and unique historical resources of the U.S. Army Military History Institute were helpful for both the Reconstructing Iraq study and FM 3-24. Here the author stands in the midst of the War Department Library, established during George Washington's administration. ETHAN HILL/REDUX PICTURES

Events moved very quickly after that, and I found that I was jumping onto a moving train. I got two important e-mails the next day. The first came from John Nagl. He gave me "congratulations and condolences," attaching his proposed outline for the new manual and a list of thirty-two people he thought should attend a conference to work on it, and offered his full support.[11] The second came from Lt. Col. Jan Horvath of CADD at Fort Leavenworth. When the Army had desperately needed some sort of COIN guidance in 2004, he had been tasked to write an "interim" manual, designated the COIN FM-I. It had been published in October. Very tactical in focus, it was still better than anything else available, and it introduced the

concept of protecting the population as an essential focus for COIN. It expired in two years, so he was working on its replacement, Field Manual 3-07.22, the draft with which Eliot Cohen and others were so displeased. Jan told me he was catching the first flight he could to Carlisle and would bring a copy of his draft with him. He also mentioned a COIN conference to be scheduled at Leavenworth and gave me two dates for it to choose from.[12] I was not ready to make that decision until I found out more details from Lieutenant General Petraeus.

Lt. Gen. Jack Cushman, USA (Ret.), and Eliot Cohen had already offered him suggestions about how to write the new manual, and we began an e-mail exchange about possible approaches. Lieutenant Colonel Horvath showed up in my office on 22 November, gave me a copy of his draft, and provided thorough background on what had gone on so far. He never showed any resentment in any way about my taking over his project, and he always gave me full support. After hearing his stories, I had the impression he may just have been glad to put the burden on someone else. To top off that first week, Eliot Cohen had mentioned the new doctrine project to the director of RAND-Arroyo, Tom McNaugher, and he "came up on the net" to offer any support that we needed from his team of experts.[13] We were grateful for the offer, but Lieutenant General Petraeus, who had no money for contractors, left the decision up to me as to how best to exploit it. Tom would prove to be extremely cooperative and willing to spend his own "flex-money" to help us.

On 28 November I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. The weather was dreary, but the post seemed energized. Lieutenant General Petraeus was beginning to create his "engine of change," a synchronization of education, training, and doctrine to better incorporate the lessons of contemporary conflict and make the Army a true learning organization. I spent the next couple of days getting my marching orders. I met with Clint Ancker (the director of CADD) to discuss the writing process, talked again with Jan Horvath, and was introduced to Maj. Tom Westen, who would also be part of the support team. I detected some unease within CADD about the outside involvement, special treatment, and unusual process involved with the COIN manual. Normally Army doctrine is produced by a multiyear bureaucratic process with lots of checks and feedback; this time, General

Petraeus was talking about a finished product in a few months. Clint would be a key player in making that happen.



General Petraeus used this graphic to illustrate his view of his role as the commander of the Combined Arms Center in linking Army doctrine, training, and education to create a better learning organization for modern warfare. FURNISHED BY GENERAL PETRAEUS

I also wanted to break the paradigm of reading level. Army doctrine is normally written at about a tenth-grade standard, not because soldiers are stupid, but because doctrine is supposed to be grasped quickly and easily. I thought that since my vision was for a manual aimed at the battalion-staff level and higher, out of the purely tactical weeds of techniques and procedures, it should be pitched for college graduates. Clint assigned an editor to work with me on meeting required formatting standards. However, I found out in early drafts that she had a penchant for changing my wording without telling me, and I registered some irate complaints with Clint. He responded by replacing her with Steve Capps, one of the true unsung heroes of the writing effort. He was the ideal CADD editor for us. I found out to my surprise that I knew both his parents. His father had been head of the English Department at West Point, and his mother was the chief archivist at

the library there. He was blessed with a great set of genes that proved a boon to us. In the end we were able to jack up the reading level but still keep diction and meaning clear and meet all the official formatting requirements.

I had a long meeting with the general about his own vision for the new doctrine. He was honing his remarks from the November COIN conference into an article for *Military Review* and wanted those observations incorporated into the manual.[14] He wanted a draft done by January and then a conference of experts convened to dissect it. One of the reasons for his sense of urgency was that he fully expected to be sent back to Iraq and did not know how much time he would have at CAC to implement his plans. I managed to finagle an extra month out of him, sliding the vetting conference to February, and said we should invite about thirty people to attend. He agreed, as long as he got to decide who those thirty were. With that timetable set, he added some new conditions to the process. He envisioned a joint Army/Marine manual, perhaps even drawing in the British, making it a combined effort. Apparently he had already talked to his Marine counterpart, Lt. Gen. James Mattis of the Marine Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia, about the venture, and perhaps to some Brits as well. I was given the assignment of cementing those relationships. He gave me plenty of freedom to establish the writing team and to structure the manual but made clear that he would be an active reader of everything we produced, a real editor in chief. He knew that many Army doctrinal manuals would soon be up for review but believed he could make the most immediate impact on the COIN volume and use that to influence publication of the rest—all as part of his drive to make the service a better learning organization for modern war.

We continued our discussions over an informal dinner with some of his key staff. I also spent some pleasant time with his wife, Holly, as he got ready to go out. They were in temporary quarters as the commanding general's house was being renovated, and she was contemplating still another move in a long career that had already featured too many. Her father was Lt. Gen. William Knowlton, superintendent of West Point while we were cadets; she was an attractive girl living in the midst of more than four thousand guys high on testosterone. Women would not be admitted to

the Academy until 1976, two years after we graduated. Marrying her was one of the first signs David Petraeus would go far.

When I had visited CADD, I had ruffled some feathers by suggesting a redesignation of the new field manual. The October 2004 FM-I (Field Manual–Interim) and the current draft, both titled *Counterinsurgency Operations*, were numbered 3-07.22. The Army has a carefully structured doctrinal system. The number "3" indicated an operational focus, while "07" meant stability operations. So COIN was deemed subcategory 22 of stability operations, a level below them on the conceptual hierarchy. In my opinion, however, the level of violence and complexity of problem sets made COIN fundamentally different from stability operations: it had much in common but was definitely not just a subset. I had some spirited discussions about this issue with members of PKSOI, particularly Bill Flavin, who strongly disagreed with me. They could not change my mind. However, when I proposed at CADD a renumbering for the doctrine, the response was as if a monk had walked into the Vatican and announced he wanted to rearrange the Old Testament. I got all kinds of explanations about how such a change would unbalance the whole system. I mentioned my idea to Lieutenant General Petraeus, who said he would muse over it. A few weeks later he suggested to CADD that the new manual needed its own operational category. I must assume that they had used the passing time to reconsider the issue, because they gave him a different answer than they had given me. As a result, the Army's designation for the new FM became 3-24.

I returned from Leavenworth with loads of new missions, and the train sped up. I talked with John Nagl about possible members of the writing team and started reaching out to them. Lt. Col. Richard Lacquement, then working for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, was eager to tackle our interagency chapter. I recruited Dr. James Corum at Fort Leavenworth because of work he had done concerning the training of indigenous security forces and airpower in small wars. I courted Col. Rick Swain, USA (Ret.), at the USMA Center for the Professional Military Ethic to do our chapter on leadership and ethics, along with Col. Don Snider, also retired, now the Army's expert on professional ethics. John contacted Kyle Teamey for our intelligence chapter. I talked to the Marine Corps Concepts Branch of the Combat Development Command;

Lieutenant General Mattis had reviewed the draft manual in November and alerted his team to be prepared to help fix it. His people would be tied tightly to the effort from that moment forward.

Mattis and Petraeus had served together in the Pentagon and Iraq and had a terrific relationship. The new Army/Marine Corps COIN manual was to result from the fortuitous linkage of two soldier-scholars with similar backgrounds and interests, whose resolution to change their respective services had been forged in the crucible of Iraq and who were given simultaneous assignments where they could make that happen.

I approached Tom McNaugher and John about suggestions for guiding principles for COIN. I sent them a proposed list I had prepared having reread classics like Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson and reviewed the work of contemporary analysts like Steve Metz.[15] Tom gave that assignment to a team at RAND consisting of Adam Grissom, Bruce Hoffman, Bruce Pirnie, Jim Quinlivin, and Lauri Zeman, who sent me a useful list on 4 December. They concurred with the idea of a target audience of battalion level and above, and they recommended six tenets: "Objective," "Legitimacy," "Unity of Effort," "America in Support," "Security First," and "Intelligence at the Forefront."[16] Their input had much in common with my initial proposal and reinforced the direction I was taking. John Nagl worked his suggested list into the acronym "PRIMAL": Protect the People, Rule of Law, Intelligence Drives Operations, Measured Force, Adaptability and Learning, Local Forces Lead.[17]

Meanwhile, Jan Horvath was preparing a concept briefing for the February conference for Lieutenant General Petraeus. On 5 December he sent John Nagl and me a proposed list of sixty-nine distinguished invitees for the vetting conference—from academia, the media, the interagency, and the military—expecting that only about half would be able to attend. (Almost all would eventually show up.) The next day he sent me a draft agenda for the gathering, and we tweaked it by e-mail.[18] I shifted the focus from small breakout groups for each chapter to examination by everyone of the whole manual, a change the general approved. At that point the goal was still an audience of from thirty to thirty-five.

Fortuitously December was also the time of Exercise Unified Quest at Carlisle Barracks, an annual “futures” war game that attracted significant Allied participation. The British were sending a contingent who also wanted to discuss a combined COIN effort; Bill Flavin set up a meeting at PKSOI on 8 December. Jan Horvath continued to build up his frequent-flyer miles by attending, along with Janine Davidson and Lt. Col. Dave Pere, from the Marines, as well as many Army War College personnel. Rear Adm. Chris Parry, head of the British Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, was keen to set up a collaborative doctrinal framework between American and British land forces, believing we both would benefit. His representatives favored a brief overview manual, basically just what we planned to have in our first chapter, combining all our service perspectives.

I sent a report afterward to Lieutenant General Petraeus and Ancker expressing my misgivings. I believed we would be able to work with the Marines but thought principles of the British were overly operational and their capacity to keep up with our writing schedule too limited. While the U.S. Army had a building full of doctrine writers at Fort Leavenworth and the Marines a floor’s worth of them at Quantico, the British Army basically had a room staffed with two officers and a couple of bulldogs. (At the COIN conference in February, a British general amazed at the size of the gathering remarked to me that we Americans had an “industrial approach” to producing doctrine, in contrast to their more handcrafted style.) Petraeus replied three hours later that we needed to work with the Marines but did not require British buy-in. We would give the British plenty of opportunities for input and invite them to the February conference, but I was to focus my attention on getting Quantico on board.[19] (Our instincts about British capacity proved correct. They did not publish their own version of a new COIN manual until late 2009.)

That same day, 12 December, I also forwarded to the general and Ancker a proposal from Sarah Sewall and the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard for cosponsorship of the February conference. John Nagl had received feelers also from the Foreign Policy Research Institute, but that initiative never worked out.[20] I discussed both organizations with Jan Horvath, the conference organizer, who at that point was not sure how much funding assistance would be necessary. Sarah and I had a lively phone

conversation that morning, fueled by her very strong interest in helping with the new manual. Her only condition was that she wanted to get four or five representatives with human rights credentials on the invite list, at her expense, and was willing to interpret "human rights" very liberally. She volunteered her event staff to help. Lieutenant General Petraeus replied, again within three hours, "Con, Clint: This sounds like a great idea to me. Sounds like a good way to expand the size of the tent and the number of those in it. And she'll be a net contributor, not a net consumer—and we'll strengthen the bridge with the academic world, all in one." He directed Ancker to check with the post judge advocate on the legality of such a cosponsorship, which was quickly approved.[21]

I burned up a lot of electrons that day. I was contacted by Dave Pere, who relayed the Marines' harsh critique of the draft 3-07.22, and I set up a meeting at Quantico for the next week to convince them that we could produce a joint manual.[22] Jan Horvath informed me about a conference at Leavenworth on information operations on 15 and 16 December that would be relevant to the doctrine we would have to write. John Nagl was already going, and I saw this as an opportunity to get most of the Army writers together. Jan finagled a seat for me at the last minute, and I soon headed back to Kansas.[23]

Laying Foundations

John and I attended the first half of the conference, and he gave his usual presentation on learning in Malaya. We heard a number of fine talks about the importance of winning the information war in COIN, with great recommendations as to how the Army could do that better. Most dealt with increasing local initiative and decentralizing hierarchical controls. (As far as I know, none of those recommendations were soon to be implemented.) On the 16th, John and I stepped away to meet at CADD with Jan Horvath, Tom Westen, and Jim Corum.

That proved to be another seminal event in a very busy month. I began by presenting my list of guidelines for executing COIN. I had considered the comments from RAND, and John, and had added David Galula's work to the long list of classics I had read.[24] I had also contacted Kalev Sepp at

the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, and obtained material from him about his extensive research into COIN best practices. From all this I had come up with three categories—principles, imperatives, and paradoxes—which I laid out at this meeting. I wrote each grouping on butcher paper and fine-tuned them as we all discussed each entry. I considered as "principles" the timeless tenets from the long history of COIN, while the "imperatives" had been especially important in contemporary conflicts. I created the easily remembered acronym "MULES" from the first letters of the imperatives, listed below. In hindsight, I should have grouped these two categories together, an oversight that authors of subsequent doctrine have fixed. The paradoxes were different, however. I did not intend those as dogmatic assertions but wanted to provoke readers to think about what made COIN different from conventional fights. They were deliberately written to startle and prod. After hours of dissection, the final preliminary list was as follows:

Paradoxes of COIN:

1. The more you protect your force, the less secure you are.
2. The more force you use, the less effective you are.
3. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
4. The best weapons for COIN are not weapons.
5. Doing something poorly is sometimes better than doing it well.
6. If something works this week, it won't work next week. If it works in this province, it won't work in the next.
7. Tactical success guarantees nothing.

Traditional COIN Principles:

- Legitimacy of host nation government.
- Intelligence drives operations.
- Unity of effort.
- Understanding of the environment.
- Political primacy.
- Long term commitment.
- Isolation of the insurgents from cause and base.

- Security is first priority.
- Rule of law.

Modern COIN Imperatives:

- Manage information and expectations.
- Use measured force.
- Learn and adapt.
- Empower the lowest levels.
- Support the host nation.

We decided that this list merited an article in *Military Review* to preview the coming doctrine for the Army. I was tasked to write the base piece and then to send it to John and Jan for their comments. John suggested we also draw Eliot Cohen in as an author, to lend academic gravitas to the work. He had come to see me in Carlisle the week before to talk about the doctrine and remained very enthusiastic about it. After some persuasion from me, Eliot eventually agreed, and John worked with the journal's editor to get our article published in the March/April issue.[25]

Our next tasks were to develop an outline for the manual and to assign chapter authors. Our ambitious goal was to have a first draft written by 16 January, a month away, so I would have a chance to edit it before it was distributed to conference attendees. John's "napkin" structure gave us a starting point, along with Jan's draft 3-07.22. We decided to ask Lieutenant General Petraeus to write a short foreword, while I would create the preface. Eventually John took over that assignment, so I could give more attention to chapter 1, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," combining my new lists with the reworked contents of the first two chapters of Jan's draft. Richard Lacquement would pen chapter 2, "Unity of Effort and Coordinating Instruments of National Power." We wanted that subject put up front to emphasize its importance. Richard and I thought that the perfect case study for his chapter would be the experience of CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) in Vietnam. He would craft a draft that would eventually be much enriched by Dr. Dale Andrade at

the Center for Military History, an expert on that important example of a combined civil-military organization. Chapter 3 would be on intelligence, to be written by Kyle Teamey and Col. Derek Harvey, an analyst on the Joint Staff. Jan Horvath would have initial responsibility for chapter 4 on operations, with instructions to draw in important work done by Maj. Gen. Peter Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick Michaelis on the lines of operation for COIN.[26] Chapter 5 belonged to Jim Corum, on supporting the host nation and indigenous security forces. Tom Westen was assigned to produce chapter 6 on combat support and combat service support considerations. (I am still not certain how it happened, but that mission would soon be assumed by Maj. Sean Davis, a student at Fort Leavenworth determined to contribute to the manual.) Chapter 7 on leadership and ethics would come from Rick Swain and Don Snider, though they would not be able to remain involved beyond the February conference.

There would also be some appendices to cover topics we believed required extra treatment. Dr. Montgomery McFate, an anthropologist from the Institute for Defense Analyses, would be asked to write one, covering cultural assessment, and review one that Jan had created on interpreters. We wanted a section on legal considerations and would need a lawyer point of contact for that, as well as another summing up Kalev Sepp's research on best practices. Finally, John volunteered to provide a reference bibliography and an appendix on learning.

The appendices would undergo considerable rearrangement as the manual evolved, while the main chapters were more stable. There was some discussion about the growing size of the manual, as we knew the Marines, like the British, favored something short, and Lieutenant General Mattis wanted something for the field quickly. We agreed, however, that the main determinant for the length of the FM would be the content required, and we had a lot of doctrinal gaps to fill. We also confirmed that we wanted to keep our main focus on battalion staffs and above but decided to ask the Marines to produce a pocket-sized companion for captains and below. We thought that might also be an extra enticement for them to buy into our concept for 3-24.

Before we broke up, Jan updated us on plans for the conference. The number of potential invitees had swelled to eighty, but projections for actual

attendance remained in the thirties. I suggested that we give everyone who showed up a Che Guevara tee shirt with an appropriate label to set the mood for the gathering, and Major Westen took that on as a mission. Eventually the lawyers killed that idea, which perhaps would have made too obvious the insurgent nature of our initiative.

The next week I headed down to Quantico to meet face to face with the Marines. Col. Doug King, the Director of Concepts and Warfighting Plans for Combat Development Command (CDC), presided over the gathering. Small, wiry, with short-cropped hair and a grim visage, he made quite a contrast with his chief deputy, Lt. Col. Lance McDaniel, tall and balding and with a seemingly brighter outlook on life. Both would be critical players in the months to come. Other attendees included Lieutenant Colonel Pere, Maj. Farrell Sullivan, Lt. Col. Phil Chudoba, Lt. Col. Kevin Brown, Capt. Jeff Davis, Erik Doyle, and Robert Dobson. Frank Hoffman, who would soon become well known for his concept of "hybrid war," was working for them as a contractor and was a highly vocal participant. He seemed more receptive to our broader approach than did most of the others. The Marines had already done extensive work concerning the many lines of operation in COIN, were far ahead of the Army in the intellectual arena of operational design, and appeared most interested in the operational chapter. I provided them with our proposed outline and chapter authors and also mentioned the pocket manual. We had a very rich discussion, but when I left, all I had gained was their commitment to attend the February conference in full force and a promise from Colonel King that he would brief Lieutenant General Mattis on our concept for the manual.

The day after the meeting, on 21 December, McDaniel and Hoffman deluged me with Marine products by e-mail. They definitely had been thinking very deeply about the structure and conduct of irregular wars and campaigns.[27] But the most important communication came on the 22nd, when Colonel King sent me the results of his briefing to Lieutenant General Mattis. The CDC's boss obviously wanted a joint product. Colonel King admitted that our concept was a "departure" from the direction they thought the manual was going but thought we could work through our differences. He proposed a resequencing of the chapters, especially moving back the interagency one, and the elimination of the combat support/combat service

support chapter by incorporating it into others, and also assigned Marine coauthors for each chapter. There was only one really inflexible prerequisite for their full participation, but it was a big one: a separate chapter on operational art and design for COIN.[28]

I was aware that an Israeli, Shimon Naveh, had developed a concept called "Systemic Operational Design" but knew few details, except that it was complex and difficult to understand. I sent my report on Quantico and King's response to Lieutenant General Petraeus, Nagl, and Horvath. There was not much enthusiasm about the Marine demand from CADD, but I suggested we let them write the chapter and then judge it at the February conference. Lieutenant General Petraeus agreed, deciding that was a price worth paying to get a joint manual. Nagl, fighting a strep throat, pushed back hard about the proposed chapter rearrangement. I sent a message to King explaining our rationale for the chapter sequence, and that seemed to mollify him for the time being, perhaps because I also told him we would accept the operational design chapter and that they could write it. He immediately put me in contact with his chosen Marine author. We expected a product by February.[29] Little did we know how difficult, or important, that chapter would be. It was designated to be chapter 4, coming before the operations section and after the coverage of intelligence.

The year 2005 closed with one last flurry of important e-mails. Lieutenant General Petraeus sent Gen. William Wallace, commander of Training and Doctrine Command, which included the Combined Arms Center, a summary of the planned February symposium. While impressed with the list of attendees, Wallace expressed concern at the likelihood that they would reach no consensus and produce a "Joint doctrinal product watered down to the point of uselessness."[30] Petraeus sent the message to me for information, and I responded:

> You can assure LTG Wallace that you and I will not let the conference water down the manual. In the end we are going to publish what we think the field needs. I am more concerned about what the USMC will eventually want than what comes out of the conference. The whole accelerated process we are going through is

> really a way to avoid the "watering down" process that long joint doctrine reviews produce. My biggest problem is going to be integrating all the dynamic contributions from the writing team to give the document unity (and keeping John Nagl from working so hard that he catches strep throat.) I expect the final product to be the exact opposite of the pabulum joint doctrine normally becomes. But that is what the Army in the field deserves, and needs.[31]

Petraeus forwarded that to his boss, who seemed reassured by it.[32] Now all we had to do was live up to my claim.

CHAPTER FOUR

Inside the Big Tent

Ringmaster to the Stars

January was a month of frenzied writing that would create the first draft of the manual. It was also a time of complicated preparations for a conference that was growing far beyond the modest gathering initially envisioned. I told my old colleagues over in SSI that I could make my deadlines only by "shamelessly stealing all the good ideas I can from everyone I know." I solicited a definition of "legitimacy" from Max Manwaring and thoughts about networked insurgencies from Steve Metz.[1] I also borrowed from work Jan Horvath had already done. I had always been intrigued by Douglas Pike's claim that the North Vietnamese insurgency model of Dau Tranh was unbeatable because of its close linkage of political, military, and social activities, and I aimed to create a style of COIN to defeat it. But as I looked at the contemporary environment, I realized that modern insurgencies were not like the centrally directed campaign the North Vietnamese had executed. American forces now faced loosely integrated alliances of enemies, including criminals, pursuing different goals with different approaches. I never could decide whether it was more accurate to talk about the "insurgency" in Iraq or of the "insurgencies."

Word was spreading about what we were trying to do, and I was almost overwhelmed by people willing to volunteer their thoughts and time to help us. I received suggestions for content from Eliot Cohen, Frank Hoffman,

serving civil affairs officers in the field, the Army Center for Military History, and professors at the War College and at Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General Huntoon sent around an article from *Military Review* by a British general, Nigel Aylwin-Foster, highly critical of American COIN efforts.[2] Dave Keough, an archivist working for me at the Military History Institute, dug up some terrific material on evaluation metrics used in Vietnam. The writing team continued to grow. Kalev Sepp had recently published his summary of best practices in COIN, also for *Military Review*, and I solicited from him an appendix, editing work, and participation in the February symposium.[3] He was eager to assist, confessing that he did not understand operational design either. Rick Swain recruited a team of officers from West Point to work on his chapter, including ethicist Tony Pfaff, then serving in Iraq. Jan Horvath contacted Lt. Col. John Graham, also at West Point, for an appendix dealing with his groundbreaking work on social network analysis.

Tom Ricks had just visited CAC and Quantico doing research for the *Washington Post* about changing military thinking and, having heard my name brought up many times, asked me for details about the project.[4] Ricks proved one of the few people we considered for conference attendance who could not make it, since he would be in Iraq. We were finding out that the original attrition estimate had been greatly overestimated. Almost everyone who was invited wanted to come, often with key assistants. Many others heard about the coming conference and clamored to be a part of it. Lieutenant General Petraeus had told me that he favored a "big tent," but even then I did not quite realize how large it was going to get. I got some inkling, though, when the CAC staff told me they had arranged to get the Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) at Fort Leavenworth as our venue, with a main auditorium that would seat over 110 and overflow room for 250 more.[5] Lieutenant General Petraeus admitted to Jan Horvath, in a metaphor Saddam would have appreciated, that the conference was turning into "the mother of all doctrinal seminars."[6]



Figure E-2. Large, complex network

This figure from an early draft of the FM reflects the complexity of network analysis it was trying to introduce.

John, Jan, and I expended a lot of electrons in January developing a conference format. John came up with the idea of allotting specific time periods to each chapter, about an hour each, of which twenty minutes would be for the author to present and the rest for discussion. I adjusted that concept to add a ten-minute critique by a contrarian expert, to "prime the pump" for continuing dialogue. Jan eventually carved out about seventy-five minutes for each session from a full agenda, and we lined up a distinguished set of "discussants" to comment on each chapter.[7] Now all we needed was a document to analyze.

The First Draft

Amazingly enough, the editors at CADD had a draft together to send out to conference attendees by 6 February, a tribute to the diligence of the writing team. John Nagl and I had worked with Lieutenant General Petraeus to write a preface and foreword, and Doug King had obtained Lieutenant General Mattis' input for them. I had constructed an opening chapter that provided descriptions of insurgency and counterinsurgency and then set out the initial set of principles, imperatives, and paradoxes. I was particularly proud of my detailed analogy that explained contemporary revolutionary war as a "multi-dimensional version of the ancient Oriental game of Go, . . .

free-flowing, unpredictable, without set patterns . . . or established time limits." I also introduced the concept of "mosaic war" to describe the complexity of modern COIN, a metaphor I first encountered in Phillip Davidson's description of Vietnam.[8]

Richard Lacquement provided a solid draft of chapter 2 that probably underwent the least revision of any part of the manual. That section also included Richard's CORDS case study, which benefited from much constructive criticism from historians, especially Dale Andrade from the Center for Military History. As a historian, I was especially keen on having a lot of historical illustrations in each chapter. They would really be vignettes rather than real case studies, because of lack of space, but I believed they would be very helpful in getting our concepts understood. Kyle Teamey built his chapter 3 around intelligence preparation of the battlefield for COIN. He also submitted a proposed appendix on detainee operations, which I forwarded to Rick Swain to consider incorporating into his chapter. The new chapter 4 was missing, as the Marines were still struggling to wrestle their ideas on operational design into understandable form. I had been told that Naveh wrote only in Hebrew, a notoriously difficult language, and that he wrote awkwardly. I could believe that from the early Marine efforts, which did resemble poor translations of bad Hebrew. They would eventually achieve great success, but not in this first draft. They requested us to invite Naveh to the conference, but that initiative never cleared diplomatic hurdles.[9] Jan Horvath recruited Col. Kevin Benson, then the director of the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, to provide comments and help on that chapter.

With the insertion of the design coverage the rest of the manual underwent a bit of rearrangement. Jan also provided the initial chapter 5 on operations, which probably was the one that underwent the most transformation of any chapter before final publication. Particularly vexing was the section on metrics, always difficult in COIN. Often the best indicators of progress require qualitative evaluations of people's attitudes and actions. Even quantifiable indicators have many different possible interpretations. One such is acts of violence: Who initiates the violence, and why? Are numbers rising, because the counterinsurgent is executing more offensive operations or because the insurgent is getting desperate? Are they

dropping, because the insurgent is in control of an area? The best indicator of improved security is usually that the people feel confident enough to resume normal activities. The writing team spent much time considering various measures of effectiveness and of performance. The former assess the results or consequences of actions, while the latter look at whether the commander's intent was achieved and specific tasks were accomplished. Measures of effectiveness are the more difficult to devise. Greg Daddis' superb book on assessment in Vietnam illustrates the problems of measuring progress in counterinsurgency, challenges that still plague us today.[10] The writing team improved this section through each draft but did not have many good examples from Iraq or Afghanistan to work with. That is one area that was much improved in the 2014 revision of the FM, which had the advantage of many years of more successful operations to examine. Jan had also worked with Colonel McMaster, still in Iraq, to obtain a case study of his success in Tal Afar for chapter 5.

Jim Corum's chapter 6 on training indigenous security forces was probably the most polished in the first draft. A long and thorough case study by Lou DiMarco at Fort Leavenworth on the negative impact of the use of torture by the French in Algeria was added at the end of Rick Swain's chapter 7 on leadership and ethics, which covered issues arising from detention and interrogation. (Lou's full submission proved too long for the final manual—we kept only a shortened version—but was so impressive that I encouraged him to submit it to the Army War College journal for publication. He did, and that article became another one of the numerous spinoffs from the manual writing effort.)[11] Major Davis furnished a logistics chapter 8 that was the most tactical in focus in the manual, full of diagrams and charts explaining combat support and combat service support. John Nagl provided an appendix on researching counterinsurgency and a list of recommended readings. The latter was highly controversial within CADD and among the lawyers, who argued that no government publication could appear to promote private works; Lieutenant General Petraeus himself wrangled approval for that bibliography. We also got a cultural assessment appendix from Montgomery McFate, one on interpreters from Jan Horvath, one on legal considerations from the lawyers, and another from Lieutenant Colonel Graham on social network analysis. Besides the

missing chapter 4, a gap was left at the end for a best-practices appendix from Kalev Sepp. CADD also added a glossary and short index.

I had had a chance to do only limited editing on a couple of chapters before the January edition was sent out to the vetting-conference attendees, but I reacted quickly once that text was created.[12] Lieutenant General Petraeus had sprung on CADD his request to change the manual number just before the draft went out, and I exploited his initiative by asking also for a change of title, from *Counterinsurgency Operations* to just *Counterinsurgency*. John Nagl and I had discussed this a short while earlier. Lieutenant General Petraeus accepted our logic that the new label better described the broader purpose and focus of our work, and that shift too was made. I realized we could not make big adjustments to the text itself in the three remaining weeks before the conference, but I did send each author some ideas for fixing what I saw as the most glaring deficiencies. The Marines also provided comments on each chapter. CADD did a very good job of incorporating the changes that came back, and when the conference began on 23 February everyone was asked to pick up a copy of the revised draft. Some were amazed, others perplexed, at another revision in so short a time. Steve Metz at SSI had already provided me a critique of the January draft, particularly expressing concern about the proposed definition of legitimacy, which he saw as too "American."[13] He would not be the last to make that observation.

The Circus Opens

Steve would be one of the many distinguished participants who made that February gathering so rich and, in my view, unique. Fred Kaplan has compared it to the famous bar scene from the movie *Star Wars*, but I think a more appropriate metaphor would be a combination of the organizational meeting for the First International and Gertrude Stein's salon in Paris.[14] Those gathered at Fort Leavenworth knew they were part of something important and were dealing with ideas seen as revolutionary or dangerous in some circles. At the same time, they considered none of those ideas sacrosanct, so free and enthusiastic debate flourished throughout the conference (and long after). While the bar at Tatooine was filled with

criminals and mercenaries out for personal gain, the volunteers who congregated at Fort Leavenworth had a higher purpose—to improve the capability of the United States to deal with the complex conflicts amongst the people that typify modern war. Instead of seeking to make problems, they were out to solve them.

We did not get everyone we wanted. I was particularly sorry to receive regrets from Professor Bard O'Neill, insurgency and terrorism expert at NDU; Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, commander of the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Bruce Hoffman from RAND; and author Max Boot. We also could not get T. X. Hammes back from Oxford. Nonetheless, the assembled multitude remained exceptional—in fact, it was an eclectic and brilliant group that I believe has never been matched in the COIN arena. Besides the distinguished list of presenters and discussants, the audience was filled with experts and enthusiasts from many fields. Lieutenant General Petraeus played a major role in shaping the group, though John, Jan, and I also had input. Jan and Tom usually cleared all proposed attendees with me before sending invitations, but I never said no. Sarah Sewall and her Carr Center added to the list some important names, whose travel they funded. The conference was designed to spread information as well as gather it and therefore included many media representatives who had reported extensively on COIN topics. These included CNN's Jane Arraf, now the press fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Jim Fallows, from the *Atlantic Monthly;* Elaine Grossman, from *Inside the Pentagon;* Greg Jaffe, from the *Wall Street Journal;* and Linda Robinson from *U.S. News and World Report*.

Author, journalist, Vietnam veteran, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Bing West was there, as was George Packer, who had recently published his book *Assassin's Gate*. From academia we had Eliot Cohen and Tom Mahnken from Johns Hopkins, Tom Marks from NDU, who had helped Jan Horvath with his draft of FM 3-07.22, and Brian Linn from Texas A&M (who had published two award-winning books on the Philippine insurgency). Tom McNaugher came from RAND. Bill Flavin and Janine Davidson were there. Sarah Sewall's contingent included Marc Garlasco from Human Rights Watch, Michael McClintock from Human Rights First, and Francoise Hampson, an international human rights lawyer at the University of Essex. Retired

veterans with SOF and El Salvador experience included John Waghelstein and James Steele, both colonels, and Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert. We had not gotten Shimon Naveh, but we had Brig. Gen. Huba Wass deCzege, USA (Ret.), a primary author of AirLand Battle doctrine and well-known Army intellectual, and Maj. Gen. Dave Fastabend, a key thinker for the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command. Ambassadors James Jeffrey and David Passage contributed their extensive State Department expertise, as did Molly Phee. Representatives came from the Army's Center for Military History, Center for Army Analysis, the Joint Staff, CIA, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security Council, as well as the Red Cross. The United Kingdom sent a large contingent headed by a major general. Australian Dave Kilcullen was there, serving as a counterterrorism advisor to the State Department (he had to leave early for Iraq when he heard about the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, what was to ignite so much sectarian violence). Other international attendees came from Germany, France, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, mostly liaison officers at CAC.

Participants began arriving on 22 February. Doug King had proposed that all the Army and Marine writers meet face to face that afternoon. The Marines had a list of concerns for every chapter that they wanted to hash out before the public session with media present. He wanted to make sure the conference itself featured real discussion instead of interservice squabbles. I must admit that I went into that preliminary meeting with some trepidation. I was the only person there who had met everyone already; all that the bulk of the Army writers knew about their "jarhead" coauthors had come from critical e-mails. Somehow we had to meld a team or at least achieve enough harmony to facilitate a smooth-flowing symposium over the next two days.

One can never predict how teams will form. There are many theories about the stages of group development, but most emphasize certain activities that can help the process along. I doubt any of them have ever considered cell-phone ring tones, though. After brief introductions, gruff Doug King got up to describe the Marine issues with the work so far. Even in civilian clothes, he looked like somebody who chewed bayonets for breakfast, and there was palpable tension in the air. Then his cell phone went off. I am not an aficionado of modern music (in fact, in my course on

American culture at West Point I used to tell cadets that “American Pie” was the last great American song), but the younger officers in the crowd (basically everyone but me) immediately cracked up, as he turned red in the face and excused himself to take the call. I was told later that the ringer was an excerpt from a particularly wild AC/DC hard rock tune. Whatever it was, any tension dissipated, and by the end of the meeting everyone was ready to grab a couple beers and warble “Kumbaya.” There were still differences of opinion, but it was now clear that all the writers shared the same passion for the project and dedication to its successful conclusion. I have never been involved in any other joint effort where different-service personnel worked together so smoothly and seamlessly.

Afterward I headed off to another important preconference session, a dinner with the British contingent, set up by their CAC liaison. Kevin Benson was also there. We had a pleasant meal, discussing Iraq and the writing of doctrine. Kevin even had a chance to vent a bit about campaign design. The Brits seemed excited about the conference and would prove to be active participants.

Since my idea for Che Guevara tee shirts had been nixed as inappropriate, we needed an alternative memento for conference attendees. I solicited ideas from Eliot, John, Jan, and Tom. Eliot favored a mug, as being easier to throw than tee shirts;[15] that prompted John to propose a new “principle” for the symposium: “Scathingly angry professors will not be allowed unaccompanied access to coffee mugs or other implements of destruction at the COIN conference.”[16] Whether because of or in spite of Eliot’s preference, the organizers at CAC indeed decided on a coffee mug. Negotiations between the Carr Center and Fort Leavenworth as cosponsors eventually created a logo to put on it. That still seemed too plain and inadequate to me, so I endeavored to find an appropriate supplement.

When I was stationed at Fort Bliss in Texas, I used to take my family on excursions up into New Mexico. On one of those trips we had stumbled on a unique fossil store, and I had procured a large piece of Diplodocus coprolite—petrified dinosaur excrement. It looked like a normal large rock until broken open to reveal quartzlike reds and browns. I kept it on my office desk and used it to threaten briefers who I believed were feeding me similar material. I happened to be wandering around a mall in Harrisburg in

mid-February when I stumbled upon one of those educational stores that carry lots of geology and astronomy items. In one corner was a box of about two hundred polished pieces of coprolite. I haggled with the clerk to get the price down and eventually struck a deal for all of it. It would make a strange addition to my luggage, but since this was the era before extra baggage fees that did not concern me. I thought I had hit upon the perfect gimmick to get everyone's attention at the conference.

When I arrived for the conference opening session on the morning of the 23rd, the Battle Command Training Center was a hive of activity—the staff was issuing badges, handing out draft manuals, and herding people into the main conference or overflow rooms. Many of the more than a hundred primary attendees had brought "straphangers," who spilled into the crowded overflow areas. The general sat next to Sarah Sewall right up front in the main venue. He would miss only a few minutes of the activities during the next two days (later explaining that he feared that if he left the other general officers in attendance might also feel free to step out), an immense investment of time for someone in his position but also indicative about the importance he placed on the event. All the 114 seats in the main room were occupied, and a large portion of the 250 overflow ones as well.

We had received presentation slides from all the presenters beforehand, including those for working lunches, and each attendee got a copy of a CD containing them. Also included on the disk was a copy of the February draft, a commentary on COIN by Ambassador Passage, a multitude of relevant Combat Studies Institute publications, and a draft pamphlet from the Joint Staff J-7 (responsible for Doctrine, Education, Concept Development and Experimentation, Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned) on a planning framework for stability operations. While it was understood that information on the CD would be distributed widely, what else "happened at Leavenworth would stay in Leavenworth." Each day everyone was reminded that "all dialogue is considered non-attributable (no by-name quotes) to ensure an open, robust, and candid dialogue among all participants." Requests by news media for on-the-record statements would be handled one on one, case by case; Sarah Sewall and her representatives were particularly sensitive about that issue. There accordingly was no reason for anyone to hold back anything, and no one did.[17]

After some opening housekeeping details, for what was officially called a “workshop,” and an explanation from CADD about where the new manual would fit within joint and Army doctrine, Lieutenant General Petraeus provided his opening remarks. He gave an overview of the Combined Arms Center, then moved on to describe his “Engine of Change” to make the Army a better learning organization. He explained the shifts in doctrine, leader development, collective training, lessons-learned processes, and knowledge management that had been instituted since the beginning of the GWOT. He closed by announcing his latest initiative, to set up an Army/Marine Corps COIN Center of Excellence at Fort Leavenworth as a further catalyst for change.

Doug King followed with a presentation on Marine Corps initiatives to deal with the changing security environment. Besides contributing to the COIN doctrine, these included revisions to the curriculum at Marine Corps schools, new cultural learning and training initiatives, and the establishment of a U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. I had a hard time understanding the logic for the latter, which looked to me like an attempt to grab a piece of another mission (and budget) area; I had always thought the Marines considered themselves elite special forces already. But I kept those sentiments to myself. I had more concern about creating a coherent chapter 4 than a new Marine SOC.

The two military briefings were followed by two civilian ones. Dr. Barbara Stephenson represented the new State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. She gave a creative presentation that mapped her office’s concepts for conflict transformation onto the draft doctrine. She ended by describing its work with the J-7 to develop a conflict-transformation planning framework for the whole U.S. government—another, and not the last, of those doomed attempts to develop unifying doctrine for civilian agencies in contemporary conflicts. She was followed by Sarah Sewall, who described the role of the Carr Center and what its representatives hoped to accomplish with their involvement in the conference.

Now it was my turn. I wanted to open with something powerful, and I thought the David Bernstein images did that. I may have been overly dramatic, but I wanted to emphasize that this was not an academic exercise, to make sure, by putting a face on the price of failure, that everyone

understood the main reason that we were there. There were many justifications for the presence of so many important people at Fort Leavenworth that day, but the primary one was that the nation's best and brightest were dying in faraway places trying to achieve its policy objectives, and we had a responsibility to lower those costs and improve the results.

I then recited a long list of additional reasons why we needed the new manual. The conventional military especially had neglected COIN for thirty years. Guidelines were needed for the troops in the field, as well as for anyone who supported them. I echoed Lieutenant General Petraeus' emphasis on changing the way the military thought and also John Nagl's persistent theme of learning and adaptation. We expected the manual also to set standards for further revisions in other joint and service doctrine, including war-fighting manuals as well as those associated with stability operations and related fields. I admitted that the draft product the audience had was more an anthology than a coherent body of thought and that it needed a lot of improvement, on a tight time line. Everyone was challenged to help us do that, to assist the military to speedily "head in new directions and break new ground." This was not just a "living document, it was constantly mutating." But I then explained the significance of the piece of coprolite that had been placed in each coffee mug. The rocks were colorful and bright, but they were still petrified crap. We had an obligation to create something that not only looked good, but also served a useful purpose. We would not produce another "shiny piece of shit." After describing the sources and high quality of the attendees, I explained the structure of the field manual and of the workshop itself, giving authors the responsibility to highlight changes from the January draft in their presentation but warning that we would be ruthless in enforcing our time schedule. We expected that most discussions would remain unfinished but hoped for written comments by e-mail or regular mail from all participants. I wanted those inputs within two weeks however, because I had a goal of completing another "mutation" by April. (That estimate would prove to be too optimistic.)

All that was accomplished before we had taken a single break. When everyone returned from a well-deserved respite, I had the task of finishing the morning with the analysis of chapter 1, setting the standard for the presentations to follow and getting everyone off to a very busy lunch. My

briefing began with a discussion of the sources of the ideas in chapter 1—classic theorists, contemporary writers, “the Marx Brothers (Lenin, Mao, Giap, Che),” think tanks, Lieutenant General Petraeus, and “the ubiquitous John Nagl.” That seemed the right adjective to use for John, who had been so important in generating the momentum that had gotten us to this point from so many directions. He liked the moniker and it stuck. I even heard Lieutenant General Petraeus use it on occasion. The dominant theme of the manual, the need to continuously learn and adapt, was and probably always will be John’s greatest legacy to the intellectual development of the American military.

The early draft of that opening chapter relied heavily upon Bard O’Neill’s work on insurgent types and approaches; on elements and dynamics of insurgency from the early work Jan Horvath and Tom Marks had done; and my own analysis of COIN principles, imperatives, and paradoxes. I was able to introduce the concept of “mosaic war” to describe the complexity of the conflict. For a discussant, I had invited Brigadier General Aylwin-Foster. I found out later that he was very used to being employed as “setup man” by Lieutenant General Petraeus, for whom Aylwin-Foster had served as deputy commander when Petraeus commanded the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq, MNSTC-I. Petraeus had been instrumental in getting the Brit’s incendiary article published (*Military Review* was also under Petraeus’ purview). The general used Aylwin-Foster’s arguments to get American military audiences riled up, like waving a red flag at a bull. In this case, after acknowledging that role, Aylwin-Foster emphasized both the scale and complexity of COIN challenges, talked about similarities with British doctrine, and pointed out that FM 3-24 had to address unique American military culture.

I had prepared some discussion questions to guide the ensuing commentary, but I got much more than I bargained for in a rich fifty minutes or so’s worth from about twenty-five participants. I found out that others agreed with Steve Metz’s concern about the definition of legitimacy; my “Go” metaphor was too complex; some thought there was too much Mao; and we needed more coverage of motivations for insurgency and of the overarching importance of political outcomes, as well as of the impact of globalization. The most entertaining moment for me came when one of the foreign liaison officers held up the draft manual and declared that it was

“much too good for a field manual.” I jokingly replied that we were negotiating with Stephen Spielberg for film rights, but the officer’s point was that he thought the document was pitched at too complex a level for soldiers in his army, with too much nonmilitary terminology and too many concepts outside the military’s purview. Our editors at CADD would work diligently on all the drafts to keep the language understandable for our audience, but we were not going to lower the intellectual bar for our soldiers and Marines or narrow the discussion. In hindsight, I realize that this remark was influenced by his European perspective on what COIN was, which I would later find to be much more restricted than ours.

That completed the morning sessions in grand style, but the participants did not get much of a break over lunch. After getting their meals in the designated lunchroom, they received briefings from Dr. Tom Marks on the continuing relevance of Mao as the “gold standard” for insurgency and how COIN operational art could defeat such an approach; from Col. Alex Alderson on British COIN principles; and from Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert, USA (Ret.), on the pendulum swings of American COIN doctrine and practice that he had witnessed and on how SOF and conventional forces should work together. Then everyone was herded back into the seminar rooms for a crowded afternoon. I had the responsibility of keeping the “COIN circus” on schedule and the discussion flowing, though with that lively audience I could never figure out whether I was a ringmaster or a lion tamer.

Richard Lacquement began with his overview of chapter 2 on unity of effort, emphasizing the importance of agencies other than the military in securing final success in COIN. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy played the role of discussant, identifying a list of other challenges in achieving true coherence of actions between civilian and military actors. That was the primary theme of the ensuing discussion. There was some pushback about the necessity for unity of command in any war, but the strong consensus was that there were too many disparate players to achieve that ideal. During his presentation, Richard included a Gen. Tony Zinni quote about the importance of “handshake con” in Somalia, a play on the military terminology for relationships such as “OPCON” for operational control or “TACON” for tactical control. Lieutenant General Petraeus thought that that description of ad hoc and

situational command and control relationships in such complex environments was so important that he directed it be placed in the manual.

We then moved to chapter 3, on intelligence. Kyle Teamey emphasized the importance of focusing on people, and of requiring social, political, and cultural analysis, as well as the difficulties in joint, combined, and interagency intelligence fusion. All soldiers and Marines were potential intelligence collectors, and often-neglected human intelligence was usually more important than technical means. His discussant was Lt. Col. Jon Sweet from the Joint Staff, who ignited a dialogue with the audience that brought up many of the shortcomings apparent in contemporary operations. Issues included incorporating bottom-up intelligence, getting reliable interpreters, and establishing rules of engagement. One particularly insightful commentary described the difficulties in the field with the transfer of intelligence during transitions, a persistent problem with unit rotations.


Information Operations
Combat Operations
Secure the populace continuously
Separate insurgency from people. Identify and neutralize political and support infrastructure
Counter crime (organized and petty)
Secure national and regional borders. Isolate insurgency
Integrate with HN security forces. Hand over responsibility on case-by-case basis
Train and Employ HN Security Forces
Identify and recruit leaders. Recruit members.
Establish training centers and infrastructure
Develop organizational infrastructure for security forces
Basing and training
Integrate organization with U.S. and employ HN security forces
Essential Services (Life Support)
Security
Sanitation, sewage and trash collection
Potable water
Electrical power
Transportation network
Education and schools
Medical clinics and hospitals
Governance
Identify and recruit local leaders and organizational representatives
Establish national, regional, and local agencies and departments
Develop national, regional, and local policies and ordinances
Reapply justice system (law enforcement, legal courts and prisons)
Support and secure elections
Economic Development
Mobilize/ develop local economic activity (water, food, fuel, clothing, agriculture
Initiate contracts with HN local businesses to stimulate trade
Rebuild commercial infrastructure (banks, transportation, marketplace, currency)
Support broadbased economic opportunity (micro to macro development)
Support a free market economy
Conditions
The public secured continuously/ freedom of lawful movement
Effective and self-sufficient HN security forces
Essential services developed and/or restored/ refurbished
Effective government institutions and presence established or restored
Functional economy re-established/ freedom to conduct lawful commerce
Endstate
Secure and Stable Environment

Figure 5-1. Common counterinsurgency operational-level logical lines of operations

This FM 3-24 diagram of logical lines of operations underwent many revisions before reaching its final version.

To allow the Marines an extra day to get their design presentation together, we finished the afternoon with chapter 5, COIN operations. As a result of the especially rapid "mutation" of that part of the manual, there were considerable changes from the first draft, particularly with refinement of the logical lines of operation (LLOs) for COIN and the incorporation of more aspects of information operations. At one time we had considered a separate information-operations chapter, but the team eventually decided that since it affected every LLO, it belonged in the chapter with them. Jan argued it was the most decisive activity of COIN operations. He described

the other LLOs quickly and explained the concept of “clear-hold-build” that would dominate the chapter. Lance McDaniel assisted by providing examples of activities included in the LLOs from work the Marines had done, foreshadowing the next day’s chapter 4 discussion. Their discussant, Kalev Sepp, gave a most insightful critique based on his analysis of best practices. The ensuing commentary from the audience was again valuable; to their credit its members had retained their enthusiasm and intellectual vitality all day. Many of the civilian participants emphasized incorporating their tasks and perspectives into the LLOs. Particularly lively debates revolved around the importance of openness and truth in information operations and in metrics of success, always a problem in COIN.

It was now after five o’clock, but the day was far from over. All attendees were quartered in Hoge Barracks, the large guest-housing building at Fort Leavenworth. They were bussed there from the BCTC to freshen up and then taken to the Frontier Conference Center for a banquet. Lieutenant General Petraeus gave an address on his observations about COIN, while many topics from the day’s discussions bubbled around the tables. At 8:30 a select group of guests was taken for cocktails at Lieutenant General Petraeus’ home, while the rest returned to Hoge Barracks.

If any part of the two-day gathering truly resembled the bar scene on Tatooine, it was in the small bar at Hoge Barracks. I remember being cornered, while trying to get a beer, by Francoise Hampson. For some reason, she felt determined to instruct me about important aspects of international human rights law in COIN, for forty-five minutes. I learned a lot, but I really needed that beer, even more when she was done. I eventually extricated myself from the bar and wandered around the building. Having everyone housed there had been a brilliant decision by someone, because the intellectual intensity carried over from the earlier discussions. I ran into many clusters of disparate people debating all kinds of intricate issues. I particularly remember one grouping, I believe in John Nagl’s room. He was there with Kalev Sepp, Richard Lacquement, Molly Phee, and Jane Arraf. Someone had procured a bottle of good Scotch, and I remember that they all appeared mellow by then. I don’t remember anything about the topics of discussion, but I was impressed with Jane’s mastery of profanity. Her use of such colorful language was particularly surprising to me because she had a soothing voice as an interviewer.

Whatever they were drinking, it did not seem to affect the quality of their participation the next day, which continued at a high level.

Day Two

Everyone was sobered up by 8 a.m. when busses picked us up for the final day of the conference back at the BCTC. The Marines would dominate many of the presentations. We began with chapter 4. They had finally produced a draft, and Lt. Col. Dave Pere brought slides with him as well. The Marine explanation was highly theoretical, but discussant Kevin Benson did well tying operational design to the operational art he taught at the School of Advanced Military Studies and justifying design as the doctrinal start to figuring out the problem you are trying to solve. The ensuing discussion continued to grapple with the concept and question its utility, with a primary focus on commander's vision, end states, and metrics for success. By the conclusion of the session, many of us had begun finally to understand what the concept was all about. Not everyone was sold on it yet, but at last we had a good starting point to work from.

We had scheduled more breaks on the second day but still demanded a hectic pace and a long morning. Jim Corum gave the next presentation on chapter 6, on training indigenous forces. He covered the historical background of the American experience, the many elements involved in creating a viable indigenous security establishment, and the central importance of police in COIN. He had added a case study about the British experience in Malaya to reinforce that latter point. His discussant was newly retired Col. John Martin, back from still another GWOT deployment, this time working under Lieutenant General Petraeus when he ran MNSTC-I training the Iraqi army. Fresh from his own experience wrestling with indigenous forces, "J.R.," as he is known to his friends, feared the chapter might be setting the bar higher than could be achieved. Historical examples where the trainers maintained sovereignty, like Malaya, were not relevant to the situation in Iraq. He also emphasized the importance of choosing the best people for training teams, a point John Nagl also often made. The American historical record on that practice was not a good one. Again the Vietnam example is illustrative; there officers knew that assignments to

advisory teams were not as career-enhancing as orders to American units, and training for such missions was often perfunctory.[18]

The discussion on chapter 6 was among the most diverse of all and the most heated to that point. There were exchanges about which kinds of military units were best suited to such training and the proper role of international and civilian organizations. Human rights violations by indigenous forces also sparked concerns, as did opinions that we tended too much to view foreign trainees in our own image. There was a lively discussion about whether the whole manual downplayed killing too much, a theme that we would never be able to eliminate, no matter how many changes we made.

Everyone needed a break after that session, but they still had one more chapter to review before lunch. That too would inspire a lively and often heated debate. Rick Swain gave a presentation on behalf of his West Point team on chapter 7, leadership and ethics in counterinsurgency. He described their view on the importance of commanders setting the right leadership tone and about the ethical differences between war fighting and policing. He also thought the Algeria case study that had been added needed to be moved to another section or shortened. Discussant Frank Hoffman revealed that the Marines did not like the "Be-Know-Do" doctrinal construct of the chapter, considering it outdated, and proposed some emerging concepts that might be better organizing principles for leaders of learning organizations. Much of the following discussion from the audience focused on the last section on detainees, which Swain's team had added at my request, based on the input provided by Kyle Teamey. Since the revelations at Abu Ghraib, detention and interrogation had become a sensitive issue. Some participants did not think that discussion belonged in that part of the manual. Sarah Sewall's group was particularly concerned about a two-paragraph insertion from Tony Pfaff about "ticking time bomb" scenarios that were often used to justify torture. The human rights proponents argued that there could be no apparent toleration in doctrine for any kind of "gray area" behavior when ethics were concerned. There was almost immediate consensus on the inappropriateness of that section, and it would be removed from future drafts. Tony later complained that his intent was not to justify such logic but to increase awareness of it, but that particular discussion convinced Sarah

and her contingent that they were really being listened to and could have meaningful impact on the doctrine. Almost thirty people commented on the unique ethical and leadership pressures that COIN placed on commanders. The discussion was brought to an end by Lieutenant General Petraeus, stating that nothing that smacked of torture had any place in the manual, and by an announcement by Clint Ancker that new doctrinal manuals being written on interrogation and detainees would probably supersede anything we planned to do in that arena—which ultimately proved to be correct.

It was now after 12:30, and the participants had finally earned the right to go to another working lunch. They were herded into the lunch room, where Jim Steele regaled them with his description of operations in El Salvador. Then Lieutenant General Petraeus gave special presents to the many people who had helped make the conference possible. Most of us got CAC commander's coins—actually fitting, considering our topic. But there was no time to savor any awards, as we needed to get everyone back to the grind of finishing the symposium.

Major Davis opened the afternoon with an insightful presentation about chapter 8, logistics in counterinsurgency, emphasizing how different CS/CSS was for nonlinear COIN as compared to conventional major combat operations. His presentation convinced some skeptics about the utility of the chapter. The Marines provided another discussant, Lt. Col. Kevin Brown, their assigned coauthor, who provided further insights about problems with inter- and intratheater logistics and supplying indigenous security forces. The shortened discussion that followed focused on issues with contracts and different standards of living between Americans and indigenous people, as well as the special leverage good logistics provided for COIN.

We did not have time on the schedule to cover all the appendices, but we did allocate to John Nagl forty minutes to cover his section on learning and to Dr. McFate to discuss cultural assessment. We also had some time left for an open discussion. The consensus from the assembly was that both subjects were too important to be relegated to an appendix. John's material would be incorporated throughout the manual, except for his recommended readings, which would stay as a separate bibliography. Dr. McFate's work would need to be merged with Kyle Teamey's chapter on intelligence, giving them both tough assignments. One of the audience members took the

opportunity to praise the openness of the conference and the process it represented and to wish there was some way to get Congress to operate in the same manner. He also opined with some foresight that the toughest battle would be getting the political system to the same level of competence as the military.

It was then time for summaries and closing comments. In the few minutes I was allotted, I talked about changes I foresaw for each chapter. I had a lot of work to do on legitimacy for chapter 1, and while there was broad acceptance of the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes, many suggestions had been voiced for changes to supporting material. Sarah Sewall was especially motivated to contribute more and would provide enough material to develop a new paradox. We needed additional detail on dealing with multinational and coalition forces in chapter 2. Melding the new combination chapter 3 would require a lot of work, and chapter 8 had to be tied closer to the LLO construct of chapter 5. It was apparent that chapter 4 still had a long way to go, and chapter 5 needed more detail about specifics of the LLOs. The many divergent viewpoints about chapter 6 would take many months to resolve. The ethical issues over chapter 7 had been resolved, but eventually the Be-Know-Do construct would be dropped as the writers changed. I knew I had not covered everything and emphasized the need to provide written comments to me or the team within two weeks. More good ideas would come from that deluge of commentary. I ended by thanking everyone for their hard work and declaring that I thought David Bernstein would have been proud of us.

As always, Lieutenant General Petraeus had the last word. He directed me to get better continuity between chapters as we continued to aim for speedy publication. He asked the audience to keep the COIN dialogue going, perhaps with a virtual community. (That would actually happen, in many different Internet forums.) He announced that the Marines had the responsibility for a tactics, techniques, and procedures COIN manual for company commanders, and that he would continue work to establish the Army/USMC COIN Center of Excellence at Fort Leavenworth. He also said that he would set up a high-level meeting with the Department of State to increase COIN cooperation and interoperability. Then he dismissed us, and the workshop was over. The Big Tent came down.

At that point, I was both physically and mentally drained. I traded comments with a few of the departing attendees, but most left quickly to catch departing Friday flights or to drive home. I was one of the last people out of the meeting room. I was disappointed by the number of pieces of coprolite left behind and began to police them up. Then some of the young officers and soldiers doing cleanup began approaching me for stones to give to their children. I handed out all that I had picked up and even a couple of my spares. I decided that if I could not make an impression on a bunch of mature analysts, maybe I could at least help educate the younger generation. There were a lot of children at Fort Leavenworth that week with neat objects for Show and Tell in school. It was a small token of appreciation for those staff members who had supported the conference so well. It had been a monumental effort, and I believe a unique one, sort of a brief COIN Camelot that would not be recreated. Expectations were high about what it would produce. I thought I had a better sense now about how much work was left to finish the job. Again, I would be wrong. Lieutenant General Petraeus and I both expected we could finish sometime in late summer or early fall. The final version of the field manual would not be published until December, and it would be a very different product than the February draft. The next nine months would involve an intense intellectual debate about the execution of counterinsurgency, a discourse that went beyond just the issues raised by the conference and that would draw in myriad new military and civilian contributors.

CHAPTER FIVE

From Theory to Doctrine

Intellectual Debates about Contemporary Warfare

Fred Kaplan does a generally fine job in his book *The Insurgents* describing the many initiatives throughout the Army dealing with COIN at the time of the Leavenworth workshop, but he is wrong when he claims that the doctrinal "cake was already baked" and the conference was just designed to confirm it.[1] It is a tribute to the effort of the writers and editors in those hectic first two months that such an impression was possible, but an immense amount of work remained after the event. The final manual would be far different from the February draft, affected by comments from conference attendees, external criticism, broadly based internal reviews by the Army and Marine Corps, and continuing contributions by the extremely dedicated writing team, who were members because they wanted to be, not because they had to be. Everyone had other jobs to do. Kyle Teamey got out of the Army to pursue a graduate degree but continued to work on the manual anyway, on his own time.

Within a few weeks of the end of the workshop, I was deluged with written and electronic comments from participants. Steve Metz was shooting me e-mails as the conference was proceeding and then followed up with more. Eliot Cohen sent me his comments as he was flying home. Brian Linn was not far behind, and neither was John Waghelstein. Sarah Sewall sent an initial response and suggestions how to further her cooperation with

CAC. I would get even more from her later. Michael McClintock e-mailed me finely crafted thirty-eight pages of recommendations from the Human Rights First perspective. Elizabeth Kvitashvili provided extensive comments from USAID. Janine Davidson furnished her insights. The Center for Army Analysis sent a detailed critique, along with an update on its own computer model for COIN. I got particularly rich commentaries from "the Smith brothers," two CIA representatives at the conference; some of their comments I incorporated verbatim into chapter 1. Tom McNaugher put a lot of effort into improving chapter 4.

That covers just a portion of our feedback. With Tom Westen's help, I gathered together all we received and farmed out to the authors the relevant comments to their respective chapters. The writing team also produced copious notes, which circulated. The month after the workshop was an intellectual feeding frenzy. Then the authors settled down to produce the next draft.

There was some attrition after February. Rick Swain had made clear from the beginning that he could not commit himself to the project for the long term, so Frank Hoffman took over lead responsibility for chapter 7. Sean Davis was completing his time as a student; we were lucky to get Lt. Col. Marian Vlasak to take his place, out of the Military History Department over at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). She had been a student of mine at West Point and was another veteran of the History Department faculty. I had particularly enjoyed working with her on her senior thesis as a cadet, dealing with the populist elements that shaped L. Frank Baum's *Wizard of Oz*. She was a good writer with unique combat experience in Somalia. She would do fine with the logistics chapter. Lieutenant Colonel Graham, for his part, was getting stretched by his duties at West Point and brought in Lt. Col. Brian Reed to help with the appendix on social network analysis.

CADD underwent some key personnel changes. The toughest loss would be Jan Horvath. He eventually headed to Iraq in the fall, to the COIN Center for Excellence of the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I). Lance McDaniel picked up primary responsibility for chapter 5. We also lost Tom Westen in the summer, replaced by Maj. Barry Periatt.

Some other additions to the team included Col. Mark Martins, probably the most knowledgeable person in the Army about legal aspects of COIN.

Mark volunteered his time, expertise, and connections within the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch to help with the legal appendix. Mark had been Lieutenant General Petraeus' legal advisor in several previous assignments, and he subsequently would serve two years straight in Iraq as Petraeus' legal advisor during the Surge and two years in Afghanistan engaged in the rule-of-law effort there. He rewrote the draft annex and passed it to the military lawyers at the JAG Legal Center and School at Charlottesville, Virginia, where eventually Maj. Carlos Santiago became our primary contact. Another new key player was Col. Peter Mansoor, recruited by Lieutenant General Petraeus to establish the new Army/Marine Corps COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth.

Petraeus would later get Mansoor and H. R. McMaster on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Iraq Assessment Team in the fall of 2006, and he would take Mansoor to Iraq with him as his executive officer when he deployed in early February 2007 to command the Surge. Mansoor subsequently wrote a superb insider account of the effort in Iraq that is footnoted often in this book. Like H.R., Pete was a veteran of the History Department Future Warfare group whose career had survived getting evaluations from me. I had also worked with him while he was a student at the Army War College in the Advanced Strategic Art Program. Pete knew he was going directly from Carlisle to command a brigade in Iraq in the summer of 2003, and shortly before leaving he had a long discussion with Andy Terrill and me about what he might face there. Less than a month after graduating, he had moved his family to Germany and deployed with his soldiers to Baghdad. In mid-July, he sent me an e-mail that was such a terrific description of modern COIN that I had it distributed to all of the incoming AWC class:

> We are fighting former regime-backed paramilitary groups, Iranian-based opposition, organized criminals, and street thugs. We have stood up governing councils from neighborhood to district to city level. We have conducted humanitarian action in numerous areas to include repair of electricity, water, sewer, hospitals, and schools; created refuse collection systems and built numerous recreational facilities (particularly soccer fields). We have cleared hundreds of

> tons of UXOs [unexploded ordnance] and weapons caches. I have already hosted Fox News, ABC, ITN, UP, Reuters, the New Yorker, and an Indian news service. On any given day I deal with the political realm of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the humanitarian realm of the NGOs, and the military realm of firefights/improved explosive devices/snipers/mortar attacks. My BCT [brigade combat team] contains active duty, reservists, and National Guardsmen. The BCT has lost 4 soldiers since taking over the sector. The soldiers are staying focused and disciplined, and are getting more effective with each passing day. Our snipers have had some success as of late—enough said. . . . The people we kicked out of power can't stand our success, however, and will do everything they can to try to make us fail. Thus the ongoing gun battles in the streets. There is also a lot of organized crime here. I have flashbacks to "The Godfather" all the time. As the military commander of Eastern Baghdad, I feel like Don Corleone . . . or maybe a ward boss on the south side of Chicago.[2]

John Nagl also recruited David Kilcullen to craft a special appendix for us containing his observations about COIN; eventually that would also be published as a separate piece in *Military Review*. Our editor, Steve Capps (see chapter 3), reorganized the entries to match themes in the manual.[3] While most of Kilcullen's remarks were tactical, they provided unique perspectives on the broader concepts we were trying to promulgate.

I also decided to get Jim Corum to write an appendix on the use of airpower in COIN. We had been unable to get the Air Force to show any interest in our project and were lucky to have Dr. Bill Dean attend our conference from Air University on his own initiative. He recommended the airpower addition, and I discussed it with Lieutenant General Petraeus. The Marines felt the new section was unnecessary, since everyone knew airpower was an important part of any operation, But I argued that the Army did not own its air support, as the Marines did, and needed more-detailed discussion of its possible contributions to COIN. Lieutenant General Petraeus also hoped that appendix might finally attract the Air Force to join us. Jim was the right person for the job, as he had coauthored the seminal

book on airpower in irregular conflicts.[4] To lighten Jim's load a bit I asked J. R. Martin, back in SSI as a civilian after a tour serving with MNSTC-I, to contribute to chapter 6.

One of the goals of the conference had been to generate media buzz about what we were doing, and that buzz led to all kinds of new opportunities. John Nagl appeared with author Bob Sorley and me on the Public Broadcasting Service show *Charlie Rose* to talk about "Lessons Learned in Vietnam and the U.S. Military Strategy in Iraq."[5] The normal host was out, so Jim Fallows, COIN conference attendee and author of *Blind into Baghdad*, moderated. John and I were thankful to have Bob there, the biographer of Creighton Abrams in Vietnam, so we could steer questions to him that were too sensitive for DoD employees to answer. John and I also participated on COIN panels for Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools at Fort Knox and Fort Bliss, and I gave presentations at the war colleges and at general-officer training courses. In addition, many articles began to appear that talked about our effort, not always accurately. Often their critiques were based on out-of-date drafts or paraphrased others' misinterpretation of out-of-date drafts. That problem would only get worse.

In the meantime, all the authors were preparing for another conference, to be held at Fort Leavenworth in mid-May. My April target had been too ambitious, but by May we had produced a draft significantly different from the February version. I had considerably expanded chapter 1, from 15 pages with 74 numbered paragraphs to 21 pages with 104. I inserted a large section on insurgent approaches based on Bard O'Neill's categories. A new figure was created to illustrate how the proportion of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks varied in different phases over time in COIN, as well as how they might differ geographically and by echelon. To the traditional insurgent conspiratorial, focoist military, urban terrorist, and protracted war strategies, I added a new category, which I called "identity-based," that applied to a clan, tribe, or ethnic group participating en masse as a community.[6]

There were many changes to the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes. Every explanation was expanded. I made considerable adjustments to my discussion of the key concept of legitimacy, moving away from a purely Western definition to one more locally determined. Sarah Sewall provided

me a paper and briefing describing how decreasing violence would change public expectations and shift legal norms from the law of war to international human rights law, requiring restraint in the use of military force and more reliance on conventional policing. As often happened, her work was compressed to save words while retaining its insights. A new third paradox was added to the list: “The More Successful You Are, the Less Force You Can Use—and the More Risk You Must Accept.”

Richard Lacquement fine-tuned chapter 2, but it stayed about the same size. Kyle Teamey and Montgomery McFate had the most difficult assignment, that of recrafting and combining their work in chapter 3. They created a new appendix on intelligence preparation of the battlefield that included most of the checklists that were in the manual, including an analysis of “ASCOPE,” for civil considerations—that is, areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Dr. McFate was highly dissatisfied with that acronym, since most important civil considerations for COIN were under “people,” but she worked with it as best she could. The original analytical and descriptive sections remained in chapter 3, which still ended up thirteen pages shorter than in the February version with so much moved to that appendix.



Figure 4-2. Iterative counterinsurgency campaign design

This figure from FM 3-24 shows the process of campaign design and how it relates to the lines of operation in planning. Campaign design requires continuous reassessment of environmental conditions, which in turn force corresponding changes in plans.

The Marines had made an immense amount of progress with chapter 4 on campaign design. Frank Hoffman had helped with that as well. Their discussion was short, concise, and actually easy to understand, showing how understanding the problem set had to precede planning in complicated operations. The addition of a case study of then–Maj. Gen. James Mattis and the 1st Marine Division in Anbar Province provided a clear example of operational design for complex COIN, including how to disaggregate and deal with a coalition of enemies. No other part of the field manual would have as much impact on the whole of American military doctrine as would that chapter.



Figure 4-3. 1st Marine Division's operational design for Operation Iraqi Freedom II

This figure from FM 3-24 shows how General Mattis dealt with the three major enemies he faced in Anbar Province. Each required a different approach. Eventually, after the "Awakening," the tribes began attacking the foreign fighters of Al Qaeda.

In contrast, chapter 5 remained a work in progress. In May it was still a hodgepodge of different ideas. The Marines added more meat on combined-action platoons, but details and diagrams for the various logical lines of operation remained incomplete. We were also still struggling with the phases of COIN and the mechanisms of clear-hold-build, as well as with proper metrics for assessment.

There were different problems with chapter 6, basically arising from divergence in philosophies about developing indigenous security forces. It had expanded by nine pages since February, but a realist-versus-idealist split within the writing team revealed at the workshop remained, exacerbated by differences between Army and Marine approaches. Frank Hoffman had recast chapter 7 away from the Be-Know-Do construct, with Colonel Swain's assistance, and had shaped the discussion of detention and interrogation around the recently passed Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

Chapter 8 had undergone the most drastic cuts, from forty-two pages to only seventeen, as Marian Vlasak removed much of the tactical details and diagrams to focus more on operational matters. The material removed was just not relevant for a campaign-level manual, and its deletion kept the length more manageable, though the publication was still longer than we wanted.

The appendices had also undergone revision and would get even more rearrangement later. John Nagl's appendix A remained unchanged for now but was followed by the new nineteen-page "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield." I did a lot of tightening of appendix C on interpreters, and Mark Martins and the JAG school had created a new and much more detailed legal appendix. Social network analysis stayed at appendix E but now was followed by Jim Corum's new airpower section. A new unexpected appendix G was inserted that combined Kalev Sepp's and David Kilcullen's ideas on best practices. There had been some miscommunication with the editors about that section that I'd have to straighten out later.

Creating the Coordinating Draft

From 17 to 19 May the writing team assembled again at Fort Leavenworth to hash over the latest version of the field manual, with the goal of producing the "final coordinating draft" for distribution in June. That text would be sent throughout the Army and Marine Corps for comments, with a goal of publication in October. Once the coordinating draft was sent around, the writing effort would be in official channels, and we would have less control over the final intellectual content. However, I would continue to resist changes that I thought were too drastic, and I would usually have the important support of Lieutenant General Petraeus in doing so.

Pete Mansoor's book on the Surge reports that Lieutenant General Petraeus "took control of the electrons" late in the writing process.[7] I had told the general that I thought chapter 1 was the most important, probably the only one a lot of people would read, so he needed to pay particular attention to its final form; however, he always had the final say for every chapter, and he read them all. He remembers reviewing over thirty drafts of chapter 1 alone. I don't have the same recollection, but he did see scores of

versions of various chapters. We had our differences over some points, and I actually won a few arguments, but in the end he was the boss. He was also a very thorough editor. I still have a bit of PTSD over “Petraeus pronouns,” when a sentence begins with “It is” or “This is” and the antecedent is not clear. He apparently became quite focused on such inspecific pronouns, as many of his speechwriters have ruefully confessed to me.

The final resolution of the differences over chapter 6 provides a good example of how the editorial process often worked and of his role in it. When the May conference failed to create a consensus on indigenous security forces, I circulated the draft chapter for suggested revisions: Jim Corum got it first, followed by Erik Doyle for the Marines; then John Nagl looked at it, followed by J. R. Martin. Finally, I tried to resolve all the differences, but realizing Lieutenant General Petraeus’ special interest and expertise on the subject, I decided to let him play King Solomon to settle the most intense disagreements. I e-mailed a package to him at 11:10 p.m. on Saturday, 3 June. At 10:32 the next morning, he sent me his edits. Except for one organizational paragraph he solicited from Col. James Greer at MNSTC-I and some final formatting from Steve Capps, that version was what was in the June coordinating draft.

All the chapter authors got valuable guidance and many good ideas from that May session, and significant adjustments would be made during the next month. Some were just due to service preferences. For chapter 1, the Marines did not like figure 1-1, which depicted possible phases of COIN with elements of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, so it was much simplified from four sample blocks to one. They also did not think O’Neill’s list of distinct types of insurgency based on motivations was necessary. In hindsight, I wish I had kept those sections intact, as I believe they would have enriched the final product. Based upon our team discussions I expanded most other areas of the chapter and added new coverage of insurgent narratives and vulnerabilities. Kalev Sepp’s appendix on best practices became figure 1-3 at the end of the chapter—years of painstaking research crammed into one half-page chart. That figure, actually, is a good metaphor for the whole manual, which attempted to provide as much useful information as possible in as little space as possible.

Chapter 2 changed little, though Richard did track down that the Zinni “Handshake Con” referred to Operation Provide Comfort instead of

Somalia. Chapter 3 became better organized and integrated as Kyle and Montgomery fit their sections together better; Dr. McFate also gave me some good suggestions for chapter 1. Doug King and his crew improved chapter 4 by adding a figure depicting the differences between design and planning and also a crafty historical vignette about Napoleon's unpreparedness for the aftermath of his invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808, the "Spanish ulcer" that so drained French capacity and resources. I have been asked many times if that example was a subtle attempt by the writing team to criticize the Bush administration for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I can truthfully say that such a rationale was never discussed among us, but only the Marine writers can really answer the question. I must admit that the possibility did occur to me when I first saw it and that it reinforced my admiration for how the chapter had developed.



Figure 1-1. Possible COIN phases

This figure from the May draft of FM 3-24 illustrates how the three elements of military operations can shift in their relationships in various phases of COIN. At the urging of the Marines, the final version removed the bottom three example blocks, while keeping the text.

Chapter 5 was cut from thirty-seven pages to twenty-nine as Jan Horvath and Lance McDaniel streamlined the descriptions of LLOs and tightened the historical vignettes. Richard Lacquement assisted by fine-

tuning the coverage of Tal Afar. I have already described the process that crafted the June chapter 6. Frank Hoffman did considerable editing of chapter 7, reducing it from a bit over twelve pages to nine, cutting a section on "enabling competencies" while sharpening the focus on ethics and judgment. Chapter 8 ended up a bit longer after Marian Vlasak made her revisions. She would retire on 1 August but continue to work on the manual.

The appendices underwent some reshuffling. Appendix A became Steve Capps' reorganized version of Dave Kilcullen's contribution. John Nagl's learning appendix moved to G. We also took John's recommended readings section out of references and created a special annotated bibliography—as far as I know, our field manual remains the only one with that sort of recommended-readings section.

From the end of the May author's gathering until the coordinating draft was sent out on 20 June, my schedule was unrelenting. I collected all the rewrites, edited them, tried to standardize the writing so there would be continuity and flow, sent the products to the Marines for their comments and reacted to their critiques and revisions, and then sent the product to Steve Capps. He made sure we were not in conflict with other doctrine, used the right terminology, and were clear in our meanings before formatting everything into a unified document. When I got outside submissions, either unsolicited or requested from someone by Lieutenant General Petraeus, I usually tried to farm them out to John Nagl for review, though he had the temerity to complain to me on a few occasions that his real job was cutting into his time available for me. I worked until midnight almost every day. The coordinating draft was the culmination of seven hectic months of frenetic intellectual ferment, and it was a tribute to the dedication and diligence of all the soldiers, Marines, and civilians involved.

But now its fate was out of our hands—the draft was sent throughout the Army and Marine Corps. Even the Office of the Vice President asked John Nagl for a copy.[8] The document was posted on *Army Knowledge Online*, on which anyone connected to the service could comment. When I say that FM 3-24 had 600,000 editors, I am not kidding, though admittedly only a few thousand really took the opportunity to read the draft. Comments came in from all over the world. I started getting them the week the draft was distributed, but most were sent to the collection point of contact at Fort

Leavenworth. The deadline for input was 17 July, but we would continue to receive suggestions, especially from general officers, up until the publication of the official manual in December. While the writing team had tried to create doctrine broadly applicable to any counterinsurgency, today or tomorrow, the commentary from the field was mostly influenced by contemporary fights, especially in Iraq. That commentary would have significant impact on the final product, focusing it more on the present than the future. Since Lieutenant General Petraeus knew by now that he was likely headed back to Iraq to exercise the doctrine, he too was inclined to shape it toward that end.

Our publication goal was still October. CADD gathered together all the inputs, sorted them by chapter, and sent them to the authors for comment. I had all their responses by 14 August; I drove to Quantico to talk to the Marines on the 15th and flew to Fort Leavenworth on the 16th. There I sat down with a few members of the writing team for two days to go over each submitted comment. We had received over four thousand from the field, a thousand from the Marines and the rest from the Army. CADD placed submissions in four categories: “Critical” (raising so contentious an issue that it risked official nonconcurrence with the manual), “Major” (pointing out items so erroneous as to also risk nonconcurrence by the submitting agency), “Substantive” (pointing out material factually incorrect but not enough to merit nonconcurrence), and “Administrative” (editorial and typographical comments). While the Marine Corps writers provided no feedback to Marines who responded to the coordinating draft, Major Periatt, who had replaced Tom Westen, had the unenviable responsibility of replying in writing to all from the Department of the Army who sent in the most serious comments. He ended up sending out over eight hundred responses.[9]

Barry had a lot of work, as did the team. We could not just reject the criticism without explaining why, and we had received a large number of submissions that were well thought out and not easily dismissed. The discussions at the August gathering were long and mentally exhausting. Most comments had come from field-grade officers, company-grade officers, warrant officers, and DA civilians, but there were others from noncommissioned officers, contractors, and even retirees. Represented

organizations came from around the world, including Afghanistan and Iraq. Bill Flavin from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute probably provided the most of any individual. I had included in early drafts some of his commentary on “spoilers,” who foment unrest, but the Marines had not thought it necessary. He wanted it reinstated, along with a number of other concepts from stability operations doctrine he was working on for Field Manual 3-07. We still disagreed whether COIN was a subcategory of stability operations, but we did adopt some of his ideas. I wish I had fought harder to keep more of his spoilers concept, however.

I was very pleased to get inputs from U.S. Special Operations Command and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. One of the unintended consequences of the creation of Special Operations Command in 1987 was an unhealthy intellectual bifurcation in the Army. Special operations forces had no incentive to think about concepts of counterinsurgency beyond the small-scale operations they had run in El Salvador, while conventional forces could ignore COIN altogether, assuming such missions belonged to SOF. Integration of the two components remained problematic (I would eventually get to observe such flaws firsthand in Iraq). These comments, and the other thousands, would help create a final product that was richer but also with a more contemporary focus, especially on Iraq.

While at Fort Leavenworth, I had the chance to discuss the manual with the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker. He provided a few suggestions, but his most important guidance was to get the manual published as soon as possible. He told us to set the bar high but not to aim for perfection, fixing any shortcomings later. When Lieutenant General Petraeus asked me afterward in an e-mail if we should announce that we would be revising the manual within a couple years, I advised against it:

> I don’t think there is any problem in planning to relook this in a few years (the AirLand Battle 100-5 was written in 1982 and then redone in 1986), but I would not recommend announcing that, as it might weaken the way the manual is received. I think three or four years would be a better window. (We could start to rewrite two years down the road, and then take a year or more to grind through the full

> doctrinal process.) I would also hesitate to commit some future CAC Commanding General to that requirement as they might not be as passionate or knowledgeable as you are about COIN. Your interest and expertise have been key to this effort. Perhaps when you become Chief of Staff [CSA] we can do it again. The current CSA said we only needed to be 85 percent or 90 percent correct. If people have problems with what we write we'll just say that is part of the 10 percent we are allowed to have wrong.[10]

Other Sources of Change

Some especially strong criticism outside the formal review process was to influence the end result as well. Some came from influential civilian commentators; Lieutenant General Petraeus' approach was to engage such sources and co-opt them, or at least demonstrate a willingness to listen to their concerns. Some came from uniformed sources, arising from such background as the Air Force's late interest in the airpower appendix or the Army Intelligence Center's resistance to our initiatives in its area of expertise. Each was handled differently, but each had some impact on the eventual field manual.

By the time the coordinating draft was distributed, our writing effort had received considerable publicity. John Nagl and I had numerous interviews on National Public Radio. The manual was mentioned in many articles about the military's efforts to regain control in an Iraq that seemed to be tearing itself apart. Pieces also began to critique the new doctrine. A 16 July article in the *London Times* was headlined "Hug an Insurgent: The US's New Plan to Win in Iraq." That prompted a number of e-mails from Steve Metz musing about how we could incorporate "hugs" into the new concepts. Most reactions to the draft FM were quite positive, but among the most negative coverage was a 7 August op-ed in the *New York Times* by Richard Schultz and Andrea Dew from the international security program at the Fletcher School at Tufts, who claimed to have read a draft of the manual on the Federation of American Scientists website. In their piece, entitled "Counterinsurgency by the Book," they were highly critical of flaws in the intelligence chapter. Like many others to follow, they did not like the emphasis on what they termed "soft power," or "hearts and minds." They

had just written a book on combating terrorists and insurgents and wanted more attention paid to targeting armed groups, which I thought an oversimplified view of contemporary insurgency. I also felt that they had missed the content of appendix B completely.

We had intentionally avoided using the term “hearts and minds” anywhere in the manual, realizing the baggage it carried from its characterization as a failed social-engineering approach to COIN. I also knew that counterinsurgents often had to grab other parts of the anatomy to gain people’s attention. “Hearts and minds” is all about changing attitudes, a long-term effort. In the short term, it is more important to change behaviors, a school of counterinsurgency sometimes called “carrots and sticks,” as it combines sanctions and incentives to influence choices. We tried to combine both approaches without identifying directly with either.

In reality, setting up those schools as opposites creates a false dichotomy. Lasting success in COIN does depend upon changing attitudes, but the process has to start with changing behaviors. One leads to the other. The purpose of the manual was to present a series of tools and options that counterinsurgents could apply to their particular situation. If we tended to overemphasize “nonkinetic” political, economic, and social activities, that simply reflected a sense that there was already a military bias toward “kinetic” actions—that is, actions that kill people and break things—and that plenty of doctrine already existed for such skills. We wanted to emphasize a more holistic approach to COIN.

Pete Mansoor, firmly established as director of the new Army/Marine COIN Center, immediately contacted me about writing a letter to the editor of the *Times*. A week later our counter appeared, emphasizing the many errors in Schultz’s and Dew’s characterization of the manual and arguing that military actions alone could not succeed in COIN.[11] What Pete realized better and earlier than I was that the new doctrine and field manual had another purpose beside the ostensible ones. FM 3-24 was the most important information operation of GWOT. It was designed to convince political leaders, military officers, and the soldiers and Marines that they led (and our enemies as well) that the United States had figured out how to win these wars. It would give troops in the field new confidence in their campaigns, and politicians and generals new faith that COIN could produce

positive outcomes. Without FM 3-24, President Bush and General Petraeus would never have been able to get the time they needed to implement the Surge and restore stability to Iraq. Arguably, it was too successful in selling the possibilities of COIN, but none of the writing team's members were thinking about that in 2006.

Lieutenant General Petraeus also responded to the critical editorial with personal outreach. His approach to critics was always to engage them, even to enroll them in the effort. He knew Schultz from teaching at West Point. Petraeus sent a personal e-mail expressing gratitude for the input, offering to send page references to show how the manual covered the areas Schultz thought were missing, and asking that any further suggestions for improvement be sent straight to him.

The general applied the same approach to Ralph Peters, who, along with Bing West, was another proponent of a hard and kinetic approach to COIN. For these critics, success in COIN came from killing the bad guys. In October 2006 Peters penned a blistering critique of the June draft, calling it too soft and inadequate for dealing with religious fanatics.[12] Lieutenant General Petraeus invited Peters to Fort Leavenworth, where he debated John Nagl, with Colonel Mansoor as recorder and referee. As a result of Peters' input, about six paragraphs were changed to project a harder line (though I managed to keep the qualification that counterinsurgents need to analyze opponents carefully to figure out who really was implacable). When the manual was finished in December, Peters wrote another article, this time praising it as "the most improved government publication of the decade."[13] He has since reverted somewhat to his earlier position, which remains emphatically enemy-centric.

Peters was not alone in wanting to add more "teeth" to the doctrine. Similar comments came from general officers, and Lieutenant General Petraeus himself was also coming to that conclusion. I added more about dealing with religious extremists to chapter 1, but successfully resisted suggestions from TRADOC headquarters that we include a discussion about branding such insurgents with names that had a more negative connotation among Muslims than "jihadists." Regional experts I consulted like Andy Terrill were unanimous that an American directive proposing to classify "good" and "bad" Muslims would be a great recruiting tool for our enemies.

Steve Capps did make sure we avoided using the term “jihadist” in the text, instead using clear English terms that described how we viewed such insurgents.

I could not prevent modification of the paradoxes, however. I had confidence that soldiers and Marines would understand that the statements were designed to be prods for thought, not dogmatic rules, but that opinion was not widely shared. Lieutenant General Petraeus added an explanation that the paradoxes were not designed to be applied when the enemy was “coming over the barricades” and did not constitute a checklist. Instead, they needed to be applied with considerable thought and depending upon the situation. He also added qualifiers to most of them. The final list read:

1. Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.
2. Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.
3. The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.
4. Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
5. Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.
6. The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.
7. If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next.
8. Tactical success guarantees nothing.
9. Many important decisions are not made by generals.

The most irksome change for me was for the last paradox. I still think *most* important decisions in COIN are made by lower-ranking officers (or by politicians, as I will explain later), but when general officers have the final say about wording of such guidance, that is a hard tenet to sell.

Lieutenant General Petraeus also added a paragraph about force ratios that he had had Pete Mansoor create. The Marines, in particular, had strongly resisted including any such discussion in the manual, knowing that no two COIN situations are the same and fearing that any numbers we mentioned would become dogma. Unknown to us, Lieutenant General

Petraeus was beginning to think about congressional testimony for his coming assignment to command in Iraq, and he and Pete had realized they would need to justify adequate force levels there. The ratio set a standard to justify resources for COIN and would force an administration or Congress who thought an operation could be accomplished with fewer resources to explain how fewer troops could accomplish the mission. As was to come up in the hearings and as Petraeus had been cautioned, the ratios the new insertion envisioned were unlikely to be achieved in Iraq. What became paragraph 1-67 stated that "twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations." Those numbers are highly suspect, and the most systematic analysis generally comes up with a lower figure.[14] I managed to add a caveat ("however, as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation"), but the damage was done. The Marines' fears proved well founded, and many pundits, critics, and decision makers have touted that number as a doctrinal requirement for COIN.[15]

Lieutenant General Petraeus had also been responsible for the one major change to the "imperatives" in chapter 1. After debates over whether the third should be "Use Measured Force" or "Use Discriminate Force" (or even "Use Minimum Force," as the British state it), he decided he wanted "Use the Appropriate Level of Force." While acknowledging that any use of military force had to be carefully calculated in COIN, that nuance accepted also that there are times when an enemy needs to get hammered.

I still have the copy of the coordinating draft that Lieutenant General Petraeus critiqued. He called it a "tremendous accomplishment," but he also directed me to smooth out the writing more and made comments on every chapter. Most were just editorial changes or word choices, but at times he added complete sentences. It was clear that he had read the chapters thoroughly, including analyzing the relevance of every quote and historical vignette. He especially liked Frank Hoffman's latest version of chapter 7 on leadership and ethics for counterinsurgency, emphasizing the special challenges with respect to patience, ethics, and learning that COIN presented. Lieutenant General Petraeus wrote on his copy of the draft, "This is a *great* chapter. I'm tempted to say it should be an article in *Military*

Review." Even in that section, however, he added or changed a number of words.



Petraeus

FM 3-24
FMFM 3-24
June 2006 (Final Draft)

☐ Cy of COIN FM sent to VCSA.

COUNTERINSURGENCY
(FINAL DRAFT—NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION)

- Add anything on metrics?
- Use Spanish & Arabic convention on commas (i.e. always add them)
- Spell check
- Needs a bit of smoothing
- Needs a consistency check
- examples from OIF? (There's a brief mention of measures in the design chapter.
- Names of authors again?
- This is a tremendous accomplishment
- Redundancy betw Chapters 4 & 5?

Distribution Restriction: The material in this manual is under development. It is NOT approved doctrine and CANNOT be used for reference or citation. The approved FM is still current and must be used for reference, or citation, until this draft is approved and authenticated. Upon publication, this manual will be approved for public release; distribution will be unlimited.

[redacted]

Headquarters, Department of the Army

These notes on the cover page from then–Lieutenant General Petraeus' copy of the June coordinating draft give his overall impression and mention that he had sent a copy to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. His printed commentary inside was much more extensive.

He did not pay much attention to the appendices but was well aware of the major issue there. Prompted perhaps by the publicity the new manual was getting, or maybe by the coordinating draft, the U.S. Air Force was now officially interested in the airpower appendix. Its liaison officer at Fort Leavenworth was heard from in early August complaining that his service wanted to submit its own annex. Jim Corum already had reviews from Air

Force and naval aviators on the Fort Leavenworth faculty and thought he was in line with their service doctrines, but we could not turn down the offer.

Whoever created the Air Force submission seemed to have written it with the clear intention of antagonizing the Marines.[16] It not only heavily emphasized bombing targets and paid scant attention to airpower's specific contributions to irregular conflict, it also directed centralized control of all air assets. Nothing raises a red flag faster for Marines than threatening to take away their organic air resources; the response of the Marine members of the writing team was to advocate eliminating the whole appendix. That was one of the issues that Lieutenant General Petraeus and I discussed with General Schoomaker, who suggested a joint appendix instead, bringing in the Navy. We actually tried to do that, with the Marines handling seapower contributions to COIN, but there just was not enough material to make the effort worthwhile. The commandant of the Air War College even took time out of a visit to Carlisle in mid-October to come and see me to talk about the "amateurish" appendix we had created. He was under the impression it had been removed. Instead I told him that I had taken the Air Force input, had Jim Corum merge it with his material, let the Marines have a hack at it to remove what they did not like, and sent it to Steve Capps for final formatting. I told Brig. Gen. (promotable) Stephen Miller that at this point our choices were to go with what we had, which the Marines would accept, or delete the airpower appendix altogether, but I restated my conviction that it was better for the Air Force to have something in the manual to draw attention to airpower, even if they were not satisfied with it. Clint Ancker stepped into the breach a week later. He negotiated between the Marines and the Air Force Doctrine Center to get more into the appendix that the airmen wanted while still keeping it acceptable overall to the Marines.

Air Force critics of the manual would later hold that it was created without any input from their service.[17] That is patently false, though it was an Army and Marine document and those services had final say on content. In hindsight, the Marines were right again: we would have been saved much trouble without it. However, I still think appendix E added value by highlighting the many contributions that airpower, the greatest American "asymmetric" military advantage, can provide, even in an irregular

environment. Ironically, we spent many more words describing the use of airplanes in COIN than we did tanks or artillery, but those communities have never claimed the doctrine had an antitechnology bias.[18]

Sure enough, we did not meet Lieutenant General Petraeus' goal of publication in October. In the Army doctrinal system, major organizations have virtual veto power over any proposed publication if they "nonconcur" with its content. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) at Fort Huachuca did exactly that with the coordinating draft of FM 3-24. They did not like the new sociocultural intelligence or social-network analysis. They did not like Kyle Teamey's concept of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for COIN and seemed wedded to old order-of-battle formulations that did not fit contemporary conflicts. Major disagreements were also apparent over aspects of human intelligence. Kyle Teamey became intensely frustrated with what he perceived as a lack of willingness to accept new ideas about intelligence that, however valuable, originated outside Fort Huachuca. During my August visit to Fort Leavenworth I had discussed the impasse with Lieutenant General Petraeus, who then called Major General Fast, commander of USAIC and one of his subordinates. He conveyed firmly that he expected cooperation and not resistance from her organization and that both sides of the debate needed to be open to new ideas. When I talked later to Major General Fast, she offered full support to resolving our differences.

As a result, I scheduled a meeting in Montgomery McFate's offices at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, for 13 September. Besides her, Kyle and Jon Sweet would attend. Derek Harvey sent input via e-mail. The USAIC delegation would be led by Steve Leeder, deputy director of its Doctrine Directorate. Kyle, Steve Capps, and I worked diligently before the meeting to create a new chapter 3 and appendix B for the attendees to consider, one that incorporated many of USAIC's desires. We knew there was a lot of overlap between the sections but decided to let the conferees decide how to resolve that. We also tightened up what was then appendix E on social network analysis. Steve Capps put a good deal of effort, along with Lieutenant Colonel Reed, now stationed in Hawaii, into revising that section. The three documents were sent out to the attendees the week before the meeting.

The actual gathering was not exactly anticlimactic, but there were few fireworks. It quickly became clear that USAIC's main concern was that the new doctrine not conflict with what was already established. We had been too loose with our language, especially about human intelligence, and agreed to reinforce established procedures for the management and exploitation of such sources. The group had a very constructive discussion of the best organization for the various intelligence sections. We decided to eliminate the IPB appendix and draw that material back into chapter 3; that also eliminated the redundancy problems, though it made the chapter much bigger. USAIC accepted the social-network-analysis construct but asked to insert some of its own products and processes. The new appendix B became "Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools." The final manual was much better from the interaction.

However, the delay allowed other distractions to develop. For instance, Ralph Peters would not have had a chance to influence the manual without Fort Huachuca's nonconcurrence. Other suggestions from many sources began to crop up as well. Lieutenant General Petraeus decided to do another review of chapter 1 in early November. That led to six new versions by the end of the month. I enlisted Andy Terrill to comment on the new sections dealing with Islamic extremism. Steve Capps had to deal with every suggestion and every change, after the Marines had had a chance to weigh in as well. I continued to attempt to improve the writing. Eventually, everything was ready to be unveiled. Petraeus finalized the foreword, and the signature draft of the manual was done in early December. Like Moses, who never crossed over into Canaan, Lieutenant General Mattis had been reassigned shortly before we were done, so Lt. Gen. James Amos would sign for the Marines. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, was officially released on 15 December 2006, thirteen months after that fateful call to my office in Carlisle.

Two weeks before, Eliot Cohen convened a "small dinner" in Washington to discuss the adequacy of the new doctrine. It was a distinguished group, including Lt. Gen. Dave Barno, USA (Ret.), T. X. Hammes, Greg Jaffe, Dave Kilcullen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Tom Mahnken, Pete Mansoor, H. R. McMaster, future Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Vickers, and Bing West, along with

Eliot and me. Except for Pete and me, none had seen the final version, but they had all read the June draft. Overall, the experience was quite positive. There was unanimous praise for the process that produced the document and all that had spun off from it. No one could remember any field manual that had generated so much interest, in and out of the military. Someone suggested the Government Printing Office should put out a hardcover version and place it in Barnes and Noble, speculating that it would rise to the *New York Times* bestseller list. Much of the discussion centered around the Iraq situation, including the impact of our lack of control over host-nation institutions and leaders and their rampant corruption. That generated a lot of contradictory discussion about how much control we should exert. There were also many conflicting opinions about whether the manual should focus on Iraq or not, though there was virtually universal condemnation of Ralph Peters' arguments. (The only one of his points that got some support was his assertion that some foes were implacable, and that had been covered in late revisions.) There was a consensus that the manual was too long. I explained that we planned to reduce the length in an eventual rewrite but needed to put out a great deal of information in the initial "blast." There was also a lot of debate about whether we were in a religious war with Islam, some characterizing our current situation as being caught in the middle of a war within Islam between Sunni and Shi'a.

There was much doubt that the military was really committed to this doctrine, despite changes in training and education. The consensus was that the current personnel system was too inflexible for multiple and long deployments or for the requirements of COIN (even the new modular brigades were designed for conventional warfare and not COIN) and that the acquisition system was still focused on the Army Future Combat System and F-22 Raptors while troops in Iraq were being killed in inadequate vehicles by improvised explosive devices. There was also concern that while the ground forces were focused on this new doctrine, the Navy and Air Force were stealing a march for coming budget wars. (AirSea Battle would emerge later.) The best quote of the night came from T. X. Hammes: "There is a fine line between a vision and a hallucination." Dave Kilcullen had the best metaphor: he compared us to the allied staff in 1917 developing concepts of methodical battle to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare. We were making the first successful stab at a system that

would handle a new complex military problem, but he did not believe we had yet developed “blitzkrieg” for COIN.[19]

There was much prescience on display that evening. But the time for talking and speculating was over. The new doctrine was now official, and only time would reveal its true utility.

CHAPTER SIX

Behind the Curtain

A Reader's Guide to FM 3-24

The first piece of advice I'd offer about understanding FM 3-24 is not to trust anyone's summary of it, maybe not even mine. Most critics, and even some supporters, portray it as a unified document driven by an overarching theme or two. In fact, however, it was written by a committee, and while I did the best I could to tie it all together, it remains somewhat of a compendium. The various authors were aware of the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes of chapter 1, and those tenets did influence what was written, but one of the values of the FM is the depth of unique individual expertise that created its parts. It is often said of the Bible or the Koran that one can find justification for almost any idea if one looks hard enough, and that is also true of this field manual. Many commentators have pulled items out of context to support strawmen, and enough of those have been created to fill many farmers' fields. The manual was indeed designed to present many varying ideas, in the hope of inspiring creative thinking and action by soldiers and Marines in the field. In counterinsurgency there is no "approved solution," and American military doctrine is not dogma but a guide for action—and is never a substitute for a commander's judgment.

The most important theorists who influenced the final product were David Petraeus and Peter Chiarelli, in ways reflected by their important articles in *Military Review* that were incorporated in the manual in toto.

John Nagl's theme of "learn and adapt" also permeates the pages. I have mentioned many of the other active participants in the writing effort who contributed their ideas.

One of the most common characterizations of the manual, both by critics such as Gian Gentile and supporters like John Nagl, is that it is dominated by the thinking of David Galula, based in turn on his own experiences in Algeria. That is erroneous for many reasons. To be fair to Galula, he was a keen observer also of insurgencies in Greece, China, and Vietnam; his classic *Counterinsurgency Warfare* has a much broader experiential base than Algeria. To be fair also to the writing team, we became aware (except for John Nagl) of Galula too late to make much difference. I had never read any of his work until December 2005, and I suspect that most of the writers hadn't either. My thinking was most influenced by Robert Thompson, Frank Kitson, and Steve Metz on counterinsurgency, as well as by extensive reading of classical insurgent theorists Lenin, Mao, Giap, Guevara, and others. In fact, the French campaign in Algeria was one we had to steer carefully away from after the revelations at Abu Ghraib and debates about the use of torture in GWOT. We did cite it, late in chapter 7, as an example of how *not* to execute COIN.

I must confess, nevertheless, that I felt much heartened by reading Galula. His writing reinforced many conclusions that I had already reached. His discussion of the importance of "propaganda" in all phases of COIN matched the Chiarelli-Michaelis diagram that wrapped all lines of effort within information operations. In some of my early public presentations I used his conceptual structure as a metaphor for the new doctrine, because of all the models of the classic COIN theorists his view of multiple lines of effort seemed to come closest to the Chiarelli-Michaelis concept, and he was much better known than they were. His description of the many traditionally nonmilitary missions that had to be performed by soldiers and Marines meshed with what I had been writing since 2001. His emphasis on identifying root causes of an insurgency and doing so quickly was echoed by other theorists as well and seemed particularly relevant in light of Secretary Rumsfeld's characterization as "thugs and dead-enders" of the elements resisting in Iraq.

There were two areas where I credit Galula with direct influence. The first was his characterization of revolutionary warfare as favoring the

insurgent.[1] For example, despite superior resources, the counterinsurgent must attempt to be strong everywhere, while the enemy can pick and choose targets. Insurgents hold the strategic initiative, having themselves begun the conflict. Because of their apparent authority, counterinsurgents must match deeds to words, while insurgents can just promise to bring better conditions when they win. Galula's argument here struck me as very important, and I folded it into chapter 1.

The other key contribution from Galula was his famous view of revolutionary warfare as 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military. Most of the writers were aware of it, and we tried to emphasize that point in many places. Ironically, I misattributed it in the military printing of the FM. When John suggested that I read Galula, I had to make a copy of a much scribbled-in edition of his classic at the War College. I misinterpreted a footnote to mean that the famous quote really came from General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong's Central Committee. In what in hindsight was an amazing case of intellectual hubris, I assumed that the whole world had been wrong about the source of that quote and attributed it to the Chinese general in the military version of the FM. I am not sure if Janine Davidson will ever forgive me for making her change a speech she had written to incorporate my error. Only later did I take the time to look at the actual *New York Times* article cited in that footnote and realize that I was wrong. I managed to redress my mistake in the University of Chicago reprint of the FM, but that was too late to help Janine.

The Early Chapters

Every piece of the manual has something important to say. The foreword, written by Lieutenant General Petraeus and signed by him and by Lieutenant General Amos, states openly that soldiers and Marines executing COIN need to be both warriors and nation builders—an argument that critics like Bing West continue to assail. It goes on to explain that the purpose of the manual is to provide a general approach to COIN, one that can be adapted, since every situation is unique and constantly changing. The preface that follows the foreword gives a general overview of the publication's structure and defines the audience as leaders and planners at the battalion level and above, those who might have to develop operational-

level COIN campaigns, beyond just tactical activities. The last of the short beginning sections is John Nagl's introduction, which evolved from his learning appendix. He asserts that Western militaries often neglect the study of insurgencies and rely too much on conventional means to fight them. Success, he argues, depends upon the ability to learn and adapt under fire more rapidly than one's enemies. Finally, he sets out the goal that motivated Generals Mattis and Petraeus to create the new doctrine—to make the Army and Marine Corps true learning organizations.

As I expected, chapter 1, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," has been the most read and most quoted part of the manual. We were dissatisfied with the official DoD definition for insurgency, viewing it as too narrow, but as a subordinate-service publication ours could not override joint doctrine. Paragraph 1-2 states the established definition, "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict," but follows with one of our own, "an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control." (Later I would lobby with the team creating the Joint Staff's *Counterinsurgency*, Joint Publication [JP] 3-24, to broaden the DoD definition, and it did.)[2] Counterinsurgency is, then, "military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." That was also the joint definition, which, though we did not like all the action labels, we thought acceptable.

The chapter opens with a general historical overview of insurgency and emphasizes early that long-term success in countering it depends on whether the people accept their government's rule. That places certain requirements upon the government, as well as upon counterinsurgent forces. The chapter describes the evolution of insurgency and lists six standard approaches: conspiratorial, like that of the Bolsheviks in 1917; military-focused, like Che Guevara's (or Al Qaeda's); urban terrorism, like the Irish Republican Army's; protracted popular war, waged by Mao; identity-focused, based on tribes or ethnic groups; and a composite or coalition approach utilizing two or more of these. While it uses the North Vietnamese strategy known as Dau Tranh to illustrate the complicated and multilayered

nature of multiple lines of operation in insurgency, the chapter also points out that modern “mosaic war” is even more complex. Enemy operations in Vietnam were directed by a central authority in Hanoi, controlling a hierarchical and layered structure from political leaders down to a mass base that rarely exists in contemporary conflicts. I created the new category of “identity-based insurgencies” to cover conflicts where these obvious divisions within the insurgent movement are not evident, where groups reacted monolithically, without the obvious segmentation described in the next paragraph of this book. (That originality would not survive in JP 3-24 or in the rewritten FM.)

Counterinsurgents must also deal with different parts of each insurgency, which the manual lists as movement leaders, combatants, the political cadre, supporting auxiliaries, and a mass base. Each slice might require a separate set of actions to deal with it; for example, auxiliaries might be susceptible to economic incentives, while combatants must be killed or captured. This discussion also includes the infamous paragraph on force ratios, 1-67. My scheme of the layers of an insurgency differed from the SOF model in their doctrine, which included leaders at all levels in one category and also an “Underground” element. I convinced our writing team that my version made for a much clearer “salami-slicing” of the insurgent structure, although JP 3-24, with direct Special Operations Command participation on the writing team, reverted to their scheme.





These maps from a briefing by Lieutenant General Petraeus reflect the "mosaic war" in Iraq in November 2004. The top shows that each multinational division was fighting a different sort of war from the others. The bottom shows that even within the 1st Marine Division sector, regimental and brigade combat teams were engaged in different kinds of wars, sometimes within the same city.
FURNISHED BY GENERAL PETRAEUS

The chapter then describes how insurgencies mobilize support, including interaction with crime, and lists their general dynamics—leadership, objectives, ideology and narrative, environment and geography, external support and sanctuaries, phasing and timing. Paragraphs dealing with the third dynamic discuss extensively religious extremists, the implacable nature of such foes, and the necessity for counterinsurgents to disaggregate enemies to determine which are open to negotiations and which must be eliminated. In conducting the Surge in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, Petraeus distinguished between insurgents who were "reconcilable" and those who were "irreconcilable." The only solutions to deal with the latter were to capture them, kill them, or run them out of the country and keep them out. The chapter's coverage of insurgency then concludes with analysis of insurgent networks and vulnerabilities.

The chapter then moves to counterinsurgency, to the guiding tenets that will shape the rest of the doctrine. Figure 1-1, adjusted from the May version reproduced in the previous chapter, suggests that any military operation consists of a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, all three of which need to be pursued and conducted, in mixes appropriate for given areas at given times. As violence involved in the COIN campaign is reduced, the scope of combat operations decreases and the emphasis on stability missions increases. In cases where regimes are nonexistent or have been changed, issues of sovereignty and national reconstruction make the situation even more complex. That explanation sets up the principles, imperatives, and paradoxes that follow. The final list of principles is:

1. Legitimacy is the main objective.
2. Unity of effort is essential.
3. Political factors are primary.
4. Counterinsurgents must understand the environment.
5. Intelligence drives operations.
6. Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support.
7. Security under the Rule of Law is essential.
8. Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.

The first had undergone quite a change since my initial draft reflecting Western liberal traditions. It now discussed concepts of legitimacy based on religion, security, or military force. One of the phrases of the manual that caused the most intense debate among the writing team was reference to "a culturally acceptable level of corruption" as an indicator of legitimacy. (An Iraqi policeman told me that he had to charge for his services to earn a living, and we called that "corruption," while in our country we did the same thing and called it "taxes.") The manual emphasizes that the local definition of legitimacy is the most important but cautions that differences between host nation, U.S., and international visions of the term could complicate operations.

A recent book by Daniel Bolger criticizes military leaders, including himself, for not being frank enough with political leaders about the amount of time and resources necessary for successful COIN.[3] FM 3-24 can't be blamed for that, and for his part, Lieutenant General Petraeus consistently sought to caution in subsequent years that counterinsurgencies were protracted affairs. Especially prodded by the Marines, we drafters emphasized that fact strongly in the last-listed principle. We also stressed the importance of preparing to support host-nation institutions for a long time, even in the face of pressure to reduce U.S. military force levels quickly. But military doctrine is just guidance, not law, and is always subordinate to the judgment of the political leaders who control and direct the application of national power.

The final form of the paradoxes, with all their changes, was covered previously. My "MULES" list of imperatives (see chapter 3) remained intact, except for the late change to the second from Lieutenant General Petraeus mentioned in the last chapter.

1. Manage information and expectations.
2. Use the appropriate level of force.
3. Learn and adapt.
4. Empower the lowest levels.
5. Support the host nation.

The first is especially hard for Americans. President Barack Obama has been often quoted as saying that if we can put a man on the moon, we can accomplish almost anything. Afghan or Iraqi villagers often have the same belief, and if we do not work quickly to temper it we end up with frustrated clients who believe they have been deceived by false promises. The military is also sometimes victimized by civilian agencies that also raise false hopes. That is not intentional, as it is typically a result of sincere desire to help, but in many foreign cultures failure to deliver on promises is seen as intentional deceit, not good intentions gone awry.

The last imperative is important, a key shaping attribute of the American way of war and COIN. We are always playing "away games," and eventually we leave. That requires creating sustainable, legitimate institutions that can take over tasks that we may have performed in the early years of a counterinsurgency. The primacy of legitimacy, as it is used in the manual, means that the counterinsurgency effort must be focused more on the people being supported than on the enemy being fought. Because of that emphasis, the doctrine is called "population-centric," in contrast to "enemy-centric" approaches holding that killing the bad guys is more important than protecting the good ones. In reality, any COIN campaign requires a combination of actions directed both ways, in proportions depending upon the situation; in the manual that is made clear in the later discussion of lines of operation. But in the end, "a COIN effort cannot achieve success without the [host nation's] government achieving legitimacy."[4] In my view, that point is even more important to stress to politicians than the realities of long-term commitment. That closing statement of the discussion of the first imperative could not be any clearer. And achieving that objective is usually far beyond the capabilities of the military alone.

Realizing that achieving legitimacy requires the assistance of a host of civilian agencies, indigenous as well as American and international, we placed Richard Lacquement's chapter, "Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities," next. It describes the various participants in COIN, ranging from international organizations to tribal leaders, with particular focus on nongovernmental organizations and U.S. government agencies. It covers their roles and realistic responsibilities. It explains interagency mechanisms for integration, including the National Security Council and

Country Teams headed by the ambassador, along with sections on provincial reconstruction teams and civil military operations centers. Colonel Lacquement's most prescient paragraph deals with the problems of transitions, whether between military units or military and civilian organizations. The chapter is designed to prepare soldiers and Marines at all levels to deal with civilian organizations in their midst.

These groups can significantly help with COIN—or hinder it. Emile Simpson, a British officer I respect greatly and an astute observer of modern COIN, e-mailed me that American problems in Iraq and Afghanistan should be seen as failures of foreign policy, not COIN. (Simpson is now leading a team at Harvard that is working with General Petraeus, now retired, to capture lessons learned on strategic command and leadership of large coalition campaigns in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.) I have thought often about that. Military campaign planners did not select Hamid Karzai to lead a centralized government in Afghanistan or pick Nouri al-Maliki to be prime minister of an Iraqi democracy. Nor did they recommend the withdrawals of American forces that occurred.

Still, should politicians, American and host-nation, be blamed for failing to implement COIN properly, or should we authors of FM 3-24 be criticized for naively expecting that political leaders would pay attention to our principles or that military leaders would be able to enforce them? Peter Feaver, noted commentator on American civil-military relations, has said that our elected leaders have the right to be wrong. All the military can do is provide their best advice and follow orders. We thought FM 3-24 was the best advice we could come up with in the time we had. We hoped the rest of government would follow our lead. For a number of reasons that will be discussed later, that did not occur.

The Heart of the Manual

Despite all the attention paid to chapter 1, the heart of the manual really comprises chapters 3, 4, and 5, which provide the foundation on which to plan and execute a COIN campaign. They have also had the most impact on broader institutional doctrine, since much of what has been labeled as "counterinsurgency" is really just contemporary warfare amongst the people. Chapter 3 incorporates sociocultural themes that have

revolutionized intelligence in COIN. It merges the COIN intelligence preparation of the battlefield developed by Kyle Teamey with cultural anthropological insights from Montgomery McFate, insights that were shifted forward from an appendix after the February conference. This new focus contributed to the development of human terrain teams deployed in the field and of new courses and institutions at the Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca. Dr. McFate would soon be severely criticized by some narrow-minded colleagues who saw her as compromising the standards of her profession by creating a "military-anthropology complex."[5] The military was going to pursue this avenue of analysis anyway, since it is essential for success in COIN, and Dr. McFate was willing to help us perfect it. In my view she deserves accolades, not condemnation, a position echoed by Lieutenant General Petraeus in his foreword to her book on the human-terrain-system concept.[6]

Teamey's chapter has six primary sections: intelligence characteristics in counterinsurgency; predeployment planning and intelligence preparation of the battlefield; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; counterintelligence and counterreconnaissance; all-source intelligence; and intelligence collaboration. While those categories seem standard for any intelligence doctrine, their content is not. That is especially evident in the largest chunk, section II, containing IPB. The discussion of the operational environment covers social, economic, political, and cultural characteristics that define people and their society. We felt hamstrung a bit by the Army's standard acronyms for group intelligence analysis, METT-TC (mission, enemy, troops, terrain, time, and civil considerations) and ASCOPE (see chapter 5). With respect to the former, a broad characterization of required information, the last category is especially important for COIN. For its organizing memory aid of ASCOPE, the most important category is people. We pay lip service to those acronyms in appendix B but structure the sociocultural chapter content under "society," "social structure," "culture," "language," "power and authority," and "interests." Specific discussions in this rich section deal with determining and addressing grievances, generating popular support, and observing indicators of insurgent approaches. Interrogation of detainees for information is addressed in section III but refers readers to the new FM 2-22.3 *Human Intelligence*

Collector Operations, declared the legal standard by the Detainee Treatment Act enacted by Congress at the behest of former Vietnam prisoner of war John McCain after the backlash over the abuses at Abu Ghraib.

The detailed analysis of society and culture lays the foundations for the most important contribution to the doctrine from the Marine Corps: chapter 4, "Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations." The idea that commanders need to systematically analyze the problems they face before developing a campaign plan was new to Army doctrine, as was the assertion that plans have to be continually adjusted as the situation changes. In the enemy-centric operations envisioned during the Cold War the enemy and related defeat mechanisms were fairly standard and relatively easy to identify, but in the complex and murky world of counterinsurgency, as well as any contemporary conflict amongst the people, that is not the case. Campaign design has now become a standard part of all American operational doctrine.

This garbage pile in Fallujah is typical of those found throughout Iraq. American commanders found that providing essential services like trash pickup often produced positive effects in the security or governance realms and increased local cooperation in other matters. The lines of effort in COIN are intended to be synchronized and reinforcing. AUTHOR

The necessary campaign activities identified during this intensive analysis will be executed along thematic logical lines of operation, or "lines of effort," as they are described in later doctrine. Combat and civil security operations remain important and will be the cornerstone on which to build. John Paul Vann, describing the challenges he faced conducting counterinsurgency in Vietnam, remarked, "Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it's the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else we do will last."[7] But nonlethal mission sets will also be important. These will include spurring economic development, nurturing good governance, restoring or establishing essential services, and building host-nation capacities in the security sector. When properly executed, the synergistic effect of the LLOs will reinforce each other and shift the population's support from the enemy to counterinsurgents. While establishing security facilitates reestablishing essential services, the opposite can also be true. Picking up trash removes possible hiding positions for improvised explosive devices and can also produce more intelligence to prevent further attacks as people become convinced that supporting COIN can improve their lives. The diagram of the figure below depicts in graphic form the application of LLOs.[8]

Linking and surrounding all the LLOs will be a program of information activities. In COIN, perception is often more important than reality in shaping people's attitudes. As mentioned earlier, insurgents have a big advantage in the information arena in that they can make exorbitant promises about what they would accomplish if they were in power, while the counterinsurgent must produce actual results, must match words with deeds. Counterinsurgents have to consider the information impact of their actions on many audiences, including international, regional, and local civilian populations. Additionally, friendly military forces must be kept informed; an information campaign should be directed at the enemy; and, for American counterinsurgency especially, maintaining home-front support is also a factor. Messages to all these audiences must be consistent. In today's globalized information environment, local populaces can access the Internet or satellite television to monitor the messages being transmitted to the international community and the American public. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines COIN efforts.



Figure 5-1 from FM 3-24 is a depiction of modern warfare through the lens of the concept of logical lines of operation, or lines of effort. It illustrates how synchronized sets of actions involving various themes, all encompassed within comprehensive information operations, should be focused on creating legitimacy and public support for the host-nation government.

Chapter 4's clarity is helped immeasurably by its graphics and case studies. The closing example from the 1st Marine Division in Anbar Province illustrates both the complexity of COIN problems and the need to treat disaggregated enemies differently. It set the stage for chapter 5, "Executing Counterinsurgency Operations," which emphasizes a clear-hold-build approach to achieve permanent results. Too often in the early phases of Afghanistan and Iraq gains were sacrificed because coalition forces left areas instead of securing them, allowing the enemy to return. Some other alternatives, such as combined action and limited support, are also mentioned but receive fairly cursory treatment; most of the chapter deals with details of clearing, holding, and building, along with examples of actions for recommended LLOs. However, the field manual encourages originality and innovation tailored to fit local situations in the mosaic war that COIN is and envisions that units in the field will develop other ways to pursue LLOs. The chapter also includes a section on determining measures

of progress and of effectiveness for COIN, always a difficult task, especially in a mosaic war.

Chapter 5 remains the most problematic in the manual, more for what it does not say than for what is does. We knew that we needed to present more and cheaper alternatives to time-and-resource-intensive clear-hold-build and offer more analysis of assessment, but we just ran out of time. The detailed instruction on clear-hold-build was necessary, however, and the list of recommended activities for the LLOs was thorough. Though there are long lists of economic and political and civic actions, they do not amount just to "hearts and minds"; combat operations are essential to secure the populations and protect infrastructure. There is also a substantial section detailing population-control measures, such as curfews and a census.

Andrew Birtle's provocative official history of American counterinsurgency doctrine did not appear until after the FM was in the final process of publication. One of his key points is that the United States has always had great difficulty getting supported nations to take the actions it deemed necessary to conduct successful COIN.[9] In hindsight, the manual too should have discussed that reality and dealt more with ways to exert leverage on indigenous leaders. As Steve Biddle has emphasized, we should not be surprised when their goals are not the same as ours, and we must be prepared to deal with such differences. General Petraeus was especially adept at using carrots and sticks to influence the Maliki government in Iraq, and I did make sure that the 2014 revision of the FM mentioned the issue. Petraeus would also state later that among the most important lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan was the extraordinary difficulty of making overall progress in a COIN campaign if host-nation leadership is problematic.

One of the notable differences between FM 3-24 and the stability-operations doctrine represented by the Army's 2008 Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, is the former's lack of specific emphasis on building democracies and market economies. The latter doctrine and national security documents, in contrast, are permeated with "democratic peace theory," issues of trying to establish societies much like our own. This school of thought, which encourages the spreading of democracy as the way to create a more peaceful and prosperous world, has arguably become the new grand strategy of the United States, to replace Cold War–era

containment. Given FM 3-24's emphasis on local legitimacy, it is much more sensitive to local norms and desires. The suggested activities listed in chapter 5 for each LLO, which are worth reading carefully, are oriented on working through local institutions; while eliminating corrupt officials is mentioned, changing economic or political systems is not. We recognized not only that such decisions would be made by political leaders and not military ones but also that such goals would make COIN much more difficult.

One of the great myths about the American military is that it does not follow its doctrine. In fact, it has been dedicated to pursuing and executing it, whether one considers precision bombing or AirLand Battle. FM 3-24 was much less prescriptive than doctrine usually is, a fact that has troubled many. Many officers in the field have complained to me that they wanted more "checklists and templates" in the manual, such as were once laid out for fighting the Soviets. If you could find Russian artillery groups, for example, you could then determine the array of the rest of the enemy forces you faced. Chapter 3 devotes a section to explaining that standard order-of-battle considerations don't fit well with COIN. Chapter 5, however, is the most prescriptive in FM 3-24, and I suppose we should not have been surprised that the recommended LLOs became dogma, even repeated as such in other Army publications. In only rare cases were alternatives to clear-hold-build actively pursued in the field, except to add a new phase, "Transition," to emphasize handoff to indigenous agencies at the end. In some ways the LLO construct became the very template we wanted to avoid, making it too easy to conflate Iraq with Afghanistan and establishing the expensive clear-hold-build as the approved solution for any COIN.

Filling Gaps and Scratching Itches

The rest of FM 3-24 can be viewed as less important than the first 5 chapters, though those later pieces addressed what the writing team perceived as prior deficiencies in doctrine and unique requirements of COIN. Chapter 6, "Developing Host Nation Security Forces," was designed to fill one of those holes, and it had strong support from Lieutenant General Petraeus, who had, of course, previously spent nearly sixteen months establishing the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq. The

United States was training indigenous armies and police in Iraq and Afghanistan but had no encompassing doctrine for such missions. After giving a general overview of their requirements, the chapter organizes itself around six key tasks: assess, organize, build or rebuild facilities, train, equip, and advise. The last section of the chapter deals with the essential role that police forces play in COIN. Jim Corum provides an especially instructive vignette about their important role in Malaya.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits DoD support to foreign police forces unless in accordance with specific exceptions and under the authority of a presidential directive—that is, the job belongs to civilian agencies unless the president waives legal restrictions. However, in both Iraq and Afghanistan that mission was given to the U.S. military after international and civilian organizations had failed and years had been wasted. This is another one of those sources of "mission creep" that should always be anticipated, especially if the police training-mission is large in scale. There is no facet of American stability operations that needs reform more than does the issue of dealing with police. Laws, responsibilities, and capabilities need reexamination, and duties need to be realistically partitioned. Either the military should be recognized as the executor and fully trained to do the job or civilian capacity needs to be increased.

An Iraqi army unit in training under American oversight in 2007. While there have been some notable successes with such efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, positive progress has been hard to

sustain without U.S. presence. The training of indigenous police has been even more problematic.
COL. JAMES EMBREY

Frank Hoffman's chapter, "Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency," which General Petraeus liked so much, follows. It emphasizes how important it is that leaders provide and maintain a moral compass for their subordinates amidst the frustrations and complexities of COIN. I think that his three illustrative vignettes, two from Iraq and a truncated version of Lou DiMarco's piece from Algeria, are especially supportive. There is some overlap with chapter 3 and the legal appendix concerning the treatment of detainees and the new laws and regulations concerning them, but considering the importance of that information, I had no problem with that redundancy. Like many of the other chapters, Frank's closes with the imperative to keep learning. In line with the guidance in this chapter, Petraeus would, several months into the Surge in Iraq, send to the members of the Multinational Force–Iraq a memo, "Living Our Values," emphasizing the accepted norms of land warfare and eschewing actions that could be seen as torture. He would subsequently note that the best way to get information from detainees was to become their best friend, not to use so-called enhanced interrogation techniques.

All authors were directed to come up with epigraphs to open their respective chapters; I had used that technique in my own books and believe it not only foreshadows what is to come but provides a nice intellectual nugget to remember. I think they did really well. John Nagl supplied me with the quote I used for chapter 1, that COIN is the graduate level of war.[10] That statement had the impact we desired and has been much repeated, but in hindsight I realize that it was unfair to conventional operations, as a number of critics have noted. *All* forms of war are at the graduate level; it is the final exams that are different.

Marian Vlasak's chapter 8, on sustainment, opens with a good quote I helped her find in the extraordinary archives at the Military History Institute. It is from the Senior Officer Debriefing Report of Maj. Gen. James Heiser, who commanded the 1st Logistical Command in Vietnam. General Heiser stated that there were no "rear area soldiers" in Vietnam, that logistics personnel had to be soldiers first while also mastering their military occupational specialties. After the ambush in Iraq of the 507th

Maintenance Company and the ordeal of Pvt. 1st Class Jessica Lynch, that was an important message to transmit. It also highlights the theme that dominates the chapter, that logistics in COIN differ from those in conventional operations. Marian kept some of Sean Davis' tactical-level discussion but adjusted it to match the LLOs. Of particular note are her analyses of the special requirements of supplying host-nation forces and the complexities of dealing with contractors, both indigenous and external. There is much to consider there. Her chapter deserves more attention than it has received.

The appendices and additional annexes provide a rich variety of supplemental materials. While Dave Kilcullen's appendix A, reorganized and retitled "A Guide for Action" by Steve Capps, appears aimed at the tactical level, much of it is relevant at higher levels of war. A whole campaign could be planned according to his guidelines: to analyze the problem, organize for intelligence and interagency operations, establish and maintain a presence, avoid hasty actions, build trusted networks, seek early victories, exploit a single narrative for a local and global audience, fight the enemy's strategy, and get ready for handovers from the day you arrive. We would have done better throughout GWOT if we had kept all those tenets in mind.

Appendix B, "Social Network Analysis and Other Analytical Tools," is an intelligence catchall combining items that did not fit in chapter 3, tools supplied by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, and the Graham-Reed material that had originally been an annex by itself. The latter two are combined under the heading "Evaluate the Threat." The staff of USAIC contributed time line and pattern analysis, along with a number of various assessment overlays to go along with the network analysis, the latter enriched by an illustrative case study, from Lieutenant Colonel Reed's 2006 PhD dissertation for the University of Maryland, on the capture of Saddam Hussein. It is another legacy of the FM that social network analysis has now become an essential tool in the individualized targeting processes that today are an essential component of counterterrorism.

Appendix C, "Linguist Support," benefited from efforts by Jan Horvath, Montgomery McFate, and me. Also, it was shortened by Steve Capps, who turned into tables sections on orientations for interpreters and practices for speakers. In contrast, the lawyers at Fort Lee would not let us even change a

comma in appendix D, “Legal Considerations”; Major Santiago and his colleagues at the Judge Advocate General Legal Center and School claimed that any adjustment, no matter how small, could change meanings and upset carefully written legal nuances. Their contribution describes intricacies of the sources of authority on assistance to foreign governments and use of military force, rules of engagement, and laws of war and internal armed conflict; it also deals with detention and interrogation. It further addresses the expenditure of special funds, such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program or solatia (condolence) payments, before closing with a reinforcing pitch for establishing the rule of law as a key goal of COIN. This is a very dense appendix.

Appendix E is the notorious airpower in counterinsurgency annex that resulted from Clint Ancker’s mediation. It does discuss airpower in the strike role, but the largest sections deal with airlift, intelligence gathering, and building host-nation capacity. American air capabilities remain a significant asymmetric advantage in counterinsurgency (and have become even more so since the Surge in Iraq) but not in the same manner as for conventional combat operations. Jim Corum provides a concise discussion of the utility in COIN of low-tech assets, such as AC-130 gunships and civilian light aircraft. Right after the manual was published I was approached by two special forces officers who had been inspired to develop a special aircraft for COIN. They described it as relatively slow with a long loiter time and a great deal of ordnance-carrying capacity. They wanted some sort of jet propulsion, but I told them for what they wanted a propeller engine would be more practical. Then I mentioned that in Vietnam we had had exactly the airframe they desired—it had been called the A-1 Skyraider. They went away feeling somewhat deflated. While commander in Afghanistan, General Petraeus had a similar problem trying to convince Afghan president Hamid Karzai that a high-performance propeller-driven aircraft would be ideal for supporting Afghan operations. Karzai resisted the concept, wanting a jet instead. Eventually he relented, and Embraer won a contract to furnish the Afghan air force with Super Tucanos. This light support aircraft is built in Florida and represents a cheap and easily maintained source of firepower for irregular warfare in austere environments.

I have had discussions with a number of Air Force officers about such low-tech aircraft for COIN, which are far cheaper than F-22s and more relevant to the conflicts America has fought in the last decade. Their dilemma is that in times of budget constraints it is hard to justify single-role aircraft of limited utility, whereas our friends and allies want what the U.S. Air Force has, as much for prestige as for capability. So if we are not going to sustain a squadron of Beechcraft propeller light aircraft for COIN, no one else wants to either. The fact remains that the Air Force remains tightly focused on conventional fights requiring the most modern airframes, still seeing irregular conflict as a lesser included subset that can be handled by multirole airplanes.

In many ways, what follows the appendices is the most distinctive part of FM 3-24, as compared to other official doctrinal publications. First, the endnotes—Steve Capps faced quite a dilemma with them. Generally, field manuals do not have such citations. However, the writing team included many academics, and I instructed everyone to write at a college level; so contributions came in with many citations of sources. Montgomery McFate's material was especially dense in that regard. Steve had to balance that practice with a desire to save pages for a section that most military readers would ignore. He decided to include notes for direct quotes and historical vignettes but eliminate more general references; I have seen popular publications that do the same. Not realizing how unusual endnotes were in a field manual, some academic critics still were not satisfied and wanted more extensive attribution.

Next comes a list of acronyms and definitions. Most manuals have something similar but not as extensive. Steve and his colleagues at CADD provided more detail because of a realization that this particular publication was going to be read by a lot of nonmilitary readers. While the primary target audience was uniformed, we all knew there were important secondary readerships as well.

That section is followed by John Nagl's annotated bibliography, a spin-off from his original idea for an appendix on learning. FM 3-24 remains unique in recommending further reading, which would not have survived challenges from lawyers without General Petraeus' personal intervention. That list underwent much revision as ideas for additions or deletions came in from the Marines, regional experts, and general officers. I added a couple

myself and spent a lot of time crafting annotations. I wish we had had space for longer descriptions, but again, we were lucky to get the section included at all. Knowledgeable readers will recognize the classics. Robert Komer's *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing* is just as relevant to the conduct of GWOT today as it was to Vietnam in the 1960s. T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* reveals that "asymmetric warfare" is as much a result of cultural preferences as a calculated counter to a Western way of warfare. There was some discussion about including such books as *The Centurions* or Roger Trinquier's *Modern Warfare*, in light of the concerns about torture of detainees, but in the end it was decided that they were recognized classic works that had to be included in that opening part of the bibliography.

The following two sections of the bibliography, "Overviews and Special Subjects in Counterinsurgency" and "Contemporary Experiences and the War on Terrorism," underwent much more revision over time than did the listing of classics, usually to add more items that came to our attention. Besides allowing John to slip his own book into the mix, those two lists gave space for updated sources deemed especially relevant to current conflicts. Besides the seminal Petraeus and Chiarelli pieces, there are articles from leading modern commentators like Dave Kilcullen, George Packer, and T. X. Hammes. There was some resistance to the inclusion of Lewis Sorley's *A Better War*, even though the book was quite popular with Army leaders. While it seems clear that Creighton Abrams had a better understanding of COIN by the time he took charge in Vietnam, there is less consensus about what real impact he had on the conduct and outcome of the war. Even he acknowledged in transcribed passages from Sorley's monumental research into Abrams' recorded tapes that the primary focus of enemy efforts during his tenure had shifted from Southeast Asia to the United States, and they were having significant impact.[11] Concerns were voiced among the writing team about any apparent attempt to purvey a "stab in the back" theory about Vietnam that would exonerate the military for its failings there. We decided to include the book, but I explained in the annotation that despite Abrams' actions the North Vietnamese had effectively facilitated American withdrawal from Southeast Asia by targeting our will at home. *A Better War* remains a target of critics like Gian

Gentile, who see it as perpetuating another myth, that of the gifted general who single-handedly turns around failed COIN efforts.[12]

The annotated bibliography is followed by the standard list of military references. While many of our ideas were new, the staff at CADD, along with the Marines at Quantico, made sure that the manual was synchronized with doctrine that already existed. The final part of the book is a detailed index. Because of its complexity, this document presented a much more challenging indexing task for Steve Capps than a normal field manual would have, but his product, like all good indexes, makes the volume much easier to use.

That is my summary of the content of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 in the version that appeared in December 2006. All the writing team could do now was wait for a reaction. In many ways the ripples from its publication are still being felt. The next year, however, would bring an extraordinary mixture of public acclamation and condemnation of an intensity unprecedented for a military publication. All the while, the practices it espoused were, more quietly, being practiced and perfected in Iraq.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Malpractice or Messiah?

Launched into the Storm

Richard Schultz and Ralph Peters (see chapter 5) were not the only critics of the early drafts of the manual. One of the most thoughtful was Steve Biddle. He conceded the utility of the emerging doctrine for popular insurgencies but argued that it was not suitable for civil wars like the one that was occurring in Iraq in mid-2006. In such situations intervening forces might have to act more like peacekeepers than counterinsurgents, brokering peace agreements between factions instead of automatically supporting a government. That prescient recommendation foreshadowed to some extent what would happen in Sunni and mixed-sect areas during the Surge. He also advised that emphasizing the holding of rapid (and likely premature) elections or the quick rebuilding of security forces might only serve to strengthen one faction or harden sectarian divides.[1] While I think the doctrine has wider applicability than he did and had included in FM 3-24 assertions that any insurgency typically "contains at least some elements of civil war," Biddle's cautions about proper sequencing are particularly important.[2] Democracy does not just come from holding elections. Without the establishment of the necessary political culture first, elections can become matters of "one man, one vote, one time" and just establish new forms of corrupt authoritarianism. Arguably in both Afghanistan and Iraq elections occurred too early, resulting in weak or sectarian governments.

Restoring sovereignty to such dysfunctional authorities also made the conduct of any sort of unified COIN effort much more difficult.

Another insightful line of commentary came from Jeffrey Record at the Air War College. He posited that U.S. COIN is almost always going to fail, because this nation's military is not properly structured or motivated to conduct it and because the American people are easily frustrated by limited wars and conflicts in which national interests are not obvious. Accordingly, the United States should avoid COIN unless it is clearly essential for national security.[3] For critics such as Record, political systems based on two- or four-year election cycles and populations with little interest in foreign affairs are just not capable of conducting protracted conflicts overseas. It is a version of George Marshall's dictum that "a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War." Yet at this writing the United States has remained engaged in Afghanistan for more than twelve years, still has troops in the Balkans, and has returned to Iraq (albeit with advisors and air assets vice "boots on the ground"). Low-level, long-term American COIN is possible, as in El Salvador. As with most other foreign policy actions, presidential involvement and emphasis can make a big difference also. The military has proved it can adapt to such missions, though the staying power of those adaptations remains to be seen.

FM 3-24 was designed as a major demonstration of the military's ability to adapt under fire, and it arrived to great acclaim. General Petraeus' information campaign leading up to its release worked to perfection. No other military field manual has ever caused a stir like the finished FM 3-24. It was downloaded more than 1.5 million times from Army and Marine websites the first month it was available. It received a positive review from Pulitzer Prize–winning author Samantha Power in the *New York Times*.[4] The *Economist* praised it, as did even *Le Figaro*, though that pessimistic French journal thought the new doctrine was too late to have any effect in Afghanistan or Iraq. FM 3-24 soon became a textbook for courses at many major universities. John Nagl received an invitation to appear on *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*, and when that confrontation occurred in August, it was noncontentious and professional on both parts but still entertaining. The guest showed up in his military regalia, with decorations, and I think the host was reluctant to appear disrespectful to a man in uniform—though

the ubiquitous lieutenant colonel was also in rare form and has always been capable of matching witty quips with anyone.

I matched him by being featured by *Newsweek* in its "Who's Next in 2007" issue. Reporter Dan Ephron had interviewed me for an article, "The Pentagon's New Fighting Manual for Iraq," on the MSNBC and *Newsweek* website the day the manual was released, and I suspect that he initiated the action. A photographer from the magazine, Ethan Hill, showed up in late December to get an appropriate picture of me. He took shots of me in our archive stacks, standing among busts of famous generals and arrayed among books and publications. Some of his ideas were downright painful. The Army Heritage and Education Center has an outdoor trail with ordnance displays, including tanks and helicopters. One is an operational Sherman tank from World War II. He decided that readers might like to see me inside it, so I crawled in, and he took his pictures. That experience gave me a whole new appreciation for the fortitude of World War II tank crewmen. Not only was the space very cramped for my six-foot, two-inch frame, but there were all kinds of obstructions sticking out to poke ribs and bang heads. I can't imagine what it must have been like to ride around in such a vehicle, bouncing over European terrain under fire. I was glad to get out of it.

That trail also has some prepared exhibits, such as a Vietnam firebase and a full-size replica of Redoubt Number 10 at Yorktown, which American soldiers under Capt. Alexander Hamilton stormed to help make the rest of British fortifications untenable and force surrender. I suggested that a picture of me on its ramparts might be appropriate, with a caption that described the lead author for American counterinsurgency doctrine standing on a site reminiscent of victory in our own insurgency more than two centuries ago. He liked that idea and took a number of pictures of me standing there in a trench coat as the wind whipped around me with a gray sky in the background. That is the picture that ran in the special double issue that ended one year and opened the next, along with an excerpt from Ephron's longer web piece.[5] I shared the spotlight with Mitt Romney, Kathleen Sebelius, Steven Spielberg, Daisuke Matsuzaka, and Jerry Seinfeld. I was wedged between Silvestre Reyes, new Democratic chair of the House Intelligence Committee, and Kim Ng, assistant general manager

of the Los Angeles Dodgers, projected to be the first female general manager in a major U.S. sport. Since then, Reyes lost his chairmanship when the Republicans took over the House and then lost the Democratic primary for his seat in 2012. Ng has done a little better, being interviewed for a number of GM positions before becoming Senior Vice President for Baseball Operations for Major League Baseball.

I should have realized something was amiss when I quickly got a somewhat questioning e-mail about the piece from distinguished American military historian Mac Coffman. Then in the first week of January, I got an e-mail from John Nagl, now commanding the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment, at Fort Riley, responsible for preparing advisory teams for COIN. He told me he had seen the *Newsweek* article, and that the trench-coat picture made me “look like a flasher.” So much for hubris.

This is the picture that ran in Newsweek *with my entry in "Who's Next in 2007." With the right caption it could have been, I think, a powerful image. Without one, many less flattering interpretations can be made, as John Nagl demonstrated*. REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION OF ETHAN HILL/REDUX PICTURES

International and Critical Reaction

The British had remained closely engaged with the writing effort from the beginning. In early October 2006, Richard Lacquement and I were invited to speak at a conference at Wilton Park, a lovely country estate in West Sussex where was located an academically independent agency of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. T. X. Hammes was also there, as was Bob Perito from the U.S. Institute of Peace, whom I had worked with for many years on issues concerning police in stability operations. The title of the conference was "Tackling Counter-Insurgency and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Recent Experiences and Best Practices." The opening address was by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, commander of Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, and the closing talk came from Ambassador John Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State, a relatively new office there. I talked on a panel dealing with the question "What needs to be done to obtain the critical nexus between political and military dimensions?" Other panelists were Rear Adm. Chris Parry, Royal Navy, in charge of the British Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre at Shrivenham, and Dr. Andrew Rathmell, from RAND Europe. I talked about the emerging doctrine, though I am not sure I really answered the question.

There were representatives there from twenty countries and five continents, and we had a lot of fascinating conversations. I learned that the British referred to "silos" instead of organizational or bureaucratic "stovepipes," and there I first heard the abbreviation "SSR," for security sector reform. The most interesting discussion I had occurred one night drinking Guinness with two British colonels and two British academics, all of whom had just come back from Iraq and now wanted to explain to me how the British had fouled up Basrah. After the city had been conquered, they said, the government of the United Kingdom ordered a quick drawdown. In order to maintain security as their forces shrank, British commanders looked for armed indigenous elements that they could enlist

quickly for that effort. The Shi‘a militias seemed ready made to meet the requirement, and were given security responsibilities. However, the British soon lost control of large segments of the city, as the militias refused to take their direction. One theme at the conference that I heard for the first time there was that we Americans were now supplanting the British as the real COIN experts. One officer told me that he and his fellow British soldiers were too much prisoners of their recollections of Northern Ireland, where they had all served. He categorized that experience as having been all in the “hold” and “build” phases of COIN and was convinced that they had forgotten how hard and complex the “clear” phase was.

Other commentators were not so convinced we were on the right track. I have mentioned that Montgomery McFate and the manual were quickly criticized by anthropologists for militarizing their discipline. I can understand their concern about their image as neutral observers when human terrain teams were openly gathering sociocultural intelligence for the U.S. military. That could make future anthropological research more difficult and limit access to suspicious audiences. But the military was going to do this collection anyway, with or without help from academics. Perhaps some sort of compromise could have been effected whereby anthropologists provided training for military officers who actually gathered the intelligence, keeping civilians out of sight, but no such dialogue ever occurred. The academics were also critical of the lack of detailed citations for the ideas from their discipline, mostly in chapter 3. That was not Dr. McFate’s fault; no military manual is going to offer such extensive attribution; in a document as intellectually rich as FM 3-24, the endnotes would have added scores of pages. As it was, Steve Capps procured proper copyright permission for all direct quotes or vignettes, ranging from Galula to the *New York Times*—another unusual problem arising from our approach to writing the manual.[6] The anthropologists were savaged in exchanges on the *Small Wars Journal* website during 2007, many commentators coming to the conclusion that the critique’s real target was President Bush’s foreign policy.

Most criticisms of the doctrine were not procedural, however. The first major postpublication substantive criticism came from Edward Luttwak, in *Harper’s* in February 2007. Terming the new doctrine “military

malpractice," he endorsed instead a population-centric approach with a different, more brutal, focus. For Luttwak, the proper role models for COIN are the Romans and the Nazis, and success comes from intimidating the people by willingness to "out-terrorize the insurgents."[7] His position has much in common with the tactics the Sri Lankans used to successfully suppress the Tamil insurgency.[8] Those who agree with Luttwak would argue that Western countries not willing to resort to such brutal means are doomed to fail at COIN.

At a conference later that year in Paris, American, British, German, and French doctrine writers unanimously rejected such an approach, based on international law, the realities of the current media environment, and a shared conviction that such an approach is counterproductive.[9] It is not a coincidence that among the first principles of Sri Lankan COIN are ignoring international criticism and strictly regulating the press or that the Sri Lankan military is currently being accused of atrocities and war crimes. That Paris gathering was the beginning of efforts to develop some sort of COIN doctrine for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I learned a great deal about many things there. Most important was that the partners were divided by language—that is, by definitions. For continental Europeans, the term "counterinsurgency" applied to actions conducted by the military to defeat insurgents, close to our concept of "counterguerrilla operations." For them COIN then fit inside a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to achieving stability. For the Americans and the British, COIN *was* that total effort, involving all players, civilian and military. That different understanding caused some problems in Paris and would again in NATO doctrine negotiations.

Less important, but in my opinion just as interesting, was what I learned about Parisian architecture. One night the conference attendees went out to dinner. A bunch of them, including John Nagl, Janine Davidson, Bill Flavin, Alex Alderson, and his colleague Brig. Gen. Gavin Bulloch, decided to accompany me on some wanderings around Paris. We drank some fine wine and ended up at Notre Dame late at night, where Janine decided to show off her bachelor of science degree in architectural engineering with an impromptu lecture on the flying buttresses of the cathedral. By the time she finished, we had a small crowd of awed tourists surrounding us. They

probably thought we were part of the staff. I don't remember much about what she said, but I'll never forget the admiring look on the faces of the listeners or their applause. In one of the more amazing pairings in Washington, she is now married to David Kilcullen. I wonder if she has ever given him that lecture?

John Nagl, Janine Davidson, and the author at a café in Paris during the June 2007 Workshop on Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations there—tough duty. Later that night Janine enlightened us about the architecture of Notre Dame. JOHN NAGL

Some critics of the FM were particularly galling. One technique they used to pillory it was to quote the opinion of a single poorly informed soldier or Marine in the field as to how the doctrine worked or cite one example from one village and use that small piece of the mosaic to typify the whole. It is very difficult to aggregate results in such a war, as much for the media as the generals. Also, it is much easier for a writer to assume that any soldier or Marine who comes to hand fully understands the doctrine than to engage a member of the team that created it. Most exasperating for me is to see lazy pundits use some other journalist's ideas, no matter how outdated or wrong they are, instead of developing their own. When I taught my history students about research, I told them never to trust someone

else's analysis of a historical document, that it is always better to go back and read it yourself. It is often surprising what others miss or misinterpret.

The latter malfeasance drove me to my only direct response to initial criticism of the published doctrine. As the director of the Military History Institute, I received *Government Executive* magazine. I happened to spot in the first January 2007 issue an article by Greg Grant entitled "Lessons Not Learned."[10] It was basically a repeat of the Schultz/Dew critique of intelligence from August 2006 (see chapter 5), with a smattering of other outrageous characterizations of the manual, including that it focused only on unitary Maoist insurgencies. After my battles with Fort Huachuca I was particularly sensitive to such criticisms. The Schultz/Dew position was ill informed when it first appeared and was even worse now. I began by calling the magazine and tracking down Grant. He answered his phone and talked to me. He admitted that he had never read, or even seen, the current manual; instead he had developed his article from whatever he could find that others had written over the last year or so. He was not aware that the manual had changed over time and had apparently not considered that the other observers might have misrepresented its content.

Talking to him only increased my chagrin. I sent him a long e-mail explaining the background and content of the doctrine but also felt driven to send an e-mail to his editor. She asked to publish it as a letter to the editor, and I agreed. It expressed my disappointment that the piece had been written without reading the final manual or talking to one of its creators. I explained that we had already addressed the criticisms brought up in the article as part of our review process. I asked that the magazine post a link to the FM 3-24 website so all who wished could read it for themselves—I touted it as well worth reading—and make their own judgments.

Some people have questioned whether it was smart to make the manual available to everyone on the Internet. To begin with, it is unclassified and in the public domain, so there is no legal way to restrict it. But beyond that, we wanted to make it more accessible to soldiers and Marines who wanted to get it—and to encourage dialogue about it to foster the learning process. Initially there was talk in CADD about making it available solely electronically, to save money, but eventually cooler heads prevailed. I had a

number of e-mails from soldiers in the field asking for hard copies, the nearest printer being hundreds of miles away.

Electronic access did, however, allow quick dissemination of the new doctrine. As soon as the manual was published, I started getting e-mails from Col. Gian Gentile, at West Point. He has become the most prolific and most effective critic of the doctrine, the leading spokesman for a "conservative school" within the Army still emphasizing conventional skills, and the most recognizable "COINtra."[11] That term was developed to contrast with "COINdinista," which branded the most enthusiastic supporters of counterinsurgency, like John Nagl; both were plays on elements of the Nicaraguan situation in the Ronald Reagan era. Gian and I have been friends for a long time, back to our History Department connections. He followed me to Stanford for graduate school preparations to teach, then was also assigned to teach American history with me. We both did our doctoral dissertations on some aspect of strategic bombing, and when I retired from my position as Academy professor teaching military history, Gian was picked to replace me. In 2005 he had taken time away from teaching to return to his armor roots and command a battalion in Iraq. He had just returned when FM 3-24 was released.

But Gian's views have sometimes been sources of exasperation for me. His arguments have continually oversimplified the doctrine and have created acres of strawmen to attack. His commentary often characterizes it as mainly warmed-over Galula from Algeria or as almost disdainful of attacks on insurgents. His views are also sometimes contradictory: I have heard him claim both that he was doing successful population-centric COIN in 2006 *and* that such an approach does not work, sometimes in the same presentation.

Gian argues that the new doctrine gets too much credit for success in Iraq, that other circumstances were more important—for example, our "buying off" most of the opposition by hiring "concerned local citizens" or "Sons of Iraq." (At other times he has claimed that the Surge really accomplished nothing. In any case, however, the Anbar Awakening that spread during the early months of the Surge did not initially include plans to pay the locals for helping to secure key locations in their tribal areas. That happened later, as a way to solidify the gains.) He asserts than an enemy-

centric approach might be appropriate in some cases and is concerned that the Army is moving too far and fast in the direction of irregular warfare or French models of revolutionary warfare. In the process there is danger of losing important fighting skills that will remain essential for dealing with conventional threats, as well as with tough insurgents. He also fears that the Army and policy makers have gotten overconfident in conducting COIN, which could lead to risky foreign policy decisions.[12]

There is much to ponder in his arguments, some of which I actually agree with, which is why I have helped him get some of his material published.[13] Learning organizations must tolerate thoughtful dissent. His cautions about losing war-fighting skills have been echoed by some generals, including the Army Chief of Staff, and must be kept in mind for a future featuring the hybrid threats highlighted by Frank Hoffman in his latest work. However, those who were engaged in the battles of Ramadi, Baqubah, Sadr City, and a host of other places in Iraq—or the myriad locations in Afghanistan—would counter that they had plenty of chances to hone their war-fighting skills while engaged with substantial forces (brigade-sized, sometimes) in very intense combined-arms combat. Competent enemies learn and adapt, and future foes will add the most lethal technologies and conventional tactics to the problems of war among the people and adept information campaigns.[14] Gian is correct that conventional capabilities and skill sets must be maintained. And the evolution of operations in Afghanistan seems to bear out his concerns about overconfidence with COIN.

At the core of Gian's critique, however, are heartfelt convictions about his own time in Iraq. I have met other officers who served under Gen. George W. Casey Jr. when he commanded MNF-I (2004–2007) who share Gian's view that the historiography of that conflict has become a zero-sum blame game, one in which General Petraeus had to come in and save a situation messed up by his predecessor. Many of the "instant histories" that have appeared do indeed paint that sort of picture. Such officers also bristle at any suggestion that they wasted lives doing something wrong. As a historian, Gian is especially critical of the "savior general" view of American military history that has been applied to Creighton Abrams and David Petraeus. The writers of FM 3-24 built the doctrine around the best

practices from Iraq. Even General Petraeus readily admits that; he gives credit liberally to the many members of the civil-military team that executed the Surge and recognizes the achievements in Iraq prior to his arrival. Still, he did need to standardize those practices when he arrived there, and the strategic and operational concepts of the Surge did represent a virtual 180-degree shift in approach. The most objective officers who served under General Casey will acknowledge that they failed to adjust their campaign adequately after the Samarra mosque bombing of February 2006. Before that, I think, he was following the right campaign strategy to build up Iraqi forces. But General Casey (and his boss, Gen. John Abizaid) and some of those who served with him disagreed about the need for the Surge, and still do not think the additional forces, and the changes that came with them, were necessary.[15] General Petraeus, for his part, notes that the Surge that mattered most was not that of forces but that of ideas, the major concepts, including those in FM 3-24, that guided the overall comprehensive civil-military campaign.

While Gian's criticisms of the doctrine have probably had the most impact, what I think are the most important came from one of the people who helped create it, Sarah Sewall. As background, one of John Nagl's terrific initiatives was to persuade the University of Chicago Press to publish FM 3-24 commercially in 2007 and donate a portion of the resulting income to Fisher Houses, living quarters at military hospitals for families attending wounded loved ones. In order to add new material so as to be able to copyright its version, the publisher solicited introductions from both John and Sarah. John's explains the evolution of the manual, while Sarah's summarizes the content.

Her contribution, entitled "Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition: A Radical Field Manual," is by itself worth the (relatively low) price of the volume. She explains what is different about the new doctrine and the choices it makes. She takes on the "nice guys finish last" arguments of Peters and Luttwak, that the new doctrine does not face the harsh realities of COIN, pointing out that the manual does talk a good deal about fighting and the high costs of such operations. (General Petraeus has repeatedly explained that he substantially increased every kinetic aspect of the campaign in Iraq, including the conduct of targeted SOF raids,

conventional clearing operations, even dropping of precision bombs.) She offers a terrific discussion about the dilemmas of accepting local legitimacy and the possible clash between concepts of peace and justice.

But the most important points she makes deal with the fact that this military doctrine is attempting to fill a civilian vacuum. She calls the manual a "moon without a planet"—since the interagency capacity and guidance to conduct COIN are sadly lacking in the U.S. government as a whole. In addition, she believes, the new doctrine "came out of the wrong end of the COIN equation."[16]

As we teach at the war colleges, the process of developing a national capacity for successful COIN should ideally start with a coherent national security strategy that sets out policies and objectives for such conflicts. Then the government should develop the capabilities and procedures for each part of the interagency to contribute as part of a unified effort, including a National Military Strategy. The Department of Defense should in turn define joint doctrine for COIN, after which each service should create its own. In fact, however, this process went backward, beginning with the individual services and moving upward. Until the rest of the government catches up in resources and procedures, the American military is destined to bear a heavy burden in any COIN effort. In addition, the lack of a coherent national security strategy created a situation where the hype attached to FM 3-24 might have overinflated its importance. Counterinsurgency is an operational approach, not a national strategy, but in the strategic vacuum that existed, the manual came to fill that role. The fact that a nation can execute counterinsurgency does not mean it should.

Interagency Response

Not surprisingly, the first effective U.S. government responses to the new manual emerged within DoD. The Air Force immediately took umbrage at the doctrine, claiming that it undersold airpower. Jim Corum's annex was not received well by that service's leaders, who felt they had been "relegated to an appendix."[17] They did not realize that they had been lucky to get that much. In April 2007 they invited John Nagl and me to a conference on irregular warfare at Maxwell Air Force Base, where an Air

Force four-star general made his displeasure clear with a number of pokes to my chest. Besides sparking a series of articles defending the importance of airpower in COIN by Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap of the Air Force's Judge Advocate General's office (an interesting source for that response), FM 3-24 inspired the service to develop its own doctrine for irregular warfare, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.[18] Not surprisingly, the publication emphasizes targeting and strikes, and, frankly, it was not very good, because it was done too hastily. Many Air Force officers have acknowledged that to me.

Major General Dunlap has written much about what he considers the flaws of a "ground-centric" approach to COIN.[19] Aside from his incorrect claim that the Air Force had no input into the Army/Marine Corps field manual, his basic assumption, that the United States would be better off avoiding protracted conflicts requiring large deployments of ground troops, is valid—albeit not much help to those striving to execute a COIN campaign that has been initiated anyway. Airpower was indeed a major contributor to the success of Surge combat operations in Iraq, proving again the superiority and necessity of joint military operations, and it has been the key U.S. contribution to the new campaign in Iraq against the so-called Islamic State. However, the course of the war in Afghanistan has vindicated the FM's warnings about excessive reliance on airpower in COIN and attempts to substitute firepower for boots on the ground, especially in rugged (or, as in Colombia, heavily forested) terrain. A shortage of troops combined with perceived civilian casualties from airstrikes has had catastrophic effects on public opinion in key provinces and throughout the country while tarnishing the international image of the NATO effort.[20] Visible troops do more to reassure citizens about their own security than do transitory aircraft, and whoever controls the sites where long-range strikes impact has the advantage of being able to control the media images resulting from them.

Other DoD initiatives were taken to further improve joint operations in COIN. The most notable was the creation of Joint Publication 3-24. The lead author was Maj. Jon Klug from CADD, whom I had taught at West Point and with whom I had remained in close contact. He had the difficult job of forging consensus among all the services, which usually produces the

watered-down doctrine General Wallace had feared (see chapter 3). Instead, Jon produced a document in some ways better than FM 3-24. He built upon the same principles and paradoxes but plugged some holes. He managed to broaden the definition of insurgency to fit contemporary conditions better: "Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region."

He also wrestled effectively with the semantic obfuscation that plagues writing about irregular warfare and stability operations. In the past we have used misleading terms like "military operations other than war" or "low-intensity conflict," phrases obviously ludicrous to an infantryman in a firefight. He created a sort of Venn diagram to show the relationship between concepts like COIN, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and irregular warfare. Each of those terms and many other related ones are promoted by interest groups whose resources are tied to the acceptability and breadth of their particular label. There is no central authority with real power to coordinate boundaries or parcel out definitional space. When DoD wanted to create a website to consolidate resources about irregular warfare and stability operations, organizers decided to call it the *Consortium for Complex Operations*, intending that "complex operations" would now become all inclusive. That idea has not yet caught on. We really need a Council of Nicaea—the conference that Emperor Constantine called in the fourth century to standardize Christian theology and terminology—for irregular warfare definitions. However, it is unclear who today could serve in the emperor's role.

Because Jon did such a fine job with JP 3-24, which eventually was published in 2009, he was given the task of working on doctrine for NATO—no good deed goes unpunished. Getting all those nations, including Turkey, to agree on anything was much harder than eliciting concurrence from different U.S. services. Jon had not only to get consensus on what COIN was and how to do it: the Turks, for example, held up final publication for six months simply over the use of the term "guerrilla." Jon told me that their dissent was a product of some legal aspects from their involvement in Cyprus, though he never clearly understood what it was. But the word was replaced throughout the manual, and the Turks relented. *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency*, AJP 3.4.4, finally appeared in 2011, and it is actually pretty good, building upon the best of recent

American and British doctrine. By then the British had also produced a fine manual with many pictures in a fancy yet informative glossy book that finally replaced their 1995 counterinsurgency guidance. The initial version had been ready in early 2008, but had been canceled because it was not seen as being a sufficient advance on our American manual. A more radical approach was desired, but the resulting product still had much in common with FM 3-24.[21]

While it would be nice if Major General Dunlap were actually right and bombs from the air could substitute for boots on the ground, there are other ways to avoid putting American soldiers and Marines in harm's way in counterinsurgency. One is to substitute indigenous "boots," the intent of the FM's chapter on training host-nation security forces, or coalition boots, like NATO's. Another option is to rely instead on the nonmilitary elements of national power to conduct the "population-centric" activities necessary for success. That was one point of Sarah Sewall's University of Chicago Press introduction, and the creation of FM 3-24 did inspire efforts to develop increased civilian interagency capacity and even corresponding guidance.

In the atmosphere of self-confidence and novelty that existed after the publication of FM 3-24, I engaged with many government agencies. I taught seminars at USAID, where I got the feeling that listeners were really serious about integrating themselves into COIN efforts with the military, and at the State Department, where I did not. However, I was invited by the program assistant for the one-week Iraq/Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) training group to address his students at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, Virginia, about COIN strategy for Afghanistan. He described the goal of his program as "to have speakers come throughout the week holding different modules ranging from History, Doctrine, and Structure of Afghanistan to COIN strategy with the intent to cover a wide array of cultural, economic, and security topics." That proved a tremendous understatement.

I eventually got a seventy-five-minute block during a course that was not just trying to pump students full of information with a firehose—it was more like immersing them under Niagara Falls. On the first day they received introductions to USAID, the military, the International Security Assistance Force, and the history of PRTs. The second day was filled with

classes about the history of Afghanistan and the workings of national and provincial governments there. The third day covered the roles of the U.S. Institute of Peace, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society in the morning, and tactics for negotiations, public diplomacy, and working with interpreters in the afternoon. I spoke on the fourth day, amidst discussions about narcotics and police training, along with PRT missions, strategy, planning, and assessment. The last day featured a video teleconference from Afghanistan about embassy operations, as well as a practical exercise. Most of those classes deserved a full day or week themselves. The only aspect of the course that I found encouraging was that many of the participants were young former soldiers or Marines who were headed back into an environment with which they were already familiar. I am sure that the training schedule checked a lot of boxes on a list of essential topics, but I find it hard to believe that the course material more than scratched the surface of what students needed to know or that they could retain much of the information anyway.[22]

The Department of State also led an initiative to create a whole new paradigm for U.S. government interagency operations to support COIN and irregular warfare. The story of that effort and of why it failed reveals much about the problems with U.S. interagency coordination and helps explain why DoD will remain the best lead agency for such campaigns. It is much more difficult to reform civilian interagency processes than military ones. There is no persistent “doctrine” for civilian departments, because each presidential administration basically starts over. President William Clinton initiated Presidential Decision Directive 56 to formalize coordination for complex contingency operations, but his ideas ran into many bureaucratic barriers within the government and then were abandoned by the incoming George W. Bush administration. There are often calls for bills to reform the interagency as the Goldwater-Nichols legislation did for DoD. However, to get Goldwater-Nichols through Congress required working with only the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Broader interagency reform legislation would have to be cleared by more than a hundred committees and subcommittees. Despite these obstacles, State Department and USAID personnel who had been involved with the creation of FM 3-24 were encouraged to push for similar guidance for their own organizations.

The project began with a conference at the Reagan Building in Washington on 28 and 29 September 2006 entitled “Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a National Framework.” Its avowed purpose was to “to discuss best practices of a wide array of political, military, economic and irregular warfare subjects to help the Department of State and the Department of Defense develop a framework that will aid in building a new counterinsurgency paradigm.” Attendees came from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. It was jointly hosted by John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs, and Jeb Nadaner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. Hillen and Nadaner gave introductory speeches admitting that the United States lacked an interagency structure adequate to allow civilian government to lead COIN efforts. It was time, they declared, to fix that deficiency for a mission that everyone knew was more political than military. They touted recent initiatives—DoD Directive 3000.05, State Department implementation of “Transformation Diplomacy,” and the president’s signing of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, mandating DoD to lead civilian efforts in stabilization and reconstruction—as moves in the right direction. They were followed by Eliot Cohen, who gave a historical overview of American COIN, and by Lieutenant General Petraeus, who described the pace and scope of military reforms, including FM 3-24, and offered a modest proposal for a State Department–led interagency doctrine for COIN. A common theme of the conference was trying to avoid the “Groundhog Day” scenario, endlessly repeating the same mistakes and relearning the same lessons.

The importance of the issues being discussed attracted the best and brightest in the field. I moderated the first panel, on best practices in COIN, a terrific discussion that involved Kalev Sepp, H. R. McMaster, and Dave Kilcullen, now serving as a counterterrorism advisor for the Department of State. We were followed by USAID’s acting deputy administrator, James Kunder, who emphasized the utility of foreign assistance programs while admitting that his organization’s capacity and capabilities were inadequate for the current environment. The second panel, focused on how to create a national COIN capability, included Jeb Nadaner, John Herbst, and Montgomery McFate. Their recommendations for more resources suitable

for a ten-to-fifteen-year process involving a host of initiatives closed out the first day.

The second opened with a British perspective on how to create national COIN capabilities. It was presented by Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely, director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom at Shrivenham, who had previously served as the deputy to General Casey in Iraq. He was followed by Sarah Sewall, who gave another powerful presentation. After discussing the problem with disagreement over the meaning of terms, she voiced a key question that still reverberates with me: "Is the United States a revolutionary power or a status quo power?" The answer to that question has major implications for policies and resources, but I do not think we have yet resolved it as a nation. She closed with another concept, simple but profound, emphasizing that choosing the right people to execute COIN is just as important as putting the right processes in place: "COIN is too important to leave to the inept." After her talk, the rest of the meeting seemed anticlimactic. Dave Kilcullen chaired a panel looking at the "Roadmap to Success in Global COIN," and Ambassador Eric Edelman, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, presented closing remarks. He pleaded for new interagency cooperation and argued the need for new legislation from Congress: "State, [US]AID, and DoD lack the legal authority sometimes to 'get inside of the enemy's decision cycle,' and this must stop." As for the need for national COIN capability, "This is the calling of our generation as President Bush said, and you, in this room, are ready for that call."[23] Unfortunately, that call would soon get muted and then distorted.

The gathering had definitely brought together the interagency "first team" to jump-start the effort, but any momentum established was quickly lost. Within six months Hillen and Nadaner had left government and Lieutenant General Petraeus had taken Kilcullen, initially designated as the lead author for the projected interagency COIN guide, to Iraq as one of his advisors. The writing task was assigned to a team primarily composed of representatives from USAID, the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (which was the lead office), and Ambassador Herbst's office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS). Some other government agencies were participating, as well. It would soon

become apparent that the primary participants had very different ideas about what they were supposed to be doing.

In early April 2007 I was contacted by Tjip Walker, the USAID representative for the writing team, whom I knew from involvement with FM 3-24. He asked to see me in Carlisle for advice about what should be put in the COIN guide. John Nagl had obtained a copy of a 12 April draft, and I was prepared to discuss it with Tjip. It was entitled *United States Government Guide for Counterinsurgency*, and its stated purpose was "establishing a baseline understanding of insurgency and COIN for all USG [U.S. government] agencies and departments likely to be involved in COIN activities and to articulate the elements of an integrated national COIN effort for planning and conducting COIN operations." It was "designed for all government personnel" trying to prevent or counter insurgency.

I was prepared to provide advice on enriching that draft, but when Tjip arrived later that month he had disturbing news of divisions within the writing team about the purpose of the guide. While he favored the comprehensive goal of the 12 April draft, State "Pol Mil" did not, and S/CRS acted as if the whole project were an invasion of its turf. He told me that a decision had been made to reshape the guide to just target senior policy makers and planners in Washington rather than provide any broader guidance for the field. He asked me for some contacts for people and organizations that could advise the effort, and I recommended John Nagl, Col. Mark Olson (who was now running the COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth, since Pete Mansoor was in Iraq), and Scott Graham at Nellis Air Force Base, home of the Air Force Warfare Center. Tjip showed me a new outline that included a list of agencies involved in COIN, and I agreed that a good description of what the agencies were supposed to do, along with a realistic assessment of what they *could* do, would be quite useful. Even with the new narrower focus, he still expected the resulting guide to be connected to NSPD 44 and to generate new interagency linking mechanisms.

I was not so sure. I immediately e-mailed my three recommended contacts to alert them. Colonel Olson responded that he had arranged to have two majors from the School of Advanced Military Studies assigned to help State "Pol Mil" until June and would have them contact me. I soon got a call from Maj. Jim McDermott, who told me he had some trepidation

about phoning me, since I had been one of his professors at West Point. I never thought I was an especially intimidating teacher; I must assume he had me mixed up with someone else. But after we talked he sent me the latest version of the guide, dated 26 April. Its objectives had indeed changed; the guide was now "to inform policymakers on the key principles for designing a counterinsurgency strategy and building and conducting an effective counterinsurgency campaign that integrates the core competencies of the relevant departments and agencies. Additionally it serves to inform government agencies and departments who their counterparts are in U.S. Government counterinsurgency activities."

The guide's focus had shifted from the field to Washington, D.C., and that is where the writing effort was concentrated. Tjip's group wanted a final product by June, but the project dragged on, and time lines continued to extend. I participated in one workshop in November 2007 to help invigorate the effort. I remained particularly concerned about the list of agency and department capabilities, finding that all the participants wanted to list the things they were supposed to contribute and were getting budget money for but that none wanted to admit their shortcomings. A good example was the Department of Justice's emphasis on training police, whereas experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan had revealed the insufficiency of its capacity and capability. The guide effort eventually came to be called the "Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative." Col. Dan Roper, the new COIN Center director, kept us well informed about it, and Janine Davidson, now working in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, circulated drafts for comments, even though DoD had no official say in the content. She told us in August 2007 that the latest goal of the guide was "to socialize COIN among civilian agencies" so they could each best determine how to contribute. She admitted that the dream of real "whole-of-government doctrine" was dead.[24]

There was a fairly solid draft ready by October 2007 for the workshop the next month, with significant input from nine agencies, but when David Kilcullen returned from Iraq to serve as counterterrorism advisor to the secretary of state he reclaimed control of the pen. In June 2008 I was

invited to a second interagency COIN guide workshop to review the latest version.

Sixty-eight representatives from all over the government assembled at the Foreign Service Institute to provide feedback. Dave had made significant changes, expanding the document from forty to fifty-five pages and putting more emphasis on the character of "the affected government." One passage particularly troubled me: "It is folly to intervene in a counterinsurgency in a foreign country, unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the affected government will cooperate with the international community in introducing necessary reforms and demonstrate adequate willpower and capacity to defeat insurgents."[25] I assumed that was a result of his impressions from Iraq but found it ahistorical, wrongheaded, and a bit irresponsible. In open forum I generated a lively debate about it. I pointed out that if the government had adequate capacity we probably would not be there. I used the historical example of El Salvador to illustrate how our long-term presence can eventually influence reluctant allies to reform. I also noted that if pursuing COIN somewhere was deemed in our national interest, we would do it despite such a warning. I agreed that the guide would be correct to state that such conditions increased risk of failure or made COIN more difficult but thought the word "folly" was much too extreme.

I wish I had referred everyone to Andrew Birtle's excellent history of the Army's involvement in COIN, because I could then have also pointed out that no supported nation had ever reformed the way we wished.[26] I had a few sympathizers in the crowd but also sparked resistance from some political scientists there who liked the use of "folly." In the end I was probably just tilting at a windmill. The final manual toned down that passage but kept "Much will hinge on the degree to which policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive to assistance, advice and reform; it is folly to intervene unless there is a reasonable likelihood of cooperation."[27]

But in the end it did not matter, because in fact the interagency COIN guide was dead on arrival. It was finally ready to be published in November 2008, but the presidential election results produced a quandary for the authors. They could work diligently to get it signed by the incoming

administration, thus ensuring its impact would carry over, or take the easy way out and get lame-duck signatures. I don't blame them for taking the latter course, since that at least guaranteed their product a few weeks of relevance. It finally appeared on State Department websites in January 2009 shortly before President Obama's inauguration. It was signed by Robert Gates for DoD, who would remain in the new administration, but also by Condoleezza Rice for the State Department and Henrietta Fore for USAID, who would not. And the Defense Department was not the agency that needed the document.

The guide is well written and remains a useful brief summary of counterinsurgency theory and practice with a lot of sensible advice for the policy makers it targets. But I am not aware of any that have read it, and it is far from being the new framework for national COIN capability that was initially envisioned. It could have been a timely supplement to the new military doctrine, which by then had proven its utility in Iraq. I knew that by then, because I had seen it firsthand.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Observing the Payoff in Iraq

The View from Baghdad

In early February 2007, General Petraeus invited me down to Washington, D.C., for an award ceremony. He had a temporary office in the Pentagon as he made his final engagements in that building and with Congress before heading overseas to take formal command of the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I). After giving me a civilian award for my work on FM 3-24, he sat down to talk about his expectations for his new assignment. He told me that he really needed four different "surges" to ensure success. The president had already committed to increased military forces, so that surge was taken care of. General Petraeus also wanted a surge in the Iraqis' will to resist sectarian and foreign elements destroying their country and another in American political will to give him time to get his new approach to work. Lastly, he desired a U.S. civilian surge to match the military one, with more interagency people to work for provincial reconstruction teams and increased funding for them. I tried to engage him on what he would do if it became apparent that the surges would not happen or would not work and how he would tell that to the president. That was not a topic he really wanted to discuss at that time. He was determined to be successful and was not ready yet to consider other outcomes. I wished him well and headed back to Carlisle.

In early fall he contacted me again, about coming over to Iraq to evaluate the new doctrine in action. By then he had achieved phenomenal success in reducing violence and routing enemies. He had gotten, or created, the surges he needed. The first surge, an increase in military forces, eventually totaling about 40,000 troops, allowed him and the new commander of the Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, to secure Baghdad and its environs and keep insurgent forces on the run. The announcement of the reinforcements and the president's confirmation of American commitment to stay had created an accompanying surge in Iraqi will to resist, a feeling that was most evident in Anbar Province. There the "Awakening" of Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda had already begun, fostered by astute Army and Marine commanders, as well as oppressive Al Qaeda policies. With a new sense of American commitment, more Sunnis now felt confident they could risk turning on the "foreign fighters" and that they could trust Americans to intercede with the Shi'a-dominated government. In this second surge, innovative programs in the detention camps, "COIN inside the wire," also reaped benefits in terms of public support. (I would get to observe those firsthand—quite a difference from Abu Ghraib.) All the positive psychological momentum in Iraq was reinforced by the content and outcomes of General Petraeus' September congressional testimony, which seemed further to affirm American commitment.

There had also been a surge in American political will. Petraeus and his staff had opened up the theater to journalists, hoping that objective reporting of progress would influence public opinion. On 30 July Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution published an op-ed in the *New York Times*, "The War We Must Win," that was the first recognition in the media that the Surge was actually working—after the publication of FM 3-24, the most important information event of the Iraq War. Fresh from a trip to Iraq, the two experts wrote that while they had been harsh critics of the Bush administration's policies, they now saw the possibility of achieving sustainable stability. Their piece forced even Democratic presidential candidates to acknowledge progress, and political debates began to focus on how to exploit success. Ironically, General Petraeus' September testimony emphasized that success so much that it

risked creating expectations at home of a significant and quick drawdown of forces that could in reality risk all that had been gained.

The final and toughest surge to obtain proved to be an increase in U.S. government interagency support to the effort. When the State Department was unable to augment its personnel in Iraq, General Petraeus assigned the provincial reconstruction teams to brigade commanders, making those colonels responsible for both military and civilian activities. That eliminated problems with security, coordination, and synchronization. He was also assisted greatly by his own close relationship with Ambassador Ryan Crocker.[1] In fact, Petraeus and Crocker had committed themselves to integrating closely all that they and their respective organizations did—including meetings with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which they invariably held together, with the one for whom the meeting was scheduled sitting closest to the prime minister and the other in the next seat. On some occasions they actually exchanged chairs during the meeting, to make clear to Prime Minister Maliki who was at the moment his primary interlocutor.

As with all successful military operations, luck was involved as well. Moqtada al-Sadr, the most influential and troublesome militia leader who had very close ties with Iran, announced a unilateral truce, taking his Shi‘a militias out of the picture and thereby reducing Iranian meddling at a key time. (Some of this luck was manufactured, however, as MNF-I had hung around Sadr’s neck responsibility for the killing of several Shi‘a governors and police chiefs, as well as for violence in the holy city of Karbala, and he realized that he had to lower his militia’s profile.) There was plenty of money to pay off Sunni tribesmen to resist Al Qaeda (though it must be noted that the payments did not begin until several months after reconciliation and the Anbar Awakening was first encouraged by General Petraeus).[2] Though political progress was agonizingly slow, the Iraqi government took some measures to reintegrate Baathists and Sunnis and treat them more fairly. In late March 2008, Maliki actually mounted an Iraqi army operation, Charge of the Knights, to subdue Shi‘a militias in Basrah, as part of an MNF-I and Iraqi campaign that would eventually defeat those militias. Many Iraqis, worn down by years of chaos, were eager to support any opportunity for peace. (Sometimes, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping can resemble a fight during a hockey game: only after

combatants have tired themselves out can referees step in and enforce a settlement.) Also, after multiple tours in Iraq, American soldiers and Marines had learned from harsh experience how to conduct counterinsurgency. Perhaps most important, President Bush remained personally engaged, giving the operation guidance and steady support via weekly video conferences each Monday morning at 7:30 a.m. Washington time with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus.

I made my arrangements to travel to Iraq through Col. J. R. Martin, recalled to active duty from retirement for the second time, for his fourth GWOT tour overall. On this occasion he was to serve as General Petraeus' (his West Point classmate's) senior advisor—again for the second time, having done so when Petraeus commanded MNSTC-I as well. "J.R." was assisted by a dynamic Kosovar named Ylber Bajraktari, a graduate of the Wilson School at Princeton University who had become an American citizen and would subsequently serve on the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. I traveled with Major General Huntoon, who was in the process of getting promoted and moving from his position as commandant of the Army War College to become director of the Army Staff; Col. Jim Embrey, an expert on peacekeeping and stability operations from the Army War College faculty; and Steve Biddle, who had assisted General Petraeus with his country assessment earlier that year and was still working for the Council on Foreign Relations. It was my first visit to a real combat zone. While in uniform I had been along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea during tense times in the 1970s, but only now, after retirement, would I have a realistic chance of being shot at.

That became uncomfortably evident as our C-130 corkscrewed through the darkness into Baghdad International Airport on 30 October 2007. I had heard about the evasive maneuvers aircraft took going in and out of that airfield but was not really expecting the roller-coaster ride that I got. We had flown through Frankfurt to Kuwait City before transiting to Iraq. Though civilian and military aircraft shared the same facility in Kuwait, they had different halves, and to get to the military side we had to drive a long loop around the whole city. It would have been so much easier just to walk across between terminals, but I was told that the Kuwaiti government wanted to keep the two elements clearly separate.

Other passengers on our C-130 included a Marine platoon headed to Ramadi. A young sergeant told us that he was heading back to the same foxhole he had occupied on his last tour. That struck me as an eminently sensible replacement policy, with the least possible transition requirements and the advantage of established small-unit cohesion. In contrast, when the 10th Mountain Division had to redeploy units that had returned from earlier tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, they were sent where they had not served. Instead of building upon their previous knowledge, each had to start all over. An important aspect of maintaining a long-term commitment in COIN is establishing a viable rotation system. One of the biggest drawbacks of whole-unit rotations is the requirement for mass transitions, which are not needed with individual replacement systems. I thought these Marines had struck the best possible balance between the two, though, of course, they had the advantage of operating in the same area, Anbar Province, on each tour.

We quickly offloaded the Marines in an intermediate stop before heading on to Baghdad. I remember the eerie feeling flying in a completely blacked-out aircraft and the spread of small lights showing the dimensions of Baghdad. We stayed the night in the Victory Base Complex, near the airport, in one of Saddam's ninety-nine palaces. The bed was nice ("Louis Farouk," as the kitschy furnishings were dubbed), but as in all of Saddam's buildings, the plumbing was problematic. I did finally get the shower to work and the toilet to flush. In the morning at breakfast we ran into Col. H. R. McMaster, on one of his numerous trips in and out of Iraq working on special projects for the general.[3] We also linked up with our security team, led by a Lieutenant Gledhill. Until we left the country on 8 November they would be our constant companions; it was hard getting used to having armed guards all the time, and their presence made transportation arrangements more complicated, but we were in a war zone. I never did get acclimated to wearing body armor all the time in the field. I could only imagine how hard that would be in the heat of the summer.

Breakfast at the Victory Base Complex, our first meal in Iraq. Attendees are Dr. Ahmed Hashim (from the Naval War College, in Newport, R.I.), Maj. Gen. David Huntoon, Col. H. R. McMaster, Col. Jim Embrey, and Dr. Steve Biddle. Hashim and McMaster were conducting evaluations for Lieutenant General Petraeus. AUTHOR

Our living quarters would be in the Green Zone, also called the International Zone, close to the American embassy. Steve Biddle and I shared a trailer with small bedrooms on each end and a bathroom in the middle. The water was not potable, but bottled water was available in stacks all over the compound. We had access to the superb Brown and Root cafeteria there. If not for the long hours everyone on the staff pulled, I am sure they would have put on weight from the ample meals; some writers have criticized the abundance and quality of the food there, but for many of those dedicated troops that was the well-deserved highlight of the day. We could always run into key staff officers dropping by the facility in the evening to get something to eat after a long grinding day.

The Green Zone would be our base of operations for a truly whirlwind tour of Iraq. In ten days we would visit soldiers in Diyala Province and Marines in Anbar, the British in Basrah and detainee operations at Camp Bucca, Iraqi training centers and ministry officials, embassy offices and military headquarters. We would talk to ambassadors, generals, and many frontline soldiers and Marines. We traveled by Stryker, MRAP (mine-

resistant ambush-protected vehicles), Bulldog, HMMWV ("Humvee" light truck), Merlin and Blackhawk helicopters, and C-130s. Most every night we would straggle back late to the Green Zone, overloaded with information, and head to the cafeteria to overload on food.

There was something surreal about the Green Zone. Our trailer was located close to the officers' club with its pool. Outside the embassy was a sign that stated "No Drinking While Armed." (U.S. military personnel were already prevented from drinking by the infamous General Order No. 1, "Prohibited Activities." The sign was aimed at civilian personnel and contractors.) On our first night there, Halloween, we witnessed an outdoor showing of the *Rocky Horror Picture Show*. I distinctly remember an animated line of soldiers dancing the Time Warp on the stage by the pool, ignoring sirens warning of incoming rockets. The convoluted security checkpoints were manned by Peruvians and Fijians; personnel of all sorts of nationalities could be seen wandering around. Those many writers who have compared the Green Zone to Oz and the Emerald City were not far off the mark.

Behind the Headquarters Curtain

The zone was dominated by the massive American embassy. Many of our earliest interviews were with civilian officials and military support agencies based there. The primary military headquarters for MNF-I was at the Al Faw Palace, nearer to the airport, about five kilometers away. We often traveled between the two in small military convoys. There was a lot of civilian traffic; whenever one side of the highway was blocked the convoy vehicles would blow their sirens and go to the other side against traffic flow, expecting Iraqi vehicles to get out of their way. I know that we could not afford to get stuck in traffic, both for safety reasons as well as time constraints, but I am sure such actions caused much local resentment. General Petraeus was to later issue instructions not to antagonize the civilian population that way, by acting like Toad in Kenneth Grahame's *The Wind in the Willows*.

Al Faw was at first sight an amazing edifice. Sitting by a lake, with bomb damage repaired, it looked majestic, a marble and crystal extravaganza. Inside the door was an ornate chair donated by Yasir Arafat

with an image of the Dome of the Rock and an inscription in Arabic that I was told said “Next Year in Jerusalem.” A sign posted nearby requested picture takers to move quickly to allow others to get a chance. (I must confess that I have an image of myself sitting there.) But when I went to J. R. Martin’s office, I noticed a number of messages posted to columns with thumb tacks. I thought whoever put them there must have had awfully strong thumbs, since the columns appeared to be stone or marble, but closer inspection showed that they were made of a substance like Styrofoam. The crystal chandeliers were really plastic, as were the marble floors, and most plumbing was not hooked up. Soldiers kept toilet paper in the inoperable commodes, as much for safety as convenience. Saddam had been a corrupt building contractor, along with his other talents. I am sure he skimmed a lot of money off Al Faw’s contracts, while keeping normal Iraqis at a distance to admire his false facades.

Al Faw Palace was very impressive from the air. AUTHOR

In contrast, the embassy was not ornate but solid, as solid as the people we interviewed there. General Petraeus spoke highly of Ambassador Crocker and his top aides. However, he remained disappointed with the

total amount of interagency support he was getting, particularly as reflected in unfilled positions in many provincial reconstruction teams, and our first interview of the trip was a long talk about that issue with Phyllis Powers, director of the Office of Provincial Affairs at the embassy. She was frank about her frustrations trying to fill thirty PRTs and PSTs (provincial support teams, stationed in rear areas). She estimated that task occupied 40 percent of her time. She had great difficulties getting any agency, including DoD, to meet quotas or release volunteers.

Here is the author in Yasir Arafat's chair in Al Faw Palace. On the other side of the abnormally large teapot is a sign encouraging photographers to move quickly, to allow others to get pictures there.
AUTHOR

The chandeliers, pillars, and floors of the palace were impressive at first glance, but close examination revealed that all were made of cheap materials. AUTHOR

At the beginning of the Surge, State had no authority or funding to hire more people; so Secretary of Defense Robert Gates deployed military volunteers, many from the Reserve Component with skills in the civilian world that were needed in Iraq, to fill positions unfilled by civilian agencies in PRTs, both embedded in combat units and operating separately in the provinces. The reservists were very capable and much appreciated, and some even returned to the teams after their initial deployments were completed. Eventually an executive order was issued allowing direct hiring for PRT positions but without authorizing any career rights with responsible organizations. I taught some of those people at the Foreign Service Institute. Other problems on the U.S. side included applicants who misrepresented

themselves in resumes, agencies that sent their people for only six-month tours, and brigade combat team (BCT) commanders who were slow to accommodate the needs of their embedded PRTs. Powers was under a lot of pressure to fill empty slots but refused to sacrifice quality to do that. Also, some areas were still too dangerous for the deployment of full PRTs. She particularly mentioned Diyala, which we would visit later. She was a big fan of the civil-military partnership being displayed by the embedded PRTs, which she saw as a model for our hosts as they moved toward democracy.[4] Our discussions with her validated for me the emphasis we had given chapter 2 of the FM.

Powers was candid about her difficulties dealing with Iraqis as well. She wondered aloud if we Americans were really helping develop local solutions or imposing our own and emphasized that we needed to adjust our own views of democracy to match Iraqi realities. PRTs made more progress working with tribal sheikhs, who had long-standing, traditional authority and constituencies that made their needs known, than they did with elected officials, who did not. As Steve Biddle had warned, flawed elections, held too soon, had created representatives with unclear responsibilities but long tenures, there being still no provincial election law. In some districts of Baghdad there were locally elected officials who were not recognized by city or provincial governments, even though they were knowledgeable about local issues. The government ministries too were dysfunctional. Calls for appointments with local or provincial leaders were ignored if they didn't come from the embassy; Powers' staff often ended up playing the role of intermediary. She had to go all the way to the top to get any issues resolved in the Iraqi government; no one was willing to delegate any authority.

Iraqis also have a much different perspective on time than we do, looking farther back and farther forward, with less sense of immediate priorities. Powers said that fact contributed to the severe "culture shock" suffered by many incoming PRT members, who usually had had little time to prepare for their jobs. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, she was being pressured to increase spending on regional projects to $50 million a month, much of which she feared would be wasted on unsustainable efforts. She mentioned that Karbala and Najaf were pushing for regional airports, both to promote tourism and gain regional leverage. There were, she

reported, four funding streams for such projects: funds provided to provincial authorities by the central government, Commander's Emergency Response Program money, funding from USAID, and her own resources for quick-response projects. Her complex dealings with the Iraqis, the military, and even her own colleagues in the embassy often drove her to voice the prayer, "Lord, grant me patience, and I want it right now."[5] Since that tour in Iraq, I see that she has served as the ambassador to both Panama and Nicaragua; I hope she found less need for such extraordinary patience there.

We also had a lengthy interview with Ambassador Charles Ries, the embassy's Minister for Economic Affairs and Coordinator for Economic Transitions. His responsibilities too were daunting. He described at length the difficulties resulting from the Iraqi policy of not charging for electricity. That commodity, with unrestrained demand and limited supply, had now become a source of leverage for brigade commanders, who kept pushing for more control over it in their areas of operation. Some did not even ask. In a story reminiscent of George Patton's Third Army hijacking fuel from Courtney Hodges' First Army in 1944, Ambassador Ries remarked that the Marines in Anbar were especially adept at securing electric power for that province to the detriment of Baghdad and had the day before we spoke managed to get 100 percent of their requirements. Of course, that meant the city had even less than usual.[6]

He was also critical of the state of development projects before he arrived. Most had been initiated without Iraqi government buy-in or strategic planning. For instance, the Coalition Provisional Authority chose sites for health clinics without consulting the Iraqi ministries, which therefore had no plans to budget for or sustain them. He found that Sadr City housing projects were mainly being used to bribe the local Shi'a and that militias were controlling fuel supplies.[7] While working to fix those situations, he was proud of also initiating community stabilization projects that were employing 73,000 Iraqis in community service projects, rather like the Depression-era Civilian Conservation Corps. Ideally, all those hired would be young men of fighting age, but his having to work through local sheikhs required compromises, because older men had families to feed. He was concerned that the United States did poorly at getting credit for everything it accomplished, and he aimed to make sure that every project

had some sort of payoff for us, that no one got anything for nothing. For him, the key indicator of economic progress was refugee flow, and in November 2007 those trends were positive.[8] (We had anticipated the utility of that metric in the FM and also, I now saw, had been fairly prescient on the possible difficulties with development projects.)

We had one short office call with General Petraeus and later a fine dinner at his quarters, a small palace overlooking the Euphrates. What I remember most vividly about that night was the close camaraderie he had with his team and our shooting laser pointers at the many bats that emerged at twilight. One must find his recreation somehow, and I can confirm for PETA that no animals were harmed by any actions I saw that night. He asked that I not only provide him general observations about what I saw during my travels but also gather ideas for what he should say to Congress during his upcoming testimony in March. His September testimony, and its response, had done much to reassure Iraqis about our commitment to make the Surge work—and to also reassure Americans that the Surge was indeed working. His next appearance would have to chart a way forward, so as to exploit its accomplishments.

We were also given access to key staff officers, and they were candid. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence admitted that most of the official documentation for 2003 and 2004 had been destroyed. Many important PowerPoint presentations, e-mails, and records of teleconferences had not been saved, making it difficult to research the course of earlier operations.[9] This problem also occurred in Afghanistan, and it affected more than just 2003 and 2004 in both theaters. One of the ironies of this new age of information is that while procedures to preserve paper records have been firmly established for many years, that is not true for electronic data. Historians trying to reconstruct the major actions of GWOT are going to face feast or famine, sometimes overwhelming numbers of stored files, sometimes purged hard drives. The Army's Center for Military History has worked diligently to collect what operational electronic records are available, but significant gaps remain.

One common theme from the staff was that Central Command headquarters and the Pentagon were usually three months behind in realizing what was going on in Iraq, which complicated those relationships.

At this stage in the Surge, events were moving rapidly, which contributed further to the perception gap. Every office seemed to display a print of Frederick Remington's "The Stampede," a visual image of General Petraeus' goal (and of his emphasis on being comfortable with a semichaotic situation), with the caption "Irreversible Momentum: The Mesopotamia Stampede." It was obvious from our interviews that the Iraqis were being herded in the right direction, but whether they would continue to go that way in the future, especially without U.S. presence, was still unknown. Maj. Gen. Mike Barbero, the J-3 Director of Strategic Operations for MNF-I, was amazed at the complexity of the situation he found in Iraq. He had just attended a "targeting meeting" that had discussed among a host of issues: the influence of the Shi'a Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) on the Central Bank of Iraq and around Baghdad International Airport; work with the FBI to break up Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and criminal networks in Mosul; and actions to counteract increasing Iranian activity. In his view, JAM was fracturing and AQI was on the run, though he agreed that Diyala was the most violent province, because insurgents were being pushed out of Baghdad in that direction.[10]

He considered the Iranians, militias, and foreign terrorists to be the main enemies to stability, but he had his share of problems with friends as well. He was irked that key embassy staff members did not work on weekends and that many positions there were filled with very junior people.[11] I could sympathize with his perspective that wars don't stop on Saturday and Sunday, though I did send a note to General Petraeus that he was not going to get innovative thinking out of staff officers working sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, and needed to give them some time off somehow, as well. He thanked me politely and actually did try to fence off Sunday mornings for the staff (though he and his personal team used the "free time" for six-mile runs and workouts). My note actually reinforced an initiative already launched by Pete Mansoor.

Major General Barbero, like everyone else we talked to at headquarters, was especially critical of the Iraqi government, whose members did not seem to be taking proper advantage of the tactical and operational momentum that MNF-I had achieved. He felt that "their appetite for sovereignty exceeded their capacity," though it must be noted that our

political leaders were also eager to give it back. He posed a question that I have been musing over for many years now, whether problems with the Iraqi leadership were the result of the wrong form of government or the wrong people in it.[12] What strikes me most about his query is that neither of those conditions is within the purview of the American military. Both are results of political decisions, in this case ones made in Washington and Iraq, that have no place in military campaign plans for counterinsurgency. While we could write in our doctrine that the success of that campaign depended upon establishing a legitimate governing authority, in reality many of the key determinants of achieving that end are beyond military control. That reality does not reduce the importance of that objective, but it does mean that even the most competent military plan can be doomed to failure by bad political decisions.

Steve Biddle had foreseen early on that the best possibility to stabilize Iraq might rely upon bottom-up reconciliation, beginning with provincial and local initiatives, and that was echoed by the MNF-I chief of staff, Maj. Gen. John Paxton, USMC. Paxton was the first person to discuss the rise of Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) with us, and we would soon get many more details about this important development. General Petraeus had established a Force Strategic Engagement Cell, under Maj. Gen. Paul Newton, a British veteran of Northern Ireland, along with a senior American diplomat, to work with the Iraqis to reconcile factions and build on these initiatives. MNC-I also had a Force Reconciliation Cell, under a brigadier general, assisting with those efforts.[13]

Major General Newton gave us a delightful interview. He told us that he had expected to be spending most of his time dealing with those attacking the Iraqi government, not the government itself. As it was, only 5 percent of his time was expended in “Lawrence of Arabia stuff,” talking to enemies, while the bulk of his work was providing honest feedback to the Maliki government about insurgent attitudes and other issues. While conceding that American company and battalion commanders, not the British, were now the real masters of COIN, he did not think Americans were quite ready to accept reconciliation with enemies with blood on their hands (a challenge that General Petraeus also acknowledged and one on which he and Lieutenant General Odierno were working). Major General Newton

believed that his own army had much more experience with the "unpleasant support of political activities necessary to end such conflicts." While we had mentioned such actions in the FM, we really had not provided much useful guidance. He thought his engagement initiatives were putting pressure on all the insurgent groups to participate and believed he was getting adept at determining which were truly irreconcilable and which were open to negotiations. He emphasized the importance of Sunni CLC groups in sustaining the Anbar Awakening but said the trick would be to get them off our payroll and into relationships with the Iraqi government. While security was improving across the country, political gains and job creation still lagged far behind, and those would need to catch up to achieve General Petraeus' goal of "irreversible momentum."[14]

Another of Major General Paxton's points had been that while the military was reforming its doctrine and training for this kind of war, the rest of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System, described as "DOTMLPF" (an acronym for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities), was broken. This was apparent from the briefing we received from MNF-I logisticians. As a result of the task-organizing of brigade combat teams and of accumulating materials for COIN, the 20 BCTs in Iraq were logistically equivalent to 45 regular brigades. They were also managing 136,000 contractors, 36,000 of them third-country nationals. One of the briefers remarked that we had empowered a lot of middle-class elements from other countries with our contracts, an unexpected spin-off from OIF. The logisticians had already begun planning for drawing down force levels and closing the 66 forward operating bases throughout Iraq. I left them with a selection of documents from our Military History Institute collections dealing with the withdrawal from Vietnam, highlighting possible problems like canceling contracts. It is much easier to deploy into a foreign country than pull out.

One of the biggest challenges the MNF-I logisticians foresaw was removing the astounding number of concrete security barriers we had emplaced, 16,000 "t-walls" on Camp Victory alone.[15] They seemed present on every road and in every neighborhood, another key element in reducing violence. But walls work both ways, and while they limited the access of threats, they also blocked social intermingling and created divides. Baghdad

was more secure, but sectarian neighborhoods were now much more starkly delineated. That was a cost of security and a permanent result of the insurgency. We had devoted a few pages in the FM to the importance of population control measures but had not foreseen the possible ethnic divisions that might result.

Building Iraqi Capabilities

The logisticians confessed that they had great difficulty adjusting to local customs and needs. Sanitary facilities were a special problem. Iraqi latrines did not have toilet paper; instead, they normally had foot pumps and hoses to wash hands. When U.S.-style portable outdoor toilets were installed, Iraqi soldiers would just wipe their hands on the walls until the unit became untenable. That required some real scrambling to make modifications to installations, especially for combined U.S.-Iraqi bases, another key element of the new approach to COIN.[16]

While General Petraeus had changed many aspects of the campaign in Iraq, he had maintained his predecessor's focus on increasing the numbers and competence of Iraqi security forces (ISF). Indeed, that remained the key enabler for long-term success, along with establishing a legitimate governing authority, and it was a mission area where the military had the primary influence on outcomes.

A meeting in the offices of the Iraqi deputy prime minister attended by, from left to right, Maj. Gen. Huntoon, Steve Biddle, Barham Salih, the author, Col. Jim Embrey, and Col. John Martin. AUTHOR

We spent a lot of time on our trip looking at the Iraqi side of the COIN equation. John Martin got us appointments with Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih and Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani. The former was open and erudite, a Kurd educated in the United Kingdom, a man who impressed us with his knowledge of Iraqi politics and what would be required to fix his country.[17] But he had little real power in the government or influence over the Shi‘a elements that dominated it and had turned the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) into their own fiefdom, notorious for creating Sunni-hunting death squads. Al-Bulani, appointed in mid-2006, was seen, though a Shi‘a, as someone independent of militias and extremists, but he had a tough road ahead to reduce the sectarian taint of his ministry. He described his vision wherein his national police would handle all domestic emergencies, thus freeing the army to deal with external threats.[18] But we knew that goal was a long way off, especially with the great mistrust non-Shi‘a had for the MOI’s police. I can’t say I felt reassured when I left his office.

I did gain an important lesson from the visit, however. That was the first time I had been served the standard sweet tea that was a part of all Iraqi

meetings. It arrived in a small clear glass sitting in a saucer, and a servant set it on a table next to me. I grasped the handle of the glass and raised it to my lips, quickly realizing two things—it was very good, and it was very hot. My fingers were frying from the heat of the handle, but unwilling to let on that I was suffering, I placed the glass back in the saucer as gracefully as I could and silently tolerated the pain in my inflamed hand. I then watched as everyone else picked up the saucer, brought it close to their face, and only had to lift the molten glass a few inches for a quick sip of tea. I would not make that same mistake again. While my burns healed speedily with no apparent scars, my embarrassment lasted longer, and from then on I always watched what my hosts did before sampling any food or drink.

While we had ceded sovereignty back to the Iraqi government in 2004 (too hastily in my view), that did not mean we had transferred all provincial control. Maj. Gen. Mastin Robeson, USMC, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Assessments for MNF-I, briefed us on the process to pass responsibility for a province back to the Iraqis. The operating acronym was "PIC," provincial Iraqi control. Division commanders began with recommendations for transfer, which were evaluated by Lieutenant General Odierno's corps headquarters. Assessments focused primarily on security and governance. General Petraeus then reviewed the findings and passed them to Robeson for his Wednesday meetings with a special coalition committee that looked at the status of all provinces. On Thursdays Robeson met with another group to finalize recommendations for any awarding of PIC, a group that included representatives from most Iraqi ministries, along with American and British officers. While the Iraqis had originally tended to be keen to accelerate transfers, recent mosque bombings in Karbala had made them more cautious, even to the point of delaying scheduled shifts in Basrah. He admitted that generally we did not desire transfers as fast as the Iraqis did, because once they assumed responsibility, PRT mobility disappeared, security always suffered, and Commander's Emergency Response Program monies dried up. Perhaps to illustrate his concerns about Iraqi competence, the power to his office went off three times during our interview.[19]

For Robeson, the big stories were the rise of 67,000 Concerned Local Citizens, later called the "Sons of Iraq," and the related tribal "Awakening" in Anbar Province. Two hundred fifty sheikhs there had signed a covenant

to fight Al Qaeda and support the Iraqi government and its allied coalition. Those advances remained fragile. Some sheikhs had tried to backtrack and had had to be coerced to keep the covenant by such threats as refusing to allow tribal funerals if they got killed. The Maliki government still feared the armed CLCs, but Robeson predicted they would eventually be accepted. He posited that if the coalition could learn to reconcile with insurgents, it could get Shi‘a and Sunnis to cooperate.[20]

To reinforce that point, he discussed the working of the Iraqi Followup Committee for National Reconciliation, which was only three months old. It had already communicated with insurgents, Sunni tribes, and officers of the old Iraqi army. Two hundred fifty thousand questionnaires had been sent out to former soldiers, and 60,000 had been returned. Robeson saw great hope from that program to fill leadership gaps and reduce unrest. Army reconciliation options included retirement with pensions for senior officers, return to active duty for majors and below, and assignment to work in other agencies that desperately needed expert help. He was frustrated that only 10,000 forms had been processed and was trying to get the government of Iraq (GOI) to commit more people to that task. Police forces were also being expanded, with a goal of a ratio of at least 1 policeman for each 133 people, but the limited capacity of the Baghdad Police Academy for training slowed that process considerably.[21] We had devoted many pages in the FM to the important mission of training police for COIN, and that emphasis had not been misplaced.

We got a lot more details about the training of Iraqi security forces from Lt. Gen. James Dubik, commander of MNSTC-I, and his staff. They acknowledged the difficulties trying to reduce sectarianism, especially within police elements controlled by MOI. They described security sector reform as another mosaic that differed from region to region and that was also being accomplished with a bottom-up approach. Iraqi security forces would reflect the society that produced them, and social and political change would also be required to lessen sectarianism. Steve Biddle noted that this process would likely take a long time, and Lieutenant General Dubik expressed concerns that reports in the United States about decreased violence in Iraq would create political momentum to pull out troops too soon, thereby squandering the opportunities that improvement offered. The

recent British pullout from Basrah had revealed the problems with SSR force generation and increases of violence that premature withdrawals could produce.[22]

Trying to transform the Iraqi army, as well as their navy and air force, in the middle of a war was a daunting task. There was a lot of political pressure to "cut corners" to get new units into the fight quicker, but that risked mission failure. MNSTC-I's mission had been made even more complicated when the military became responsible to oversee police training. As mentioned previously, the Foreign Service Act of 1961 puts severe restrictions on any DoD role in training foreign police. That responsibility lies with the Justice or State Departments. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, years were wasted as those organizations demonstrated that they were not capable of the large-scale efforts required. Some NATO allies were asked to help and made contributions of varying effectiveness. In both cases the president granted waivers to allow DoD to pick up the overall mission. For Iraq, that National Security Policy Directive was signed in late 2004. In fact, perhaps the greatest deficiency in the American interagency infrastructure to conduct stability operations or counterinsurgency concerns police training. The police always constitute a key component of security, and the most important one for long-term success in that arena. If properly trained, the police can maintain a justice system that sustains legitimacy. If not, police can be a source of grievances that undermine it.

This expanded mission forced MNSTC-I to interact with many different agencies. The Iraqi army belonged to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), police to the MOI. The ministries gathered their forces differently. MOD recruited nationally for the armed services and vetted recruits speedily. MOI recruited and vetted locally, in a much more cumbersome process. Finding enlisted recruits was fairly easy, but officer billets were only 50 to 60 percent filled. Transfers of control and the withdrawal of U.S. troops had to be performed in carefully crafted phases to get MOD and MOI forces to work together. There was a "fifty-year culture gap" in planning capabilities faced by MNSTC-I training teams with MOI, MOD, and all major military and police headquarters. For combined meetings, American staffs showed up with laptop computers, while their Iraqi counterparts brought stacks of yellow tablets and pencils. The Iraqis could not handle the same scope or

pace of planning and operations. In addition, they were handicapped by more than thirty years' experience of a system that centralized all decision making and discouraged any innovation.

In addition to coordinating transition teams for Iraqi Ground Forces Command and the national police, MNSTC-I also had responsibilities for guards at the four hundred posts of the Department of Border Enforcement. Coverage was porous at best. At that time, in 2007, the British could not control their area of the south, and there were not enough resources to handle northern borders either. The situation was further complicated by the fact that once MNSTC-I developed new units and they joined the Iraqi security forces, training responsibilities passed to MNC-I, under Lieutenant General Odierno. A special Iraq Assistance Group under Brig. Gen. James Yarbrough had the mission of coordinating all the training and ensuring unity of effort.

BCTs controlled all army and police training teams in their areas of operations. As we would later find out, those teams were often created "out of the hide" of those BCTs, reducing their combat effectiveness for other tasks. That was one of the reasons Lieutenant General Dubik emphasized that combat and advisory missions could not be treated separately, as they usually were in Washington. Team members usually got two months of training and then served as trainers for twelve more. However, reservists were only available for nine months in the field. Iraqi soldiers and police usually saw many different trainers, as it was difficult to predict when units would reach Operational Readiness Assessment Level 1 and be capable of independent operations. That created another handoff problem, as advisors changed. It was apparent to me that any future revision of the FM would have to deal in much more detail with the many transition problems that were becoming evident in Iraqi operations. That subject had not been covered enough in our work.

Lieutenant General Dubik's goals for Iraqi security forces were ambitious. Iraqi assumptions of 2006 that they could transition from COIN to a general defense force of 390,000 by 2008 had proven invalid. After a big fight with our own Office of the Secretary of Defense, those projected numbers had been raised. At that time, in 2007, total authorized force structure for ISF was 488,000, MOD units numbered over 162,000, and MOI had over 319,000. By December 2008 overall numbers were projected

to increase by 100,000 more, with over 332,000 in MOI and over 255,000 in MOD, including 13 army divisions and 10 air force squadrons. MNSTC-I wanted 645,000 in the Iraqi security forces in 2009, but the Maliki government was balking at funding that many. MNSTC-I staff conceded that these force expansions were awfully complex for a country like Iraq with a "five-minute FYDP," meaning that its future-years defense planning was not projected far into the future, as it is at the Pentagon.

We also got the opportunity to talk to Maj. Gen. Hussein Al-Awadi, head of the Iraqi National Police. Though an ex-Baathist, he was seen as a hero by the MNSTC-I leadership for his campaign to reduce sectarianism in his organization. It had been formed in March 2006 from special police counterinsurgency units. It had had a terrible reputation for corruption and death squads before he took command, and he was striving to change that. He explained that the Sunni boycotts as the new MOI was being established had created a Shi'a dominance he was trying to rebalance. He had replaced all nine of his brigade commanders and seventeen of twenty-seven battalion commanders. He told us that three of his brigade commanders were Sunni and six were Shi'a, and all staffs were mixed. Most officers had been in the old Iraqi army. He confessed that he had to do some sectarian recruiting to fill units in some regions, especially for Sunnis. His vision was for an agile "Carabinieri-type" force that could be used anywhere in the country, an organization better armed than local police but avoiding the human rights problems that could arise from the army's heavy firepower. Right now he was focused on defeating terrorism, and his units had helped secure Baghdad during Surge operations, but he eventually wanted to tackle smuggling and disaster relief as well.[23]

The Iraqi National Police was later redesignated as the Iraqi Federal Police to distance itself from past abuses, and its competent commander was deservedly promoted to lieutenant general. After the American withdrawal, Maliki "kicked him upstairs" to command border posts and replaced him as commander of the Federal Police, and the force quickly reverted to become more sectarian and less capable. The importance of choosing and supporting the right host nation leadership in COIN cannot be emphasized enough, but such decisions are often out of the control of the U.S. military.

As part of our orientation on MNSTC-I's operations, we were flown to training centers for both the army and National Police. While we saw normal basic training activities for soldiers, the visit to the Numaniyah National Police Training Center was more revealing. Major General Hussein had a four-phase transformation plan for his force. He had already completed the first phase, unit assessments that had led to the replacement of so many leaders. He was almost done with the second, a "re-blueing" course of training on general skills at Numaniyah to create better police. Phase III would be Carabinieri-style training at Camp Dublin at the Victory Base Complex, involving Italian trainers from NATO. The last phase would be to deploy fully prepared National Police brigades throughout the country.

We witnessed the last brigade going through Phase II. For most such organizations, this phase was the first time the whole unit was together. All students underwent fingerprinting and extensive vetting through many databases. Classroom instruction included sessions on human rights, gender issues, and hate crimes, as well as on tactical operations like cordon and search. We witnessed an end-of-course Final Training Exercise that included setting up a cordon, searching buildings, taking out a sniper, investigating a crime, and evacuating mass casualties from an improvised explosive device. It appeared choreographed to me, but the policemen looked sharp and determined.

Brig. Gen. James Yarbrough, head of the Iraq Assistance Group, extolling the virtues of Maj. Gen. Hussein Al-Awadi, in charge of the Iraqi National Police. Major General Hussein was an important and effective leader in efforts to reform and train his organization. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was quick to remove him after the American withdrawal, in order to reassert sectarian control over the INP. AUTHOR

We were allowed to interview both army recruits and the training policemen. I was struck that while the new soldiers were generally young and just beginning their careers, the policemen were older and were coming from other jobs. Most were also army veterans. I wondered whether they were motivated by patriotism, higher pay, or a reaction to the disruption of their lives from the ongoing violence, but I was never able to pursue that line of questioning. The one impression I got from talking to both Iraqi soldiers and policemen was that they all enjoyed the new freedom they had and that it would be very difficult for anyone to put that "back in the bottle." Considering that impression in hindsight, I suspect they were probably mostly Shi'a.

Major General Hussein admitted that among the bottlenecks in his system were the limited capacity for the Baghdad Police College (BPC) to train officers and the lack of training centers in other provinces. He knew he would have to expand those facilities. We also got a chance to see the BPC

when we visited the new Rule of Law Complex at Baghdad al Rusafa. It also included the Rusafa Prison, Central Criminal Court of Iraq, and Law and Order Task Force (LAOTF) at Forward Operating Base Shield. The complex included heavy representation from the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Established only a few months earlier, the LAOTF took its doctrine from FM 3-24, another example of the major impact and utility of our work, and had a mission to "build essential Iraqi capacity for independent, evidence-based, transparent, and evenhanded investigation and trial of major and other crimes before the Central Criminal Court of Iraq." One of its lawyers explained just how hard that was. While courtrooms reflected their British heritage, established court procedures did not. The Iraqi legal system, LAOTF lawyers found, was often based primarily on coerced confessions; as trials then proceeded, defendants tried to disprove their admissions. There was a Koran for witnesses to swear on but not for defendants, since they were expected to lie. There were also massive delays in the system, with an average wait of 2 years before trials. Rusafa was overflowing with excess detainees resulting from the Surge, and LAOTF had a goal to get 2,000 prisoners through the system every 60 days. Iraq actually had a solid secular civil code in place and capable judges; the biggest challenge for the LAOTF was protecting them while increasing Iraqi forensic and investigative capacity. The FBI was working with the BPC to increase training in those areas. When we arrived, there were 23 investigative judges working for the Central Criminal Court. In the previous 120 days they had received almost 2,400 cases. Four hundred twenty-eight had been closed or dismissed, 1,128 were under investigation, 654 had been referred to trial, and 120 trials had been completed. The LAOTF was proud of its progress but realized it still had far to go.[24]

I had much to ponder as we flew back from the training centers after a long day. Again I had the chance to muse about the lights of Baghdad. I found out later that after the free government electricity went off, people contracted with local generator operators for power. Fuel for those generators was a critical supply item for MNF-I. Environmentalists will be happy to know that all Iraqis used low-wattage light bulbs to reduce their electricity needs. I once asked one of the generator operators what

assistance he needed from the government; the response was that he needed a job. I was surprised and asked if he was making money each night from his generator. He was, but for him an occupation was not a job unless it was given to you by the government. I guess too many years under a centralized economy can skew your definitions.

One of the new courtrooms built by the Law and Order Task Force at Baghdad al Rusafa. There is a Koran at the witness podium in front of the judges but none in the prisoner's docket. AUTHOR

We popped countermeasure flares twice on the return flight, a reminder that even the area around Baghdad still had some dangers, but overall I felt encouraged. The Iraqis seemed willing and eager to assume responsibility for their own future, though there were obviously many obstacles that still needed to be overcome. But I would not have a good perspective on exactly how far they needed to go until I had a chance to watch our own forces in action in the field.

CHAPTER NINE

Turning the Switch On and Off in Iraq

The View from the Field

During my visit to Iraq I was privileged to visit every divisional sector except the far north. I got the chance to see in action in a number of venues the most competent counterinsurgency force the world had ever witnessed. I wish I could say that its effectiveness came primarily from the enlightenment provided by FM 3-24. The doctrine had helped, as had General Petraeus' adept adaptation of it to the situation he faced, but nothing could substitute for the accumulated experience resulting from multiple tours in Afghanistan or Iraq. Soldiers and Marines ranking from general to sergeant had learned in the crucible of combat and passed on their hard-earned wisdom to their subordinates. What the new leadership and doctrine did most importantly was provide a standardized structure by which to focus and apply that accumulated learning.

For me, the moment I truly realized the depth of competence in MNF-I occurred in the back of a Stryker armored combat vehicle on a dusty road in Diyala Province. I was traveling to another of my interviews in the company of two grizzled young sergeants, E-5s, and a new private first class on his first combat tour. The two more experienced soldiers, who still looked incredibly young to me, were carefully teaching the rookie about how to know "when to turn the switch on and off," how to determine when it was time to talk with an Iraqi or to be prepared to fight. Their discussion

was incredibly nuanced, talking about everything from body language to local culture to broader political currents. Undergirding this situational sophistication was an intense devotion to the mission and each other.

It has been said that one death is a tragedy but thousands or a million are just a statistic. Because of the nature of contemporary combat in Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, with its small, deadly firefights and ambushes, every loss for a unit is a tragedy, magnified by the close connections between brothers and sisters in combat and long remembered. Division commanders we interviewed had always close at hand decks of cards or arrays of names that listed all of their subordinates killed on their watches, along with details like hometowns and surviving family members. Battalions who had occupied the same compound for any length of time had “walls of heroes” with names and pictures of the slain. Every commander could recount the names of their losses and how they occurred. Every soldier and Marine remembered the comrades they had lost. It is no wonder post-traumatic stress disorder is such a problem: every unit in Iraq was accompanied by ghosts lingering in collective memories. Yet at the same time, only rarely did those recollections lead to an overreaction that could compromise the overall mission. It is not surprising there were a few atrocities in Iraq; one of the objectives of chapter 7 of FM 3-24, recognizing the particular stress of COIN, was to prevent such acts. It is surprising there were not more. That there were not is a tribute to the immense professionalism of the all-volunteer American military in Iraq. The country can be justifiably proud of its sons and daughters.

Competence started at the top. I watched General Petraeus handle one of his morning briefings from his staff. He not only sucked in data like a sponge but asked hard questions about everything from improving Iraqi combat readiness to establishing public medical clinics. He reminded me of the conductor of a symphony synchronizing all his instrumental sections to perform an especially complex composition, or a spider in the center of a web spinning and controlling disparate strands, which in this case were lines of effort. All modern warfare is intricate, whether a conventional assault by combined-arms divisions sweeping over wide swaths of terrain or a nonlinear irregular conflict fought in cities and shadows. Still, the skill sets needed to orchestrate each style are different, and no American general of this era has been able to match Petraeus’ feel for the intricacies of COIN.

While at West Point, I taught an elective, “Generalship and the Art of Command,” to cadets like Jon Klug, who went on to become the main author of JP 3-24. One of my points of emphasis was that successful commanders are usually members of successful pairs, each having some key subordinate who fills an essential complementary role. The subordinate might be a chief of staff, or a gifted planner, or an especially capable combat commander. I saw Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commanding Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), take one of the morning briefings in his commander’s stead. As leader of MNC-I, Odierno focused on different things, and I thought he let a few administrative items get by that General Petraeus would have questioned, but he obviously had a remarkable grasp on the conduct of his units in the field and the complex operations they were conducting. Pete Mansoor has well described the workings of the Petraeus-Odierno partnership during the Surge, one managing the war from “his strategic perch” while the other focused on the operational and tactical fight.[1]

This array of Task Force Dragon Fallen Heroes, who died “so others can live free,” was typical. All units in Iraq had some memorial for comrades who had been lost. AUTHOR

We had a couple opportunities to talk to Lieutenant General Odierno at length. His physical presence is quite imposing. He dominates a room. Nevertheless, he made clear to us, he was not dominating the campaign at this stage. Instead, this was a battalion and brigade commander's war, especially the latter. He spent a lot of time setting the boundaries for those colonels to work within, dealing with their pieces of the mosaic, and was willing to take some risk to enable them to do that. National reconciliation was being driven from the bottom up through local initiatives, just as Steve Biddle had predicted over a year earlier. Lieutenant General Odierno had to trust the judgment of his subordinate commanders, both about the sincerity of those reconciling and to understand properly and operate within local definitions of honorable and bad behavior.[2]

That process was being facilitated by the presence of the embedded PRTs, which helped BCT commanders and staffs better understand interagency resources and solutions. Lieutenant General Odierno thought that intelligence gathering for reconciliation purposes still needed some refinement, though he praised the government of Iraq (GOI) for the mechanisms it had established to assist the process. He foresaw a future of continuing to build the Iraqi capacity for local governance and security, while reconciliation advanced at many levels. He was also concerned about getting supporting United Nations resolutions renewed and about the growing Iraqi political pressure on Maliki to limit coalition authority (as had been the case in 2006, when coalition forces were moving to large bases and tasks were handed off to Iraqi forces at a substantial pace that was not sustainable). He presciently saw that pressure as a danger to the irreversible momentum that MNF-I desired. He was convinced that it was essential that, as our forces withdrew, the transition and training teams would remain in place with the Iraqis, for many reasons, including intelligence and logistics support. He wanted to see the Iraqi armed forces outfitted with as much American equipment as possible, to keep them tied to us.[3]

Though he was positive about the course of ongoing events, he did list three "things that bothered him" that could derail future stability. The first was a failure in reconciliation. If the Shi'a government did not accept the Concerned Local Citizens, the Sunni might give up on it; there were also

Kurd-Arab issues that still needed to be resolved. His second concern was the growing Iranian influence and intervention in Iraq. In his book on the Surge, Pete Mansoor writes extensively about the extent of those problems at that time; they have since manifested themselves even more. Shi‘a militias with Iranian ties have returned to Iraqi streets to defend Baghdad against the Islamic State and then to oust it. Lieutenant General Odierno’s third “bother” involved unit transitions after fifteen-month tours. There were many facets to that one: how units would hold up after that long in combat, problems with passing of intelligence and authorities between units as they arrived and left, and disruption of the continuity and local relationships that are so essential for successful COIN. The inevitable reduction in overall American forces would necessitate passing more responsibility to Iraqi security forces.[4] While the individual-replacement system used in Vietnam receives much criticism for isolating new arrivals and reducing unit cohesion, it had many advantages for COIN, because it allowed long-term unit presence without the organizational transition issues present in Afghanistan and Iraq.

MND-B

As it turned out, all his “bothers” proved critical ones, but their eventual impacts were not evident in late 2007. Instead, the “Mesopotamian Stampede” seemed headed very much in the right direction. Our visit to units throughout Iraq confirmed Lieutenant General Odierno’s description of the conflict as a “colonel’s war.” MNC-I had divided the country into multinational division (MND) sectors, most of which we saw. Those commanders were not maneuvering forces, as had their predecessors who assaulted Iraq in 2003. Instead, the MND leadership set standards and provided enabling support for the BCTs and battalions that were really conducting the fighting and restoring stability. The experience reinforced my opinion that I had been right in my initial wording of my last paradox: in COIN, most important decisions are not made by generals.

Another striking aspect of the array of units throughout the country was the impact of modularity and unit rotations on the organization of those MNDs. At the time at which we visited the headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, their subordinate brigades also came

from the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions and the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, not to mention the many allied contingents. When Maj. Gen. David Perkins, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, took over MND-North in 2010, none of his seven BCTs came from his own division. In fact, however, once we saw the augmented size of most BCTs, the arrangement looked a bit more traditional. In capability and even numbers, the BCTs were really small divisions, so the MNDs functioned more like corps headquarters. This aspect of the war in Iraq deserves more study, to determine how transferable this model might be for future conflicts.

The increase in forces around Baghdad for the Surge had created the need for a new headquarters there. While Maj. Gen. Joe Fil of the 1st Cavalry Division retained responsibility for most of the city, with his Multinational Division–Baghdad (MND-B), Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch of the 3rd Infantry Division had taken over the new MND-Center for the area to the south that included the area known as the "triangle of death."[5] That name was bestowed by Shi'a pilgrims heading to Karbala who found the Sunni area along their route bounded by Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah, Latifiyah, and Iskandariyah particularly dangerous to pass through.

We were able to visit both major headquarters and some of their subordinate units. MND-B was pursuing its own version of clear-hold-build that it called "disrupt-clear-control-retain." It also added a last stage called "transition," which implied that the building was going to be done on someone else's watch. Looking at the definitions for each phase, it was apparent MND-B had split "hold" into two components, one to establish influence over an area and the second to occupy it. Otherwise it was following the doctrinal guidelines closely in its effort to handle a complex problem set. Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Sadr Shi'a militia, had made a big push to control the city, and most Sunnis had been pushed to the southern and western sectors. They in turn had turned to AQI to help resist the Shi'a. With the spread of the Awakening to Baghdad, AQI had been routed, though intelligence personnel were still looking for "rat droppings" indicating attempts by AQI to reestablish itself in cleared areas. JAM had become the biggest problem, even with the cease-fire. Major General Fil and his staff estimated that 90 percent of Iraqis were fed up with violence. The Sunnis had also realized they had lost the insurgency and needed to leverage the

Americans to gain their rightful place within the new Iraq. However, the Shi‘a still had not realized they had won and did not trust other factions.[6]

American presence remained vital to stabilizing the city. Major General Fil thought that the shift out of the large forward operating bases into small, scattered combat outposts, a key element of General Petraeus’ new approach, was the key factor in changing the dynamics of COIN in Baghdad. Troops could travel safely virtually anywhere in the city, as we did, with the exception of Sadr City, with its two million inhabitants. Negotiations were ongoing to gain permanent access to that zone.

One of Fil’s battalion commanders told us a story about how picking up trash helped pacify his own sector. Anyone who has visited the Middle East has seen the trash piles that litter cities. This battalion commander decided to clean them up in his zone. Within a few weeks the incidences of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) fell dramatically. In part, that was because the insurgents were planting bombs in the trash piles, but it was also true that the local sheikh approached the responsible commander, thanked the American for performing that essential service, and said he and his people were willing to cooperate more to get additional aid. Soon local inhabitants began to report IED locations and even turn in insurgent bomb teams. All the lines of operation reinforced each other. In this case, restoring essential services enhanced security.

A combat division normally includes three to five brigades. MND-B was controlling ten brigade-sized elements. Without the need to maneuver, however, the division headquarters could focus on allocating resources in accordance with the division operational plan. The establishment of so many “joint security stations” manned by both American and Iraqi forces really stressed logistical capabilities, as all supplies had to be pushed out to them. Armored transport vehicles, including MRAPs, were critical for this effort. Major General Fil agreed with Lieutenant General Odierno about this being primarily a brigade and battalion commander’s fight, though even company commanders were also involved in essential economic and political activities.

The latter were extensive. New schools were being opened throughout the city. “Safe Market Initiatives” involved setting up concrete barriers and protected pedestrian zones. Out of a goal of 119 markets, 93 were open, and

45 were considered fully hardened and safe. The centrally directed economy had established many important industries in Baghdad. These included state companies for batteries, leather goods, hand-woven carpets, cotton and woolen goods, electricity, heavy engineering equipment, furniture, and dairy products. All were getting some kind of support through funding or contracts, including an effort to increase the use of solar power in the city. MND-B was also engaged in major projects to build new water lines and expand police presence. The current ratio of police to population was only 1:549, far below the goal of 1:133 (plus a 10 percent overage to account for Baghdad's being the capital), requiring the addition of 25,000 more police officers and 30 new police stations.

MND-B had an intricate relationship with the Iraqi units from the National Police and army helping to secure the city. As we found was the case with most American units dealing with host-nation organizations, the amount of intelligence gathered on Iraqi leadership was voluminous. We had at least as much information about our friends as we did about our enemies. Sometimes it was difficult to tell the two apart. MND-B gave me a copy of a chart depicting every major Iraqi formation in the city, INP and army, along with its associated BCT. Each Iraqi brigade was rated by its Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) level, with an estimate of how many months would be needed to increase that rating. Of six INP brigades, two were at level 1, two at level 2, and two at level 3. Of nine army brigades or independent battalions, six were at level 1, two were at level 2, and only one lagged back at level 4.[7] Major General Fil thought that the National Police was generally two years behind the army in training and equipment. Each Iraqi commander was assessed as to his involvement with disruptive sectarian militias. Of twenty evaluated, ten were rated fully loyal to GOI, eight tolerated militia activity in their sectors, and two, one each in the INP and the army, were engaged in such activity themselves.

Backing up these government forces were Concerned Local Citizens, which eventually would be called "Sons of Iraq" once it became widely known that "concerned local citizens" translated into "worried Iraqis" in Arabic. Most such organizations had popped up on their own in unstable areas and then been embraced by the Americans. We were told about one insurgent sheikh in Amiriyah who turned against Al Qaeda when it had

planted a bomb near his house. When he asked the insurgents to move it, they replied that everyone had to sacrifice for jihad. At that point he started attacking them. Eventually he became a major leader of the Sons of Iraq and an example for many others.[8] There were 24 groups within MND-B's area, with between 14,000 and 17,000 members depending upon the statistics used. They were being paid through our contracts for fixed site security, but as a prerequisite they had to submit personal information for a special biometric database. This practice ensured that they could not return to being anonymous insurgents again, but, unfortunately, it would also provide the GOI with a useful tool to purge their ranks once the Americans left. MND-B also wanted to create another group for rebuilding, modeled on the Civilian Conservation Corps, similar to the programs described by Ambassador Ries.

All the important indicators showed that security in the city was improving. Murder rates had plummeted. Only one improvised explosive device had been found in the whole city during the last week of October. MND-B could raid Sunni mosques with impunity, though the GOI still reacted strongly to any such actions against the Shi'a, and General Petraeus retained approval authority for Joint Special Operations Command raids into Sadr City, a decision to be made each afternoon, often after discussions with Ambassador Crocker and sometimes after a call to Maliki. As security got better and the ORA levels of the ISF improved, MND-B planned to move past the "retain" phase into a "tactical overwatch" and then "operational overwatch" role, focusing mostly on noncombat actions, such as improving economic development, governance, and essential services. Major General Fil believed that the counterinsurgency experience had made his heavy brigades much more nimble and agile, migrating the skills of special operations forces into conventional units. His soldiers were comfortable with their new proficiencies and wanted to keep them. He saw that as an interesting challenge for the Army after Iraq.

We then traveled to see two of his brigades in action, the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division in the Rashid area of the city and the 2nd BCT of the 1st Cavalry in Kharq—respectively, the Dragon Brigade and the Blackjack Brigade. The former was commanded by one of my former seminar students at the Army War College, Col. Ricky Gibbs, an

impressive officer who had served as General Petraeus' division G-3 for the fight to Baghdad in March and April 2003 and for several months thereafter before going to the college. He provided reinforcement for my opinion that the U.S. Army needs to make its brigade commanders brigadier generals. He was commanding eight battalions but had led as many as nine. (As a reminder, the standard span of control for military organizations is three to five maneuver units.) As he was talking to us in his office, he was also watching video feeds from three unmanned aerial vehicles and one aerostat balloon that provided constant surveillance of his area of responsibility, home to 1.2 million Iraqis. That is a greater population than in the whole American occupation zone in Germany after World War I, a mission that the whole Third Army could not handle. We accompanied him as he opened a new hospital in his zone, an Iraqi initiative funded by U.S. money and furnished in part with equipment donated from generous Americans far away. During the day he was focused on reconciliation and essential services. The Dora Market had had only 10 shops open when he arrived; now it had 450. He was frustrated by the restrictions of peacetime contracting rules in a combat zone. Meanwhile, at night he managed targeted combat operations that he believed were important in influencing JAM to pursue a cease-fire and that were devastating AQI.[9]

One striking aspect of his urban operations involved the use of artillery. He found that AQI would fire mortars and rockets from vacant lots, assuming he would think the area was populated and refrain from firing back. He had scouted out the lots and had preplanned fires to be carried out in response. He also found that his counterbattery fire put pressure on local people and their leaders not to let AQI shoot in the first place. However, his combat had not been without cost. The forty-eight portraits on his wall of fallen heroes, "so others may live free," were evidence of that.[10] The early months of the Surge had been particularly difficult for his unit, sadly validating General Petraeus' assessment during his confirmation hearing that the going would "get tougher before it gets easier."



The headquarters of the Black Jack Brigade Combat Team in Kharq, proudly displaying its unit patches. AUTHOR

The Blackjack Brigade zone was similar, but as we toured the streets and visited a new apartment complex being built, a palpable tension was in the air. People were pleasant enough, but not as forward as those in Rashid. We were escorted by a battalion executive officer, and when his frustrated commander showed up later, we found out what had happened. On the previous day, the unit had received ten hours' notice of a special operations raid in its zone that night. The battalion was told just to stay out of the way. The operation commenced on schedule, aimed at six "targets of interest." The raid captured five, but one escaped, and three bystanders were killed. The battalion commander had been spending his day dealing with the aftermath, fearing that his COIN efforts had now been set back for months. He had never been consulted about the conduct of the raid or its targets. Ironically, perhaps tragically, he had been playing in a soccer game with the

targets' children the morning before the raid, and they all had been watching the game. He could have walked over and peacefully arrested them there.[11]

In my years of talking with soldiers and civilians about their experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan, virtually everyone has a similar story to tell, of some special operations raid that might have been good counterterrorism but was terrible COIN. Much has been written about advances in SOF/conventional jointness, but the fact remains that the separate chains of command and the aloof nature of direct action still contribute to dysfunction, though efforts to improve coordination in Iraq were ongoing at that time and later bore fruit. Lieutenant General Odierno told us that the Iraqi people wanted us to do four things: provide security, restore services, release prisoners, and stop the targeted raids.[12] They had a good deal of support from unexpected quarters in their last wish.

This was not the only example we saw of disconnects with SOF. We got a disconcerting briefing from the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), which was supposedly under the tactical control of MNC-I but seemed completely out of synchronization with the campaign. The 5th and 10th Special Forces Groups were rotating people every seven months. Their briefing to us never mentioned counterinsurgency or lines of operation. They were strictly focused on providing security and on the "lethal aspects of reconciliation." They took credit for initiating the CLC program as a form of unconventional warfare (UW) inciting rebellion against Al Qaeda. They were unaware of Major General Hussein's reforms of the National Police, considering the INP completely corrupt and untrustworthy, and trusted local police instead. We encountered that view rarely in Iraq; in fact, opinions were usually the exact opposite, especially within MNSTC-I. The CJSOTF's assessment of the regions we had visited was very different from those of commanders there.[13]

I was so disturbed by the briefing that I got access to a computer that night from John Martin and sent General Petraeus an e-mail describing what I had heard, explaining that I was listening for COIN but hearing UW, focused on creating our own insurgency instead of defeating one. Within a couple days I was called in by Lieutenant General Odierno. He explained that the current personnel of the CJSOTF had just rotated in and that instead of continuing the campaign of their predecessors they had reverted to what

had been done seven months ago, before the new operations of the Surge had really started. CJSOTF now was dealing with Iraq as it had been before General Petraeus.[14] Lieutenant General Odierno had expressed concerns to us about unit transitions, and it would be hard to find a worse example. He had taken immediate action to get CJSOTF on board with the counterinsurgency campaign, but I did not know how he was going to fix its skewed situational awareness. I am sure that was a reason why its members did not seem to understand the negative impacts of some of their raids.

MND-C

We also got to spend a day with Multinational Division–Center (MND-C), beginning with a visit to Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch at his headquarters inside a large base on the outskirts of Baghdad at the northern end of his area of responsibility. Upon entry, we immediately confronted a large sign headed "FARs," which he explained was the acronym for "Flat Ass Rules." Underneath was a list:

- Make security and safety your first priorities.
- Help the Iraqis win—Don't win it for them.
- Treat the Iraqi people with dignity and respect. Learn and respect Iraqi customs and culture.
- Maintain strict standards and iron discipline every day. Risk assess every mission—No complacency—No comfort.
- Maintain your situational awareness at all times—We are in an unforgiving environment.
- Take care of your equipment—It will take care of you.
- Innovate and Adapt—Situations here don't lend themselves to cookie cutter solutions.
- Focus on the enemy and be opportunistic.
- Be Patient—Don't rush to failure.
- Take care of yourself and take care of each other—Teamwork.

Arrayed on other walls were charts entitled "Preparation for Victory" that followed the tenets of doctrine, beginning with "It's all about the

People.” Major General Lynch noted that his organization truly deserved the title “multinational,” since it included contingents from El Salvador, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania. The Kazakh sappers became the most problematic; after they lost a soldier on their first bomb-disposal mission their government no longer permitted them to leave their operating base.[15] While it might have been advantageous politically to add them to the list of coalition members, such allies were a logistical headache for MND-C, who had to keep them supplied without getting much in return.

Like John Paul Vann, Major General Lynch asserted that improvements in security had allowed expansion of the other lines of operation, which were all being pursued “with equal vigor.” He was definitely focused on shutting down the “rat lines” into Baghdad. Like Major General Fil, Major General Lynch thought that establishing patrol bases among the people had turned the tide. That had not been easy. He had lost 117 soldiers and had cards on his desk for each, listing names, places and dates of birth and death, how they had entered the Army, how they had been killed, and all surviving relatives. He reinforced Major General Paxton’s concerns about the inadequacies of DOTMLPF (see chapter 8) for COIN, asserting, “I don’t know anyone on this battlefield working in their comfort zone.” He particularly singled out field artillerymen, explaining that they were doing just about everything but firing their guns. Many were conducting patrols just like the infantry. We found others serving as prison guards. With so much urban combat and heavy use of airpower (Major General Lynch said he had dropped 400,000 pounds of bombs in his area of operations), there was not much call for artillery.[16] The accurate delivery of massed ground fires is one of those skills “COINtras” (see chapter 7) fear will be lost by Army overemphasis on irregular warfare, though those skills were exercised in Afghanistan.

Some of those adjustments resulted from more agile airpower as well. Aerial bombardment was a key enabler for Surge combat operations, even in urban areas. Preplanned strikes could be meticulously prepared to avoid counterproductive collateral damage, with friendly forces controlling the ground and information flow after such actions. Perceptions of indiscriminate or rash bombing causing avoidable civilian casualties in both Iraq and Afghanistan usually arose from on-call strikes in remote areas,

sometimes to support SOF raids or beleaguered units, delivered hastily without the careful planning or ability to control poststrike messaging that go with preplanned missions. That is a major drawback of “long-range precision strike” in the CNN era. For most insurgents in Iraq, information warfare—that is, Galula’s propaganda, with the political backlash and restrictive rules of engagement it could inspire—was the most effective defense they had against being bombed by the omnipresent American aircraft. Overall, the precision of the strikes in Iraq demonstrated further impressive airpower progress over the course of GWOT, along with the exponential growth of the fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles there.

Major General Lynch echoed General Petraeus when he talked about statistics on violence, often used as a metric to evaluate the Surge. The MND-C commander argued that the nuances of the indicator were often misunderstood, that an increase in violence can actually be a good sign. For instance, as Iraqi police start to root out bad guys in a community, violence will go up; who initiates that violence is important. Also, he particularly stressed the activities of the 23,500 Concerned Local Citizens in his zone, both Sunni (20,300) and Shi‘a (3,200); he was concerned that we would lose them if we disengaged or the GOI did not respond more positively to their presence. About half were currently on U.S. contracts being paid with Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds. He mentioned that the CLC leader, Sheikh Sabah, had once been a Sunni insurgent, which I am sure contributed to GOI reluctance to embrace him.[17] We would subsequently get the chance to evaluate him face to face.

An aerial view of the combat outpost at Jurf as Sakhr. Pushing troops out into cities and towns in such compounds was a key component of General Petraeus' new approach to COIN in Iraq.
AUTHOR

Around the table at the joint patrol base are Steve Biddle, Major General Huntoon, the author, Col. Mike Garrett, Capt. John Henry Moltz, and Lt. Col. Bo Balcavage. COL. JAMES EMBREY

We then headed out to the sector of Col. Mike Garrett's 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division (Airborne), a long way from its home station in Alaska. He met us at one of his patrol bases southwest of Baghdad in Jurf as Sakhr, along with Lt. Col. Bo Balcavage, commander of the "Geronimo" 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry (Airborne), and Capt. John Henry Moltz, who ran Company A of that battalion and the outpost. Deep in the heart of the "triangle of death," the area had also been the home for the Medina Division of the Iraqi army. We also met Sheikh Sabah, who claimed he was a former noncommissioned officer in the Iraqi army who had come from Tikrit specifically to lead the local CLCs. I watched him with his men, and I suspect he had had a higher former rank than he admitted. His goal was to get his men into the Iraqi police, employed by the GOI and thus not perceived as just local militia. He complained about the Shi'a leadership of the local Babil governate (Babylon Province) police academy, which was denying his people entrance, and about the slow process to get anyone accepted into the police. He claimed that if he could get one thousand trained policemen he could completely stop insurgent infiltration through his zone. He also wanted stronger support from the Iraqi army and National Police, to include a quick-reaction force he could call upon. He was convinced that the GOI did not really want him to succeed. As we wandered with him and some of his troops through the streets of Jurf as Shakr, Captain Moltz remarked to me that he was sure those CLCs had been shooting at him a couple of months earlier. I replied, "Welcome to counterinsurgency," where turning enemies is often an ingredient of success.[18]

Captain Moltz was quite intelligent and a master of the new doctrine, having even developed lines of effort for his company. In the streets of Jurf as Sakhr he and I had a a lively side discussion about the CLCs that motivated him to contact us a few days later. Steve Biddle had stated in our initial meeting at the outpost that he thought the CLCs had brought better security. Captain Moltz believed the opposite. He e-mailed Major General Huntoon:

> When the population turns (when you have won the COIN fight) it happens so quickly that most commanders do not identify the changing conditions before the population undergoes a full metamorphosis. In Jurf as Sakhr that metamorphosis produced a CCP [Concerned Citizens Program] force willing to take responsibility for their neighborhoods. I don't believe, however, that the CCP has done anything more than strengthen the population's resolve to reject extremism and violence. However, that resolve was already present just prior to the CCP program[;] . . . otherwise the program could not have begun because the population would not have supported it (they would have continued fighting us instead). I think this is important because it gives hope to the idea that the population can be turned in any area even without the CCP because the CCP is an effect rather than a cause of victory in COIN. Victory in COIN may produce different results, or effects, in different areas. In a densely populated area such as Baghdad, commanders may see men willing to join the ISF in unprecedented numbers, or join public works battalions, or maybe vote. Once the population is won through COIN, commanders must carefully analyze what actions the population is taking to capitalize on their newfound "hope" and commit all resources to reinforce success in those areas. In Jurf as Sakhr it just happened to be the CCP.[19]

If Captain Moltz is right, the challenge for senior leaders becomes how to turn all those local mosaic victories into a larger one. His observation also highlights the fact that without security and a sense that one can survive, local security volunteers will not raise their hands.

Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage was overseeing 15 CLC contracts in his area—9 Sunni, 5 Shi'a, and 1 mixed, employing in all about 2,500 men. He had a unique relationship with Sabah. When they had first met, Sabah had tried to get extra weapons for his men by asserting that Brig. Gen. John Campbell, deputy commander of MND-B, was arming CLCs in his area. Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage bluffed that he knew Brigadier General Campbell and would call him on his cell phone. As he started to dial, Sabah admitted that he had been lying and immediately dropped the issue.

Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage was one of many commanders who mentioned that shame was a useful tool to ensure Iraqi cooperation. Sabah was compliant after that, even setting up a meeting with the local insurgent leader to help facilitate reconciliation. In turn, Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage protected Sabah from pressure from MND-C headquarters when it wanted him to turn in his heavy weapons and turn over his Sunni prisoners to Shi‘a authorities. Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage knew that those machine guns were targeting bad guys who were equally armed and that Sabah not only could not trust those Shi‘a authorities not to abuse or kill the prisoners but he would face a potential Sunni revolt if he transferred them. They remained in his jails, out of the fight.[20]

Finding the right local police chief could also have a major impact on security. Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage particularly admired Lt. Col. Mohammed Mahawilli in Musayib. A Shi‘a whose relatives had been killed by JAM, he had cleared the extremists out of his area. Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage called him “Icarus,” since he had to be kept from daring too much and getting himself killed. Whenever Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed seemed to be taking it too easy, Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage would challenge his manhood, which always prompted the police chief to go out and capture another important target. Conditions got so good in Musayib that people traveled down from southern Baghdad to shop, an important indicator of progress in security and changing perceptions. In response, JAM elements came into town and removed all playing cards and dominos, declaring such pursuits violations of the Koran. Their actions backfired. For COIN, every agency has a potential role to play; the battalion chaplain, when he heard about what happened, revealed that his church channels had boundless supplies of such game materials. In “Operation Geronimo Domino” the Americans procured enough to replenish what had been taken, and Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed distributed them. Instead of reducing the influence of the police chief, JAM’s actions had provided a way for him to increase it.[21]

Sheikh Sabah, the leader of the local CLC, talking through an interpreter with Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage, Major General Huntoon, and Captain Moltz in the streets of Jurf as Sakhr. AUTHOR

Colonel Garrett pointed out that not all police were that trustworthy. As in MND-B, he had extensive intelligence about the friendly units in his zone. He knew that one of the two police battalions had been heavily infiltrated by JAM and other Shi'a extremists, while the other had not. Both Sunni and Shi'a CLCs were motivated by moderates trying to counter such extremists and the violence they engendered. As another positive spinoff, the CLCs spent their salaries in the local community, supplementing other boosts to the economy coming from reconstruction projects, which were carefully balanced between Sunni and Shi'a contractors. Colonel Garret was highly pleased with the performance of his embedded PRT, headed by an "old State Department hand," now retired, who had been in CORDS in Vietnam (see chapter 3).[22]

Colonel Garrett was a strong supporter of efforts to get more Sunni into the army and police, which not only helped the individuals but also increased local credibility for those GOI organizations. He had initiated adult education programs to teach applicants to read and write, increasing their chances for acceptance. Those who got in had a nominal guarantee of two years' stabilization in their home area, though there was a lot of

pressure to move units elsewhere. Maliki had recently bent enough to allow direct coordination between the CLCs and the Iraqi army and INP, but Colonel Garrett was careful to ensure that each organization had its own, separate battle space.[23]

Consequently, we had to visit another site in MND-C to talk to Iraqi army and INP leaders. We traveled to Patrol Base Assassin in Qarghulia, the responsibility of the 3rd Squadron of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. John Kolasheski, out of the 3rd BCT of the 3rd Infantry Division. His unit was partnered with an INP battalion. He had found that the police were not very good at patrolling but did well with checkpoints. In his area of responsibility the local police, INP, Iraqi army, and CLCs all had their own checkpoints. In the adjacent zone of the 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, Shi‘a soldiers from the Iraqi army and Sunni CLCs actually manned checkpoints together.[24]

We met with a gathering from all those varied elements at the patrol base. A few months before, the Sunnis in the area had considered all the Shi‘a to be JAM and the Shi‘a had seen all the Sunnis as AQI. Working together had changed those attitudes, and the rise of the CLCs had allowed the Americans greater access to the local population, at the same time that the increased number of boots on the ground, American and Iraqi, enabled more emphasis on all lines of operation, not just security. As prosperity and order returned to the area, so did inhabitants who had fled.

Other initiatives were bringing back the rule of law. Through a training contract with Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), retired police advisors embedded at division and brigade levels were doing sensitive site exploitation, along with forensic work, and training soldiers to do the same. Through the work being done by the Law and Order Task Force, Iraqi courts were now accepting such forensic evidence for prosecution. The brigade had just brought a judge into the zone to reduce the backlog of court cases there.

At the core of the improvements was the rise of the CLCs along with “the Awakening” of the Sunni tribes in Anbar. They claimed that they had initially invited AQI in, having felt rejected by the Shi‘a-led government in Baghdad, then had come to regret that decision. Once Surge forces drove AQI out, the Sunni tribes and CLCs could keep their towns clear.

Lieutenant Colonel Kolasheski prepared a display for us of a CLC shirt, hat, and identification card. He also emphasized the utility of the biometric data collected on each recruit. His intelligence officer expected that JAM or AQI would try to create friction between the CLCs and Americans with IEDs and attacks, understanding how important the Sons of Iraq were. Lieutenant Colonel Kolasheski later wrote a fine article in *Military Review* describing the rise of the movement throughout Iraq and its impact in his area. In just over five months, CLCs in the squadron zone turned in fifty-eight weapons caches and thirty-two IEDs, while providing innumerable tips about insurgents. Attacks against coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as local nationals, plummeted throughout the battle space.[25] But like every other American who discussed the CLCs with us, he was concerned about the slow response of the GOI to embrace them.

The Marines

Though many American forces claimed credit for fostering the Awakening of indigenous Iraqi security forces, everyone agreed that the movement that helped so much during the Surge started in Anbar Province in the fall of 2006. Anbar was the responsibility of Multinational Force–West (MNF-W), the zone run by the Marines, along with assigned Army BCTs. About the same size as New York State, the province covered one-third of Iraq but included only a few more people than Colonel Gibbs' zone of Baghdad, with most living along the Euphrates River. Command of MNF-W had rotated between the First and Second Marine Expeditionary Forces (I and II MEFs) since 2004, and the continuity of presence and experience provided great advantages for them. When we visited, Maj. Gen. Walter Gaskin of II MEF was in charge of a textbook COIN operation. In recognition of the importance of longer experience and established relationships for their senior leaders, the top commanders and their staffs were rotating every eleven months, instead of seven, like subordinate units.[26]

Like American divisions stationed in the same zones of Vietnam for many years, the Marines really understood their area of operations. They presented a fascinating briefing about the clash between governmental and tribal authority in their province. Anbaris expected to be governed by

competent technocrats who could provide services, but led by their own sheikhs. The GOI structure was highly stovepiped, and de-Baathification and other actions had removed most of those who knew how to make it work. Though one Marine exclaimed, “We never attribute anything to conspiracy that can be explained by incompetence,” the continuing lack of effective government response fueled Sunni mistrust of its Shi‘a leaders. Most power in Anbar had shifted to the Sheikh’s Council and local tribes, and in order to work with them one needed to understand the tribal ethos that underpinned all their institutions. The Marines had T. E. Lawrence’s famous quote displayed in its entirety in numerous places: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”[27] The Marines realized not only that it was essential for Iraqis to develop their capacity to take care of themselves but also that our methods and solutions often did not fit their needs.

As Lieutenant Colonel Balcavage had found out, shame and honor were key motivators for tribal behavior. It was a zero-sum game: if someone was shamed, another gained honor. Power was not something to be shared, but there were accompanying expectations for patronage that did not fit our contracting rules. Those who controlled resources were obliged to help those who did not, and subordinates were not shy about asking for largesse from their sheikhs. Though there was a hierarchy of sheikhs that we had to respect, senior sheikhs did not necessarily have much authority to order others around. Consequently, disputes took a long time to resolve, and solutions were usually developed in private discussions. The Marines found that meetings set up to solve problems rarely did; such gatherings served just as formalities or became forums to discuss other issues. The tribal system was dominated by a sense of competition, not cooperation: “Me against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin, and all against the outsider.”

The Marines found that the keys to gaining acceptance were being honest and showing respect. Major General Gaskin stated, “We continued to do what we said we would do every day.” Keeping one’s word was

important. A visit to Washington, D.C., by Anbari Sunni leaders had done much to cement relationships with the Americans also. Not only had they learned a lot about what the United States "really is," but meetings with the president and secretary of state made the visitors feel they were being treated with the utmost respect. But it must be noted that respect goes both ways. There is much to be said for Bing West's characterization of the Marines as "the strongest tribe" in Anbar Province, able to enforce their will on everyone with superior combat power and providing Sunni leaders with an effective counter to oppression by AQI or GOI.[28] By 2007 the tribal chiefs had realized they had "backed the wrong horse" and that their strategic mistake had cost them two bloody years.

Maj. Gen. Walter Gaskin, commander of II MEF, shares tea with Major General Huntoon and the author in Fallujah. By now I had mastered the art of using the saucer to make handling the scalding glass easier. Though conditions at this point were peaceful, body armor and helmets were mandatory for all Americans in the streets. COL. JAMES EMBREY

The support of those sheikhs was the key to defeating Al Qaeda in the province and reintegrating former insurgents. This was not the first place that I had heard that AQI were inept insurgents. They worked to undermine

the sheikhs and did nothing to gain the support of the tribes. AQI's suppression of smuggling routes cut off tribal income, and its indiscriminate brutality often backfired, pushing sheikhs to change allegiance.[29] One sheikh noted that when AQI operatives arrived in Anbar, they announced to the populace that foreign fighters were coming to steal their oil, rape their women, and attack Islam. After a few months, the outside insurgents imposed taxes to fund their operations, then said they were lonely and took local women as wives. When AQI tried to impose a strict version of Sharia law, the Anbaris realized that foreign fighters had indeed arrived to take their resources, women, and religion but that the evil outsiders weren't the Americans. The first two attempts at the Awakening years earlier had been violently suppressed, but the third had taken hold and was spreading rapidly.

Some important sheikhs had gone to Jordan for their safety, and the Marines had provided helicopter support to keep them tied into events in the province. This also allowed the Marines to meet everyone and become essential links for tribal affairs. Through a process of reconciliation established and maintained by the tribes, some supporters of AQI were allowed back into tribes and eventually into the local police. Some tribes had vetting boards, where applicants had to re-swear fealty to the tribe, renounce AQI, and convince three sheikhs of their sincerity and loyalty. Some tribes required the applicant to kill a member of AQI as a blood atonement. It was clear that not even all members of AQI were irreconcilable. The pace of defections rapidly increased once it became apparent that readmission to the tribe was a possibility. An Iraqi could not survive in Anbar without being a member of either AQI or a tribe.

This reconciliation could be especially problematic, however, if the applicant had tribal blood on his hands. Blood feuds normally took six generations to cleanse and were nightmares for the sheikhs, who understandably wanted to avoid them. Thus blood atonements were sometimes required. More sheikhs were accepting the rule of law as an alternative, with prison terms as suitable punishment. However, detainee release remained a major issue with the tribes, and the Marines had come to believe that tribal leaders deserved more say in the matter, as those best able to determine if someone was reconcilable.

If the sheikhs vouched for someone to serve in the local security forces, their own honor became involved, and that recruit was more likely to be kept reliable. The Marines actually pulled Iraqi army units out of the cities and set up joint security stations mainly manned by police who lived there, a solution much preferred by everyone. The sheikhs liked having local people enforcing security, and most Marines and the Iraqi army were freed up to pursue insurgents in rural areas, where they also did not have to fear so much collateral damage from firepower. The insurgents had been driven to "seams" between units and uninhabited dead space. Some regimental combat teams had redrawn unit boundaries by tribal areas rather than geography, to push enemies farther away from the people. This action also facilitated population-control measures that had taken away freedom of movement from insurgents and made them even easier to hunt.

The sheikhs also encouraged young men to enter the GOI security forces, though there was some friction over assignment policies. The local ISF payroll had grown from 12,000 to 48,000 in the last year, and the Marines were convinced the Iraqi army and police now had the capability and capacity to execute "hold" operations in the province. At this time, 70 to 80 percent of the soldiers in provincial Iraqi army units were Sunni. General Petraeus guaranteed two years' service for them in Anbar, but just as in the jurisdiction of MND-C, the GOI kept trying to divert troops to other areas. Many of the bad guys had been chased to Diyala, but when one battalion from Anbar was sent there to help out, 28 percent of the troops deserted.

Training police had become a primary mission for Major General Gaskin. He had 70 police training teams, totaling 1,700 men, engaged in a "combined-action platoon" relationship. Most personnel came from line units, but each of those teams had at least 1 international police contractor (of the 145 in the province) assisting with the effort. Retired FBI agents were also helping. Some of those policemen manned border forts right out of the movie *Beau Geste*. The province now boasted 119 police stations, almost double the number a year ago. There were currently about 22,000 police on the rolls, of the 24,000 planned. However, only about half had been through the 400-hour training course at the local police academy. The Marines had developed an 80-hour quick-fix course to give the others some training before they could attend the longer version. The biggest challenge

remained training officers, since the Baghdad Police College remained the only option for that purpose and would not admit Sunnis from Anbar. The Marines had also already trained 20 policewomen with U.S. Army military police personnel for Ramadi, not only as a symbol of the new Iraq but also "to piss off AQI."

To give us a real feel for the progress that had been made, we were taken to see Fallujah, a hotbed of Sunni resistance that had been devastated by heavy fighting in 2004. When we went out to visit the city we traveled in a large, American-made MRAP. I preferred that larger and roomier model to the smaller South African ones we had ridden in before and to the armored HMMWVs, which were very cramped. We heard a lot of good comments about the MRAPs, including that they made soldiers and Marines more willing to risk entering dangerous urban areas. I later heard, however, that MRAPs could be counterproductive in rural areas in Afghanistan, encouraging occupants to stay inside rather than get out and patrol, but I heard no complaints in Iraq. I wish I could get hold of one of those imposing U.S. models to drive around the District of Columbia Beltway during rush hour some day. I'm sure I'd have less trouble getting other drivers to yield, and frankly I would not care much if they didn't. Fallujah was booming. The shops were busy, the streets were full. Twenty-two babies a day were being born in the hospital. The Marines were proud that it was more peaceful than any part of Baghdad and that Fallujah remained 5 percent Christian and even had a hundred Jewish families. There were neighborhood watches all over the city. Each volunteer got a hundred dollars a month stipend from MNF-W. We met the mayor, in his downtown office, surrounded by concrete barriers to stop vehicles. The barriers were painted with Iraqi flags marked "Well-come." He had been instrumental in changing the behavior of local police, making them less corrupt and more cooperative, and was proud of his city. Everyone we talked to emphasized "respect," whether Marines or local civilians. The only sign we saw of the control measures in place were passes required for every vehicle.

There was no fear evident anywhere, especially not of Americans. Nowhere in Iraq did I see such acceptance. A bunch of little boys came up to us on the street because one of them had fallen and cut his finger. Our accompanying medic from Lieutenant Gledhill's detachment (see chapter 8) patiently cleaned and bandaged the wound. Young Iraqi men came up to ask

the Marine officers about job programs. The most important ammunition carried by the Marines with us were Tootsie Roll Pops, in bags on their hips. Children swarmed to get them. One of the sights from Fallujah I will always remember is a Marine colonel lounging in the back of an MRAP sucking on a Tootsie Roll Pop. What a way to fight a war.

But my most vivid memory occurred a few hundred yards away from the bridge over the Euphrates where the burned bodies of murdered contractors had been hung back in 2004. An Iraqi woman was walking with her young daughter on the far side of the street from us, near a group of men. The girl saw the boys grabbing pops from the Marines and looked pleadingly at her mother. The woman let go of her daughter's hand, and the small child walked slowly by herself across the street. She approached a lieutenant colonel who was with us; he pulled a pop out of his bag and offered it to her. She grabbed it, gave us a smile the size of Saudi Arabia, and proudly strutted back to her mother. They then walked off. I felt that I had witnessed something significant, though I was not sure exactly what. I have often wondered what happened to that child and about her fate today in a once again very different Fallujah.

Just as in the other zones, the security gains so evident in Fallujah enabled all the other lines of operation to advance as well. The Marines were working with the Iraqis to focus on economic development and using those initiatives to facilitate relationships with GOI. Commander's Emergency Response Program funds remained the easiest tool to use in that regard and the most flexible for dealing with the requirements of tribal patronage, but USAID also carried out many worthwhile projects focused on long-term development. The Anbaris knew the Americans would leave someday and were preparing for that eventuality. Like the Duchy of Fenwick in the movie *The Mouse That Roared*, they used post–World War II Germany and Japan as the historical metaphor for what they expected Iraq to become after U.S. occupation—that is, quickly prosperous and democratic. The Marines cautioned them with another historical case, Korea in the 1950s, to emphasize that the sort of progress the Iraqis envisioned would take decades, not years. It appears that the Marines had the right country but the wrong years. As of this writing, Iraq appears to resemble the Korea of 1949 and 1950 after the departure of the U.S. occupation force, and there is no United Nations army coming to save it.

Young children in Fallujah bring a friend with a cut to be treated by our accompanying medic. They had no trepidation at all about dealing with American troops. AUTHOR

Young men in Fallujah discuss job programs with a Marine officer and his interpreter. The bag on the officer's hip contains the Tootsie Roll Pops so popular with local children (and Marine officers). AUTHOR

The divisional sectors described in this chapter were generally following the doctrine closely, providing much reinforcement for the material in FM 3-24. However, there were other areas in Iraq where counterinsurgent actors in the field were not as inclined, or as able, to apply its guidelines. They will be described next.

CHAPTER TEN

Beyond the Doctrine

Basrah, Diyala, and Bucca

While I was generally pleased with the widespread relevance and application of the doctrine we had developed, it was not being universally applied, nor was it universally applicable throughout Iraq. Some allies had their own ideas about COIN, and we had not foreseen all possible scenarios. Leaders on the ground were doing their best to learn and adapt in difficult situations.

MND-SE

My greatest disappointment came from visiting the British sector around Basrah, Multinational Division–Southeast (MND–SE). While all the British officers we had interviewed had emphasized that the Americans had leaped past them in COIN competency, I was not aware before just how much that gap had grown, and not just in policies and practices. The British Bulldog armored personnel carriers were much as the name implied, squatty and awkward looking, with no firing ports or windows to allow light inside. They reminded me of our old M-113 armored personnel carriers, and in fact they were developed at about the same time. The gunner on the British Merlin helicopter manned a machine gun situated on an open rear ramp, an obviously ad hoc fix that did not do much for aerodynamics or noise abatement and looked uncomfortable for the gunner. After visiting Basrah I

had a much greater appreciation for the comfort of our Bradleys, Strykers, and Blackhawks.

We were received graciously by the British forces when we deplaned from our C-130. Hustled to their headquarters, we received an extensive, and somewhat stunning, briefing from Maj. Gen. Graham Binns, the British commander of MND-SE, and his staff. The British were taking an approach to COIN basically the opposite of that of the Americans. While General Petraeus was pushing units out of the forward operating bases into joint security stations in the towns and cities, the British had just withdrawn from Basrah to a forward operating base near the airport. They explained that their presence in the city was antagonistic. (To be fair, that was a view that CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid and General Casey had essentially embraced in 2006, as well.) They were being attacked by militias trying to depict themselves as defenders of Iraq, which distracted everyone from the real enemy, the Iranians, who, while not present, were the backers of the militias from the south all the way north to Baghdad. The British asserted that their presence was "confusing Shi'a loyalties." Major General Binns saw no need for any aggressive strikes back into the city, or even for a capacity to conduct offensive operations, though he said he was prepared to support the ISF with long-range fire if requested. However, he argued that the risks of any "kinetic" operations outweighed any benefits. His staff pointed out, in one of many references to Northern Ireland that they made, that they had had a much higher force-to-population ratio in Belfast (reinforcing what I had been told at Wilton Park about too precipitous a withdrawal in 2003), and they asserted that they could not win a fight inside Basrah militarily anyway. Major General Binns stated that violence had dropped by 90 percent since they left. He believed that the militia elements running the city had reached accommodations and were satisfied with their "piece of the pie." He used the fact that the local police chief had survived four attempts on his life to vouch for how good he was.[1]

Major General Binns admitted that not everything in the city was perfect. JAM had too much influence over the ports and was successfully using claims of having forced British withdrawal as a recruiting tool. The militias did not always cooperate with the ISF. While Iraqi army units had a code of conduct under military regulations, policemen were operating with

a nonexistent rule of law that encouraged corruption. New elections were needed, which the Sadrists would win, but even that result would be more representative than the current government there. (This was in keeping with Steve Biddle's warning about the dangers of holding elections too early.) Major General Binns believed that the British could still exercise leverage over events through economic incentives. He expressed confidence that whatever happened, Basrawis would never allow the Iranians to gain undue influence over their oil or resources, that Iraqi nationalism would always win out.

Without having to worry about security in the city, the British could now focus more on border security and training. Saddam had had 34,000 men covering the Iranian border in Maysan Province, north of Basrah; there was only a company there now. The assigned PRT for that province could not even gain access. The Brits were trying to convince the locals of the advantages to be gained if they allowed the PRT entrance but so far had achieved no success. For me, this example highlighted the advantages of the American approach of embedding the PRTs with BCTs that could force such doors open while ensuring security.

He was impressed with the enthusiasm and ability of the ISF personnel being trained, though he acknowledged that better mentoring of officers was needed. Good leadership was essential. He admitted that the United Kingdom was too risk averse in its approach to mentoring; his command was moving to adopt more U.S. methods. In contrast to the Marines, the British thought that Iraqi army units performed better outside their home areas.

He foresaw that the British presence in the area would decline to only 2,500 troops by the next year. He really had only about a robust BCT's worth now, far less than any other MND sector. He closed his PowerPoint presentation with a picture of the last British vehicle leaving the city with its flags flying high. He proclaimed that they had not been defeated or forced out, despite the media reports, and instead had left when they chose to. He interpreted the fact that they had not been shot at as they left as another sign of their success.

I was really taken aback by the briefing, which was so out of synchronization with what else we were hearing. I could not be sure if the British really believed what they were telling us or not. Like everyone else,

I knew there was a lot of pressure back in the United Kingdom to reduce British casualties and presence, and I would have understood if they had used that as an excuse. Perhaps they were being loyal subordinates and supporting their political leadership, but there appeared to be plenty of self-delusion or disingenuousness in the presentation. I asked if their withdrawal from the city had affected their intelligence gathering, and they assured me it had not. When we got back to Baghdad we asked the same question of the officers in the J-2 (joint intelligence) section, and they stated vehemently that all the sources in Basrah had dried up after the withdrawal. The MNF-I staff was not happy with the conduct of the British. "Resentment" would probably be too strong a word, but the staff was disappointed with MND-SE and foresaw accurately that eventually the militias would have to be taken on and that when that happened the Americans, not the British, would be providing most support to the ISF. (That is what transpired in March and April of the following year.)

To end our day in MND-SE, the British took us out to meet with the ruling council of the town of Al Zubayr, south of Basrah. Steve Biddle and Major General Huntoon went to meet with a set of leaders who had been focused on security there, including the local Iraqi army battalion commander, local police commander, and head of the tribal council. Jim Embrey and I met with a governance grouping that included the mayor; chairmen of the town council, farmer's union, and journalist's union; heads of the electricity and education boards; and the political leaders of the Shi'a and Sunni communities. These Iraqis were quite a mutual admiration society. They gave us the impression they were unique in many ways and were setting a precedent for reconciliation and recovery in other areas. They praised each other's bravery and competence, stressing that unqualified leaders would be quickly replaced. The Sunni and Shi'a representatives explained that they got along well, that some tribes actually had both sects as members. Everyone declared that they met often to work out differences, so they could speak with one voice to higher authorities.[2]

Colonel Embrey and the author meeting with the governing council of Al Zubayr. The mayor is at the head of the table. The council members were confident they could solve their own problems but appreciated British security. They also expressed much dissatisfaction with provincial authorities, a common theme among Iraqis. AUTHOR

But they still had problems. They needed money to build more infrastructure. The head of the electricity board appeared to be the most harried of all attendees at the meeting. “Bad elements” were jealous of their success, but the Iraqi army and police worked well together to protect everyone. Most aggravating was their treatment from the provincial government, which ignored Al Zubayr’s needs and even turned back money that could have helped build infrastructure. Consequently, the mayor and councils were appealing directly to Baghdad and MNF-I for assistance, bypassing the provincial authorities.

They were very grateful to the British for many forms of aid. MND-SE helped with elections and training council members. The British conducted twenty projects to restore essential services and increase education opportunities, as well as furnishing a security overwatch. They helped Al Zubayr with its main economic activities, growing tomatoes and pumping oil. Al Zubayr had even established a relationship with a sister city in England.

Those who met with us thought that unemployment was the source of most of their security problems and that education was the way to control their youth. Work projects and schools kept people away from “criminals and terrorists.” They stressed many times that their major difficulties were external ones, arising from being ignored by the provincial government, a common complaint throughout Iraq. They were positive about their future.

I was not sure what to make of the meeting, which ended after dark. Our British escorts did not seem to share our hosts’ optimism about security. They brought their Bulldogs right up to the gates of the compound to load us on board. During the whole ride to our helicopter pickup point the soldiers seemed nervous and wary, constantly on the radio inside the dark vehicle. The helicopter lifted off quickly, and the crew seemed relieved when we finally got up and away. As we flew back to Baghdad after transferring to our C-130, I concluded that MND-SE was behind other sectors in achieving acceptable security, that key enabler for successful COIN. There were some local COIN successes, such as in Al Zubayr, but not of the scale in MND-B or MND-C or of MNF-W.

The Heart of the Storm: Diyala

Security in the sector assigned to Multinational Division–North (MND-N) too would prove to be more problematic than in MND-B’s or MND-C’s. That area constituted about a third of Iraq, but in an economy-of-force operation, the division only had about four BCTs to secure its zone. Arguably MND-N had the most complex problem set of any in the theater of operations, including the dangerous area around Mosul in Nineveh Province. That was somewhat ironic, considering that then–Maj. Gen. David Petraeus had first established his reputation in counterinsurgency with the adept way he and his 101st Airborne Division had restored order to that city in 2003. However, in another one of those problematic transitions, his full division’s worth of foot soldiers that had blanketed the city with their presence had been replaced by just a single mounted brigade, the reconciliation initiative that had been central to their achievements was not supported in Baghdad, and the interim Iraqi governor (seen as too independent during Petraeus’ time) was removed. Consequently, control of Mosul began to slip away until it collapsed some six months later after the

Sunni Arab members of the province council (in a Sunni-majority province) walked out during a highly contentious process to select a new governor.

A common theme throughout MNF-I was that insurgents were being funneled from both Baghdad and Anbar into Diyala Province, one of four provinces under MND-N. Diyala covers an area about the size of Maryland. While the Surge had increased troop strength for more complex operations, there was still not enough force to cover every zone adequately, as we had seen in MND-SE. The bulk of the burden to defend Diyala fell upon the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division, the Greywolf Brigade, commanded by Col. David Sutherland.

He was nearing the end of what had been a bloody and challenging tour for himself and his soldiers. A few weeks before we arrived, he had attended a gathering of friendly sheikhs that was attacked by a suicide bomber. The explosion sprayed him with body parts and broke his hand. When the cast was being applied, he had the choice to configure it so he could either handle eating utensils or fire his weapon; he chose the latter. As a consequence he needed help with his meals, which I found out when we sat down to lunch with him early in our visit to his area of operations. That handicap did not prevent him from verbally giving me both barrels as we took our seats. He wanted to make clear to me that the doctrine in the field manual did not work in Diyala. His understrength BCT did not have enough manpower to do clear-hold-build. For his command the mantra had been restated as “security-development-reform,” which reflected an inability to really “clear” anything and limited capacity for holding or building. I would describe his solution to his unique situation as “establish presence and influence,” an approach that required a lot of offensive operations to build a reputation as “the strongest tribe,” and a lot of cajoling and arm-twisting to get local leaders to take more responsibility for their own fates.[3]

It was apparent, however, from the detailed briefing by his staff that its members definitely had made good use of the FM’s guidelines on intelligence and operational design so as to understand an amazingly complex problem set in the province. AQI and Sunni insurgents had started coming in from Anbar in 2006. More had been pushed up from Baghdad in 2007. JAM too was becoming a growing problem, along with Iranian influence across the border. Even the Kurds were starting to push in from

the north. The provincial government was corrupt and dysfunctional. While Anbar contained basically one major tribe with numerous divisions, Diyala had twenty-five major tribes with over a hundred subtribes, with Shi‘a Arabs and Kurds, as well as Sunni Arabs, a situation further complicating the process of reconciliation. There was a rising CLC movement, but that brought friction with the Iraqi police and army. A new police chief was trying to reduce sectarianism in his units but was meeting resistance from the Ministry of the Interior. When Colonel Sutherland arrived, his Iraqi army units could only spend six hours off their forward operating base and then needed six days to recover. The embedded PRT was ineffective until its leader was replaced. Thirty percent of the staff and many line personnel had to be diverted to fill military and police training teams and the PRT, further reducing manpower available for operations. There was terrible public information flow, since the local media had completely disappeared. Colonel Sutherland was establishing a satellite network to remedy that and increase the transparency of ISF and GOI in the province.

Despite that imposing list of “challenges,” the Greywolves had made a great deal of progress. To overcome Iraqi army deficiencies, partnerships were being established for combined operations. The local Iraqi army division was matched with the brigade, Iraqi army brigades with U.S. battalions, and Iraqi army battalions with U.S. companies. As Iraqi army performance improved, the primary training focus turned to the police. The cumulative results of all the lines of effort encouraged the rise of CLCs in the province. Many of the initial recruits had joined because they were starving. When Colonel Sutherland found out, he directed the distribution of rice and flour, which brought even more volunteers. Like other CLCs, they wanted eventually to get into the Iraqi army or police, where they could receive a salary. Colonel Sutherland vetted every member, and, he admitted, he even encouraged competition between different groups to facilitate his control of them.

CLC members were often young and educated, out to challenge existing power structures. They were also mostly Sunni, though not all, which caused much friction with the predominantly Shi‘a police. The CLCs worked much better with the Iraqi army, though that relationship also could be contentious. Colonel Sutherland took us to a meeting between the leaders of those forces in the provincial capital of Baqubah, which the

coalition had cleared of insurgents. General Kareem of the Iraqi army and Dr. Hussein of the CLCs were both low-level Sunni sheikhs, but that did not mean they agreed on most things. The general did not want the CLCs to carry arms. He saw that as tantamount to arming militias and claimed that real militias were claiming to be CLCs just to keep their weapons. He also asserted that some of the CLCs were engaged in kidnapping. Dr. Hussein denied that, instead blaming the police, though he acknowledged that something needed to be done to counter the growing suspicion between their groups, resulting from that conspiracy-theory mind-set that the Marines tried to avoid. Colonel Sutherland interjected that there were some bad elements in both the CLCs and police, but not many. He thought the biggest problem both faced was Baghdad's reluctance to permit the hiring of even more CLCs. Dr. Hussein, like every other CLC leader, also wanted Baghdad to allow more of his people into the Iraqi army and Iraqi police. All leaders agreed that the CLCs eventually needed to move from security to reconstruction, but Dr. Hussein argued that too many areas still needed to be cleared of insurgents for such a shift now.

After the meeting Colonel Sutherland told us that the CLCs had made a great difference in early 2007 by driving a wedge between AQI and the people at a critical time. When the first big wave of insurgents flowed into Diyala in September 2006, the GOI had cut off all support to the province. That drove the people into the insurgent camp. However, again AQI proved inept; when it did not deliver required services, the people turned and the CLCs rose. This process was also facilitated by the cumulative effect of the logical lines of operation being pursued by coalition forces, making up for government shortcomings.

Colonel Sutherland explained that he skipped the "clear" phase because of lack of manpower and just tried to hold a few areas where he could establish his presence and conduct what he called "intelligence-driven, evidence-based" operations. He believed those actions also fostered the rise of CLCs, as the locals saw that the Americans were both capable of taking the offensive against enemies and willing to. Colonel Sutherland asserted that he had come to be seen as a powerful sheikh, worth dealing with. He had also mastered the tribal dynamics of shame and honor to motivate local leaders to take proper actions. He found that they were proud of their palm tree groves, which gave prestige as well as economic benefits, and threats to

pull back his patrols and leave those assets uncovered usually gave him the leverage he needed.

Major General Huntoon discusses the situation in Baqubah with General Kareem, commander of the Iraqi army units there, and Dr. Hussein, who led the CLC. They had many disagreements. Neither could have functioned without the support of Col. David Sutherland, far right in the photo. AUTHOR

By the time we saw him, Colonel Sutherland was in the last month of his tour. He was rightly proud of what his brigade had accomplished. He gave much credit to his battalion commanders, explaining that he spent more time himself maneuvering not troops but water and other logistics, trying to keep his scattered units supplied. His vision of the end state for Diyala was a total cease-fire with no support for terrorists. He explained that "reconciliation is a system," that there were powerful initiatives occurring at the tribal and village levels. Seventy-six percent of the tribes had signed on for the reconciliation process, hence the suicide attack aimed at supporting sheikhs in which Colonel Sutherland had been wounded. He was not overly concerned about governmental reform—he believed that Iraqis wanted justice more than democracy—though like the leaders of Al Zubayr he thought the provincial council was a stumbling block to success.

As Steve Biddle had predicted about the role of American forces in contemporary counterinsurgency, Colonel Sutherland had established his unit as the balancing force between all the factions in the province. He explained that every city in his zone had required a different approach to stabilize it but that all required the same American presence to make that condition permanent. He shared concerns I had heard in Baghdad about pressures back home for a speedy withdrawal once violence was reduced. He asserted that at least six to nine months of U.S. presence was necessary just to start to institutionalize stability once it was achieved, and then more time would be required to sustain it. He may have underestimated those numbers.

The Greywolf Brigade had paid a high price for its progress. Colonel Sutherland and his brigade chaplain went to the theater hospital at Balad to visit all their wounded and to put a last hand on all their dead. The monument they had established to memorialize all those they had lost, on a concrete barrier near Forward Operating Base Warhorse, near Baqubah, was filled after only five months in combat. Another barrier was erected next to it.[4]

Before we left the zone of MND-N we carried out three other visits. One gave Major General Huntoon a chance to promote his son, who was assigned there with a unit from the 2nd Infantry Division, to captain. That is always an important and moving ceremony, even more so in a combat zone. Another was to the CJSOTF headquarters in Balad for the disconcerting briefing described earlier. The third was to that Air Force hospital in Balad. I have always had a great deal of respect for field hospitals, perhaps because my first battery command was at Camp Billy Mosier in Uijongbu, Korea, the actual site of the 4077th MASH of TV fame during the Korean War. My command suite could have been Hawkeye Pierce’s operating room.

Balad was everything I expected—clean, bustling, filled with dedicated personnel. One placard at the front desk proclaimed, “Tuskegee Medics—Busting Ours . . . to Save Yours!” Other signs written in both English and Arabic declared, “Stop, Take Orders from Surgeons. Lethal Force Authorized.” That revealed the unique nature of medical care in the midst of this coalition counterinsurgency. Doctors told us a number of stories

about Iraqis they had treated, from both sides. Recently the staff had distributed get-well letters written by American schoolchildren to wounded soldiers from the Iraqi army; that caused quite a surprised reaction among the recipients. Even more interesting to me was the description of the standard response of enemy prisoners brought in for treatment. They arrived fearful, not trusting anyone, but eventually those sentiments turned into gratitude for the totally professional and immensely competent care provided by the medical staff.[5] For some, the road to reconciliation started in a hospital bed.

Though the bustling hospital at Balad had much in common with civilian medical facilities, these signs suggest some of the differences. AUTHOR

COIN behind the Wire

But for others, that path began in a less likely place, the main detention facility at Bucca, almost directly south of Basrah, close to the Iraqi border with Kuwait. That was the last stop on our whirlwind tour before we headed for Kuwait City and a plane home.

We spent our last day visiting the facilities of Task Force (TF) 134, under the command of Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone, USMC. It was in charge

of all coalition detainees in Iraq, at two main facilities. Besides Camp Bucca, which housed the large majority of prisoners, there was a smaller installation, Camp Cropper, near Baghdad International Airport. That compound housed some special-interest prisoners, along with the few women who had been taken and all the juveniles. Task force personnel included representatives from all the services—active duty, reservists, and National Guard—and most were working far outside their areas of expertise. As Major General Lynch had remarked about his soldiers in MND-C, no one in TF 134 was working in his or her comfort zone either.

We started at Cropper, where the population numbered almost 4,000. The staff there had set up a school for detainees from age 12 to 17 and was rotating 750 though the program as best it could. Eventually the school hoped to increase capacity to 1,100 for a round-the-clock operation. The individual running the program was a Utah National Guardsman who was a school administrator and a former Reserve Officers Training Corps instructor. The school day was based on the Iraqi model. Students got 3 hours of classroom instruction and 1 much-anticipated hour of soccer, facilitated by generous American donations of soccer shoes and soccer balls (though many students still played in bare feet). They were also fascinated by the televisions throughout the compound. Teaching was difficult, however, because of the large number of illiterate detainees and the fact that juveniles had to be turned over to the Iraqi detention system after a year. (They would spend one more year there before being released.) We saw a large array of their crayon drawings, which prominently featured Iraqi flags. Virtually all the young prisoners claimed to not know why they were being detained, but they also agreed that their educational experiences inside Cropper were better than they had been outside. So far the school had been certified through fifth grade by the Iraqi Education Ministry. The goal was to get that official sanction all the way through high school.[6]

From there we took a long helicopter ride to the main detention center at Bucca. We flew over many miles of desolate desert, and then a complex of barbed wire and tents appeared on the horizon. As we got closer we also saw many guard towers, squatting above the tents like smaller versions of the alien machines in H. G. Wells' *War of the Worlds*. There was no

vegetation in sight for many, many miles. It was hot enough in November; I could not imagine what it might be like at the peak of summer.

Major General Stone estimated that since 2003, 160,000 Iraqis had been through the detention system. Taking account of family networks, that meant 20 million people had been affected. He told us that the coalition had acquired more detainees during the last 9 months of Surge operations than at any time previously in the war. About 26,000 prisoners had been brought in and about 5,000 released. The population at Camp Bucca, which was 50 times the size of the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, had peaked recently at a bit over 21,000. Over 80 percent of its prisoners were Sunni, and most were between the ages of 18 and 39. According to the briefing we received, almost 1,900 current detainees came from AQI and 1,650 from JAM. There had been mass riots in May, when the total number was smaller, but since the implementation of a set of new programs that Major General Stone called “COIN inside the wire,” conditions in November had become the calmest anyone could remember. Detainees were now viewed as people who could be won over just like the members of the population they derived from, and they in turn could influence their family networks and communities.[7]

A view from our helicopter as we approached the sprawling complex at Bucca. The area for many miles around was desolate and forbidding. AUTHOR

Besides his requirements for care and custody, Major General Stone saw his main mission as making sure that released detainees did not return to the fight. He noted that he had about five brigades' worth of possible enemy fighters in his camps; his goal was to defeat the insurgency, not build it. Before he had arrived the camps had tended to be training grounds for extremists, and 8 to 9 percent of those released eventually returned. Since his new initiatives had been fully in place, 2,180 prisoners had been let go, and only 2 had been rearrested, and those for minor infractions. Any prison in America would be proud of such a recidivism rate.

Brig. Gen. Michael Nevin, commander of a key element of TF 134, the 177th Military Police Brigade of the Michigan National Guard, remarked that in releasing detainees who had completed the rehabilitation program the TF was launching "moderate missiles" back into Iraqi society. That was achieved in a detailed and well-thought-out process called "DART"—detention, assessment, rehabilitation, and transition. It was done without any programmed budget, since Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), then head of the House Appropriations Committee, was restricting all funding for detention in an attempt to force the closure of Guantanamo Bay; all funds had to be cajoled from MNC-I. All prisoners received complete medical screenings on arrival. They got glasses and dental care if needed. One or 2 percent suffered from tuberculosis, and there were significant numbers with diabetes and hernias. Inmates were separated as moderate or extremist, Sunni or Shi'a. Major General Stone estimated that 75 percent of the detainees would not have fought if they could have found jobs. He thought only about 20 percent were really "bad guys," and 5 percent truly religious ideologues and extremists. Moderates, he thought, were to be encouraged. The extremists were always trying to hide their identities and infiltrate into the moderate sections of camp, where they could influence others to be uncooperative, so monitoring had to be constant. There had been an "Awakening" at Bucca too, and moderate elements were becoming more assertive. There was also a lot of valuable intelligence gained from tips provided at sick call in the morning, when detainees could get away from their enclosure mates. He believed that he was succeeding in identifying the

true “irreconcilables” in his camp, eventually removing between 4 and 5,000 from the general population for detention in maximum security facilities.

The next step was to offer classes on reading, basic math, and religion to the detainees deemed reconcilable. Eventually history, science, civics, and geography were added. Major General Stone found that learning changed the prisoners; he could not keep up with the demand. He had between twenty and thirty moderate imams teaching inmates, many of whom were now able to read the Koran themselves for the first time. I witnessed a ceremony celebrating the completion of a religious education class. All the students were smiling and laughing as they were recognized for their achievements. The one with the highest grade received his own Koran. Major General Stone made some comments of his own, in Arabic. I later found out that for the Americans at Bucca, the ultimate reward they could receive was a can of Dr. Pepper. That would make a great commercial for that soda, which markets itself as the drink of unique individuals. There were a lot of them at Bucca.

Major General Stone had also set up vocational technology programs to give detainees job skills. He was just starting a textiles track when we arrived. He had established a “Lion’s Pride” work program to pay a modest salary to detainees who already had or had just acquired useful talents. The compound established a brick factory, which became very busy. The first week he paid twenty-six prisoners. Everyone in the camp watched that payday and how the money got passed to families on visitation. By the way, traveling to Bucca was a real hardship, especially for Sunni families, as the camp was located in the extreme southeast of the country. Applications for visits took four months to process, many people were killed on the trip by insurgents or militias, and visitors often carried most of their possessions with them because they could not trust them to be safe if left behind. Nevertheless, the families kept coming, and more and more prisoners clamored to join Lion’s Pride. By the time we arrived in November there were three thousand enrolled in it. Honing those job skills would further ease the final transition back to normal life.

Major General Stone viewed his DART program as another part of the “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration” process that is important for any stability operation. The last phase of DART, transition, was in many

ways the most difficult, since it required legal adjudications of the detainees' cases and their acceptance back into their communities. He found that many of the prisoners had already been in the camp longer than the normal prison terms for their crimes but had never been scheduled for hearings, which ideally should have occurred early in the detention process. Major General Stone had managed to get up to 140 cases into court in a week thanks to the yeoman service and assistance of the brilliant MNF-I staff judge advocate, Col. Mark Martins, who ultimately served some 4 years in combat alongside General Petraeus. However, there were still 1,300 pending. Major General Stone worked closely with the Central Criminal Court of Iraq and its supporting agencies. Since July he had also run about 10,000 review boards, and about 4,000 detainees had been released after pledging their loyalty to GOI in front of an Islamic judge. Even after the decision had been made, detainees were allowed to present their own argument to the review board before anything was announced, so any positive result would appear to have been influenced by their engagement with the coalition. MNC-I had final authority to approve any recommendations for release, to make sure no real "bad apples" slipped out of the system. Those who failed to gain release would get another chance in 6 months. All detainees came to realize that their behavior mattered, which further reduced incidents and encouraged cooperation.

Nevertheless, Major General Stone thought that the whole detention system was overused. He estimated that eight to ten thousand of his population should not have been there; he understood, however, that having detention as an alternative prevented a "shoot or release" dilemma for soldiers in the field. He was really bothered by the use of numbers of detainees taken as a reporting metric; that, he believed, encouraged bad behavior by coalition forces by setting the number of prisoners as a goal. (Brigadier Piers Hankinson, a British officer on the staff, remarked, "We suffer from infobesity" in the number of metrics we gathered and reported.) Also, Major General Stone sometimes felt restricted by legal rules that did not fit the war we were fighting. Some truly evil detainees needed to be held indefinitely. On the other hand, in tribal societies detention is often viewed as hostage taking, a practice that requires dealing and negotiation to resolve. He mused that we were using our rule of law as a substitute for

tribal horse trading and as a result sometimes were ending up with bad deals.

In spite of Major General Stone's enlightened DART programs, Bucca was still a detention camp, one that held a lot of very dangerous people. The day we visited, so did representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, to check on conditions. The general acknowledged that the enemy controlled extensive tracts inside the wire, where insurgents sometimes held their own courses of instruction. Prisoners would tear canvas and rubber strips off tents for slings, use their spit and the omnipresent fine sand to create "brickballs" or "chi-rocks," and then fire the pellets at high velocity at guards during the night. Many wooden guard towers had gaps torn out that looked like bullet holes, a testament to the power of those homemade weapons. The 293 foreigners in the camp were especially hard core. They had all been recruited in the aftermath of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, a testament to the information advantage such transgressions gave to our enemies. During the earlier riots, some inmates burned down their tents. Major General Stone had pointedly refused to replace them, reinforcing a hard lesson and also motivating moderates to turn in the extremist perpetrators. While the detainees did not fear their guards or U.S. forces, they were afraid of being put into Iraqi prisons, which treated inmates much more harshly, and losing support of their families. Major General Stone used those angles for leverage.

He complained that there was no manual on detention he could refer to. In fact, he had printed off three thousand copies of FM 3-24 on his own to distribute throughout his command, because it had the most useful information he could find—and because it was too hard to download electronically in Iraq.

Just as in classic World War II "POW" movies, prisoners at Bucca were always digging. Compound sections normally included eight tents, one of which was left vacant. Periodically and without prior notice detainees from one tent would be moved to the open unit to allow a thorough search of their previous abode. Using that technique guards had discovered a large tunnel, 370 feet long, the day before it was going to be used for a mass escape.

Major General Stone was concerned, however, that his population was growing so rapidly he would lose the open space he needed to manage it

properly. His rate of input continued to outpace his rate of release. Though he was against mass releases, he was planning to let out 464 detainees in early November as a “strategic message.” Each individual would have his personal possessions returned and be given 25 dollars, to be turned over, it was hoped, to family members.

What made the performance of TF 134 even more remarkable in such a stressful environment was the polyglot nature of its personnel. While it did include some military policemen from the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth and National Guardsmen of the 177th Military Police Brigade, many guard towers were manned by other Guardsmen from an artillery battalion, another example of that branch being used far outside its normal missions. TF 134 also included a large number of “in lieu of” units, Air Force or Navy airmen and sailors plugged in to fill Army shortfalls. For instance, a surprising number of trucks and truck drivers in Iraq were furnished by the Air Force. At Bucca a whole section was policed and maintained by Navy personnel, whose stations were painted battleship gray and whose language was filled with references to “decks” and “bulkheads.” The Navy guards I talked to were both active duty and reservists, and they included both surface and submarine sailors. They were even more out of their normal element than the artillerymen.

There was a cost for this sort of substitution. Every time units rotated, incidents increased as new guards learned their jobs and prisoners tested the newcomers. TF 134 found that there was a high demand for the services of stress therapists once units reached about ten months on station. Overall combat-stress casualties were high, especially in those “in lieu of” units. The towers I saw with the most damage from sling-tossed brickballs were those manned by sailors. I can’t imagine any personnel in Iraq facing more acutely the ethical dilemmas concerning the use of force in COIN than did those guards at Bucca. Whatever vision people back in the United States had of such a rear-area detention center, Major General Stone had in fact put this one into the front lines of COIN. Such warfare was not just nonlinear, it was more like being in another dimension.

Epilogue on Iraq

I had much to ponder as we helicoptered our way to Kuwait City and rode once again around it to get from the military side of its airfield to the civilian one. I was actually fairly optimistic. Flying over Iraq had revealed much of its potential. The country had not only oil but water. I was impressed with the green fields and groves along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. I also saw a lot of old irrigation ditches that seemed to promise even more agriculture if they could be restored. Of all the pictures I took, one with a lone tractor working to rehabilitate a long-dormant field seemed best to symbolize the hope of a new Iraq.

There were other scenes that also showed the promise of a bright future. The traffic jams in a bustling Baghdad, eager enthusiasm of ISF recruits, plentiful markets and busy shops in a peaceful Fallujah, all revealed a people out to reclaim their lives and country. The Mesopotamian Stampede was on in full force, and it seemed headed in the right direction.

However, whether that was an irreversible stampede was still questionable. Control of Diyala and Basrah still appeared tenuous. American forces had engineered many local truces and run out a lot of bad guys to create a mosaic pattern of peace throughout most of the country. Still, almost everyone, coalition member or Iraqi, complained about incompetence or corruption in provincial and national government that could make maintaining that mosaic peace problematic. Many commanders we talked to were already concerned about international and domestic political pressure to bring all the troops home before the mission was really completed. The Surge was reducing violence and creating a window of opportunity for Iraqi politics to start settling disputes and allocating resources. That process would still take more time to get established, and some were already starting to suspect that that particular resource would not be available.

When I got back I dutifully reported over secure e-mail channels to General Petraeus. I had sent him a couple interim e-mails while there, such as my alarm about the CJSOTF briefing, and did not have much to tell him now that he did not already know. I did have some advice for his March report, however. I was concerned about some staff slides I had seen that presented time lines for future reposturing of forces. When we asked about

them, we had always been told that General Petraeus did not like those time lines, which we saw as unworkable. However, even his approved MNF-I situation briefing contained a slide projecting a steady force reduction as the mission shifted. The graph had no time line but did depict a regular decline, in evenly spaced increments, down to zero. I cautioned him that it violated the imperative of managing expectations. I feared it would create exorbitant hopes for a smooth and inevitable course of force reductions, when instead conditions on the ground needed to dictate the pattern. Everyone we had talked to assumed there would be some long-term residual American military presence, and I thought that had to be emphasized too. Going back to the Korea case—we still had troops there more than fifty years later. I foresaw Iraq needing a similar commitment, though probably on a smaller scale.

With his irrigation ditches dry and the ground dryer, this Iraqi farmer seems to have an impossible task. But the future of Iraq depends on the success of such efforts to reestablish the infrastructure and economy so devastated by Saddam Hussein and war. AUTHOR

Right after I sent in my report, I received a piece of disturbing news. Shortly before we had left Iraq, on 7 November, there had been an IED

attack in Baghdad on a convoy carrying troops from that same CJSOTF I had criticized. Capt. Benjamin Tiffner, Alpha Team commander, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), had been fatally wounded. He was a 2000 graduate of USMA, a history major, and another one of my former students, a very sharp one.[8] I had been in Baghdad that day. I wondered whether he had died as a result of the CJSOTF's still being out of synchronization with the rest of the COIN fight or because they had instead shifted to carry out operations to support it. Neither thought was very consoling.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Witches and Wizards Revealed

The COIN Wave Recedes

Almost immediately after my return from Iraq, I was approached by Stefano Kotsonis of National Public Radio to appear on the *On Point* program to discuss conditions in the country. On 26 November I went on the air to be interviewed with Paul Hughes, now working for the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. We discussed the successes of the Surge, while also stressing that much more still needed to be accomplished. Like many of those in MNF-I whom I had interviewed, the moderator and callers were very critical of the lack of progress by the Iraqi government. Hughes and I emphasized the success being achieved in local initiatives and expressed hope that GOI would take advantage of the breathing space it now had. The toughest question I fielded dealt with the British withdrawal from Basrah, postulating that it represented an alternative to our approach. I expressed my concerns about that course of action based upon my perceptions of the uncertain situation there but said only time would tell if the British were right. The major criticism of Operation Iraqi Freedom that Paul expressed was that it should not have been undertaken until the mission in Afghanistan had been completed.

A year later Operation Enduring Freedom would also undergo a major review, as a new administration took over. When President Bush left office in 2009, Iraq seemed on its way to a stable future. However, his successor,

President Barack Obama, having been a consistent critic of the campaign there, did not have the same personal interest or commitment. There is plenty of blame to go around among both Iraqis and Americans for the failure to agree upon a status of forces agreement to protect the rights of any U.S. military personnel remaining in Iraq. Be that as it may, the total withdrawal of American forces in December 2011 and accompanying reduction of Embassy staff led quickly to a significant increase in violence and Sunni/Shi‘a friction. Resolving a mosaic war requires a mosaic peace, comprising many local agreements and arrangements. These quickly began to unravel absent the Americans who had brokered them. The U.S. military and diplomatic presence had not only served to suppress insurgents, it also acted as a check on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian tendencies. Once he was free to exercise them, he reversed what had been accomplished during the Surge toward achieving reconciliation between the Sunni Arab community and Baghdad. Sadly, Maliki’s use of the judicial system to settle scores with key Sunni Arab figures in government—starting with the Sunni vice president—and the violent responses by Iraqi Security Forces to largely peaceful Sunni demonstrations protesting Maliki’s activities and his failure to honor agreements made with Sunni elements once again created fertile grounds for growing Sunni extremism and insurgency.

The government thus lost the trust and support of the Sunnis, creating a situation where insurgent elements and then Islamic State extremists established strong footholds in Anbar and then overran Iraqi forces in much of northern Iraq, including in Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. As of this writing, the future of Iraq remains unclear. A mix of Iraqi security forces, Sunni tribes, Shi‘a militias, and Kurdish Peshmerga have retaken some territory from ISIS invaders, but the long-term viability of the nation will depend upon the rebuilding of many bridges—physical, political, and psychological—that have been destroyed since the withdrawal of American forces.[1] While a repeat seems unlikely of the 1950 Korean scenario, where a large influx of American troops was necessary to retrieve a bad situation resulting from a premature withdrawal, U.S. trainers have been reintroduced to help the Iraqi government.

To Afghanistan

For President Obama, the “good war” was in Afghanistan. In 2009 that was also the war that was going badly. Paul Hughes’ frustrations with that apparently lost opportunity were understandable. For all the criticism of Phase IV planning for Iraq, there was none for the hastily planned operations in Afghanistan that began in October 2001. For the U.S. Central Command, special operations forces in Afghanistan were executing a “strategic movement to contact” as a foundation for launching Operation Enduring Freedom. No campaign plan had been completed, nor had thought been given to the future of Afghanistan. Under great pressure for quick action, the staff was planning as it executed and could only think a few days ahead of operations. Expectations were that the Northern Alliance, helped by American advice and airpower, could secure a foothold with an airfield in the north before harsh winter set in, which conventional forces then gathering in Uzbekistan could use to mount an offensive in the spring.[2]

But the Taliban surprisingly collapsed by December. The United States now had the opportunity to create a new Afghanistan, and it scrambled to take advantage of its unexpected “catastrophic success.” A conference of invited Afghan leaders convened under the auspices of the United Nations that month in Bonn, Germany, and, without any consultation with CENTCOM, set up an interim Afghan government under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. The Americans felt lucky to have found Karzai, a Pushtun with no “blood on his hands” from fighting against them. However, the United States remained reluctant to get involved in nation building, and the United Nations was also wary about getting too heavily committed. The challenges were enormous. Socioeconomically, Afghanistan remained in the bottom ten countries in the world; it was almost bereft of human capital after decades of strife. In January 2002 a donor conference in Tokyo, unable to create a comprehensive development plan, adopted a “lead nation” approach for aid. It allocated separate responsibilities to the United States (Afghan army), the United Kingdom (counternarcotics), Japan (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), Italy (judicial system), and Germany (police). The disjointed system was distrusted by Afghans, grossly underfunded, and incomplete. It was eventually scrapped, but it set

the precedent for future assistance to the country—never adequate to achieve real reform but more than enough to fuel rampant corruption.[3]

After its rout in 2001, the Taliban replenished themselves in Pakistan. By late 2005 insurgent attacks were increasing throughout Afghanistan, and there were signs of a true Taliban resurgence in the south. The Afghan National Army—which had grown by only 36,000 since 2002—was far too small to handle the problem. Police training had progressed even less, as then–Lieutenant General Petraeus reported to Secretary Rumsfeld after an assessment of the situation there in September 2005 on his way home from his second tour in Iraq. With American forces concentrating on Iraq, more NATO troops were moved into the Pushtun heartland: Canadians to Kandahar, British to Helmand, and Dutch and Australians into Uruzgan. Yet they and Afghan forces proved insufficient to handle the Taliban push when it came; by mid-2006 areas like Garmser in Helmand Province were under full Taliban control. In hindsight, it is apparent that a few more advisors, the training of more Afghan soldiers and police, adequate aid money, and some land reform might have made a big difference between 2002 and 2006. But that opportunity was forever lost.[4]

As late as 2009, even with the reemergence of the Taliban threat, there was still no integrated counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Resources were inadequate for development programs, Afghan security forces remained small, and NATO countries, with their different agendas and doctrines, could not even agree what counterinsurgency was, let alone whether to conduct it. Air strikes or special operations forces raids in remote areas often substituted for absent ground forces. Because who controls the ground controls the impression of results, the Taliban were often able to fabricate reports to reinforce perceptions that these actions caused excessive civilian casualties.

President Obama, taking office in January 2009, shifted his nation's focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. Among the new president's first duties was to consider a request for 30,000 more troops from Gen. David McKiernan, commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and all troops in Afghanistan. Obama approved 17,000 combat troops and 4,000 trainers, who would be on the ground to help provide security for August elections. But Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, considered McKiernan's request far too low if ISAF intended to do doctrinal counterinsurgency. Further questioning and a visit to Afghanistan convinced Gates that General McKiernan was the wrong man to conduct such a campaign; Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of ISAF in June 2009.

Having made his mark managing special operation forces counterterrorism operations in Iraq for General Petraeus, McChrystal immediately undertook a formal assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, similar to one conducted by Petraeus when he had arrived in Iraq. As a result, the ISAF commander briefed three options to the president: a low-end deployment of 11,000 trainers of Afghan security forces (presented as ineffective and getting no real consideration), a high-end surge of 85,000 troops (what McChrystal really needed), or a 40,000-troop addition (what he thought he could get). Most of the president's civilian advisors, including Vice President Joe Biden, favored a low-end counterterrorism approach rather than COIN, with a smaller augmentation of 20,000 troops; those in uniform, such as Mullen and Petraeus, now CENTCOM commander, supported McChrystal. The president compromised, authorizing a reinforcement of 30,000, but with a serious caveat that he revealed to his national security team only the evening before his public announcement. When Obama described the authorized surge on 1 December in a speech at West Point in front of thousands of cadets, he promised not only that the additional forces would be deployed but that the Surge forces would start coming home in July 2011. This combination was the worst of both worlds —a troop increase that was inadequate for requirements but would increase the expenditure of American blood and treasure and a deadline that would hearten enemies and cause apprehension among allies.[5]

President Barack Obama meets with U.S. ambassador Karl Eikenberry, left, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan. PETE SOUZA, WHITE HOUSE

There were many other reasons as well why the surge in Afghanistan did not have the same impact as in Iraq. Though billions of dollars were pumped into aid programs along with the military buildup, they not only improved infrastructure but also made rampant corruption worse. That problem was exacerbated by the persistent opium trade; attempts to eradicate opium or replace it with another cash crop failed miserably. Moreover, Hamid Karzai knew that Americans did not completely trust him and had hoped he would be defeated in the 2009 elections; he felt the U.S. special representative, Richard Holbrooke, and the U.S. ambassador, Karl Eikenberry, had sought to force a runoff election with his top rival. Karzai thus was loath to accomplish reforms that Americans thought were necessary. Key civilian advisors to the president continued to oppose the surge. So did Ambassador Eikenberry, sending a curiously timed cable (at the very end of the Obama review) that called Karzai “an unsuitable partner”—and that was then leaked. Eikenberry’s relations with both McChrystal and Karzai were frosty. Infighting in Washington and in Kabul was extremely counterproductive.

Moreover, much of the impact of the surge was dissipated by the existence of a deadline and by the fact that the Marines shunted too great a

proportion of the increased strength into the less important province of Helmand. The clear-hold-build COIN campaign plan itself, which put considerable restrictions on air strikes until Petraeus arrived while replicating much else from Iraq, was even more difficult to implement in the poorer conditions of Afghanistan. Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan prevented the coalition from targeting the insurgent leaders. Even though the administration considerably increased the number of drone strikes in Pakistan (focused mostly on AQI, however, not a major actor in Afghanistan), that nation remained an important sanctuary for the resilient and adaptive Taliban and other insurgent groups. Some of the strikes in the tribal areas damaged American relations with that key country; the collateral damage and backlash complicated its own COIN efforts.

McChrystal resigned a year into his command after a June 2010 *Rolling Stone* article revealed how freely his staff disparaged members of the president's cabinet, especially the vice president. He was replaced by General Petraeus, who stepped down from his command of CENTCOM. Petraeus removed some of the combat restrictions and stepped up counterterror raids. He also established a separate task force to attack corruption and—again demonstrating his skill in all aspects of COIN—sought Taliban elements to negotiate with. He even improved relations with Eikenberry and got President Karzai to support an Afghan local police initiative and a reintegration program. Petraeus had repeatedly stated even before taking command that the augmented effort would not be able to "flip" the situation in Afghanistan as the Surge in Iraq had done. Nevertheless, by the spring of 2011 there was obvious progress, but now the deadline for the withdrawal was approaching.

The war was costing $100 billion a year, and the president had publicly promised that he would begin the drawdown on time and bring home all surge troops in a year. His position had been reinforced by the death of Osama bin Laden during a special operations raid in the spring, a blow that made Al Qaeda appear weakened. Petraeus argued that losing the troops too rapidly would undermine the campaign plan, but the president was insistent. Secretary Gates did broker a compromise that brought home the surge reinforcements by September 2012, a plan the president announced in June 2011. He argued that the surge had achieved its goals: increasing security, stabilizing more of the country, enabling the training of 100,000 additional

Afghan security forces, opening new markets, increasing opportunities for women, and allowing the commencement of transition of security tasks to Afghan forces in select areas of the country. Petraeus would add that, in addition, the momentum of the Taliban had been halted and in some areas reversed, and also that Al Qaeda had been prevented from renewing its bases, though he really only had had full surge forces for seven months.[6] Despite the president's declaration, revelations from others in the administration brought into question whether he ever had had much confidence in the Afghan mission in the first place.[7]

However, whether those gains could be sustained without a significant commitment of American ground forces remained unclear. At the same time as Obama's triumphant announcement of the surge's termination, a CIA report concluded that the country was heading toward stalemate. Increased instability in the east and north offset gains in the south. The military hotly disputed the report, while the president ignored it.[8] But the American withdrawal continued regardless, at a faster pace than was even projected in 2011, though Obama was persuaded to halt the drawdown for 2015 to allow new Afghan president Ashraf Ghani to regain political ground lost during the protracted wrangling over the election outcome in 2014. Thus, despite some impressive achievements, the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain as of this writing, just as does Iraq's. Nevertheless, while the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq should be seen as creating an opportunity for a political consolidation that never occurred, I would argue that counterinsurgency was neither ever fully resourced nor allowed sufficient time in Afghanistan. Regardless, both cases do reinforce the importance of the first principle of American COIN: that without the possibility of establishing a legitimate indigenous governing authority, such a campaign is doomed to fail. Ironically, it was only in the much later stages in each country that the kind of national leadership needed earlier was finally elected, after the removal of Karzai and Maliki. Acknowledging the difficulty of making progress when working with unsuitable partners is probably the key point that the interagency COIN guide should have made clearly (without terming such efforts as necessarily folly)—and one that our military manual should have noted prominently as well.

Traveling Sage

In 2009 and 2010 I was enjoying my allotted fifteen minutes of fame, with numerous invitations to speak and consult. I knew I had "made the big time" when I was invited to one of Eliot Cohen's Basin Harbor soirees in June 2010. Those weeklong workshops, sponsored by the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University at a gorgeous resort on the shores of Lake George in Vermont, had been bringing leading national security experts together for years. Fred Kaplan credits the 2005 gathering, focused on irregular warfare, with motivating activists like John Nagl and David Kilcullen to accelerate efforts to develop new doctrine and practices.[9]

Our workshop was a sort of follow-up to the one in 2005. For the moment, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare were still in the ascendency, or so we thought. At the time I was not aware that signs of a recoil were already present, with the changing of wording in DoD Directive 3000.05 in 2009 to the effect that instead of training for stability operations being of equal priority with combat operations, now the military just had to be equally proficient in both—much more of a judgment call. Since many senior leaders thought (incorrectly) that stability operations were just a subset of conventional ones and that skill in the latter had deteriorated unacceptably, that change meant that emphasis would shift to almost strictly conventional training. I was on a panel at Basin Harbor about the state of the art in COIN, and one of its members had posted a blog for the Center for a New American Security a day earlier declaring that the COINdinistas had achieved their goals, were no longer "plucky underdogs," and should quit being defensive.[10] That is basically the same thing I have been telling Gian Gentile the last few years, with the twist that the COINtras have now supposedly achieved their goals and, like the Shi'a in Iraq in 2007, need to realize that they have won. I may be oversimplifying the situation. Recently, after one of our many head-to-head panel discussions, one astute observer remarked that we were talking past each other. Gian was concerned about how much the Army culture and soldier skills had been changed by a decade of COIN, while I was chagrined about how little institutional practices and structures had really changed to adapt to it. The commentator opined that we could both be right.

Two memories stand out about that workshop. The first was having lunch on a veranda overlooking the lake while Eliot waxed eloquently about the military history of the "Great Warpath," the Lake Champlain corridor leading down from Canada. I was especially impressed with his account of the amazing, heroic leadership of Benedict Arnold during the grueling Canadian campaign of 1775, the battle of Valcour Island the next year, and at Saratoga in 1777. If Arnold had died of his wounds after that last engagement, he would be celebrated as the greatest combat commander of the Revolutionary War instead of its worst traitor. The second impression that has stayed with me was the all-too-common theme of the negative impact of SOF raids on COIN. There were representatives there from various government agencies with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and virtually every one had a story to tell like mine from Iraq. By that time a Human Rights Watch study of Afghanistan had confirmed that a disproportionate number of civilian casualties there had been caused by a lack of proper coordination between U.S. special operations forces and the rest of NATO.[11]

There were two former Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASDs) for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in attendance. They both sat down with me and explained how SOF had become overly focused on direct action rather than on other traditional SOF missions, such as foreign internal defense, which focuses on advising and assisting host nations to develop their own security capabilities. Partly this shift was a result of the creation of Special Operations Command (SOCOM), where the Army was the only service with major interest in non–direct action missions, though there are increasing efforts to get other services involved. One of the DASDs talked about his frustrations with trying to get Navy SEALs interested in advisory or stability tasks. Presidents also put emphasis on such direct-action missions as the core of counterterrorism efforts and an essential part of GWOT. As SOCOM responsibilities increased, and successes were trumpeted, the decision had been made to grow SOF, and quickly. While SEAL or Ranger training is grueling, it can be completed much quicker than a Green Beret with language skills, cultural knowledge, and lots of military experience can be produced. Consequently, the number of "door kickers" increased, while other specialties were neglected. Active-

duty psychological operations and civil affairs had been moved to SOCOM (reservists, who constituted the bulk of each field, were moved to the Army Reserve Command), because of a belief they were unappreciated by conventional forces. They were treated no better in SOCOM. I was surprised to have this confirmed when I was asked to give a presentation at Joint Special Operations University in Tampa for the Special Operations Center for Knowledge and Futures. When I castigated the audience for focusing too much on direct action at the expense of other essential and unique SOF specialties, instead of getting a knife in the back, I got agreement.[12]

I spoke at many other military venues as well. I have often been invited back to the Air University to present my views about the need for the Air Force to retain expertise and interest in foreign internal defense and COIN. I made presentations at many Army and Marine Corps schools, including West Point and Quantico, as well as at Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. I even participated in a very insightful conference at the U.S. Naval Academy on "The American Way of Irregular War," organized by Professor Marcus Jones and the Minerva Chair, John Nagl, a conference that I hope will produce an appropriate book from the distinguished group of experts they brought together.[13] The United States has engaged in more irregular conflicts than conventional ones, but for reasons ranging from lack of individual and organizational recognition for irregular warfare to the much larger budgets that can be justified to support conventional requirements, that experience has rarely had any lasting impact on the American military.

One of my most revealing engagements at a military post resulted from an invitation from another of my former History Department subordinates, Col. Jim Herson, by this time commanding the training brigade at Fort Eustis, Virginia, then home of the Army's Transportation Corps. He asked me to give the graduation address to one of his Officer Basic Course classes. One of the great untold stories of GWOT is the strain that it placed on the All Volunteer Force. No nation has ever tried to fight such a lengthy and demanding conflict solely with volunteers. I saw the impact on the service firsthand at Fort Eustis.

It was obvious to me that the Army had decided to take significant risks with the Transportation Corps in order to bolster other segments of the force. Colonel Herson half-joked that his brigade was returning to the poor conditions of the "Army of the '70s," but as a historian, he was not sure of which century. His trainers described personnel problems with recruits reminiscent of those experienced in the establishment of "VOLAR," the all-volunteer Army of the 1970s. They were particularly perplexed by the dynamics created when mothers and daughters enlisted together and were in the same platoons. The connection with the 1870s is that anyone who has seen old western movies is familiar with the depiction of Civil War veterans still in service missing an eye or limb. Many of Colonel Herson's trainers were "wounded warriors" from Iraq and Afghanistan. One of his staff officers had a withered arm; another was recovering from a serious head injury. Some of his noncommissioned officers were amputees. He told me that having such veterans on duty was great for the retention of current personnel, demonstrating the Army's commitment to them, but that it had a negative impact on recruiting, especially discouraging parents from letting their children consider joining up. As for the 1770s, he recounted many stories about scarcity of resources and personnel. One of the reasons the Air Force was providing trucks as "in lieu of" commitments to GWOT was because many of the Army's wheeled vehicles had been worn out from hard duty and had low priority for replacement and refitting. The Transportation branch itself was short of noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, and field-grade officers. About half of the Officer Basic Course class that I addressed were products of Officer Candidate School, "noncoms" selected to become junior officers. That was a quick fix for the lieutenant shortage, but it exacerbated the others, since the practice further depleted the noncommissioned-officer ranks and the new "butterbars" who already had served significant numbers of years on active duty would be eligible for retirement when they were majors.[14] In another cost-saving move, the Transportation School at Fort Eustis subsequently closed and all officer courses for logistics specialties were moved to Fort Lee, with consolidated resources. In light of the strains on logistics branches resulting from GWOT, that recommendation from the Base Realignment and Closure

process was a sensible one, but it did reduce the sense of branch identity so important to the logistics tasks in our Army.

I was also invited to address many civilian audiences. I participated on panels for many think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute. I spent numerous hours on National Public Radio and even got an early morning engagement on C-SPAN's *Washington Journal*. I remember that session particularly because of one question. A caller from the West, at what must have been an ungodly early hour out there, called in and asked why we were so concerned about helping the Iraqis develop their own constitution. He suggested that we just give them our own and leave. I answered with what I thought was a glib comeback, "Iraq is not Connecticut," and proceeded to explain why we had to come up with a form of government that would fit their unique society. One should always be careful with geographical metaphors. I was relating this story later during a talk at Dickinson College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, when I noticed a puzzled-looking student in the back. I gave him a moment to reflect, and he raised his hand with a comment: "I'm from Bridgeport [Connecticut], and it is a lot like Baghdad." I later found his hometown was consistently rated one of the most dangerous small cities in the United States, with a high rate of gang violence and murders.

Especially in the first few years after the publication of FM 3-24, much attention was devoted to the manual by academia. I found it being used as a textbook at such universities as Columbia, Princeton, Rutgers, and Temple. That made me feel justified in my push to elevate its reading level and in the many hours spent trying to wordsmith it. I particularly remember one political science professor at Princeton who in 2010 expressed great chagrin when I told an audience there that the manual was scheduled to be rewritten. He doubted he could find a suitable substitute for his classes, with regard both to content and expense.[15] The University of Chicago Press version was very cheap compared to regular textbooks, and the plain government publication could be downloaded from the Internet for free.

If encountering the use of FM 3-24 as a college text was one of many uplifting insights from my travels, I have often been unpleasantly surprised as well. One of my most disconcerting appearances occurred in November 2008, just after the election of Barack Obama to the presidency. I had been

selected by the Scone Foundation in New York City to receive its annual award as the Archivist of the Year. The foundation's president, Stanley Cohen, wanted to recognize archivists who had contributed to the profession and supported the research of others, while working to preserve our collective memory. I had been nominated both for my work with COIN doctrine and improvements I had overseen in facilities and procedures at the Military History Institute. Other awardees have included an Israeli, a Palestinian, and an Iraqi. I was immensely honored, as well as lucky, as it turned out, to have the award presented to me by Dr. Richard Kohn from the University of North Carolina, a noted authority on civil-military relations. The ceremony at Columbia University was attended by numerous distinguished New Yorkers, and I particularly remember the thrill of meeting Robert Caro, biographer of Robert Moses and Lyndon B. Johnson. When I was involved in helping the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute develop a course on combating corruption for Afghanistan I had recommended that his *The Power Broker* should go on the reading list, to show how power can corrupt anyone anywhere.[16]

I gave a speech entitled "Getting a Brontosaurus to Pole Vault: Moving an Archive and Moving an Army." In it I referred to having in 2004 to move the institute from a distinguished but very old building on Carlisle Barracks into a modern, state-of-the-art archival facility just outside the back gate. I had used the pole-vaulting metaphor to describe for my staff how difficult moving our voluminous holdings would be. (They did an outstanding job, and one of my most prized possessions is the model they presented to me of a pole-vaulting dinosaur when we were done.) In my speech I discussed that move and then described the creation of FM 3-24 and the archival contributions to the case studies and thought processes involved. When I concluded, I accepted questions from the audience. One middle-aged woman stood and rendered me speechless, a real rarity, as those who know me are aware. She stated that she knew that the military had developed the new doctrine just to bail George Bush out of trouble in Iraq and asked whether we would have done the same thing if the president had been Barack Obama. I really had no idea how to answer the question. Steve Biddle had instructed me about looking for the erroneous assumptions

behind people's assertions, but I did not know where to begin to deal with hers.

Thankfully, Dick Kohn jumped to my rescue, providing a concise history of American civil-military relations and explaining the military's responsibilities to the nation. However, the fact that someone in such a distinguished gathering in such an impressive venue could be so ignorant about military duties and attitudes shook me up. It reminded of the time when I was a student at Fort Leavenworth in 1990 and Gen. Colin Powell came to talk to us. One of my classmates asked whether the All Volunteer Force would be sustainable without the draft. General Powell answered that he thought we could always craft a package of incentives to keep the ranks filled but that he was more concerned about the loss of the influx of military values that draftees had once taken back into society. He feared a growing gap of understanding between soldiers and the civilians they served. I have never seen a better illustration of that gap than that question at Columbia.

That would not be the only time I would be blindsided in New York City. In 2011 I was invited by Marilyn Young to be on another panel with Gian Gentile to talk about COIN, this time at New York University's Gallatin School of Individualized Study. I had once told Gian that we were becoming the modern equivalent of Watergate mastermind G. Gordon Liddy and drug guru Timothy Leary, who had become popular together on the lecture circuit for their wildly opposing viewpoints in the 1980s. The title of the conference was "Counterinsurgency: History, Theory, and Practice." I was told Clint Ancker would also be on our panel, so I expected another engaging discussion about the pros and cons of the new doctrine.

I had not seen a description of the full program before I arrived, and I would have been much better prepared if I had. The opening keynote address, by an Iraqi woman, Dahlia Wasfi, was entitled, "Counterinsurgency: A Euphemism for Oppression." She brutally recounted a list of American atrocities in her country, for over an hour. Because she went over her allotted time, our panel started late. I had to catch a train to get back to Carlisle for an evening event; consequently I had to do something that I really hate, talk and run. One of the panelists who followed me, Hannah Gurman, was giving a presentation describing the manual as "From Imperfect Document to Imperial Doctrine." The panel after ours examined the Human Terrain System in use by the military and inspired by

FM 3-24; it was chaired by Roberto Gonzalez, the leading critic of the "military-anthropology complex" he saw resulting from the system. The conference closed with a roundtable on securing the population that took a harsh view of those efforts. One participant called American police training in Afghanistan "Modernizing Repression."[17]

To be fair, I must note that the Human Terrain System panel did include some of its supporters, but the overall tone of the conference was so antagonistic to American counterinsurgency efforts that Gian later told me he had spent most of the day defending them, along with the associated doctrine. That was particularly ironic, considering that the title of his talk had been "Counterinsurgency American Style Doesn't Work." I regretted leaving him and Clint in the lurch by departing early, but admit that I chuckled when he told me that story later. Perhaps I had been naïve up to that point, but I had not paid much attention to critics on the left who viewed American COIN as brutal and imperialist. From their perspective, FM 3-24 had not been created in a strategic vacuum or to solve a military problem set; instead, it had been designed to further U.S. hegemony in keeping with long-standing patterns of repressive behavior.

That rationale never came up during the vetting conference or writing sessions for FM 3-24, and it was also not evident in the many consultations and presentations that I provided for other countries wrestling with similar insurgency problems, from Africa, Asia, or Europe. General Petraeus has often been quoted as asserting that the counterinsurgency era is not over, because the insurgency era is not over, that as long as there are insurgencies, nations will have to counter them. He was right, of course. Consequently, while my media appearances have declined as interest in COIN has lagged in the United States, my frequent-flyer miles continue to mount, as there remains considerable interest elsewhere in the world.

Most of my initial travel after the manual was published was to NATO countries trying to grapple with their roles in Afghanistan. About a week after I returned from Iraq I was heading to The Hague for a conference on "Counterinsurgency: Historical Roots and Relevance," conducted by the Netherlands Institute for Military History. I had received many good reports about the performance of the Dutch in Uruzgan Province, and I learned a lot about their extensive experience with COIN in their colonial past. While

those policies had usually been based on “submission through force” and stressed kinetic military activities, they had adopted our doctrine pretty thoroughly in recent years and had executed it well.[18] I was very impressed at the conference with Maj. Gen. Ton Van Loon, who had just completed command of the International Security Assistance Force Regional Command–South, headquartered in Kandahar and including U.S. and Canadian forces, as well as Dutch. He was very frank about how much his forces had to learn about contemporary COIN. A lot of Dutch soldiers had to work outside their comfort zones, just like their American counterparts; for instance, antiaircraft artillerymen were being cross-trained for psychological operations. He believed that NATO expected a thirty-year commitment in Afghanistan.

That sort of commitment was not apparent from my dealings with the Germans over the next year. I was invited by a professor from the University of Kiel to address a “high level seminar on strategic matters,” hosted by the EADS Company in October 2008. The group consisted of “high ranking members of the German Parliament and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.” They were interested in the development of the new COIN approach in Iraq and how to induce the same sort of success in Afghanistan.[19] I saw this as an exceptionally positive step, after hearing stories about the German “sitzkrieg” PRT in northern Afghanistan that could not get its government to provide a helicopter for transportation. One young American officer, frustrated about working with what he perceived as a weak German army, once wondered aloud to me in a moment of pique what had happened to those tough “SS guys” he had read about. I replied that there was some baggage that came with those people that we were better off without.

I prepared for the meeting in Germany by printing copies of General Petraeus’ July 2008 COIN guidance from Iraq to distribute to participants.[20] We gathered in a conference room at the Haus Huth, near the center of Berlin. In attendance were many of the number-twos from key cabinet ministries and shadow ministers from other parties. There were also a number of distinguished retired soldiers. As I distributed my handouts, one of the government representatives explained what they were looking for: guidance for Afghanistan based on successful practices from Iraq. But

he also added some political caveats that had to guide German actions: the Germans could not spend any more money, and they could not get anyone hurt. Considering what I had to offer and those restrictions, I don't think my advice to them was very useful. I did not sense the sort of political will necessary to sustain a thirty-year commitment. Actually, though, subsequent German actions on the ground did not adhere to the limits discussed at the Berlin meeting. General Petraeus subsequently assessed German operations in northern Afghanistan beginning in the summer of 2010 as textbook COIN ops; however, like the Americans, the Germans would begin drawing down within the subsequent eighteen months.

I had attended another meeting in Germany the previous month, this time with what I considered a more useful discussion. This was the first conference of the Aspen Institute European Strategy Forum, and the accommodations were great—the beautiful Steigenberger Grandhotel Petersberg in Königswinter, near Bonn. The theme was "International State Building and Reconstruction Efforts." Attendees came from all over the world; they included a prince from Jordan, a diplomat from Beijing, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi from the United Nations, and Hekmat Karzai from Kabul's Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, along with plenty of Europeans and Americans. My assigned topic was "Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists in Post-Conflict Situations," an oxymoron of the first order that I used as a platform to talk about the principles and imperatives of COIN, along with hybrid warfare. Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, USA (Ret.), was there to add his comments. I was privileged to sit next to Ashraf Ghani, previously Minister of Finance in Afghanistan and thereafter at the Institute for State Effectiveness in Washington. He and Clare Lockhart jointly gave a very impressive talk about the reasons international reconstruction efforts fail. I remember thinking at the time that someone with his skills and knowledge needed to be back in the Afghan government. I can think of no one better to be president of that troubled country. I hope we provided some useful information for him and furthered future international state building and reconstruction efforts in some way.[21]

Among the other attendees at the Grandhotel Petersberg was Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, shadow minister for national security of the United Kingdom's House of Lords. The British remained very committed to COIN

and had produced some very fine doctrinal publications but were losing the capacity to conduct it. At the Dutch conference, Ian Beckett revealed that the British Army was shrinking to eight brigades, with only thirty-six battalions. He nevertheless argued that the British thought of COIN as their greatest contribution to the theory of war. I have had some stimulating discussions with academics at Oxford and military officers at Shrivenham that confirmed that intellectual innovation about COIN is alive and well in the United Kingdom. I was especially impressed with the work of a young Gurkha officer, Capt. Emile Simpson, and his grasp of the merging of military and political activities in what he calls the "kaleidoscope" of contemporary war. That is an even more complex metaphor than my mosaic. I highly recommend his book, *War from the Ground Up*, based on his experiences in Afghanistan.[22] He is presently working with General Petraeus on a Harvard project to capture lessons learned about theater-level combat command and coalition operations.

My travels were not confined to Europe. In 2007 I was invited to compare and contrast the American occupations of Korea and Japan at a Pacific War Conference at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, Japan. Preparing that presentation provided an opportunity to sharpen further my understanding of the many mistakes we had made in establishing stable and democratic post-conflict environments after World War II, especially in Korea.[23] In 2009 I was asked back to Japan to give the keynote address for the fourteenth International Seminar on Military Science, at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka. I crafted what I thought was one of my cleverer titles for the talk, "Clio and Mars Preparing for Chaos: Using Military History to Educate for Complex Peace and the Graduate Level of War." I talked about lessons from past occupations and reconstruction and about some of the historical roots and principles from our counterinsurgency doctrine. It was not until later, when I had an office call with the academy's president, Makoto Iokibe, that I realized that title had violated one of the prime tenets of speaking—know your audience. Many of the Japanese and other Asians in attendance were less familiar with my metaphors from Greek and Roman mythology. I should have known better.[24]

There were fifteen nations represented at the seminar, mostly Asian, but there were also some Europeans and an officer from the U.S. Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs. Each gave a report on the conduct of military science in their respective nation. Twelve of the representatives described grappling with the subjects I had covered in my talk—involving the conduct of war amongst the people and dealing with irregular warfare. The speakers from two nations were still focused on exploiting the technological advances of a perceived "revolution in military affairs." One was Russia, which was to be expected, since it had been at the forefront of such analyses since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. I was surprised about the second, Vietnam. I suppose the Vietnamese had had enough experience with People's War and were looking for something less costly and messy. The one attendee I could not categorize was the Chinese representative, a very pleasant colonel who was very hard to pin down. His focus seemed much broader than anyone else's. I came away from the meeting wondering if we in the West were engaged in a contest we characterized as baseball or soccer or chess while the Chinese were playing Go. I still wonder about that today.

I have advised some Asian officers here in the United States. When General Petraeus took over Central Command in late 2008, he initiated a program to bring Pakistani military officers to the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (known as NESA) at the National Defense University in Washington for a few weeks of seminars. Much of the focus was simply to achieve better mutual understanding, but I was asked to give a presentation about counterinsurgency. I did that for a number of iterations of the program over a few years, and I actually witnessed a lot of progress among the Pakistanis, officers from all their services, including a few generals. In season 5, episode 2, of the television show *Star Trek: The Next Generation*, entitled "Darmok," Capt. Jean Luc Picard, played by Patrick Stewart, is marooned on a planet with an alien captain, played by Paul Winfield, who speaks in a language based on historical and mythical metaphors. To survive, Picard must learn to communicate that way. I felt like that in my first meeting at NESA, in 2009, which was part of a program called "Pakistan Military Officers Seminar: A Study in Evolving National Security Strategy." The Pakistanis would not admit they had an insurgency problem. They would talk about terrorism and low-intensity conflict, but

any discussions of COIN had to deal with the American experience or other historical examples.

Over the next two years that changed, and the Pakistanis became very open about the very complex set of problems they faced. Perhaps that is why the title of the program changed to "U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue."[25] I probably learned more from them than they did from me. I have recently been brought back into the program by the NESA center and have found that the Pakistanis have evolved their own COIN doctrine. Like ours it recognizes the paramount importance of local legitimacy, but it also puts great emphasis on targeting enemy leadership. I am not surprised that the drone strikes in Pakistan continue despite some public protests, because those tactics seem to fit the Pakistani military's own preferences.

As I noted earlier, General Petraeus has asserted that the counterinsurgency era is not over because the insurgency era is not over, and that is especially true in Africa. I was invited to be part of an American team from the Army War College to travel to Nigeria to help that nation's equivalent institution improve its COIN curriculum.[26] When we arrived, we walked into a room with representatives from all levels of military education; they asked us to help revamp their whole system, which they admitted was failing them in dealing with their current problems, especially Boko Haram. Despite much experience in peacekeeping, they apparently had no lessons-learned process or after-action reviews on file. Though Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, with over 170 million people, it has an army of less than 100,000, with a very blunt, kinetic focus on military operations and very little interagency support from the rest of government, which itself is plagued by corruption. Frankly, Nigeria's path of reform is a daunting one, and as of this writing progress has not been particularly impressive.

Contributors to the new NATO Partnership for Peace COIN Curriculum being drafted in Budapest, Hungary, came from the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, and the Baltic Defense College. NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE CONSORTIUM

At about the same time, I was asked to participate in an effort by the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC) to develop an exportable COIN curriculum for nations pursuing closer relations with NATO. The goal was to provide a program of instruction to improve interoperability with such forces in NATO operations. The first meeting of the writing team was held in Tallinn, Estonia, in January 2015, with representatives from France, Germany, Hungary, the United States, and the host Baltic Defense College. Later gatherings occurred in Budapest, Vienna, Potsdam, and Paris. I was told by senior personnel that there was a great demand for the COIN curriculum, a reinforcement of General Petraeus' opinion of the perseverance of the problem set. That became evident to me when I was asked to come to Moldova and spend a whole week at their Military Academy of the Armed Forces giving instruction on COIN to all levels of their professional military education system. Russian incorporation of subversion and insurgency into the array of methods used against Ukraine has caught the attention of all of Eastern Europe. What struck me most about trying to develop readings from existing doctrine to explain the

requirements for COIN was that our 2006 FM 3-24 remains the best beginner's manual. NATO doctrine, while useful and influenced heavily by the American and British models, tends to be general, and it has to deal with many national caveats. The American doctrine as currently revised is written for a force that has been engaged in COIN for a decade. Some sections of the original field manual, such as building host-nation security forces, are now covered in separate manuals, not the current 3-24. Due to assumptions about acquired knowledge, explanatory sections in the newer American COIN manuals tend to be shorter, and some subjects have been dropped altogether. I think our short chapter on campaign design remains the most concise explanation anywhere. The list of tasks for lines of operation, detailed explanation of intelligence preparation of the COIN battlefield (or COIN "environment," as the British call it), and even the chapters on building security forces and logistics provide essential guidance for forces unfamiliar with such operations, and they don't exist anywhere else in one volume. Many participants at the first PfPC writer's meeting had copies of the University of Chicago Press edition with them. Our work may have more longevity than I expected, even though finally replaced as it was by a new version.[27]

New Doctrine and New Policies

While the practice of COIN remains a growth industry in some parts of the world, it no longer is in the United States. Nevertheless, some promising initiatives have been sparked by the publication of FM 3-24, and the enthusiasm it engendered had some lasting implications. I have mentioned the military's adoption of the Human Terrain System and campaign design. One of the most remarkable approaches inspired by the manual came from a couple of officers from the Joint Staff J-8 Warfighting Analysis Division, Col. Walter Barge, USA, and Capt. Brett Pierson, USN, who endeavored to use lines of effort and their outcomes to create a computer model of irregular warfare in 2008.[28] Using various methods of systems dynamic modeling, they constructed a very complex system in which inputs such as development investment, troop training, security perceptions, and civilian casualties all create changes in popular support for each side in the conflict.

I collaborated with them in writing an explanatory article, “The Hairball That Stabilized Iraq,” an allusion to the appearance of the intricate final PowerPoint slide in a sequence attempting to show the building of a four-dimensional model within the limitations of that presentation mode. One sophisticated intelligence website calls Barge’s and Pierson’s work “righteous brilliant good stuff.”[29] Indeed it was.

Captain Pierson was asked to assist General McChrystal with an adjusted “hairball” model for his reassessment of strategy in Afghanistan. That produced another bit of bad journalism, when a copy of the final Afghanistan “hairball” showed up in the *New York Times* in an article ridiculing PowerPoint.[30] The image was not designed simply to show “the complexity of military strategy” as the article implies. One cannot really understand that slide without seeing the dozen or so steps necessary to build it. It was designed as the last entry of a large slide deck showing the building of a four-dimensional computer model to help determine required resources for the right outputs in Afghanistan. Yet no one involved with the article took the trouble to ask any questions about the background of the slide or the real purpose of the model it depicted.

A promising initiative at higher levels of government was Janine Davidson’s launch of the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) in 2008, when she became its director under the auspices of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. She asked me to serve on its advisory board. It was described as “a growing network of civilian and military educators, trainers and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to improving education and training for counterinsurgency, stability & reconstruction operations, and irregular warfare.” Its goal was “to enhance the U.S. Government’s ability to prepare for stability operations, counterinsurgency and irregular warfare” by linking “educators and trainers across government and civilian institutions” to “catalyze cooperation for curriculum development and knowledge sharing within the complex operations community of practice.” The new term “complex operations” was supposed to encompass all those other categories, and the CCO Support Center was supposed to use an actively managed web portal to facilitate coordination and synchronization of all activities in those areas within DoD, the State Department, and USAID. That was a grand idea,

designed to outmaneuver competing bureaucracies and overcome semantic obfuscation while achieving true unity of effort throughout the whole of government.[31] Unfortunately, as in all other such integrative efforts, the bureaucracy won out. The new overarching term was never widely accepted, and Janine eventually moved on to a position in academia, then to the Council on Foreign Relations. While CCO remains in existence at NDU, renamed less ambitiously the Center for Complex Operations, it has never achieved anything near her initial vision.



The last slide in a large deck of graphics portraying a computer model to measure, in terms of FM 3-24's lines-of-operation framework, the impact of individual actions on popular support during COIN. It is built upon the interdependency and interaction of the various lines of effort. It and spin-offs have been used out of context to criticize military "PowerPoint thinking" about COIN. Actually, however, it is merely a poor two-dimensional image meant to be part of a bigger presentation explaining a much more complex mechanism.

My involvement with FM 3-24 also led to increased involvement with intelligence agencies. Its success led a colonel working for my classmate Gen. Keith Alexander, chief of the National Security Agency, to ask me to

help develop a *Commander's Cyber Handbook* for U.S. Cyber Command, which the general also headed. While that effort never came to fruition, I did learn enough to give me a healthy respect for the complexities of the cyber domain and to become very skeptical about the exorbitant expectations of cyber proponents.[32] More productive was my work with the CIA. In a chance to repay that agency for the useful inputs it had provided to me in 2006, I was able to contribute a little to the rewriting in 2012 of its excellent *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, a truly first-rate pamphlet on how to understand and assess that phenomenon.[33]

I have also been invited to participate in a number of gatherings of the Insurgency Board at RAND; that board, also supported by the CIA, features the most up-to-date research. In June 2012 I provided commentary for excellent presentations about the impact of the Internet and new social media on insurgency and the "Arab Spring" by Steve Metz and Dave Kilcullen.[34] Afterward we were all invited out to the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, for dinner with the director, Dave Petraeus. We gathered in a spectacular dining room down the hall from his office, overlooking a sea of trees. While the food was delicious and the discussion cordial, I could not help but contrast it with the boisterous camaraderie of the meal I remembered with his staff in his palace in Baghdad in 2007. Afterward, as everyone was leaving, he asked me to come into his office. We talked for over an hour, mostly about our days as cadets back at West Point but also about how proud he was of his new organization.

As I was driving back to Carlisle up Route 270 that night, it struck me that it is lonely at the top and that Dave Petraeus seemed a very lonely man. I wished I had stayed and exchanged more stories. It is regrettable that he could not have taken some of his inner circle with him to his CIA staff. Being CIA director was very different from commanding MNF-I or CENTCOM. I suspect that isolation contributed to the affair that brought his resignation in November. The scandal not only cost the government one of its most gifted leaders but denied supporters of counterinsurgency and associated approaches their most visible and eloquent spokesman at a time when the movement was fragmenting and its influence waning.

That negative trend was very evident from the efforts to rewrite the 24-series doctrinal manuals. In both Army and joint cases the decision was

made to take a different tack from that of the previous version. The joint publication was redone by a committee in 2013, pretty much on schedule. Though Jon Klug was teaching at the Naval Academy and readily available, he was never consulted on the revision, and much of his stamp is gone. The new edition adds a new chapter on assessment and changes the definition of counterinsurgency to "comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes." No one paid much attention when it appeared, though the new publication clearly shows the impact of a decade of American learning about COIN.

The new FM 3-24 took a longer and more circuitous route. We knew we had only a partial solution and initially expected revision after four years, as was the case for the joint publication. But the rewrite effort could never quite get started. Initially Klug was going to head the writing team for CADD, but when Lt. Gen. William Caldwell left the Combined Arms Center to take command of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan in late 2009, he took Jon with him. Eventually the task was assigned to the COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime, a new pope had rearranged the catechism. The Army doctrinal system had been given a whole new structure, with short capstone "Army doctrine publications" at the top of the hierarchy and field manuals farther down and less important. Consequently, the new FM 3-24 was to be almost completely redone.

My expectation had been that the manual we had written would remain the basis for any revision, and I had been keeping a file of additions and deletions that I thought needed to be made. I participated in some early surveys from CADD and the COIN Center that asked about what needed to be incorporated in a new manual, but I had no role in creating the draft that was circulated in 2012. I did not let that bother me, deciding that this was no longer my manual anymore and that it would be good to have someone else look at the problem set. Also, many of the topics we had covered were now included in manuals of their own that had not existed in 2006. Because of the new doctrinal structure this draft was focused at a lower level than the original, dealing primarily with how a battalion would conduct clear-hold-build and transition operations; it retained very little of the 2006 content. My initial impressions were not positive. In my view, the new draft

needed more emphasis on population control and disaggregating enemies, and it went too far in treating all insurgencies as Maoist and monolithic.

Borrowing upon our writing model, the current team scheduled a vetting conference for the draft at Fort Leavenworth in May, with the goal of publishing the finished product in the first half of 2013. I was invited to the FM 3-24 Revision Conference, to give a presentation about the creation of the original manual and then participate in any way I saw fit. This conference was set up differently than ours had been. It had a few plenary panels to provide background, after which participants had to pick one of seven working groups to attend, whereas we had kept everyone together. For me, the most notable aspect of the conference program was that the organizers had mixed up my picture with that of Richard Lacquement; I think I got the better of that. While the conference again featured widespread representation from throughout the services and civilian government agencies, the “B teams” had been sent instead of the “A teams” that had attended the 2006 gathering. There were also no media representatives there, and we all had to sign a nondisclosure agreement about the conference content that would be in effect until the new FM was published. Obviously someone was sensitive about publicity. I did not recognize anyone except a few CADD personnel. I did manage to get a few minutes with the writers, to present them with most of my remaining pieces of coprolite, but again I think my gesture failed to make much of an impression.

I could attend only the first half of the meeting, but that was enough to realize there was considerable discontent about the draft. Part of that problem resulted from the plenary sessions. The key presenters for the panel that was supposed to explain why the rewrite was so different from the original could not attend, and late substitutes failed to provide a very clear explanation. Consequently, as I wandered amongst the working groups, I heard countless complaints about items now left out that had been in the 2006 manual. The Marines there were especially concerned about the loss of higher operational focus. I left with the impression that they were going to take a much more active role in reshaping the postconference product. I also came away convinced that our decision to let all conference attendees

comment on all parts of the manual had been the right way to go, despite the difficulties in managing so many smart people in one venue.[35]

The final outbrief to discuss progress and points of contention was scheduled to be given to Lt. Gen. David Perkins, commander of the Combined Arms Center, and Lt. Gen. Richard Mills, commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, on 11 May 2012. I am not sure what the generals heard, but they must have come to conclusions similar to mine. In mid-July I received an invitation from Lieutenant General Perkins to attend an "FM 3-24 Community of Interest Working Group" in Crystal City, Virginia, on 1 August. We were provided advance copies of the draft manual, which had changed some since May, and told to come with lists of changes we thought necessary.

That four-hour meeting was one of the most productive and intellectually stimulating that I have ever experienced. Other attendees included Clint Ancker, Frank Hoffman, Greg Jaffe, John Nagl, T. X. Hammes, and some very sharp Army and Marine colonels, as well as some of the manual authors. Kalev Sepp connected in via video teleconference. The generals listened to everything we said, and members of the writing team took copious notes. I came in with many pages of comments. My main suggested additions involved more and clearer emphasis on legitimacy, better illustrations of lines of effort, more discussion about disaggregating enemies and influencing friends with differing interests, more on development and strategic narrative, less on Mao, and continuing emphasis on learning and adapting. I actually prefer the British construct of "learn-adapt-anticipate," but I wanted to support John Nagl's theme from 2006.

I felt very good after that session, from which the new FM, finally published almost two years later, clearly benefited.[36] In the end, so much of that original material got reinstated that the manual probably ended up with about the same content as it would have if the writers had started building from the old version. The new FM does much better than ours did discussing alternatives to clear-hold-build, but we probably still have not reached any sort of "blitzkrieg" for COIN, as Dave Kilcullen once observed. I am not sure we ever will, or can. Irregular warfare is designed to avoid any quick solutions; the swift (albeit hard-won) turnaround in Iraq was ahistorical in that regard.

In the meantime, the American stability/COIN community continues to fragment. I recently talked with Beth Cole, now an administrator with USAID, who complained to me about continuing semantic obfuscation and bureaucratic stovepipes and about a battle over scarce funds amongst communities that should be allies.[37] The COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth established under Lieutenant General Petraeus has closed. At a lower level of activity, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance he established there survives, a reflection of the contemporary importance of foreign internal defense if we are not going to do stability/COIN ourselves. The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute continues to stay busy, but its most useful work is done for the United Nations and international organizations. We seem to have returned to the conditions and attitudes of 2000. I am again hearing senior generals state that irregular missions are lesser included skill sets of conventional operations. I can only hope all those copies of FM 3-24 won't get too dusty before they have to be taken off the shelves again.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Final Musings

Observations on the Long War

Perhaps the most underrated general in American history is Matthew B. Ridgway. He demonstrated rare competence at all three levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic—during World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War. After achieving one of the greatest examples of transformational leadership in modern times with his reforms in the U.S. Eighth Army in 1951 and driving communist forces out of most of South Korea, he was rewarded by assignment as Douglas MacArthur's replacement as Commander in Chief, Far East and also of the United Nations command there. When peace talks began that summer, he struggled to find ways to influence communist negotiators with regard to key sticking points dealing with reinforcements of units in Korea and repatriation of prisoners of war. Facing restrictions about expanding ground operations, he decided to use his Far East Air Forces in a campaign of strikes and interdiction to coerce enemy concessions. For a variety of reasons his approach failed, and when Ridgway left the Far East to become Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in 1952 he took with him a healthy skepticism for the decisiveness of airpower in unconventional situations and a realistic view of the resource requirements for American success in Asian interventions.[1]

These would both come into play after he became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1953. The next year Gen. Paul Ely, Chief of Staff of the French armed forces, came to Washington to solicit American air support for his beleaguered forces at Dien Bien Phu. On 22 March, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Arthur Radford, hosted a barbecue at his home for Ely and senior American officials, including Vice President Richard Nixon and the service chiefs. When Radford asked Ely if he just needed more airpower for success in Indochina, Ridgway challenged the assertion before the Frenchman could even reply, noting, as he later recalled, that "the experience of Korea, where we had complete domination of the air and a far more powerful air force, afforded no basis for thinking that some additional air power was going to bring decisive results on the ground." Realizing that Radford wanted to support the French request, Ridgway immediately launched a campaign to isolate and counter the chairman. To support his position Ridgway mobilized the other service chiefs, including Gen. Nathan Twining of the Air Force; sent a study team to Southeast Asia to look at support facilities and combat conditions; and prepared a detailed briefing outlining the requirements in troops and time that would really be required to defeat the Viet Minh in Indochina.[2]

At Haneda Air Base in Japan in April 1951 Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and Maj. Gen. Doyle Hickey watch Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway in his first interview as the newly appointed commander in chief of United Nations Forces in Korea, replacing Gen. Douglas MacArthur. UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

He eventually wrangled an opportunity to present his briefing to the National Security Council, with President Dwight D. Eisenhower in attendance. A summary of his prescient arguments, which have since been characterized as “ten divisions and ten years,” later appeared in *U.S. News and World Report*. Key members of Congress demanded as a prerequisite for our intervention British participation that was never going to occur, and it is unclear whether Eisenhower ever really intended to intervene, but Ridgway’s dissent could have had an effect on any or all of these. Though American and French talks on intervention continued after the fall of Dien

Bien Phu, no serious plans resulted. Ridgway later wrote of his role, “When the day comes for me to face my Maker and account for my actions, the thing I would be most humbly proud of was the fact that I fought against, and perhaps contributed to preventing, the carrying out of some harebrained tactical schemes that would have cost the lives of thousands of men. To that list of tragic incidents that fortunately never happened I would add the Indo-China intervention.”[3]

In an insightful article on leadership written in 1966, Ridgway cautioned that fighting against “harebrained schemes” advocated by superiors has its risks, that dissenters must be prepared to accept possible career costs. In his case, his outspoken ways and less-than-enthusiastic support for “New Look” defense policies that devalued ground forces led to his early retirement in 1955, when his appointment as Chief of Staff was not renewed. Consequently, when the possibility of American combat involvement in Indochina loomed again a decade later, he was an outsider; to discourage another Asian intervention predicated on exorbitant expectations for airpower he had to resort to writing a memoir about the Korean War.[4]

Ridgway watched what I am sure he considered an inevitable escalation of the U.S. role in Vietnam with much trepidation. In 1969 an Army War College student, Lt. Col. Gerald Gibbs Jr., wrote the general a letter requesting assistance with a research project dealing with counterinsurgency. Ridgway’s thoughtful reply merits careful consideration today as much as it did then; it is given here with his original capitalization but with bullets supplied for clarity:

> Dear Colonel Gibbs,
> I doubt that my views will be of much, if any, assistance, but for what they are worth, they follow.
>
> Basic to the whole area you are examining are, I think, certain fundamentals, the thrust of which should dictate extreme care in any future US involvement with military force in counter-insurgency operations. Some of these might be phrased as follows:

- Identify what are and what are not our VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.
- Commit armed forces only in a situation that lies clearly within the zone of those interests, and where all other means offer little or no hope of being effective.
- Recognize that the world has radically altered since the days of "gunboat diplomacy," or when, as in the case of Great Britain in the 19th century, a small military commitment might be rewarded with large national gains.
- Reject any political involvement that might gradually commit us to military efforts that could jeopardize our basic security or those vital national interests which can not be compromised.

In short, the era we have recently entered is not likely to offer much, if any compensation for military intervention. The primary effort should be to seek a political solution.

I think your preliminary conclusions, as generalizations, are persuasive. But in the practically unlimited complexities of international relations now and for the foreseeable future, it would be wise to avoid rigidity.

Good luck with your Research Project.[5]

Perhaps that is the guidance that should have been presented in the interagency counterinsurgency guide, but his cautions apply beyond counterinsurgency (although he does not, of course, address what should be done if no acceptable political solution is found or available). The historical reality of American overseas interventions is that long-term military presence is always required to ensure the accomplishment of national goals. While it must be remembered that we did not expect to end up with messy insurgencies in either Afghanistan or Iraq, policy makers and military leaders should have been ready for long missions, especially once political leaders set goals for some sort of democratic transition. In an interview that caught my attention in late 2003, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, demonstrated the ahistorical incongruity of administration goals for Iraq. Declaring that establishing democracy there

would deal terrorism a “terrible blow,” in that “an Arab country will have been turned from a brutal dictatorship into a prosperous country where people enjoy freedoms much like we enjoy,” he also stated, “we do not want to wind up in Iraq like in Bosnia where eight years after the conflict, U.S. troops and troops from other countries are still there.”[6]

It took thirty years for South Korea to become a truly functional democracy. Despite President William Clinton’s promise we would be out of Bosnia in six months, U.S. and NATO forces are still keeping the peace in the Balkans twenty years later.[7] Gian Gentile has made a similar argument to discourage all such foreign excursions, but some of them have indeed been in pursuit of those vital national interests Ridgway described and have been worth the effort and resources expended. The long-term presences in Europe and Korea are the best examples. If one agrees with writers like Steven Pinker who perceive a trend toward a more peaceful world since the end of the Cold War, at least some of that change has to be accredited to the 500 percent increase in the pace of American military contingency operations.[8] At the same time, the Western allies we have usually relied on for assistance, like the British, have significantly reduced their own military capacities. Future American presidents trying to rein in such interventions may have some hard choices to make, involving consideration of how much chaos we are willing to accept in the world, and where.

Some Observations

For more than a decade, I have been recording reflections about the course of the “long war” launched after the tragic events of 9/11. These are based on many remarkable experiences: being the recorder for the 2002 Army after-action review on Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle, developing prewar Army plans to reconstruct Iraq, serving as lead author for the 2006 version of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency, visiting Iraq in 2007 for Gen. David Petraeus, working on projects analyzing wartime assessment and war termination for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Army Training and Doctrine Command, and engaging in innumerable conversations with insightful

civilian and military veterans returned from the field. This accumulating commentary has also been shaped by many international travels and my own reading of history. Here are a few observations designed to provoke thought about where the American military has been and where it should be going.[9]

There are two approaches to warfare, asymmetric and stupid. I have been quoted on this topic a few times, and I need to expand upon it. All competent belligerents seek an edge in conflict. That can be achieved through new technology, superior numbers, or innovative tactics. No one has pursued such advantages, especially through technology and tactics, better than the United States; the American military today is the most asymmetric war-fighting machine in the world. That means that all those "asymmetric warfare" cells and centers scattered throughout DoD are really analyzing how *the rest of the world* fights. They would probably be better termed "uncomfortable warfare" centers, to borrow Max Manwaring's term, as they are really studying common ways of countering our advantages, counters that are outside our own preferences and often lie in the purview of nonstate actors.[10] We are deluding ourselves if we do not recognize the characteristic and unique ways and means of American warfare and the fairly commonplace and pervasive application of others' "asymmetric" approaches to oppose them.

Conflict termination has become even more difficult and thus outcomes even more uncertain. I was privileged to be a member of the team put together for General Dempsey when he, as TRADOC commander, was assigned the mission of analyzing how the United States ends its wars. The project produced a number of case studies and eventually a book.[11] One of its findings was that war aims and desired end states always change over time. That happens because wars always take on dynamics of their own, and both sides must agree on final conditions if hostilities are really going to cease. Sometimes vague objectives like "unconditional surrender" are enough to direct military actions, but even in World War II the final political end states for defeated enemies were not determined until the gunfire had stopped. As the United States enters contemporary conflicts with more partners and against adversaries that are often loose and shifting coalitions of nonstate actors, the number of players who can influence termination

expands greatly, as has the difficulty in enforcing any sort of agreed-on end state. Mosaic wars require a mosaic peace, the elements of which can vary significantly from village to village, region to region. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for in contemporary complex conflicts is to reduce violence to a tolerable level, rather than really concluding it. As General Petraeus has observed on a number of occasions, “The wars in which we have been engaged since the 9/11 attacks are not the kind that end with American soldiers taking the hill, planting the flag, and going home to a victory parade.”

Decapitation strategies are a two-edged sword. Conflict termination can be made even harder by the dedicated targeting of enemy leaders. An officer back from Afghanistan complained to me that sometimes when American forces had identified a “moderate” enemy commander to talk to as part of Petraeus’ campaign to engage the Taliban, that individual would be killed by a drone strike or SOF raid and then replaced by someone much more radical and implacable. Such attacks on enemy leadership have been an important part of military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in Pakistan. They do put pressure on leadership cadres and often remove talented adversaries. However, one should always consider how enemies will respond. Matthew Ridgway once wrote, in connection with relieving commanders for cause, that a primary consideration in such a decision is who is available as a replacement.[12] It makes sense that as serving as leaders becomes more risky for our enemies, those of more extreme views and dedication are most likely to step up. Many, if not most, insurgencies end up in some sort of accommodation reached by both sides. For that to happen, there must be someone on the other side who is willing and able to negotiate and has enough influence to be worth working with. In World War II, American leaders avoided bombing the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, because they believed the emperor would have an essential role in any process of surrender, and they were correct. Especially in conflicts where extremist ideology plays an important role, it may be advisable to protect more moderate or approachable enemy leaders, not target them. Admittedly, making such evaluations is not easy.

Legitimacy does not grow out of the barrel of an American gun. This twisted paraphrase of Mao means that while American military forces can

enforce a peace, they cannot by themselves create conditions for long-term success. We will always be fighting "away games," which will require that the host nation eventually become self-sustaining and its government achieve the necessary capabilities and legitimacy to maintain popular support. U.S. presence can actually interfere with that process, a reality that buttresses a key assumption behind recommendations for "small footprint" interventions. However, my own belief is that the best way to intervene is initially to use overwhelming force to establish firm control and impress everyone with our power. Then a drawdown can be quickly executed (albeit as conditions allow) to a reduced force level, leaving a lingering image of irresistible American power but allowing civilian agencies and the host government to exploit that window of stability to establish their programs. Going the other way if violence increases—that is, from a small footprint to a larger presence—is more likely to stoke resentment and hinder the growth of local legitimacy.

In COIN, the most important decisions are made by politicians, not generals. This might have been a better paradox than the one I included on my original list. The scope of American intervention, small or large, will be decided by our civilian leaders, ideally on the basis of military recommendations. In cases of regime change, such as in World War II or Iraq or Afghanistan, the form of government put in place will probably be chosen by politicians without any military input at all. New leaders of that government may be chosen the same way or selected by some sort of indigenous process. Those choices will determine the ultimate possibility for long-term success of the intervention. If the form of government does not fit the society or its designated leaders are so inept or corrupt that they cannot be accepted by the people, no amount of military prowess can salvage success.

In irregular conflicts, you must be able to disaggregate your friends as well as your enemies. Because of the importance of indigenous leadership in achieving legitimacy at all levels, American forces must understand those leaders very well. I was quite impressed with that sort of intelligence in Iraq. You must understand the conflicts and currents within a society, and the motivations of those who lead it and those who follow. Government abuses and incompetence are often sources of the grievances that fuel unrest. Being a balancer is no easy task, but insurgencies normally end with

some sort of political compromise, and Americans might have to broker it. Just as counterinsurgents need to know which enemy they can negotiate with and which they have to kill or capture, they also need to know which "friend" they can trust and depend on and which they cannot. Even the best of partners are bound sometimes to pursue interests different from ours.

In irregular wars, if you think you are winning, you might be; if you think you are losing, you are. In a war of perceptions, attitudes are important. What the people think you have done is often more important than what you have actually accomplished. That you are convinced that you are winning does not mean that you are; if you think you are losing, however, and that attitude is transmitted to your host nation and coalition allies, that impression will affect them as well, and everyone will act accordingly. This is a call not for false optimism but for realism. Sometimes it is necessary to recognize failure, especially in a mosaic war, where results will vary from place to place. Assessments and reports are best disaggregated by region, recognizing good and bad. Sometimes the result hangs in the balance, and no one is winning. I have never agreed with the dictum that insurgents are winning if they are not losing; they too have to show progress to sustain support. Time is really neutral. Counterinsurgents have more resources than insurgents do and can wear them down, and that happens at least as often as insurgents outlasting their foes.

Precision targeting is not always the answer. Since its inception, airpower has always been a key component of American applications of military force to resolve conflicts, and it has become our greatest asymmetric advantage in major combat operations. The U.S. Air Force has doggedly pursued the ideal of precision bombing since the 1930s and has achieved truly remarkable levels of accuracy. But in exhibits of military museums of former enemies about American war fighting, the dominant theme is massed airpower. Hanoi even has a separate "Museum to the Victory over the B-52." Obviously there are certain propaganda angles that can be exploited from that perspective, but discussions with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Iraqi veterans reveal the persistent power of such images. One of the key motivators that drove so many Iraqi soldiers to go home in 2003 was their memory of B-52s in 1991. Leaflets displaying those aircraft dropping scores of bombs were used to intimidate the Serbs during Operation Allied Force over Kosovo. The deterrent impact of such

operations should not be ignored. During the writing of FM 3-24 in 2006, the proposed imperative of “Use the Minimum Level of Force” was finalized as “Use the Appropriate Level of Force,” because of the realization that sometimes one really needs to hammer an enemy to make an impression. That impact may reverberate for many years, in the minds of not only the targeted adversary but those of many potential ones as well. When I am giving a presentation and some in my audience appear uninterested, I have been known to opine, “It is worth pondering if perhaps it would be best if we dropped a nuclear weapon on someone every fifty years or so, just to remind potential enemies that we do that sort of thing.” That always gets everyone’s attention—and I am only half-joking.

Who controls the ground controls the message. Despite the strength of American airpower, our real and potential adversaries have developed many ways to counter our asymmetric airpower edge, and not just with expensive anti-access technology. These other approaches include “lawfare”—the push for international legal restrictions on uses of force most commonly employed by the United States—as well as deft information campaigns to cause public backlash against perceived atrocities. As we have found in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, one of the drawbacks of “long range precision strike,” whether by special operations forces or drones, is that whoever controls the ground in the aftermath controls how the media spin the results. America’s enemies have become adept at quickly producing images of destroyed mosques and dead children supposedly resulting from such missions but often in fact from other, unrelated (or fictional) incidents. The results of investigations that may clear American forces of wrongdoing appear too many news cycles later to change the accepted narrative.

SƠ ĐỒ QUI HOẠCH KHU VỰC XÂY DỰNG
CÔNG TRÌNH BẢO TÀNG CHIẾN THẮNG B.52
ĐỊA ĐIỂM : PHƯỜNG NGỌC HÀ - PHƯỜNG ĐỘI CẤN
QUẬN BA ĐÌNH - HÀ NỘI
CƠ QUAN QUYẾT ĐỊNH ĐẦU TƯ : ỦY BAN NHÂN DÂN THÀNH PHỐ HÀ NỘI
CHỦ ĐẦU TƯ : QUÂN KHU THỦ ĐÔ HÀ NỘI
+ GIẤY PHÉP SỬ DỤNG ĐẤT SỐ : 1921/UB - XDCB NGÀY 28 - 9 - 1992 CỦA UBND THÀNH PHỐ HÀ NỘI CẤP.
+ GIẤY PHÉP XÂY DỰNG SỐ : 875.12 - 94 GP/KTST NGÀY 3 - 12 - 1994 CỦA KIẾN TRÚC SƯ TRƯỞNG THÀNH PHỐ HÀ NỘI CẤP.
A
B
DỰNG CÔNG TRÌNH (4567M2)
LÀM VỈA HÈ (3053 M2)
BẢO TÀNG CHIẾN THẮNG B.52
THE MUSEUM OF VICTORY OVER B-52 WAS
KHÁNH THÀNH (GIAI ĐOẠN I) NGÀY 22 - 12 - 1997
NỘI DUNG TRƯNG BÀY
* TẦNG 1 :
+ TRUYỀN THỐNG LLVT THỦ ĐÔ QUA CÁC THỜI KỲ LỊCH SỬ
* TẦNG 2 :
+ HÀ NỘI CHIẾN ĐẤU VÀ CHIẾN THẮNG
+ SA BÀN TỔNG HỢP : DIỄN BIẾN TRẬN "ĐIỆN BIÊN PHỦ TRÊN KHÔNG"
* NGOÀI TRỜI :
+ CÁC VŨ KHÍ, KHÍ TÀI LẬP CÔNG CỦA QUÂN VÀ DÂN THỦ ĐÔ TRONG CUỘC CHIẾN ĐẤU CHỐNG CHIẾN TRANH PHÁ HOẠI CỦA ĐẾ QUỐC MỸ
+ XÁC MÁY BAY B.52 XẾP ĐẶT THEO HÌNH DẠNG (THÂN DÀI 48,07 M ; SẢI CÁNH 56,42M)
THE EXHIBITS INCLUDE :
* ON LEVEL 1 :
+ TRADITIONS OF THE CAPITAL CIY'S ARMED FORCES THROUGHOUT DIFFERENT HISTORICAL PERIODS
* ON LEVEL 2 :
+ HANOI'S STRUGGLES AND VICTORIES
+ AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF THE BATTLE PROGRESS "DIEN BIEN PHU IN SPACE"
* OUT DOORS :
+ WEAPONS AND OTHER KINDS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT EMPLOYED BY HANOI ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE AMERICAN SABOTAGING WAR
+ DEBRIS OF THE WARPLANE B.52 WITH (48,07 M IN LENGTH AND WING RANGE OF 56,42M)

This 2002 billboard at a Hanoi museum proclaims victory in a "Dien Bien Phu of the air" against American B-52s involved in the Christmas bombing of Operation Linebacker II. AUTHOR

SOF has succumbed too much to the lure of direct action. Some of the blame the U.S. Air Force has taken for collateral civilian casualties really belongs to special operations forces. I have described the example I witnessed in Iraq. There has been a reversal of roles in this respect during the last decade within DoD. In counterinsurgency, stability operations, and even most advisory missions, conventional forces have become the primary executors. When particularly important enemies are to be killed or captured, SOF gets that mission. Before 9/11, SOF were deployed in eighty-four countries, shaping the security environments as trainers and global scouts.[13] The demands of GWOT have skewed deployments and focus considerably. There are many reasons for the new emphasis on direct action, but SOF must also retain their traditional capabilities in other areas and shore up their global scouting capabilities.

Foreign internal defense (FID) will be a future mission of considerable importance for DoD, but nobody wants to do it. If special operations forces are not going to devote themselves to FID (though that task should not be optional), the responsibility will fall on conventional forces (as it will to some degree in any such mission of large size, given limits on SOF availability at any given time). The force structure for FID is top-heavy,

requiring experienced and senior personnel to train and advise, the exact opposite of Army plans for "grade-plate reductions" to save money. Nevertheless, all services have a role. Airpower can be an asymmetric advantage for any nation we want to help, but Air Force FID is an entirely different mission than it is for ground forces, requiring many special skills and a unique mind-set. For many nations, the Coast Guard can provide important FID expertise. In constrained fiscal times, with increasing threats to our own borders and a perception that conventional capabilities need to be restored, FID commitments are a hard sell.

We need more cyberskeptics. One mission set that has widespread support involves cyber capabilities. I have heard both the secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that increasing these will compensate for other force reductions. However, I believe that we must do better in managing our cyber expectations. Working with the National Security Agency, I have developed four realities of the cyber realm that need to be acknowledged:

1. The more capabilities that you have, the more vulnerabilities you have.
2. There is no economy of force concerning abundant electrons in cyberspace—there is an unlimited supply.
3. You cannot defend everything successfully all the time.
4. Once you have fired a cyberbullet, you have proliferated it.

The implications of these truths, combined with continuing legal and jurisdictional disputes between competing agencies, as well as in Congress and the courts, ensure that American offensive cyber capabilities, especially against sophisticated enemies, will and should always be centralized and restrained, while defenses will always be vulnerable. Success in the cyber realm will depend upon redundancy and resiliency. We had better retain the ability to fight unplugged, much more so than we are doing now.

Modern social media can "swarm" disruption but not control. One sector of the information realm that has already shown its potential for major impact on states are the new social media, which played such an important role in mobilizing dissent during the "Arab Spring." But swarms

can be swatted, and even if that does not happen, the temporary coalitions that prove capable of bringing down governments will probably be unable to organize to replace them. In Egypt's case, forces with established political structures in place, like the Muslim Brotherhood, or those with guns, like the Egyptian army, seized control. The course of the Arab Spring also showed increasing adaptations by targeted regimes, most notably Syria, to deal with the disruptions from such media mobilizations. It appears that the new phenomenon will just add another factor to the forces of entropy already extant in the world.

We have never been able to "never do this again." Despite the best intentions, those forces of entropy have always been hard to escape for the United States. Woodrow Wilson pledged to keep us out of World War I. Lyndon Johnson said he would limit our involvement in Southeast Asia. Bill Clinton stated that American stabilization forces would be gone from the Balkans within six months. One of George W. Bush's campaign pledges was to reduce commitments to peacekeeping and nation building. The 2012 Defense Planning Guidance says the United States will avoid large land-force commitments and, by extension, any major military action, in favor of other tools and approaches.[14] History implies that some crisis somewhere will override that desire.

"Mission creep" is a self-inflicted wound. When that unexpected crisis occurs, the American military will again find itself performing traditionally nonmilitary missions. When I describe the U.S. government to foreign officers at the Army War College, I tell them to envision a fiddler crab with one large claw labeled "DoD" and a small claw labeled "the mythical interagency." That's a bit harsh, I admit, but the fact still remains that there are more musicians in DoD than foreign service officers in the State Department. Civilian agencies do not have the capacity, capability, or culture to meet all requirements laid on them in complex contingency deployments, especially in violent environments. Efforts to make meaningful reform have foundered on bureaucratic and budgetary obstacles; meanwhile, in "wars amongst the people" their missions must still get done, and only the military can fill in.

People are not terrain. One of the spin-offs from the ideas generated by the effort to create FM 3-24 was the establishment of human terrain teams,

built around special expertise provided by members who were anthropologists or other social scientists. There has been some fierce opposition from anthropologists about the creation of a "military-anthropology complex" that threatens to taint the reputation of apolitical neutrality their research requires. The military is going to pursue sociocultural intelligence with or without professional help, however, and I believe that pioneers like Dr. Montgomery McFate should be commended for their assistance in helping the military to do things better. Still, I also have been uneasy with the teams; I fear they have made the anthropologists seem more important than the anthropology. In geography, hills and rivers are standardized enough that any geographer can provide competent intelligence. But just earning a PhD studying a particular tribe in Papua, New Guinea, does not make someone able to understand the Pushtuns in Afghanistan better than a soldier or Marine who has lived with them for six months. Nor does it mean such specialists will be well suited to working with the military or communicating their insights in an operationally relevant fashion. The most adept sociocultural briefings I heard in Iraq came from soldiers and Marines who had probably conducted enough field research of their own (although they wouldn't call it that) to earn a PhD back at a civilian university. People are much more complex than any terrain feature and much more changeable. It takes long periods of direct contact to begin to understand them. I am actually pleased that the Army recently decided to curtail the human terrain team program.

We are still fighting one-year wars. At a War College Strategy Conference a few years ago, I challenged David Kilcullen's claim that unit rotations would solve all the problems that individual rotations had caused in Vietnam. (As noted above—see chapter 8—the individual replacement system there was blamed for fostering a lack of unit cohesion and continuity, with soldiers constantly flowing in and out on twelve-month tours, creating disjointed units with personnel of varying expertise and motivation.) I failed to change his mind, but I remain convinced that we have just exchanged one set of transition problems for another. In stability operations and COIN, long-term presence is critical to establish the personal relationships essential for cultural understanding and political influence. I think that the individual rotation policies employed in Vietnam were actually better suited for such conflicts. The Military History Institute

of the Army Heritage and Education Center holds a vast collection of after-action reports from the war in Southeast Asia. Units established themselves for years in the same zone, getting to know every village, every infiltration route, every key person. There was no need for transitional handoffs of intelligence and relationships with local populations, who came to know the units in their midst very well. Unit rotations may mean better unit cohesion and, perhaps, better performance, but one still sees an arc of capability that peaks in the middle of tours, that rises and declines with learning and fatigue curves. There can be complete breakdowns in handoffs. The worst case I saw was in Iraq in 2007, which I have described earlier, where a new CJSOTF decided to revert to the unconventional warfare campaign it had been waging on its last tour there rather than continue the counterinsurgency of the Surge its immediate predecessor had been pursuing. The CJSOTFs were really fighting seven-month wars, since that was their rotation schedule. The Marines appeared to have a better system, deploying smaller units back and forth to the same places in constant divisional sectors, even if tours are only six or seven months.

Headquarters often "play the Super Bowl with pickup teams." Another way to provide continuity on the ground is through established headquarters, but no segment of our organizational structure is more abused or less appreciated. The first targets for force reductions are always headquarters. Almost invariably, cuts that seem fine in peacetime have to be made up quickly in crises, resulting in untrained and poorly coordinated staff teams at multiple levels. For example, when Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in 2001, the CENTCOM staff was authorized 1,254 personnel and was manned with even fewer, 1,199. It was quickly augmented with 1,246 personnel from all over the military to meet its demanding requirements. Some of those augmentees came from the CENTCOM's Army component headquarters (known as ARCENT/Third Army), which was already at the lowest possible authorized level of organization, with an insufficient structure to begin with. That headquarters then reached down into U.S. Army Forces Command (which provides troops for combatant commands) to get augmentation from the same subordinate tactical units that would soon be fighting in Afghanistan. Reserve call-ups of uneven quality also filled holes.[15] The pernicious ripple

effect of such grab-bag reinforcements is to create staffs with little experience or cohesion; it was this frustration that prodded a frustrated ARCENT participant at the August 2002 after-action review for Operation Enduring Freedom covered in Chapter 1 to offer the quote in the first sentence of this section.[16] One reason for the difficulties handling the growing insurgency in Iraq in 2003 was that the V Corps staff, which took over responsibilities for Joint Task Force 7, was inadequate for the myriad tasks it faced.[17] The complexity of contemporary warfare requires well trained and coordinated staffs capable of providing detailed planning and comprehensive intelligence at every level. That aspect of war fighting must be enhanced, not cut.

We do suffer from "infobesity," but we still don't have enough intelligence. Brigadier Hankinson's observation that our military forces are swamped with metrics is valid, and any historian digging through gigabytes of e-mail records will vouch that the accountability systems for electronic information are approaching overload. Having more data does not mean having better intelligence. Martin Van Creveld's superb book *Command in War* demonstrates that as warfare evolves the need for vital information continues to grow faster than the ability to gather and analyze it.[18] We tend to have lots of information from technology but not enough from human sources. Having plenty of overhead surveillance data does not mean we really know what is happening on the ground. Also, the mere fact that historians have gigabytes of electronic records does not guarantee to make them able to understand or explain what really occurred. This is a problem for the whole historical profession, not just the military. Archival procedures for paper sources are much more established than those for electronic ones. Many hard drives with important records from Afghanistan or Iraq were purged instead of stored, and electronic data degrade much faster than paper. Often there is too much information in files, such as thousands of unsorted e-mails, or too little, as results when a unit updates its operational briefing slides every day and only keeps the last set. So the information age presents us with two major problems: how to sort out and utilize the intelligence we need today from an overwhelming amount of available data, and how to preserve and mine those data for future insights.

It is time to reorganize our industrial-age Army. Since the days of John C. Calhoun, the idea of an easily expansible Army has always been a myth; however, because of the existence of a draft and a broad industrial base, as well as much time to react, the nation was able to build up adequate military forces to meet major nineteenth- and twentieth-century crises. Those implements no longer exist, meaning that it no longer makes sense to train every officer to be prepared to take on new responsibilities in an expanded force. We are truly in an era of "come as you are" wars, which is another reason the decline in military capability of our traditional allies is so alarming. In 2003 the British could surge a division-sized force and sustain a brigade. Today they can surge a brigade and sustain a battalion. For our Army, it is time to look at new career patterns and specialties. No area of the broad realm of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, or facilities has been more impervious to change during GWOT than our personnel system. Personnel policies and laws such as the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act need to be reexamined to allow long-term specialization, and the whole relationship of the Active and Reserve Components needs to be reconsidered as well. It is time to develop a true information-age force. At the same time, it must be realized that any cuts in the military services will be very hard to rebuild from domestic resources or supplement with allies in the future, a fact that allows contemporary decisions about military strength and force structure much less room for error than in the past.

We should all be COINfused. I am often asked if I am a "COINdinista," touting the transformational aspects of counterinsurgency. When I reply that I am not, the question becomes whether I consider myself a "COINtra," someone who believes that COIN is overemphasized and a distraction from more important conventional capabilities. I consider myself "COINfused," which critics will obviously take literally, but by which I mean a combination of the best of both schools. As we have learned the hard way during the last decade, just because you can do COIN does not mean that you should, and just because you say that you are executing COIN does not mean that you are. The ideas of operational campaign design first developed in FM 3-24 have now permeated all American doctrine, reflecting the complexities of contemporary warfare amongst the people and the necessity to pursue multiple integrated lines of effort in any military operation. Much

of what has been labeled as “counterinsurgency” is really just modern warfare. At the same time there is a requirement to maintain the overwhelming conventional capabilities that are the cornerstone of our security, assuring friends and deterring enemies. As the American military moves forward into an uncertain future, it needs to build on the insights gained from over a decade of war, not discard them or neglect them. It needs to continue the process of learning, adaptation, and anticipation that is the only real guarantee of success in future conflicts.

APPENDIX

The Army War College study team working on the plan to reconstruct Iraq prepared two versions: the long version described in detail in this book and a shorter version, which included mainly a detailed mission matrix. Realizing that the clock was ticking on the pending invasion, the study team wanted to get that task list to CENTCOM planners as quickly as possible, so the short version was distributed first, in January 2003. It was also handed out at the February 2003 conference with ORHA personnel (described in the text) at the Wilson Center, in Washington, D.C. Appendix A, the detailed matrix, remains the most comprehensive plan for rebuilding a state published anywhere.

RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

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U.S. Army War College

January 29, 2003

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Introduction.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years.[1] In contrast, LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a "dripping bag of manure" that no one else wanted to deal with.[2] Neither the Army nor Department of Defense had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.[3]

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Also, U.S. Army leaders and planners tend to focus on winning wars and not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives often can only be accomplished after the fighting has ceased, and it is possible to win a war and lose the peace.

With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operation eventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can be provided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination with them can be difficult.

In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously as possible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, and international civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders must accept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will take considerable manpower and money.

Challenges of a Military Occupation of Iraq.

The military occupation of Iraq will face a number of unique challenges rooted in the special circumstances and political culture of that country. If the war to defeat Saddam Hussein is short with limited civilian casualties, that task will be easier. Nevertheless, the issue of Western domination is of serious concern in the Arab World and a prolonged occupation of Iraq with U.S. forces may lead to especially acute problems with the Iraqi population as well as the wider Arab World. Moreover, the more detailed nuances of Iraqi political, ethnic, and culture activities are not well-understood by even the most informed U.S scholars, journalists, and officials.

Iraq political institutions have never been well-developed, and Iraq has a strong tradition of instability and violence in resolving political disputes. The instability was brought under control and violence institutionalized only after Saddam Hussein achieved power and established a regime of unprecedented brutality. Pre-Saddam instability may emerge in the aftermath of the dictator's removal. In particular, tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, and tribal communities are expected to complicate both the occupation and efforts to build a viable postwar government. Power-sharing among groups is a new and untested concept in Iraq that could well be subverted by elite political instincts to struggle for power before rivals achieve opportunities to consolidate their own gains. Also, while a struggle for power between civilian and military elites is possible and could contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the U.S. should recognize that the military is a national institution and one of the few forces for unity within the country.

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under most circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for its own purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront increasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes. The possibility of terrorism being directed against occupation forces probably will increase over time, and even a small number of terrorists can be expected to create serious problems for an occupation force. A popular uprising against U.S. troops is much less likely than a terrorist campaign, but is still possible if the occupation is poorly managed.

Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is consequently just as important as winning the war. Preparing for the postwar occupation of the Iraqi political system will probably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat.

A Mission Matrix for Iraq.

Based on relevant experience and an analysis of the current situation in Iraq, this study proposes a list of essential missions that must be performed to maintain a viable state and change the regime. The way such tasks fit in the overall campaign plan for possible operations in Iraq is illustrated by Figure 1.[4] They will be performed during a period of "Transition" that must begin while "Decisive Operations" are still ongoing. Transition will take many years, and for purposes of this study has been divided into four distinct phases. The first will encompass those requirements necessary to provide "Security," including separating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure. Functions in this phase will be almost solely the responsibility of coalition military forces, and it will take a few

months to move to the “Stabilize” phase. The timelines on the chart are approximate, and different mission categories are likely to progress at varying rates.



Figure 1.

The next phase for occupying forces will be to Stabilize the country. Security tasks will continue, but services will expand and begin to incorporate civilian agencies. Their involvement should become at least equal to that of coalition military forces once they start to “Build Institutions,” where the basis of the new Iraq will be firmly established. Eventually military forces will “Handover” all duties to Iraqi and international agencies, and the new regime will be ready to resume its proper place in the world community.

In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been more problematic for American military forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation of effort and process of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 2,[5] but in reality it normally looks more like Figure 3, where the handover is given directly to the local government. To limit the potential for any regional backlash from a perceived prolonged American military occupation, it is essential that civilian and international organizations assume coalition military responsibilities as soon as possible.



Figure 2.



Figure 3.

While recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan appear to indicate that civilian agencies are now better prepared to take over transition responsibilities from military forces, this should not be assumed for Iraq. Years of sanctions and neighbors with restrictive border policies have severely reduced the number of non-governmental organizations and international agencies prepared or positioned to enter Iraq. To facilitate participation of such groups and speed the reintegration of Iraq into the international community, sanctions and associated licensing requirements need to be removed as soon as possible, probably at the beginning of "Stabilization."[6]

Additionally, the haphazard and ad-hoc nature of civil-military organization and planning in Afghanistan has made many NGOs and IOs wary and hesitant to deal with the American military again. Some have been especially critical of what they perceive as the manipulation of humanitarian aid for political advantage, and a blurring of roles between NGOs and military civil affairs or special operations forces. The civilian agencies feel that if they become identified with military agendas their utility will be lessened and their personnel endangered.

Another factor that could further limit any civilian involvement in Iraq is the threat of biological or chemical weapons. No governmental, non-governmental, or international organization is trained or equipped to operate in such an environment, and most will not even go near an area where the use of such weapons is just rumored.

While some UN agencies and aid groups like CARE and the Jordan Red Crescent have begun to anticipate future requirements, little money will be available until a crisis erupts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received a 25 percent budget cut in 2002, and has had great difficulty getting preliminary support or financial commitments for Iraqi contingencies. Some donors who made pledges to Afghanistan have still not met those obligations, and the costs of reconstruction there were grossly underestimated. So, military planners would be wise not to assume too much support from civilian agencies,

especially those outside the U.S. government, for the early phases of Transition.[7] The United States should work to put together the broadest possible coalition to carry out combat operations, since that group will also inherit the immediate responsibility for Transition.

The Mission Matrix for Iraq (Appendix A) was constructed with these facts in mind.[8] The 135 essential tasks are grouped into 21 mission categories and arrayed across the four phases of Transition described above. Each column lists those agencies that should be involved in performing that task during a specific phase. The focus is on outside U.S. and international organizations. While Iraqi participation is not specifically stated except in a couple cases of special emphasis, it should be understood that local Iraqis will be involved as much as possible in each activity. That is why quickly establishing an effective personnel vetting process is so important.

It should also be noted that each task will proceed on a different timeline, determined by individual measures of success developed by planners. For instance, reestablishing the legal system in Category 3 might advance quickly into Stabilizing and Building Institutions, while the major security activities in Category 1 lag behind. Achievements might differ between regions, as well. Commanders and governors must be aware of the progress achieved in each task in each part of the country.

While the Mission Matrix appears complicated, the array of activities involved in rejuvenating Iraq and changing its regime will actually be even more complex. And leaders of the occupation must keep in mind the dangers of being too successful in supplying services. The final goal is to create an Iraqi state that can stand on its own, not one dependent on American or international aid.

While all 135 tasks will have to be accomplished to fully reestablish an Iraqi state, they are not all of primary concern for the commander of coalition military forces. Thirty-five are considered “critical.” If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure. The thirty-two “essential” tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission. The remaining sixty-eight “important” tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of non-military agencies. The rating of these tasks is valid whether there is a civilian or military governor of Iraq. They will have to be accomplished no matter who is in charge. We now summarize each Mission Category in more detail, paying particular attention to military roles. The categories themselves are not prioritized.

Major Security Activities. Most coalition combat forces will be occupied with these tasks for some time, though there will also be plenty to do for specialized units like Military Police. Considering the political aspects of an Iraqi occupation and the size of the forces required, military planners should not assume a major UN peacekeeping role. The U.S.-led coalition might be able to broaden its participation for tasks like training the new Iraqi Army, which eventually must be able to assume these security responsibilities. Part of this training program should include bringing selected Iraqi officers to the United States for special courses on how an army should function in a more democratic state. A long-term solution also requires creating a trustworthy and transparent new Iraqi government that will

live up to its international obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

Many long-term cautions should be considered in conducting these major security activities. In separating factions, coalition military forces must avoid the dangers of unplanned and escalating alienation of ethnic and religious groups such as the Israelis experienced during their occupation of Lebanon. That example also illustrates the previously noted problems that will grow if an occupation begins to be perceived as permanent.[9] Military commanders and forces must be clear from the beginning that they intend to leave as quickly as possible, they must demonstrate progress toward that end, and civilian organizations that accept a handover of responsibilities in turn must be clear that they aim to return control to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.

Public Administration. First priority in this mission category will be establishing viable local governments, relying as much as possible on existing institutions. Civil affairs units will be needed throughout the country to assist this process. Evaluating the trustworthiness and reliability of indigenous administrators will be important, and the effort should begin now to gather a body of regional experts, Americans and trusted Iraqis, who can make such judgments. National government will be developed in later phases of Transition, and while civil affairs can help with this task, the responsibility primarily will be with other agencies. All troops need to be aware of the importance of preserving public records, and this must be emphasized from the beginning of actual military operations.

Legal. While coalition military forces will pick up missions in this category as security is being established, overall responsibility should be passed fairly quickly to other agencies. However, commanders should be prepared to provide support for war crimes tribunals for a while, and depending on what system is decided upon for prosecution, military personnel might be involved with the actual trials. In regard to quickly reestablishing civilian courts, judges and lawyers from the Arab League might be available, though coordination for such augmentation should begin early.

Public Finance. The coalition military commander must be prepared to take necessary actions to keep the public finance system operating until civilian government agencies can take responsibility. Again, civil affairs units will be instrumental.

Civil Information. Information will be a key tool in gaining and maintaining the support of the Iraqi people. Coalition military forces will have to work promptly while security is being established to restore and maintain mass media to communicate around the nation, and to coordinate messages with whatever transition government exists. The initial priority for restoring capabilities must be given to government systems with wide range and newspapers with the largest circulation.

Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services. While it would be best to let the Iraqis control access to historic and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility for security of such places. Particular attention must be paid to religious and historic sites that have great importance; their damage or disruption could fan discontent or inspire violence, not just within Iraq but around the region. At the same time public access must be assured, especially to religious sites. The coalition military commander will have to delicately balance these competing requirements for security and access.

Public Safety. Coalition military forces will have to include a sufficient number of military police to perform law and order tasks until an international or trustworthy indigenous police force can be established in sufficient numbers. This may take some time. For example, it is estimated that training and deploying a new Afghan police force will take at least 3 years.[10] Iraq does not contain the same density of UN and NGO demining elements as Afghanistan did, so coalition forces will also have to be prepared to do more of those missions. Requirements may be reduced if coalition military forces limit their own use of mines and cluster bombs. The latter can be especially problematic. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 12,000 unexploded bomblets remain on the ground in Afghanistan, and well over 100 civilians have been killed or maimed by them since October 2001.[11]

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This is another category that will require regional experts for vetting and evaluation of personnel. A system resembling the *Fragebogen* questionnaires used in postwar Germany might be relevant for this process.[12] First priority for coalition military forces will be disarming groups and securing weapons.

Electoral Process for More Participatory Government. Many proposals are being discussed about the future form of Iraq's government. American-style democracy is probably not the ideal model for a Middle Eastern state, but some system with increased popular participation should be adopted. This will not be a decision for the coalition military commander to make, but he will be involved in supporting elections, as well as the constitutional convention and referendum to shape and legitimize the new government.

Disaster Preparedness and Response. Coalition military forces must be prepared to provide these services until civil capacity can be restored. As with most other categories, the intensity of the conflict preceding Transition will have a great impact on the timeline leading to Handover.

Public Works. Iraq's infrastructure has deteriorated under sanctions, and coalition military engineers will have to begin repairing key facilities early in the Security phase. This will be necessary to facilitate their use by the coalition as well as by the Iraqis. This mission will be much easier if the coalition limits destruction with careful targeting during combat operations.

Public Utilities. Special concerns for this mission category resemble those for the previous one. Restoring public utilities quickly will have a significant impact on public health and sanitation, and help avoid epidemics.

Telecommunications and Public Communications. Restoring communication links will help tie the country together. First priority should be given to broadcasting systems to facilitate nationwide coalition information operations. Computer networks and Internet sites also are included in the telecommunications systems to be restored and maintained.

Education. Though this is primarily a category for civilian agencies, some engineer and civil affairs effort should be dedicated to helping rejuvenate public schools. Iraqi education has seriously deteriorated under sanctions. Students in schools are off the streets and out of trouble. It also will be important to quickly implement job training programs for the many Iraqi unemployed.

Public Health. This is a category where help from international and non-governmental organizations should be forthcoming fairly quickly, though the limitations mentioned earlier about access and WMD might have significant impact. Iraqi medical personnel and facilities should also be available, though sanctions again have had a deleterious effect. Coalition military support will be especially important early in the Transition to provide and distribute health-related supplies. Many non-governmental organizations have already voiced concerns about the potential health and environmental disaster that war could bring to the whole region, and coalition military forces must contribute to preventing such an outcome.[13]

Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief. This will be another mission category of very high international visibility.[14] The coalition military commander and governing authorities will need to work with UN agencies to exploit the resources and 46,000 distribution centers of the Oil for Food Program. Again there should be some responsive 10 and NGO support for what could be a massive refugee problem. Caring for and controlling displaced populations will require extensive and well-orchestrated civil-military cooperation that should have already started.

Economics and Commerce. First priority in this category for coalition military forces will be to secure, repair, and maintain oil facilities. If Saddam Hussein burns wells as he did in Kuwait, military forces will have to provide assistance to fire-fighting organizations. Managing oil revenues will be very important in rebuilding Iraq and perhaps funding occupation costs, and coalition military forces will have to coordinate with many agencies on this complicated issue. Iraqi technocrats should also be available for assistance, though some vetting will be necessary to insure their reliability.

Labor. This mission category should not be a concern for the coalition military commander.

Property Control. Though this category is also not directly a coalition military force responsibility, the military will be preserving the public records as mentioned under Public Administration. These will provide important documentation to establish ownership systems.

Food, Agriculture, Fisheries. During the Security phase, coalition military forces will have some responsibility to insure the availability and flow of food and agriculture. To avoid famine the coalition commander must be sensitive to the timing of the initial planting and harvest, and might have to provide supporting resources to overcome any post-conflict disruption.

Transportation. During the Security phase especially, coalition military forces will have primary responsibility for the operation of Iraqi transportation systems which will be essential for military as well as civilian organizations. These duties will require many specialized units which must be available from the beginning of any hostilities. These systems have deteriorated under sanctions, but the Iraqi technocrats who have maintained them should be available to help operate them.

As is apparent from the matrix and discussion of mission categories, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and transportation units will be in high demand. Some of these specialties have been stretched thin by requirements for the war on terrorism.[15] At the

same time a strong combat force will be essential, at least during the Security and Stabilize phases. It would be advisable for military leaders, and especially the Army, to perform a detailed analysis of the force requirements for Title X and other missions in a post-conflict Iraq. The Army Staff could conduct this exercise at the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College, which has already developed a concept for a wargame that will examine such issues. It will involve all major service components, and possibly joint players, since the impact of requirements for occupying Iraq will have repercussions on force providers around the world.

While this study has focused specifically on Iraq, these insights will apply to any important post-conflict operation. The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation's major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace as well.

ENDNOTES

1. For more on Operation ECLIPSE in Germany, see Kenneth 0. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *The Journal of Military History,* Vol. LXV, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 713-739.

2. John J. Yeosock, remarks in "What We Should Have Done Differently," Part II of *In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm,* Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000, p. 25.

3. *Ibid.,* p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait,* Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999.

4. This chart is primarily the product of COL Stephen Kidder of the U.S. Army War College.

5. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

6. These observations and those in the next two paragraphs came from NGO and IO participants at two conferences, a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the Means of Intervention Ground Operations Workshop held at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC, on October 17-18, 2002; and an Institute for National Security Studies/Naval Postgraduate School Workshop on "Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam's Rule," held at National Defense University in Washington, DC, on November 20-21, 2002.

7. Moni Basu, "Aid Groups Get Ready for War," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution,* December 23, 2002; James Bone, "UN Chief Issues Secret Orders for War in Iraq," *TimesOnLine,* December 23, 2002, *http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-522510,00.html*; Mukesh Kapila and Karin Wermester, "The Afghan Job is Bigger Than Expected," *International Herald Tribune,* January 14, 2003.

8. For the completion of the Mission Matrix, the authors are indebted to the participants in the Post Conflict Military Missions Workshop held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 10-11, 2002, and particularly to Professor William Kiehl, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

9. For further analysis of the Israeli experience in Lebanon, see W. Andrew Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite

War," *Conflict Quarterly,* Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 22-35.

10. Chris Kraul, "In Afghanistan, Guns Hold Sway Over Law," *Los Angeles Times,* December 27, 2002, p. 1.

11. Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, "Bush Urged to Limit Weapons in Iraq," *Washington Post,* December 27, 2002, p. 12.

12. For more on the use of the *Fragebogen,* see Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946,* Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975.

13. See, for example June Salvage, *Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq,* London: Medact, 2002. Medact is the United Kingdom affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

14. A number of organizations have already raised red flags about the impact of war in Iraq on the whole region due to refugee flows. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, "A New Refugee Crisis in Iraq?" *Strategic Comments,* Vol. VIII, No. 8, November 12, 2002.

15. Military police have been in especially high demand. Harry Levins, "New Guard Call-Ups Renew Question of Troop Strength," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* December 21, 2002.

APPENDIX A
MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

C = Critical Task, E = Essential Task, I = Important Task

Task No.	Task	Security Phase	Stabilize Phase	Build Institutions	Handover Phase
	Category 1 - Major Security Activities				
1A - C	Secure/Destroy WMD	CMF	CMF,DoS,UNMOVIC	DoS,UNMOVIC	Transparent Iraq Govt
1B - C	Stop intra- and inter-factional fighting	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1C - E	Train new Iraqi Army	CMF	CMF	CMF(broadened)	US Army
1D - C	Round Up Regime	CMF	CMF,CIA,DoJ	CMF,CIA,DoJ	
1E - C	Eliminate Pockets of Resistance	CMF	CMF	CMF	
1F - E	Process Detainees/POWs	CMF,DoJ	CMF,IATF	CMF,IATF	Iraqi Institutions
1G - C	Secure Borders	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1H - C	Seize and Secure Oil Facilities	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1I - C	Plan and Conduct Consequence Management	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1J - C	Plan and Conduct Theater Information Operations	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1K - C	Maintain Freedom of Movement	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
1L - E	Regulate Movement	CMF	CMF	CMF,Iraqi Army	Iraqi Army
	Category 2 - Public Administration				
2A - C	Establish and Assist Regional and Local Governments	CMF	CMF, AID,NED,DoS, IO	AID,NED,DoS, UNDP, IO	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2B - I	E&A National Legislative System	CMF	AID,NED,DoS,IO,CMF	Same as above	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2C - I	E&A National Executive Office	CMF,DoS	AID,NED,DoS,IO,CMF	Same as above	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2D - I	E&A Ministries	CMF,DoS	AID,NED,DoS,IO,CMF	Same as above	UNDP, Iraqi Inst.
2E - E	Preserve & Improve Public Records System	CMF,DoJ	CMF,DoJ	Iraqi Institutions	

	Category 3 - Legal				
3A - E	Operate Criminal Court System	CMF,Iraqi courts	AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi	Previous + DoS/F	AL, Iraqi
3B - E	Operate Civil Court System	CMF,Iraqi courts	AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi	Previous + DoS/F	AL, Iraqi
3C - E	Establish and Operate System to Enact & Publicize Laws	CMF	AID,DoJ.AOUSC,AL	Previous + DoS/F	AL, Iraqi
3D - E	Operate Judicial Administrative System	CMF,Iraqi courts	AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi	Previous + DoS/F	AL,UNDP,ICM,Iraqi
3E - E	Support & Conduct War Crimes Tribunals	CMF	CMF,DoJ,DoS/S/WCI	CMF&ICC or Tribunal	Iraqi Institutions
3F - I	Provide Legal Education		AID,USED,AL,NGO	AID,USED,AL,NGO	AL,Iraqi
3G - I	Protect Human Rights	CMF	DoS,AID,CMF,NGO	DoS,AID,ICM,NGO	ICM,NGO
	Category 4 - Public Finance				
4A - E	Stabilize Currency	CMF,Trsy	Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4B - I	Maintain & Operate Govt Finance System (Revenues & Distribution)	CMF, Trsy	Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4C - I	Establish Private Financial Institutions		Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4D - I	Conduct Foreign Currency Exchange	Trsy	Trsy,AID	Trsy,AID,WB,IMF	WB,IMF,Iraqi
4E - E	Pay Govt Civil & Military Employees	CMF	AID,DoS,CMF	AID,DoS,CMF,WB	WB, Iraqi
4F - I	Collect Customs and Duties	CMF	Trsy,AID,CMF	Trsy,AID,CMF, Iraqi	Iraqi
	Category 5 - Civil Information				
5A - E	Restore and Maintain Newspapers and Print Media	CMF	AID,DoS/IIP,CMF	AID,DoS/IIP,CMF	Iraqi
5B - C	R&M Government Radio System	CMF	AID,BBG,CMF,DoS,FCC	Same as previous	Iraqi
5C - C	R&M Government Television System	CMF	Same as above	Same as above	Iraqi
5D - I	Establish Private TV System		AID,FCC	AID,FCC	Iraqi
5E - I	Establish Private Radio System		AID,FCC	AID,FCC	Iraqi
5F - I	Develop Censorship and Libel Laws		AID,DoJ,CMF,DoS,AL	AID,DoJ,CMF, DoS, AL	AL,Iraqi
5G - I	Restore & Maintain Cable Systems		AID,CMF,DoS	AID,CMF,DoS	Iraqi
5H - C	Coordinate USG-Iraq Govt Info	CMF,DoS/R	DoS/R,CMF	DoS/R,CMF	DoS/R
	Category 6 - Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services				
6A - I	Maintain Art & Cultural Institutions	Iraqi	DoS/ECA,AID,Iraqi	Previous +UNESCO	UNESCO,Iraqi
6B - I	Protect Historical Artifacts	CMF,Iraqi	DoS/ECA,DoJ,AID,Iraqi	Previous + UNESCO	UNESCO,Iraqi
6C - I	Maintain Sports and Recreational Systems	Iraqi	AID,DoS/ECA,Iraqi	Previous + UNESCO	UNESCO,Iraqi
6D - C	Protect Religious Sites & Access	CMF,Iraqi	CMF,Iraqi	Iraqi Forces	
	Category 7 - Public Safety				
7A - C	Establish & Maintain Police Systems and Operations	CMF	DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP	DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, UNP	AP,Iraqi
7B - I	Train Police		DoJ,DoS/INL,AP	DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, UNP	AP,Iraqi
7C - E	Maintain Penal Systems	CMF	AID,DoJ,CMF,AL	AID,DoJ,AL	AL,Iraqi
7D - I	Provide & Support Fire Fighting Systems	CMF	AID,FEMA,CMF	AID,FEMA	Iraqi
7E - E	Conduct Explosive Ord Disposal & Demining	CMF	CMF,AID,DoS/PM,NGO	AID,DoS/PM, UNMAS,NGO	UNMAS,Iraqi,NGO
7F - I	Protect Foreign Residents	CMF	CMF,DoS	CMF,DoS,Iraqi Forces	Iraqi
	Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration				
8A - E	Demobilize & Reorganize Army/Scty Forces/militias	CMF,DoS	CMF,DoS	CMF,DoS	
8B - I	Transfer & Reorient to reintegrate into civil sector		AID,CMF	AID,CMF	
8C - I	Reintegrate Demobilized Persons into Civil Sector		AID,DoS	AID,DoS	

8D - I	Restructure & Reorganize New Civil Security Forces	CMF	DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP	Same as previous	AP
8E - E	Dismantle Baath Party		NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL, CIA	Same as previous	
8F - C	Disarm and Secure Weapons	CMF	CMF		
	Category 9 - Electoral Process for More Participatory Government				
9A - I	Plan Local Elections	CMF	NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL	Previous+NGO	NGO
9B - I	Plan National Elections		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9C - I	Prepare Local Elections	CMF	Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9D - I	Prepare National Elections		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9E - I	Assist Conduct of Local Elections	CMF	Same as above+CMF	Previous +NGO	NGO
9F - I	Assist Conduct of Natl Elections		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9G - I	Provide Post Local Election Support		NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL	Previous +NGO	NGO
9H - I	Provide Post Natl Election Support		Same as above	Previous +NGO	NGO
9I - I	Plan for Constitutional Convention		Same as above	Previous	
9J - I	Assist Conduct of Const Convention		Same as above +CMF	Previous	
9K - I	Assist Conduct of Constitutional Referendum			Same as above	
	Category 10 - Disaster Preparedness and Response				
10A - I	Provide Emergency Warning Systems	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
10B - I	Provide Emergency Evacuation and Treatment	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
10C - I	Provide Post Disaster Recovery	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
10D - I	Conduct Pre-Disaster Planning	CMF	AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA	Same as previous	Iraqi
	Category 11 - Public Works				
11A - C	Repair Roads and Streets	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi

11B - C	Repair Bridges	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11C - C	Repair Port Facilities	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11D - C	Repair Airports	CMF	AID,FAA,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,IATA, UNDP	IATA,UNDP,Iraq
11E - C	Repair Railroads	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11F - I	Repair Dams	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
11G - I	Repair Canal System	CMF	AID,CMF,DoS/F	Previous,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
	Category 12 - Public Utilities				
12A - C	Restore & Maintain Power Systems	CMF	AID,DOE	AID,DOE,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
12B - C	Restore & Maintain Water Systems	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,UNDP, WHO	UNDP,WHO,Iraqi
12C - I	Restore & Maintain Gas Systems	CMF	AID,DOE	AID,DOE,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
12D - C	R&M Sewage Systems	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,UNDP, WHO	UNDP,WHO,Iraqi
12E - E	R&M Garbage Collection	CMF	AID	AID,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
	Category 13 - Telecommunications and Public Communications				
13A - E	Restore & Maintain Telecommunica-tions System	CMF	AID,FCC	AID,FCC,IPU	IPU,Iraqi
13B - C	R&M Broadcasting Systems	CMF	AID,FCC	AID,FCC,IPU	IPU,Iraqi
13C - I	R&M Postal System	CMF	AID,USPS	AID,USPS,IPU	IPU,Iraqi
	Category 14 - Education				
14A - E	Operate Public School System	CMF	AID,USED	AID,USED,UN,WB	UN,WB,Iraqi
14B - I	Operate Private School System		AID,USED	AID,USED,UN,WB	UN,WB,Iraqi
14C - I	Provide Adult Education Services		AID,USED	AID,USED,UN	UN,Iraqi
14D - I	Provide Job Training Programs	AID	AID,UNDP,NGO	AID,UNDP,NGO	UNDP,NGO
14E - I	Provide University Education		DoS/ECA,USED,AID	Previous+ UNESCO	UNESCO,Iraqi
	Category 15 - Public Health				
15A - E	Provide Emergency Medical Service	CMF,IT	AID/OFDA,FEMA,IT	Prev.+UN,ICRC, NGO	UN,ICRC,NGO,Iraqi
15B - E	Operate Hospitals	CMF,IT	AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,IT	Same as previous	WHO,NGO,Iraqi
15C - E	Provide Doctors and Health Professionals	CMF,IT	AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,IT	Same as previous	WHO,NGO,Iraqi
15D - E	Provide and Distribute Pharmaceutical Supplies	CMF	AID,HHS,WHO,NGO, CMF	Same as previous	WHO,NGO,Iraqi
15E - E	Provide and Distribute Non-Pharmaceutical Medical Supplies	CMF	Same as above	Same as previous	WHO,NGO,Iraqi
15F - E	Dispose of Medical Waste	CMF	AID,HHS,WHOA	ID,HHS,WHO	WHO,Iraqi
15G - E	Provide Vector Control Systems	CMF	AID,HHS/CDC,WHO	AID,HHS/CDC, WHO	WHO,Iraqi
15H - E	Provide Garbage Disposal System	CMF	AID	AID,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
15I - E	Insure Proper Sanitation	CMF	AID,HHS,WHO	AID,HHS,WHO, UNDP	WHO,UNDP,Iraqi
15J - I	Perform Preventive Medicine	CMF	AID,HHS,WHO,NGO	Previous+UNDP	WHO,UNDP,Iraqi
15K - I	Provide Mortuary Services	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
	Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief				
16A - I	Provide Assistance to Poor	CMF	AID,USDA,WFP,NGO	Previous+UNDP	UNDP,WFP,NGO, Iraqi
16B - I	Provide Emergency Relief	CMF	AID/OFDA,DoD	AID/OFDA,DoD, ICRC	ICRC,Iraqi
16C - I	Operate Orphanages	CMF	AID,HHS	Prev.+UNICEF, NGO	UNICEF,NGO,Iraqi
16D - I	Provide Care for Aged	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,WHO, NGO	WHO,NGO,Iraqi
16E - I	Provide Psychological Assistance	CMF	AID,HHS	AID,HHS,WHO, NGO	WHO,NGO,Iraqi
16F - C	Care for and Relocate Refugees	CMF	DoS/PRM,CMF,AID,UN NGO	Previous, incl. OCHA	OCHA,NGO,Iraqi

16G - C	Care for & Relocate DisplacedPersons	CMF,DoS/PRM	AID,CMF,DoS/PRM,UN, NGO	Previous, incl. OCHA	OCHA,NGO,Iraqi
16H - C	Administer Oil for Food Program	CMF,UN	UN	UN	
16I - C	Manage & Distribute Relief Supplies	CMF	AID,CMF,UN,NGO	AID,CMF,UN, NGO	UN,NGO,Iraqi
	Category 17 - Economics and Commerce				
17A - I	Revitalize Commercial Sector		AID,DoC,Trsy,IT	AID,DoC,Trsy, WB,IT	WB,Iraqi
17B - I	Revitalize Industrial Sector		AID,DoC,Trsy,IT	AID,DoC,Trsy,WB, IT	WB,Iraqi
17C - E	Repair & Maintain Oil Facilities	CMF, IT	AID, DoE, IT	AID, UNDP, IT	UNDP, Iraqi
17D - E	Manage Oil Revenues	CMF,UN	AID,DoS,Trsy,DoE,UN	Previous +WB, Iraqi	UN,WB,Iraqi
17E - I	Implement Wage and Price Controls		AID,Trsy	AID,Trsy,WB	WB,Iraqi
17F - I	Maintain Foreign Trade System		AID,DoS,Trsy	Previous+WB,IMF	WB, IMF, Iraqi
17G - I	Set Customs and Duties		DoS,Trsy,DoC	Iraqi	
17H - C	Implement Oil Fire Contingencies	AID,CMF	AID		
	Category 18 - Labor				
18A - I	Establish and Provide Employment Services & Benefits		AID,DoL	AID,DoL,ILO	ILO,Iraqi
18B - I	Establish and Maintain System to Resolve Managmnt-Labor Disputes		AID,DoL,DoS/DRL	AID,DoL,DoS/ DRL,ILO	ILO,Iraqi
18C - I	Establish and Monitor Worker Safety Programs		AID,DoL,OSHA	AID,DoL,OSHA,ILO	ILO,Iraq
	Category 19 - Property Control				
19A - I	Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Real Property		AID,DoC,DoJ	AID,DoC,DoJ	Iraqi

19B -I	Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Personal Property		AID,DoC,DoJ	AID,DoC,DoJ	Iraqi
	Category 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries				
20A - I	Maintain Production System	CMF,IT	AID,USDA,IT	AID,USDA, UNFAO,IT	UNFAO,Iraqi
20B - I	Maintain Processing System	CMF,IT	AID,USDA,IT	AID,USDA, UNFAO,IT	UNFAO,Iraqi
20C - I	Maintain Distribution System	CMF,IT	AID,USDA,IT	AID,USDA, UNFAO,IT	UNFAO,Iraqi
20D - I	Maintain Retail Sales System		AID,USDA,DoC	AID,USDA,DoC	Iraqi
20E - I	Establish and Execute Inspection System	CMF	AID,USDA/APHIS	AID,USDA/APHIS	Iraqi
20F - I	Maintain Irrigation System	CMF,IT	AID,USDA,IT	AID,USDA, UNFAO,IT	UNFAO,Iraqi
20G - E	Support Harvest	CMF	AID,CMF,USDA		
	Category 21 - Transportation				
21A - C	Operate Ports	CMF,IT	AID,CMF,DoT,IT,Dos/F	Previous +UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
21B - C	Operate Rail System	CMF,IT	AID,CMF,DoT,IT,DoS/F	Previous +UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
21C - C	Maintain Intercity Road Network	CMF	AID,CMF,DoT,DoS/F	Previous +UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
21D - E	Maintain Municipal Roads	CMF	AID,CMF	AID,CMF,UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
21E - C	Operate Air System (incl. Airspace Management)	CMF	AID,FAA,CMF,DoS/F	Previous +UNDP	UNDP,IATA,Iraqi
21F - C	Operate Pipelines	CMF,IT	AID,DoE,IT,DoS/F	Previous +UNDP	UNDP,Iraqi
	Task Breakdown:				
	35 Critical Tasks				
	32 Essential Tasks				
	68 Important Tasks				

DEFINITION OF TASK CATEGORIES:

Critical – If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure.

Essential – These tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.

Important – These tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of non-military agencies.

ABBREVIATIONS

AID –	U.S. Agency for International Development AID/OFDA- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance AID/OTI- Office of Transition Initiatives
AL –	Arab League
AP –	Arab Police Academy
AOUSC –	Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
BBG –	Broadcasting Board of Governors
CIA –	Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizations
CMF –	Coalition Military Forces
DoC –	U.S. Department of Commerce
DoD –	U.S. Department of Defense
DoJ –	U.S. Department of Justice
DoL –	U.S. Department of Labor OSHA - Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Dept. of Labor
DoS –	U.S. Department of State DoS/PRM - Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Affairs DoS/ECA - Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs DoS/IIP - Office of International Information Programs DoS/INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs DoS/DHL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor DoS/F – Future of Iraq Project DoS/G - Office of the U/S for Global Affairs DoS/R- Office of the U/S for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs DoS/CA- Bureau of Consular Affairs DoS/DRL- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor DoS/PM – Bureau of Political-Military Affairs DoS/S/WCI – Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
DoE –	U.S. Department of Energy
FEMA –	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HHS –	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services HHS/CDC – Centers for Disease Control
ILO –	International Labor Organization
IATA –	International Air Transport Association
IATF –	Interagency Task Force
IPU –	International Postal Union
ICC –	International Criminal Court
ICM –	United Nations International Civilian Monitors
ICRC –	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMF –	International Monetary Fund
IO –	International Organizations
IT –	Iraqi Technocrats (Indigenous and Expatriate)
NED –	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO –	Non-governmental Organizations
OCHA –	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Trsy –	U.S. Department of the Treasury
USDA –	U.S. Department of Agriculture USDA/APHIS – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
UN –	United Nations Organizations
UNDP –	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF –	United Nations Children's Fund
UNFAO –	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
UNMAS –	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMOVIC –	United Nations Moratorium Verification and Inspection Commission
UNP –	United Nations Police
USED –	U.S. Department of Education
USG –	U.S. Government
UNESCO –	U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
WFP –	World Food Program
WHO –	World Health Organization
WB-	World Bank

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Rick Hampson, "At West Point, a Quiet Place to Honor Warriors," *USA Today*, 28 December 2011; Spec. Justin Nieto, "The Outlook: Young Lieutenant Gets His Star," *508th Parachute Infantry Regiment*, http://www.508pir.org/taps/graves/b/bernstein_dr_01.htm.
2. Rich Bernstein, "David Bernstein: West Point, 2001," *West-Point.Org: The West Point Connection*, 14 June 2004 at http://defender.west-point.org/service/display.mhtml?u=57619&i=4329; Hampson, "At West Point, a Quiet Place to Honor Warriors."
3. Fred Kaplan, *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 155–56.

CHAPTER 1. NEW BEGINNINGS

1. Steve recently left the War College for the American Foreign Policy Council. Now that the "Evil Empire" appears to be reviving I am sure his expertise is even more sought after.
2. For examples of Air Force positions, see Richard P. Hallion, *Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); IRIS Independent Research, *Airpower and the Iraqi Offensive at Khafji* (Arlington, Va., 1997), CD-ROM; Robert C. Owen, ed., *Operation Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning* (Maxwell Air Force Base [hereafter AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1999); Rebecca Grant, *The Kosovo Campaign: Aerospace Power Made It Work* (Arlington, Va.: Air Force Association, 1999).
3. See Conrad C. Crane [hereafter CCC], "The Lure of Strike," *Parameters* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 7–17.
4. *Stochastic Analysis of Resources for Deployments and Excursions: A Historical Perspective* (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Center for Army Analysis, December 2000).
5. See CCC, *Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies during the 1990s* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001).
6. Eliot A. Cohen, "Defending America in the Twenty-First Century," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (November–December 2000): 46.
7. See CCC, ed., *Transforming Defense in an Age of Peace and Prosperity* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2001).

8. Dr. Stephen Biddle, "War Aims and War Termination," in *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses*, ed. Col. John R. Martin (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2002), 7.
9. CCC, "Beware of Unintended Consequences," in Martin, *Defeating Terrorism*, 13.
10. Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002).
11. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 19–37.
12. Steve's delivery was extremely polished. He even seemed to have choreographed his hand movements: on numerous occasions I saw him take an impromptu question, drop his hands to answer it, and then resume his gesture right where he had left off.
13. See CCC, *Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance while Pursuing a Global War against Terrorism* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002.)
14. See CCC, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002).
15. See CCC, *The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle* (Carlisle, Pa.: Center for Strategic Leadership, September 2003), 1.
16. Initial report was Col. Eugene L. Thompson and Dr. Conrad C. Crane, *The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle*, Issues Paper 10-02 (Carlisle, Pa.: Center for Strategic Leadership, October 2002).

CHAPTER 2. OFF TO SEE THE WIZARD

1. Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 64–65.
2. For more on the State and NDU efforts, see Gordon W. Rudd, *Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the ORHA Story* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 68–77, 84–87.
3. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2003).
4. John W. Dower, "Lessons from Japan about War's Aftermath," *New York Times*, 27 October 2002.
5. For the best coverage of this occupation, see Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005.)
6. Dr. Donald B. Wright and Col. Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 72–80; conversations with Col. John Agoglia.
7. Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 434–70. Also see Charles H. Ferguson, *No End in Sight: Iraq's Descent into Chaos* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).
8. Stephen Biddle, "Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 (February 2007): 3–46, quotes from 6, 40–41.
9. W. Andrew Terrill and Conrad C. Crane, *Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).
10. John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).
11. Kimberly Zisk Marten, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 13–17.

CHAPTER 3. REARRANGING THE BIBLE

1. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” *Atlantic Monthly* (January 2004), which was converted into a book in 2006; Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006).
2. Gen. Richard B. Myers, *Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Front Lines of National Security* (New York: Threshold, 2009), 233–34; Barry Lando, “Unknown Unknowns: Shinseki, the Myth,” *Huffpost Politics*, updated 1 August 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/barry-lando/unknown-unknowns-shinseki_b_5428779.html.
3. Michael O’Hanlon, “Iraq without a Plan,” *Policy Review*, 1 December 2004, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/7655; H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
4. CCC, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won,” *Military Review* (May–June 2005): 27–36. For transcript of 27 May 2007 radio broadcast, see “333: The Center for Lessons Learned —Transcript,” *This American Life*, n.d., http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/333/transcript.
5. For the best coverage of the development of that directive, see Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 117–25.
6. CCC, *Avoiding Vietnam*.
7. U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Field Manual–Interim 3-07.22 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [USGPO], 1 October 2004).
8. Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 144–45.
9. Lieutenant General Petraeus, e-mail, 17 November 2005.
10. Ibid.
11. John Nagl, e-mail, 18 November 2005.
12. Jan Horvath, e-mail, 18 November 2005.
13. Initial contact, by e-mail and telephone, with Tim McNaugher was made on 23 November 2005.
14. Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” *Military Review* (January–February 2006): 2–12.
15. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).
16. Tom McNaugher, “Core Principles of Counterinsurgency,” memorandum, 4 December 2005, sent to me by e-mail on that day.
17. John Nagl, e-mail, 12 December 2005.
18. E-mail exchange with Jan Horvath, 5–6 December 2005.
19. E-mail exchange with Lieutenant General Petraeus, 12 December 2005.
20. Nagl received initial FPRI proposal via e-mail on 8 December 2005.
21. Petraeus, e-mail exchange, 12 December 2005.
22. David Pere, e-mail, 12 December 2005.
23. E-mail exchange with Jan Horvath, 12 December 2005.
24. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Praeger, 1964).
25. Eliot Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (March–April 2006): 2–6.
26. Maj. Gen. Peter Chiarelli and Maj. Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations, “*Military Review* (July–August 2005): 4–17.

27. Lance McDaniel and Frank Hoffman, e-mails, 21 December 2005.
28. Doug King, e-mail, 22 December 2005.
29. E-mail exchanges with Lieutenant General Petraeus, Jan Horvath, Doug King, John Nagl, and Dave Pere, 22 December 2005.
30. Gen. William Wallace, e-mail to Lieutenant General Petraeus, 27 December 2005.
31. CCC, e-mail to Lieutenant General Petraeus, 27 December 2005.
32. E-mail exchange between Lieutenant General Petraeus and General Wallace, 27 December 2005.

CHAPTER 4. INSIDE THE BIG TENT

1. Steve Metz and Max Manwaring, e-mails, 3 January 2006.
2. Nigel R. F. Aylwin-Foster, "Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* (November–December 2005): 2–15.
3. Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May–June 2005): 8–12. I initially approached him by e-mail on 28 December 2005; he replied on 3 January 2006.
4. Tom Ricks, e-mail, 5 January 2006. I sent him my initial draft of chapter 1 to give him a sense of where we were going.
5. Dennis Clark, e-mail, 23 January 2006.
6. Lieutenant General Petraeus, e-mail to Jan Horvath, 13 January 2006.
7. Score of e-mails between John Nagl, Jan Horvath, and myself, January 2006.
8. Phillip B. Davidson Jr., *Secrets of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1990).
9. Tom Westen started that initiative to invite Naveh on 13 January 2006, but it never got all the approvals needed.
10. Gregory A. Daddis, *No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
11. Lou DiMarco, "Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and *Guerre Revolutionnaire* in the Algerian War," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 63–76.
12. There were actually two versions of the January draft. I got a chance to review the first version, cutting a detainee appendix and removing some tedious and unnecessary details from the legal appendix, as well as making some quick editorial revisions. The conference attendees got my somewhat more polished version.
13. Steve Metz, Blackberry e-mail, 23 February 2006.
14. Kaplan, *Insurgents*. chap. 11. The International Workingman's Association, or First International, a coalition of European radical political groups and trade unions, was established in September 1864 at a meeting in St. Martin's Hall in London. Stein's home in Paris was the preferred gathering place for the leading modernist thinkers in art and literature in the first decade of the twentieth century.
15. Eliot Cohen, e-mail, 22 January 2006.
16. John Nagl, reply to Cohen's 22 January e-mail, 23 January 2006.
17. Video recordings of all presentations were made to ensure the writing team could capture the richness of discussions. Fred Kaplan had a chance to watch these videos while writing his book *The Insurgents;* I assume that he got permission for the quotes he used from the innumerable interviews he conducted with participants. For my part, I also have a typed transcript of the proceedings. I have tried to summarize discussions without violating the nonattribution rules. The summary of events that follows is based on my notes, with a few insertions arising from General Petraeus' review.
18. Again, Daddis, *No Sure Victory*, has much to say about the inadequacy of assessment from such advisors.

CHAPTER 5. FROM THEORY TO DOCTRINE

1. Kaplan, *Insurgents*, 165. Kaplan credits that quote to Tom Marks, who was a key contributor to the FM-I and the February conference but was not involved in the further revision of the manual.
2. The text of the whole e-mail can be found in Pete's superb memoir of that tour, Peter R. Mansoor, *Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008).
3. David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May–June 2006): 103–108.
4. James Corum and Wray Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).
5. The show aired on 31 March 2006.
6. For quick reference: the Bolsheviks in 1917 used a conspiratorial strategy that allowed their small group to take over a larger movement, Che Guevara used a focoist military strategy that downplayed political activism in favor of inciting support with military action, Carlos Marighella pioneered a coherent strategy of urban terrorism in Latin America, and Mao developed a detailed concept of protracted war where an insurgent could use time and attrition to wear down a stronger opponent.
7. Peter Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2013), 38.
8. John Nagl, e-mail to Lieutenant General Petraeus, 21 July 2006.
9. Adjudication matrix in Barry Periatt, e-mail, 21 August 2006.
10. CCC, e-mail to Lieutenant General Petraeus, 22 August 2006.
11. Our letter to the editor, entitled "Counterinsurgency: A Plan of Action," appeared in the *New York Times* on 14 August.
12. Ralph Peters, "Politically Correct War," *New York Post*, 18 October 2006.
13. Ralph Peters, "Getting Counterinsurgency Right," *New York Post*, 20 December 2006.
14. Mansoor, *Surge*, 39; John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 16 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).
15. Pete Mansoor takes credit for first suggesting adding the force ratio paragraph, and notes that eventually they achieved a 50 per thousand ratio in Iraq, with 30 million people being protected by 600,000 counterinsurgents (160,000 coalition troops, 340,000 Iraqi security forces, and 100,000 Sons of Iraq).
16. We received the Air Force's "90 percent" solution for the appendix on 16 August. Barry Periatt, e-mail, 18 August 2006.
17. Most prolific with such commentary has been Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap. He has described the writers of FM 3–24 as an "odd fraternity" who produced a strategy for "warfare for northeastern graduate students." Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "Airpower," in *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, ed. Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (New York: Routledge, 2010), 101–102.
18. Major General Dunlap has gone so far as to accuse the Army of succumbing to "the lure of Neo-Ludditism." Dunlap, "Commentaries and Replies," *Parameters* 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2013): 123.
19. CCC, e-mail to Lieutenant General Petraeus, 1 December 2006.

CHAPTER 6. BEHIND THE CURTAIN

1. "Revolutionary warfare," a term popular in the 1960s, comprised both insurgency and COIN. I have always liked the term, but it fell out of favor as a backlash against French abuses in Algeria under its banner and against the anticommunist ideology that became attached to it.
2. Current joint doctrine defines insurgency as "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region." Joint Staff, *Counterinsurgency*, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, D.C., 22 November 2013), I-1.
3. Daniel Bolger, *Why We Lost* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).
4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, and Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24 / MWCP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C., December 2006) [hereafter FM 3-24], para. 1-120.
5. Robert J. Gonzalez, "Towards Mercenary Anthropology?," *Anthropology Today* 23 (June 2007): 14–19; George R. Lucas Jr., *Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology* (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2009). Actually, the anthropology community has a long history of disputes with the military over the latter's perceived misuse of the discipline for violent purposes.
6. Montgomery McFate and Janice Laurence, eds., *Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan* (London: C. Hurst, 2015).
7. Quoted in Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 67.
8. FM 3-24, fig. 5-1.
9. Andrew Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1946–1972* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 2006).
10. John, a political scientist by training, is much less of a pack rat than I am and consequently has never been able to show me the source of that quote.
11. See Lewis Sorley, ed., *Vietnam Chronicles: The Abrams Tapes, 1968–1972* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 604–605, 627, 645, 766.
12. Gian Gentile, "A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects," *World Affairs* (Summer 2008), http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/slightly-better-war-narrative-and-its-defects.

CHAPTER 7. MALPRACTICE OR MESSIAH?

1. Typical of Steve Biddle's critiques is "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (March/April 2006): 2–14.
2. FM 3-24, para. 1-5.
3. Jeffrey Record, *The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Insurgency*, Policy Analysis 577 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1 September 2006).
4. Samantha Power, "Our War on Terror," *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, 29 July 2007.
5. Dan Ephron, "Conrad Crane," *Newsweek*, 25 December, 2006 / 1 January 2007, 63.
6. Steve Capps, e-mail, 24 August 2007, with attached permission forms. No one approached asked for any fees; most considered short quotes "fair use" requiring no special permission.
7. Edward Luttwak, "Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice," *Harper's Magazine* (February 2007): 33–42.
8. Neil A. Smith, "Understanding Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers," *Joint Force Quarterly* 59 (September 2010): 40–44.
9. Workshop on Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations: U.S., French, British, and German Approaches, Institut Français des Relations Internationals, Paris, 4 June 2007.

10. The article can be downloaded at http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2007/01/lessons-not-learned/23397/.
11. Andrew Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine," *Atlantic Monthly* (October 2008), http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine.
12. For examples of Gian Gentile's critiques, see "The Dogmas of War," *Armed Forces Journal International* (November 2007), http://www.afji.com/2007/11/3155836, and "A (Slightly) Better War."
13. Gian Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army," *Parameters* (Autumn 2009): 5–17. As a member of the journal's editorial board, I pushed Gian to submit something and then supported its publication. His piece raises many good questions but is also a good illustration of his misrepresentations of the doctrine.
14. For a succinct discussion of this phenomenon, see Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, Va.: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007).
15. George W. Casey Jr., *Strategic Reflections: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2004–February 2007* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012), 142–46. Information from Dr. Charles Allen, preparing an oral history of General Casey for the Senior Officer Oral History Program of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
16. Sarah Sewall, "Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition: A Radical Field Manual," *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), xxi–xliii.
17. Gen. Ronald E. Keys, Commander, Air Combat Command, dinner presentation at Air Force Symposium 2007: Counterinsurgency, 24 April 2007, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
18. Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Irregular Warfare*, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–3 (Washington, D.C., 2007).
19. For an example of Major General Dunlap's writing, see "Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today," *Parameters* 38 (Summer 2008): 52–66. I helped get this piece published, again to further the debate.
20. Dr. Craig Charney, "Afghanistan: Public Opinion Trends and Strategic Implications," presentation at USAID-sponsored conference "Poverty Reduction in Conflict and Failed States: Institutions and State Legitimacy," Washington, D.C., 2 April 2008; Marc Garlasco, *Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008).
21. David Hazel, letter on British counterinsurgency doctrine, summer 2008. The new doctrine was published in October 2009 as *Countering Insurgency*, British Army Field Manual vol. 1, part 10.
22. Andrew T. Horne, U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute, e-mails, 4 May and 1 June 2007, with attached training schedule for 4–8 June 2007. My presentation was on June 7.
23. Tom Cooney, "COIN Quick Look Conference Paper, 5 October 06," Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA), Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.
24. Janine Davidson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy, Stability Operations, e-mail, 24 August 2007.
25. Cullen Nutt, "Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative Workshop Report: Drafting of the Interagency COIN Guide, 9 July 2008," supplied via e-mail by Tom Cooney.
26. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*.
27. *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (Washington, D.C., January 2009), 3, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.

CHAPTER 8. OBSERVING THE PAYOFF IN IRAQ

1. The best coverage of the surges and their impact is Mansoor, *Surge*.
2. Tom Ricks points out, however, that the CIA had begun some payments to the Sunnis before then.
3. Petraeus ended up volunteering to be McMaster's senior rater for efficiency-report purposes, even though McMaster was assigned to a think tank in London. More important, Petraeus served as the president of the brigadier general promotion board in November 2007 that picked McMaster.
4. Ambassador Phyllis Powers, interview, Baghdad, Iraq, October 2007, with follow-up e-mail on 13 July 2015.
5. Ibid.
6. Ambassador Charles Ries, interview, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2007.
7. For a depressing recounting of the many problems with development projects in Iraq, see Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2009).
8. Ries, interview.
9. Staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, briefing, MNF-I, Baghdad, Iraq, October 2007.
10. Maj. Gen. Mike Barbero, interview, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2007.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Maj. Gen. John Paxton, interview, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2007.
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23. Maj. Gen. Hussein Al-Awadi, interview, National Police Headquarters, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2007.
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1. Mansoor, *Surge*, 104–105.
2. Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, interviews, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2007.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Mansoor, *Surge*, 76.
6. Information in this paragraph and the following section comes from Maj. Gen. Joe Fil, briefing and interview, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2007.

7. As was noted in the previous chapter, units rated at ORA 1 were capable of independent operations. Those at ORA 4 were just beginning training, while units at the next two levels were capable of some missions with proper support.
8. Mansoor, *Surge*, 138.
9. Visit to 4th BCT, 1st Infantry Division, Rashid, Iraq, November 2007.
10. Ibid.
11. Visit to 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Kharq, Iraq, November 2007.
12. Odierno, interviews.
13. Briefing from staff of Joint Special Operations Task Force, Balad, Iraq, November 2007.
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15. Joshua Parflow, "List of Willing U.S. Allies Shrinks Steadily in Iraq," *Washington Post*, 8 December 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/07/AR2007120702585.html.
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18. Sheikh Sabah and Capt. John Henry Moltz, discussions, Jurf as Sakhr, Iraq, November 2007.
19. Capt. John Henry Moltz, e-mail to Maj. Gen. David Huntoon, 8 November 2007.
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21. Ibid. Balcavage was not as successful with all his security endeavors. One of his greatest frustrations was not being able to find a Chrysler PT Cruiser from which a sniper took a shot at him early in his tour. He figured it should have been easy to find a car like that in Iraq, but he never did.
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29. For a thorough description of the forces that sparked and fed the Awakening, see Mansoor, *Surge*, 124–131.

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3. Information in this paragraph and following section comes from a visit to Diyala Province, Iraq in November 2007; interviews with Col. David Sutherland and the staff of the 3rd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division; and a meeting with key Iraqi officials in Baqubah.

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6. Briefing from staff at Camp Cropper, Baghdad, Iraq, an element of Task Force (TF) 134, November 2007.
7. Information in this paragraph and following section is from a visit to the detention facility at Bucca, Iraq, along with briefings from and interviews of Maj. Gen. Douglas Stone and the staff of TF 134.
8. Col. Lance Betros, head of the USMA History Department, e-mail, 14 November 2007.

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2. Col. John Agoglia, USA (Ret.), telephone conversation, 30 January 2014; Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die* (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), 11.
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8. Chandrasekeran discusses the report extensively in *Little America*, pp. 343–44; also, it was covered extensively in the press. Since the report was produced shortly before General Petraeus took over the CIA, many speculated that he would have difficulty working with analysts having opinions different from his own. He did not. See, for instance, David Ignatius, "Can Petraeus Handle the CIA's Skepticism on Afghanistan?," *Washington Post*, 1 September 2011.
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11. Marc Garlasco, *"Troops in Contact": Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), 31.
12. Presentation, Special Operations Command Knowledge and Futures Center Day, 14 April 2009, Tampa, Fla. The center was being run by another USMA classmate of mine, Maj. Gen. Steve Hashem, who invited me.
13. "The American Way of Irregular War" book conference, 7 September 2012, Annapolis, Md.
14. The visit occurred on 23 March 2007.
15. I was giving a presentation, "The Development and Application of New American Counterinsurgency Doctrine," for the Research Program in International Security Seminar Series

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34. The Insurgency Board was conducted from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. on 20 June 2012. The dinner at CIA headquarters occurred that evening.
35. Observations from FM 3–24 Revision Conference, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 8 and 9 May 2012.
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